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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF COMPETITION
ANTITRUST DIVISION
hart-scott-rodino annual report
Fiscal Year 2012
Section 7A of the Clayton Act
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(Thirty-Fifth Annual Report)
Edith Ramirez
William J. Baer
Chairwoman
Federal Trade Commission
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
INTRODUCTION
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act or the Act),
together with Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 15 of the Clayton
Act, enables the Federal Trade Commission (Commission) and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (Antitrust Division or Division) to obtain effective preliminary relief
against anticompetitive mergers and to prevent interim harm to competition and consumers. The
premerger notification program was instrumental in alerting the Commission and the Division to
transactions that became the subjects of the numerous enforcement actions brought in fiscal year
20121 to protect consumers – individual, business, and government – against anticompetitive
mergers.
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continue their efforts to protect competition
by identifying and investigating those mergers and acquisitions that raise potentially significant
competitive concerns. In fiscal year 2012, 1,429 transactions were reported under the HSR Act,
representing about a 1.4% decrease from the 1,450 transactions reported in fiscal year 2011.
(See Figure 1 below.)
1
The fiscal year covers the period of October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012.
1
During fiscal year 2012, the Commission brought 25 merger enforcement actions,2
including three in which the Commission initiated administrative litigation; 15 in which it
accepted consent orders for public comment, 14 of which resulted in final orders (with one still
pending), and seven in which the transactions were abandoned or restructured as a result of
antitrust concerns raised during the investigation. These enforcement actions preserved
competition in numerous sectors of the economy, including pharmaceuticals, hospital and other
health care providers, industrial and high tech goods, energy, and retailing. In two of the cases in
which the Commission issued administrative complaints, the Commission sought preliminary
injunctions in federal district court to enjoin the acquisitions pending resolution of the
Commission’s administrative litigation.
One of the Commission’s notable challenges was against OSF Healthcare System’s
proposed acquisition of rival hospital services provider, Rockford Health in Rockford, Illinois.
On April 5, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division,
granted a preliminary injunction to halt the transaction, pending the FTC’s administrative
proceeding and any subsequent appeals. The Commission also challenged Graco, Inc.’s
acquisition of its largest and most significant competitor in the market for equipment used to
apply paints and other liquid finishes to a variety of manufactured goods. While the
Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction was pending in federal district court, the
Commission agreed to resolve the litigation with a consent order. Other enforcement matters
resulted in the issuance of consent orders designed to preserve competition in the pharmaceutical
sector, including challenges to acquisitions by Valeant Pharmaceuticals International and the
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries/Cephalon merger. In the energy industry, the Commission
challenged Kinder Morgan’s acquisition of natural gas pipelines, gas processing plants, and
associated storage capacity in the Rocky Mountain region. In the high technology sector, the
Commission required Western Digital Corporation to divest assets before consummating its
acquisition of Hitachi Global Storage, its worldwide rival in desktop hard disk drives. These
merger challenges and others are summarized in the Merger Enforcement Activity section found
later in this report. In fiscal year 2012, the Commission also pursued appeals on litigation begun
in previous fiscal years, including cases against Polypore International/Daramic LLC, ProMedica
Health System/St. Luke’s Hospital, and Phoebe Putney Health System/Palmyra Park Hospital.
The case against the Phoebe Putney Health System acquisition is particularly notable in that on
February 19, 2013 in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the state action doctrine
did not immunize Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.’s acquisition of its sole rival in Albany,
Georgia, Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc., from the federal antitrust laws. The FTC alleged that the
deal would create a monopoly and allow the combined Phoebe/Palmyra to raise prices for
general acute-care hospital services charged to commercial health plans, harming patients and
local employers and employees. The Supreme Court’s decision reverses a decision of the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals and remands the case for further proceedings.
During fiscal year 2012, the Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger transactions that it
concluded might have substantially lessened competition if allowed to proceed as proposed. In
eight of these challenges, the Antitrust Division filed a complaint in U.S. district court. In all
2
To avoid double counting, this report includes only those merger enforcement actions in which the
Commission took its first public action during fiscal year 2012.
2
eight court challenges, the parties filed settlement papers simultaneously with the complaint.
Seven of these court challenges were ultimately settled by consent decree, and in the other court
challenge, the parties abandoned the transaction and the Division filed a notice with the court
withdrawing the complaint and proposed settlement. In the eleven challenges in which the
Antitrust Division did not file a complaint during fiscal year 2012, when apprised of the
Division’s concerns regarding their proposed transactions, the parties in six instances abandoned
the proposed transaction, in two instances restructured the proposed transaction and in three
instances changed their conduct to avoid competitive problems, thus resolving the Division’s
concerns.
One of the notable matters handled by the Division was United Technologies
Corporation’s $18.4 billion acquisition of Goodrich Corporation. The transaction was the largest
merger in the history of the aircraft industry. As originally proposed, the acquisition would have
resulted in higher prices, less favorable contractual terms and less innovation for several critical
aircraft components. The Division challenged the merger in U.S. district court, and the
subsequent settlement required UTC to divest assets used in the production of electrical power
systems and aircraft engine control systems. The Division, the European Commission, and the
Canadian Competition Bureau cooperated closely throughout the course of their respective
investigations, with frequent contact among the agencies. The Division also had discussions
with other competition agencies, including the Federal Competition Commission in Mexico and
the Administrative Council for Economic Defense in Brazil. In addition to UTC, the Division
challenged a number of mergers that would have had a direct effect on the pocketbooks of U.S.
consumers. The Division challenged, and reached pro-competitive settlements, in mergers
involving sliced bread (United States v. Grupo Bimbo, et al.), electricity (United States v. Exelon
Corporation, et al.), health insurance (United States v. Humana Inc., et al.) and parking services
(United States v. Standard Parking Corporation, et al.). Additionally, 3M Co. abandoned its
proposed $550 million acquisition of Avery Dennison Corp.’s Office and Consumer Products
Group, its closest competitor in the sale of adhesive-backed labels and sticky notes, after the
Division informed the companies that it would file a lawsuit to block the deal. The transaction
would have substantially lessened competition in the sale of labels and sticky notes, resulting in
higher prices and reduced innovation for products that millions of American consumers use
every day.
In fiscal year 2012, the Commission’s Premerger Notification Office (PNO) continued to
respond to thousands of telephone calls seeking information about the reportability of
transactions under the HSR Act and the details involved in completing and filing the Notification
and Report Form (the filing form). The HSR website, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/, continued to
provide improved access to information necessary to the notification process. The website
includes basic resources, such as introductory guides, that provide an overview of the premerger
notification program and merger review process. It is the primary source of information for HSR
practitioners seeking information on the HSR form and instructions, the premerger notification
statute and rules, current filing thresholds, notices of grants of early termination, filing fee
instructions, scheduled HSR events, training materials for new HSR practitioners, tips for
completing the filing form, procedures for submitting post-consummation filings, contact
information for PNO staff and frequently asked questions regarding the HSR filing requirements.
Web users can also find up-to-date information, including speeches, press releases, summaries
3
and highlights, and Federal Register notices about any amendments. The website also includes a
database of informal interpretation letters, giving the public ready access to PNO staff
interpretations of the premerger notification rules and the Act. As always, PNO staff is available
to help HSR practitioners comply with HSR notification requirements.
BACKGROUND OF THE HSR ACT
Section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, amended the Clayton Act by adding a new Section 7A, 15 U.S.C. §18a. In general, the
HSR Act requires that certain proposed acquisitions of voting securities or assets be reported to
the Commission and the Antitrust Division prior to consummation. The parties must then wait a
specified period, usually 30 days (15 days in the case of a cash tender offer or a bankruptcy sale),
before they may complete the transaction. Whether a particular acquisition is subject to these
requirements depends upon the value of the acquisition and, in certain acquisitions, the size of
the parties as measured by their sales and assets. Small acquisitions, acquisitions involving small
parties, and certain classes of acquisitions that are less likely to raise antitrust concerns are
excluded from the Act’s coverage.
The primary purpose of the statutory scheme, as the legislative history makes clear, is to
provide the antitrust enforcement agencies with the opportunity to review mergers and
acquisitions before they occur. The premerger notification program, with its filing and waiting
period requirements, provides the agencies with both the time and the information necessary to
conduct this antitrust review. Much of the information for a preliminary antitrust evaluation is
included in the notification filed with the agencies by the parties to the proposed transactions and
is immediately available for review during the waiting period.
If either agency determines during the waiting period that further inquiry is necessary, the
agency is authorized by Section 7A(e) of the Clayton Act to issue a request for additional
information and documentary material (second request). The second request extends the waiting
period for a specified period (usually 30 days, but 10 days in the case of a cash tender offer or
bankruptcy sale) after all parties have complied with the request (or, in the case of a tender offer
or a bankruptcy sale, after the acquiring person complies). This additional time provides the
reviewing agency with the opportunity to analyze the information and to take appropriate action
before the transaction is consummated. If the reviewing agency believes that a proposed
transaction may substantially lessen competition, it may seek an injunction in federal district
court to prohibit consummation of the transaction. The Commission may also challenge the
transaction in administrative litigation.
The Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, promulgated final rules implementing the premerger notification program on
July 31, 1978. At that time, a comprehensive Statement of Basis and Purpose was also
published, containing a section-by-section analysis of the rules and an item-by-item analysis of
the filing form.3 The program became effective on September 5, 1978. The Commission, with
3
43 Fed. Reg. 33450 (July 31, 1978).
4
the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, has amended the rules and the filing form on
several occasions over the years to improve the program’s effectiveness and to lessen the burden
of complying with the rules.4
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The appendices to this report provide a statistical summary of the operation of the
premerger notification program. Appendix A shows, for the ten-year period covering fiscal
years 2003-2012, the number of transactions reported, the number of filings received, the number
of merger investigations in which second requests were issued, and the number of transactions in
which requests for early termination of the waiting period were received, granted, and not
granted.5 Appendix A also shows the number of transactions in which second requests could
have been issued, as well as the percentage of transactions in which second requests were issued.
Appendix B provides a month-by-month comparison of the number of transactions reported and
the number of filings received for fiscal years 2003 through 2012.
The statistics set out in these appendices show that the number of transactions reported in
fiscal year 2012 decreased 1.4% from the number of transactions reported in fiscal year 2011. In
fiscal year 2012, 1,429 transactions were reported, while 1,450 were reported in fiscal year
2011.6 The statistics in Appendix A also show that the number of merger investigations in which
second requests were issued in fiscal year 2012 decreased 10.9% from the number of merger
investigations in which second requests were issued in fiscal year 2011.7 Second requests were
issued in 49 merger investigations in fiscal year 2012 (20 issued by the FTC and 29 issued by the
4
43 Fed. Reg. 34443 (Aug. 4, 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 36053 (Aug. 15, 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. (Nov. 21, 1979);
45 Fed. Reg. 14205 (Mar. 5, 1980); 48 Fed. Reg. 34427 (July 29, 1983); 50 Fed. Reg. 46633 (Nov. 12, 1985); 51
Fed. Reg. 10368 (Mar. 26, 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 7066 (Mar. 6, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 20058 (May 29, 1987); 54 Fed.
Reg. 214251 (May 18, 1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 31371 (Aug. 2, 1990); 60 Fed. Reg. 40704 (Aug. 9, 1995); 61 Fed. Reg.
13666 (Mar. 28, 1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 34592 (June 25, 1998); 66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (Feb. 1, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 8723
(Feb. 1, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 16241 (Mar. 23, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 23561 (May 9, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 35541 (July 6,
2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 11898 (Mar. 18, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 11904 (Mar. 18, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 2425 (Jan. 17, 2003);
70 Fed. Reg. 4988 (Jan. 31, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 11501 (Mar. 8, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 11526 (Mar. 8, 2005); 70 Fed.
Reg. 47733 (Aug. 15, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 73369 (Dec. 12, 2005; 70 Fed Reg. 77312 (Dec. 30, 2005); 71 Fed. Reg.
2943 (Jan. 18, 2006); 71 Fed. Reg. 35995 (June 23, 2006); 72 Fed. Reg. 2692 (Jan. 22, 2007); 75 Fed. Reg. 57110
(Sept. 17, 2010); 76 Fed. Reg. 42471 (July 19, 2011).
5
The term “transaction,” as used in Appendices A and B and Exhibit A to this report, does not refer only to
individual mergers or acquisitions. A particular merger, joint venture, or acquisition may be structured such that it
involves more than one filing that must be made under the HSR Act.
6
This Report, like previous Reports, also includes annual data on “adjusted transactions in which a second
request could have been issued” (“adjusted transactions”). See Appendix A and n. 2 of Appendix A (explaining
calculation of that data). There were 1,400 adjusted transactions in fiscal year 2012, and the data presented in the
Tables and the percentages discussed in the text of this Report (e.g., percentage of transactions resulting in second
requests) are based on this figure.
7
For fiscal year 2011, DOJ has corrected its previously published number of investigations in which
second requests were issued from 34 to 31 investigations, resulting in the total number of investigations in which
second requests were issued in fiscal year 2011 to change from 58 to 55. DOJ also corrected this number for fiscal
year 2010 in Appendix A.
5
Division), while second requests were issued in 558 merger investigations in fiscal year 2011 (24
issued by the FTC and 31 issued by the Division). The percentage of transactions in which a
second request was issued decreased from 3.9% in 2011 to 3.5% in 2012.9 (See Figure 2 below.)
10
The statistics in Appendix A also show that early termination of the waiting period was
requested in the majority of transactions. In fiscal year 2012, early termination was requested in
78% (1,094) of the transactions reported; in fiscal year 2011, early termination was requested in
82% (1,157) of the transactions reported. The percentage of requests granted out of the total
requested increased from 77% in fiscal year 2011 to 82% in fiscal year 2012.
The tables (Tables I through XI) in Exhibit A contain information about the agencies’
enforcement activities for transactions reported in fiscal year 2012. The tables provide, for
8
Id.
With the correction made by DOJ to its fiscal year 2011 data, the percentage of transactions resulting in
second requests issued by DOJ changed from 2.4% to 2.2%, thus changing the total percentage of transactions
resulting in second requests from either agency in fiscal year 2011 from 4.1% to 3.9%.
10
Figure 2 reflects the corrections of the previously published DOJ number of investigations in which
second requests were issued from 34 to 31 investigations in fiscal year 2011 and from 26 to 22 in fiscal year 2010.
Therefore, the percentage of transactions in which a second request was issued by either agency changed from 4.1%
to 3.9% for fiscal year 2011 and from 4.1% to 3.7% for fiscal year 2010.
9
6
various categories of transactions, the number and percentage of transactions in which clearances
to investigate were granted by one antitrust agency to the other and the number of merger
investigations in which second requests were issued. Table III of Exhibit A shows that, in fiscal
year 2012, clearance was granted to either of the agencies for the purpose of conducting an initial
investigation in 14.7% of the total number of the transactions reported. The tables also provide
the number of transactions based on the dollar value of transactions reported and the reporting
threshold indicated in the notification report. In fiscal year 2012, the dollar value of reported
transactions was $921 billion.11
Tables X and XI provide the number of transactions by industry group in which the
acquiring person or the acquired entity derived the most revenue. Figure 3 illustrates the
percentage of reportable transactions within industry groups for fiscal year 2012 based on the
acquired entity’s operations.12
11
The information on the value of reported transactions for fiscal year 2012 is drawn from a database
maintained by the Premerger Notification Office.
12
The “Other” category consists of industry segments that include construction, educational services,
performing arts, recreation, and non-classifiable establishments.
7
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE PREMERGER PROGRAM
1.
Issuance of Proposed Rules
On August 13, 2012, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking13
proposing changes to the premerger notification rules. The proposed rules aim to provide a
framework for determining when a transaction involving the transfer of rights to a patent in the
pharmaceutical (including biologics and medicine manufacturing) industry constitutes an asset
acquisition and thus is potentially reportable under the HSR Act. The comment period ended on
October 25, 2012.
2.
Compliance
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continued to monitor compliance with the
premerger notification program’s filing and waiting period requirements and initiated a number
of compliance investigations in fiscal year 2012. The agencies monitor compliance through a
variety of methods, including a review of newspapers and industry publications for
announcements of transactions that may not have been reported in accordance with the
requirements of the Act. In addition, industry sources, such as competitors, customers and
suppliers, interested members of the public, and in some cases the parties themselves, often
provide the agencies with information about transactions and possible violations of the Act’s
requirements.
Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Act, any person that fails to comply with the Act’s
notification and waiting period requirements is liable for a civil penalty of up to $16,000 for each
day the violation continues.14 The antitrust agencies examine the circumstances of each violation
to determine whether penalties should be sought.15 During fiscal year 2012, 60 corrective filings
for violations were received, and the agencies brought two enforcement actions, resulting in
$1,350,000 in civil penalties.
In United States v. Brian L. Roberts,16 the complaint alleged that Brian Roberts, the
Chief Executive Officer of Comcast Corporation, failed to comply with the HSR Act’s
premerger notification requirements before acquiring Comcast voting securities as part of his
compensation beginning in 2007. Although this was the first time that Roberts had been charged
13
http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/02/hsr.shtm
Dollar amounts specified in civil monetary penalty provisions within the Commission’s jurisdiction are
adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (Apr.
26, 1996). The adjustments have included an increase in the maximum civil penalty from $10,000 to $11,000 for
each day during which a person is in violation under Section 7A(g)(1) (61 Fed. Reg. 54548 (Oct. 21, 1996),
corrected at 61 Fed. Reg. 55840 (Oct. 29, 1996)) and to $16,000 effective February 10, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 857 (Jan.
9, 2009)).
15
When the parties inadvertently fail to file, the enforcement agencies generally do not seek penalties if the
parties promptly make corrective filings after discovering the failure to file, submit an acceptable explanation of
their failure to file, and have not previously violated the Act.
16
United States v. Brian L. Roberts, No. 1:11-CV-02240 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 16, 2011).
14
8
with an HSR Act violation, he had twice previously made corrective filings for what he claimed
were inadvertent failures to file. Under the terms of a consent decree filed simultaneously with
the complaint and entered by the court on December 28, 2011, Roberts agreed to pay a $500,000
civil penalty to settle the charges.
In United States v. Biglari Holdings, Inc.,17 the complaint alleged that Biglari Holdings,
Inc. failed to comply with premerger notification requirements before acquiring voting securities
of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. in June of 2011. Although the HSR Act exempts
certain acquisitions “solely for the purpose of investment,” according to the complaint, Biglari
Holdings’ acquisitions did not qualify for this exemption. Under the terms of the consent decree
filed simultaneously with the complaint and pending with the court, Biglari Holdings agreed to
pay an $850,000 civil penalty to settle the charges.
3.
Threshold Adjustments
The 2000 amendments to the HSR Act require the Commission to publish adjustments to
the Act’s jurisdictional and filing fee thresholds annually, based on the change in the gross
national product, in accordance with Section 8(a)(5) of the Clayton Act for each fiscal year
beginning after September 30, 2004. The Commission amended the rules in 2005 to provide a
method for future adjustments as required by the 2000 amendments and to reflect the revised
thresholds contained in the rules. The revised thresholds are published annually in January and
become effective 30 days after publication.
On January 27, 2012, the Commission published a notice18 to reflect adjustment of
reporting thresholds as required by the 2000 amendments19 to Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §18a. The revised threshold, which increased from $66 million to $68.2 million, became
effective February 27, 2012.
MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY20
1.
The Department of Justice
During fiscal year 2012, the Antitrust Division challenged 19 merger transactions that it
concluded might have substantially lessened competition if allowed to proceed as proposed. In
eight of these challenges, the Antitrust Division filed a complaint in U.S. district court. In all
eight court challenges, the parties filed settlement papers simultaneously with the complaint.
Seven of these court challenges were ultimately settled by consent decree, and in the other court
challenge, the parties abandoned the transaction and the Division filed a notice with the court
17
United States v. Biglari Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01586 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 25, 2012).
77 Fed. Reg. 4323 (Jan. 27, 2012).
19
15 U.S.C. §18a(a). See Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762.
20
The cases listed in this section were not necessarily reportable under the premerger notification program.
Given the confidentiality of information obtained pursuant to the Act, it would be inappropriate to identify the cases
initiated under the program except in those instances in which that information has already been disclosed.
18
9
withdrawing the complaint and proposed settlement. In the eleven challenges where the
Antitrust Division did not file a complaint during fiscal year 2012, when apprised of the
Division’s concerns regarding their proposed transactions, the parties in six instances abandoned
the proposed transaction, in two instances restructured the proposed transaction and in three
instances changed their conduct to avoid competitive problems, thus resolving the Division’s
concerns.21
In United States v. Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V., BBU, Inc. and Sara Lee
Corporation,22 the Division challenged the proposed acquisition of the North American fresh
bakery business of Sara Lee Corporation by Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. de C.V. and BBU, Inc.,
(collectively “BBU”). The complaint alleged that the acquisition, as originally proposed, would
eliminate substantial head-to-head competition in the sale of sliced bread sold in retail stores in
eight metropolitan and surrounding areas and likely would result in millions of American
consumers paying higher prices for sliced bread. The Division filed a proposed consent decree
simultaneously with the complaint, requiring the divestiture of certain well-known Sara Lee and
BBU sliced bread brands in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Sacramento, California;
Kansas City, Kansas; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Omaha, Nebraska; and Harrisburg/Scranton,
Pennsylvania, as well as the associated manufacturing, distribution, and marketing assets
required to compete effectively in the sale of those brands in those areas. The court entered the
decree on February 15, 2012.
In United States and State of Montana v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc.,
Billings Clinic, Bozeman Deaconess Health Services, Inc., Community Medical Center, Inc.,
New West Health Services, Inc., Northern Montana Health Care, Inc., and St. Peter’s
Hospital,23 the Division and the State of Montana challenged the proposed agreement between
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (“BCBS-Montana”) and five of the six hospital owners
of New West Health Services, a health insurance provider, under which BCBS-Montana would
pay the five hospitals in exchange for their agreeing collectively to stop purchasing health
21
In six instances, the Division issued a press release: November 10, 2011 - First Niagara Bank N.A.
acquisition of HSBC Bank USA N.A. (banks); February 13, 2012 - Google Inc.’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility
Holdings Inc. patents (mobile telecommunications); February 13, 2012 - Apple’s acquisition of certain Novell Inc.
patents (mobile telecommunications); February 13, 2012 - Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.
(RIM) acquisitions of certain Nortel Networks Corporation patents (mobile telecommunications); April 30, 2012 National Express Corporation acquisition of Petermann Partners Inc. (school bus contracts); September 4, 2012 - 3M
Company proposed acquisition of Avery Dennison Corp.’s Office and Consumer Products Group (office supplies).
In the other five instances, the Division informed the parties of its concerns, but did not issue a press release:
proposed acquisition of Veritix by Live Nation (custom computer programming services); Revere Copper Products,
Inc. acquisition of Hussey Copper Ltd. (copper); Old Castle Materials, Inc. acquisition of Stavola Holding
Corporation (aggregate quarries and mining and asphalt paving mixture manufacturing); Crowley Maritime
Corporation proposed acquisition of Trailer Bridge, Incorporated (coastal freight transportation); and Reddy Ice
Holdings proposed acquisition of Arctic Glacier Inc. (packaged ice).
22
United States v. Grupo Bimbo, S.A.B. de C.V., BBU, Inc. and Sara Lee Corporation, No. 1: 11-CV01857 (D.D.C. filed October 21, 2011).
23
United States and State of Montana v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc., Billings Clinic,
Bozeman Deaconess Health Services, Inc., Community Medical Center, Inc., New West Health Services, Inc.,
Northern Montana Health Care, Inc., and St. Peter’s Hospital, No. 1:11-CV-00123 (D. Mont. filed November 8,
2011).
10
insurance for their own employees from New West and instead buy insurance for their
employees from BCBS-Montana exclusively for six years. The complaint alleged that the
agreement, as originally structured, would have effectively eliminated New West as a competitor
to BCBS-Montana in the sale of commercial health insurance in several areas of Montana,
thereby decreasing the number of significant competitors in the affected markets from three to
two and allowing BCBS-Montana to increase prices and reduce the quality of service of its
commercial health plans. The proposed settlement, filed simultaneously with the complaint,
prevents the agreement from harming competition by, among other things, requiring New West
to divest its remaining commercial health insurance business to a Division-approved acquirer
with the intent and capability to be an effective competitor in the commercial health insurance
markets in Montana. The court entered the decree on March 15, 2012.
In United States v. Exelon Corporation and Constellation Energy Group, Inc.,24 the
Division challenged the proposed $7.9 billion merger of Exelon Corporation and Constellation
Energy Group Inc. The complaint alleged that the transaction, as originally proposed, likely
would have substantially lessened competition for wholesale electricity, ultimately increasing
electricity prices for millions of consumers in the mid-Atlantic region of the country. Under the
terms of the proposed consent decree filed simultaneously with the complaint and entered by the
court on May 22, 2012, the merged firm is required to divest three electricity generating plants in
Maryland, which in total provide more than 2,600 megawatts of generating capacity.
In United States v. Deutsche Börse AG and NYSE Euronext,25 the Division challenged
the proposed $9 billion merger of the German company Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext,
one of the two largest and most prestigious stock exchange operators in the United States. The
complaint alleged that the transaction, as originally proposed, would have substantially lessened
competition for displayed equities trading services, listing services for exchange-traded products,
including exchange-traded funds, and real-time proprietary equity data products in the United
States. Under the terms of the proposed consent decree filed simultaneously with the complaint
on December 22, 2011, Deutsche Börse’s subsidiary, International Securities Exchange
Holdings, Inc., was required to divest its 31.5 percent interest in Direct Edge, the fourth largest
stock exchange operator in the United States, and agree to other restrictions. On February 9,
2012, the parties abandoned the transaction, and the Division filed a notice with the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia withdrawing the complaint and proposed settlement. The
Division and the European Commission communicated extensively throughout the course of
their respective investigations, with frequent contact between investigative staffs, aided by
waivers provided by the merging parties.
In United States v. International Paper Company and Temple-Inland Inc.,26 the
Division challenged the proposed $4.3 billion merger of International Paper Company and
24
United States v. Exelon Corporation and Constellation Energy Group, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-02276 (D.D.C.
filed December 21, 2011).
25
United States v. Deutsche Börse AG and NYSE Euronext, No. 1:11-CV-02280 (D.D.C. filed December
22, 2011).
26
United States v. International Paper Company and Temple-Inland Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00227 (D.D.C. filed
February 10, 2012).
11
Temple-Inland Inc. The complaint alleged that the transaction, as originally proposed, would
have substantially lessened competition in the production and sale of containerboard, the type of
paper used to make corrugated boxes, in the United States. Corrugated boxes made from
containerboard are used to ship more than 90 percent of all goods nationwide. The Division filed
a proposed consent decree simultaneously with the complaint. The proposed consent decree
requires the parties to divest a total of three containerboard mills, one located in Waverly,
Tennessee, one located in Ontario, California, and either the mill located in Henderson,
Kentucky, or the mill located in Oxnard, California. The decree was entered by the court on
May 3, 2012.
In United States v. Humana Inc. and Arcadian Management Services, Inc.,27 the
Division challenged the proposed acquisition of Arcadian Management Services, Inc. by
Humana Inc. The complaint alleged that the transaction, as originally proposed, would likely
result in higher prices, fewer choices and lower quality Medicare Advantage plans purchased by
Medicare beneficiaries in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. Individuals
eligible for Medicare, primarily senior citizens, may elect to enroll in a privately provided
Medicare Advantage plan instead of traditional Medicare. Congress established the Medicare
Advantage program with the intent that vigorous competition among private Medicare
Advantage insurers would lead insurers to offer seniors a rich set of affordable benefits, provide
a wide range of health insurance choices and be responsive to the demands of seniors. A
proposed consent decree filed at the same time as the complaint requires Humana to divest
Medicare Advantage plans in 51 counties and parishes in these five states. On October 22, 2012,
the decree was entered by the court.
In United States v. United Technologies Corporation and Goodrich Corporation,28 the
Division challenged the proposed acquisition of Goodrich by United Technologies Corporation
(“UTC”). The $18.4 billion transaction is the largest in the history of the aircraft industry. The
complaint alleged that the acquisition, as originally proposed, would lessen competition
substantially in the worldwide markets for the development, manufacture and sale of large main
engine generators, aircraft turbine engines, and engine control systems for large aircraft turbine
engines. Aircraft main engine generators, which are used to produce the electrical power in
communication and navigation equipment, environmental control systems, interior and exterior
lighting, and other aircraft systems, are complex mechanical devices that are difficult to produce,
and for which no substitutes exist. The proposed acquisition would have combined the only two
significant suppliers of large main engine generators for aircraft in the world. Goodrich’s engine
control systems business supplied critical components to several of UTC’s leading competitors
for aircraft turbine engines. In addition, as part of the proposed acquisition, UTC, one of the
three leading suppliers of engine control systems for large aircraft turbine engines, would acquire
Goodrich’s 50 percent share in a joint venture that forms one of the other two producers of such
engine control systems. The proposed final judgment, which was filed simultaneously with the
complaint and is pending with the court, requires UTC to divest Goodrich’s business that
27
United States v. Humana Inc. and Arcadian Management Services, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00464 (D.D.C.
filed March 27, 2012).
28
United States v. United Technologies Corporation and Goodrich Corporation, No. 1:12-CV-01230
(D.D.C. filed July 26, 2012).
12
designs, develops, and manufactures large main engine generators and engine control systems.
The proposed final judgment also requires UTC to divest Goodrich’s shares in the joint venture
that manufactures engine control systems. Close cooperation between the Division, European
Commission, and Canadian Competition Bureau achieved a coordinated remedy that will
preserve competition in the United States and internationally.
In United States v. Standard Parking Corporation, KCPC Holdings, Inc. and Central
Parking Corporation,29 the Division challenged the acquisition of Central Parking by Standard
Parking, the two largest parking management service companies in the country. The complaint
alleged that the proposed acquisition, as originally structured, would lessen competition for offstreet parking services in central business districts of several cities throughout the United States.
Under the terms of the proposed consent decree filed along with the complaint, Standard and
Central must divest their interests in certain off-street parking facilities in 29 cities in 21 states,
accounting for at least 107 parking facilities in the relevant areas. Without the divestitures, the
combined firm would have gained a dominant market share of off-street parking facilities in the
affected cities, resulting in higher prices and reduced service to motorists. On January 3, 2013,
the decree was entered by the court.
In fiscal year 2012, the Division investigated one bank merger transaction for which
divestiture was required prior to consummation. On November 10, 2011, the Division entered
into a letter agreement with First Niagara Bank and HSBC Bank USA requiring divestiture of 26
branches with approximately $1.6 billion in deposits in Erie, Niagara, and Orleans Counties,
New York. First Niagara’s acquisition of 195 HSBC branches in New York and Connecticut
was subject to final approval of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Division
advised the agency that it would not challenge the transaction, provided that the parties comply
with the agreement to divest the specified branch offices and associated loans and deposits.30
2.
The Federal Trade Commission
During fiscal year 2012, the Commission brought 25 merger enforcement actions,31
including three in which the Commission initiated administrative litigation; 15 in which it
accepted consent orders for public comment, 14 of which resulted in final orders (with one still
pending); and seven in which the transactions were abandoned or restructured as a result of
antitrust concerns raised during the investigation. In two of the matters in which the
Commission initiated administrative litigation, the Commission also sought preliminary
injunctions in federal district court to enjoin the acquisitions while the Commission’s
administrative litigation was pending.
The three matters in which the Commission initiated administrative litigation are
29
United States v. Standard Parking Corporation, KCPC Holdings, Inc. and Central Parking Corporation,
No. 1:12-cv-01598 (D.D.C. filed September 26, 2012).
30
DOJ Press Release: November 10, 2011 - First Niagara Bank N.A. acquisition of HSBC Bank USA N.A.
31
To avoid double counting, this report includes only those merger enforcement actions in which the
Commission took its first public action during fiscal year 2012.
13
described below.
In OSF Healthcare System/Rockford Health System,32 the Commission challenged OSF
Healthcare System’s proposed acquisition of rival health care provider, Rockford Health. The
Commission charged that the acquisition would have reduced competition for hospital services in
the Rockford, Illinois area, causing significant harm to local businesses and patients and leaving
OSF with only one remaining competitor in the market. The Commission filed a complaint in
federal district court in Illinois, seeking a preliminary injunction to halt the transaction. In
addition, the FTC issued an administrative complaint. On April 5, 2012, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, granted a preliminary injunction to halt
the transaction pending the FTC’s administrative proceeding and any subsequent appeals. OSF
abandoned its acquisition plans after the district court ruling, and the Commission then dismissed
its administrative action.
In Graco/Illinois Tool Works,33 the Commission challenged Graco, Inc.’s proposed $650
million acquisition of ITW Finishing from Illinois Tool Works, Inc., Graco’s largest competitor.
The Commission alleged that the transaction would harm competition in the market for
equipment used to apply paints and other liquid finishes to a variety of manufactured goods, such
as cars, wood cabinets, and major appliances. The Commission issued an administrative
complaint and sought a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to halt the transaction pending resolution of the administrative litigation. In March
2012, the Commission withdrew the matter from litigation to consider a proposed consent
agreement. The Commission resolved the matter through entry of a consent order requiring
Graco to hold separate and divest the worldwide liquid finishing equipment of Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. and ITW Finishing.
In Omnicare/PharMerica,34 the Commission issued an administrative complaint
challenging Omnicare, Inc.’s hostile acquisition of a rival long-term care pharmacy provider,
PharMerica Corporation. The Complaint alleged that the transaction would combine the two
largest U.S. long-term care pharmacies, harming competition and enabling Omnicare to raise the
price of drugs for Medicare Part D consumers and others. The Commission charged that a
merger combining Omnicare and PharMerica would significantly increase Omnicare’s already
substantial bargaining leverage by dramatically increasing the number of skilled nursing
facilities, known as SNFs, that receive long-term care pharmacy services from the company.
Due to its substantial market share, the Commission alleged the combined firm likely would be a
“must have” for Medicare Part D prescription drug plans, which are responsible for providing
subsidized prescription drug benefit coverage for most SNF residents and other Medicare
beneficiaries. In February 2012, Omnicare abandoned its proposed acquisition, and the
Commission dismissed its administrative challenge.
32
FTC v. OSF Healthcare System and Rockford Health, Dkt. No. 9349 (administrative complaint issued
Nov. 18, 2011).
33
FTC v. Graco, Inc., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. and ITW Finishing LLC, Dkt. No. 9350 (administrative
complaint issued Dec. 15, 2011).
34
In the matter of Omincare, Inc., Dkt. No. 9352 (administrative complaint issued Jan. 27, 2012).
14
As previously stated, in fiscal year 2012, the Commission also accepted consent
agreements and issued proposed orders for public comment in 15 merger matters. The
Commission finalized 14 of them, and one remains pending.
In Teva Pharmaceutical Industries/Cephalon,35 the Commission charged, in a
Complaint accompanying the consent order, that Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.’s
proposed $6.8 billion acquisition of Cephalon, Inc. would reduce the number of generic versions
of Actiq, a cancer pain drug, from three to two, and lessen competition in the relevant market.
The Commission also alleged that the acquisition would eliminate potential competition between
Teva and Cephalon and reduce the number of generic competitors in the future for Amrix, a
muscle relaxant. While Cephalon’s version of Amrix was the only generic available, the
Commission alleged that Teva was capable of entering the relevant market with a generic version
of the product. To resolve these concerns, the Commission’s consent order required Teva to sell
its rights and assets related to the two drugs to Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The consent order also
required Teva to enter into a supply agreement that would allow Par to sell a generic version of
Cephalon’s wakefulness drug Provigil in 2012 to resolve the Commission’s concerns that the
merger would limit generic suppliers in that market.
In Healthcare Technology Holdings,36 the Commission challenged Healthcare
Technology Holdings, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of SDI Health, LLC., a rival of Healthcare
Technology’s IMS Health, Inc. affiliate. The Commission charged that the acquisition of SDI by
Healthcare Technology would have greatly reduced competition and increased prices in the
promotional and medical audit markets. Promotional audits are market research products used
by drug companies and others to estimate advertising and other promotional activities for
branded drugs. Medical audits are used to estimate the actual medical diagnoses physicians
make and the therapies they prescribe. The Commission alleged that the markets for both
promotional and medical audits are highly concentrated and that the acquisition would eliminate
IMS’s only significant competitor (SDI) in both markets. To resolve these competitive concerns
and restore the competition that would have been lost with the acquisition, the Commission
issued a consent order requiring the sale of SDI’s promotional audit and medical audit businesses
to an FTC-approved buyer.
In Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings/Orchid Cellmark,37 the Commission
required laboratory testing companies Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp)
and rival Orchid Cellmark Inc. to divest a portion of Orchid’s paternity testing business to
another testing company, DNA Diagnostics Center (DDC). The Commission charged that
LabCorp’s $85.4 million acquisition of Orchid as originally proposed would have had an
anticompetitive impact in the market for paternity testing services used by government agencies.
Government agencies contract with laboratory testing companies to provide DNA testing
35
In the matter of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Cephalon, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4335 (proposed
order issued July 3, 2012).
36
In the matter of Healthcare Technology Holdings, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4340 (proposed order issued Oct. 28,
2011).
37
In the matter of Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, and Orchid Cellmark, Inc., Dkt. No. C4341 (proposed order issued Dec. 8, 2011).
15
services and use those tests to resolve paternity issues. The Commission alleged that because
LabCorp and Orchid are the two most significant providers of these paternity testing services in
the country and have a majority of the market, the acquisition would have reduced competition
for government contracts. The divestiture of Orchid’s paternity testing company to DDC, an
FTC-approved buyer, resolved the agency’s charges that the acquisition was anticompetitive by
restoring a competitor in the market.
In Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (Acquisition of Certain Assets from SanofiAventis),38 the Commission challenged Valeant Pharmaceutical International’s $425 million
acquisition of Dermik Laboratories, Inc., the dermatological unit of Sanofi/Aventis. The
Commission alleged that Valeant’s acquisition of Dermik would have illegally reduced
competition in the U.S. market for two topical skin-care drugs, BenzaClin and topical 5FU, by
eliminating the competition that existed between Valeant and Sanofi (Dermik) for these
products. The first drug, BenzaClin and its generic equivalent, is used to treat common acne.
The acquisition would have eliminated competition between Dermik’s branded BenzaClin and
its closest competitor, Valeant’s generic equivalent of BenzaClin. The second drug, 5FU, is a
topical cream used to treat pre-cancerous skin lesions. The Commission charged that the
acquisition would give Valeant control over three topical 5FU products (Valeant’s branded
Efudex, Dermik’s branded Carac, and Valeant’s authorized generic version of Efudex) resulting
in higher prices for consumers. In the first market (the acne drug), the Commission required
divestiture to Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of the manufacturing and marketing rights of
Valeant’s generic version of BenzaClin. In the second market (the 5FU drug), the consent order
required Valeant to license to Mylan the rights to manufacture and market the authorized generic
version of Efudex. The requirements in the consent order resolved the agency’s concerns that
the acquisition was anticompetitive by restoring the competition that would have been lost if the
acquisitions had proceeded as originally proposed.
In Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (Acquisition of Ortho Dermatologics
Division from Johnson & Johnson),39 the Commission challenged Valeant’s $345 million
acquisition of the Ortho Dermatologics Division from Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Prior to the proposed acquisition, Valeant, under contract with Spear
Pharmaceuticals, sold a branded tretinoin emollient cream called Refissa, which is used to treat
fine line wrinkles, as well as a generic version of the drug. Ortho sold the only competing
product, branded as Renova. The Commission charged that Valeant’s acquisition of Ortho
Dermatologics would reduce competition in the supply of this product from two to one, thus
creating a monopoly market for tretinoin emollient cream and likely raising prices for
consumers. The Commission’s consent order required Valeant to return all marketing rights for
Refissa and the generic tretinoin emollient cream to Spear Pharmaceuticals. The consent order
thus resolved the agency’s concerns that the acquisition as originally structured would have been
anticompetitive.
38
In the Matter of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Acquisition of Certain Assets from SanofiAventis), Dkt. No. C-4342 (proposed order issued Dec. 12, 2011).
39
In the matter of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (Acquisition of Ortho Dermatologics
Division from Johnson & Johnson), Dkt. No. C-4343 (proposed order issued Dec. 12, 2011).
16
In AmeriGas Propane/Energy Transfer Partners,40 the Commission challenged
AmeriGas, L.P.’s $2.9 billion acquisition of Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.’s (ETP) Heritage
Propane business. AmeriGas’s ACE division and Heritage Propane were the nation’s second and
third largest suppliers of propane exchange cylinders, both nationally and regionally. Propane
exchange cylinders are used by consumers to fuel barbeque grills and patio heaters. The
Commission charged that the purchase likely would have reduced competition and raised prices
in the highly concentrated market. The Commission’s consent order restores the lost competition
by preventing AmeriGas from buying the Heritage Propane business. The order also ensures that
Heritage Propane continues to be a viable competitor by requiring ETP to maintain the viability
of the business for two years unless it is sold before then.
In Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA,41 the Commission challenged Fresenius
Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA’s $2.1 billion acquisition of Liberty Dialysis Holdings, Inc. The
Commission charged that Fresenius’s acquisition of Liberty would have eliminated head-to-head
competition between the two dialysis providers in 43 regional markets, leading to higher prices
and reduced quality for dialysis consumers. The Commission’s consent order required Fresenius
to sell 60 outpatient dialysis clinics in 43 local markets. Without the consent order, the proposed
acquisition would have created monopolies for outpatient dialysis services in 17 of the 43 local
markets. In 24 other markets, the proposed acquisition would have reduced competition in
dialysis providers from three to two providers, and in the remaining two markets, competition
would have been significantly reduced. The consent order restored competition that would have
been lost through the acquisition by requiring Fresenius to divest 54 clinics to Dialysis Newco,
Inc., one clinic to Alaska Investment Partners LLC, and five clinics to Dallas Renal Group, and
to terminate a management services agreement under which Fresenius had managed a clinic for a
third party.
In Carpenter Technology/Latrobe Specialty Metals,42 the Commission challenged
Carpenter Technology’s $410 million merger to monopoly with specialty metals manufacturer
Latrobe. The Commission alleged that Carpenter and Latrobe were the only companies that
made two highly specialized alloys used in the aerospace industry – MP159 and Aerospace
MP35N. The Commission also charged that the combination of the two companies likely would
be anticompetitive and increase prices for purchasers of the alloys by creating a monopoly in the
market. The Commission’s consent order required Carpenter to divest assets necessary for
manufacturing the two alloys to another metals manufacturer, Eramet S.A., thus restoring
competition in the market.
In Western Digital,43 the Commission challenged Western Digital Corporation’s $4.5
billion acquisition of rival Hitachi Global Storage Technologies. Western Digital and Hitachi
40
In the matter of AmeriGas Propane, L.P. and Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., Dkt. No. C-4346 (proposed
order issued Jan. 11, 2012).
41
In the matter of Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co., Dkt. No. C-4348 (proposed order issued Feb. 28,
2012).
42
In the matter of Carpenter Technology Corporation and Latrobe Specialty Metals, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4349
(proposed order issued Feb. 29, 2012).
43
In the matter of Western Digital Corporation, Dkt. No. C-4350 (proposed order issued Mar. 5, 2012).
17
both manufactured desktop hard drives used in personal computers. The Commission charged
that the acquisition would have harmed competition in this market by leaving only two
companies in control of the entire worldwide market, likely resulting in increased prices to
consumers. To resolve its competitive concerns, the Commission entered a consent order
requiring Western Digital Corporation to divest to Toshiba assets used to manufacture and sell
desktop hard disk drives. The Commission’s consent order thus replaced competition that
otherwise would have been lost due to the acquisition. Throughout the course of the
investigation, FTC staff cooperated with antitrust agencies in Australia, Canada, China, the
European Union, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and Turkey, often working
closely with the staff of these agencies on the analysis of the proposed transaction and potential
remedies to reach outcomes that benefit consumers in the United States.
In CoStar Group/ Loopnet,44 the Commission challenged CoStar Group’s $860 million
acquisition of Loopnet, charging that the acquisition likely would have been anticompetitive in
the market for commercial real estate information services. CoStar actively tracks and
aggregates commercial real estate listings and property-specific information nationwide, and
provides subscription-based access to its comprehensive database of this information. Loopnet
operates the most heavily trafficked commercial real estate database and holds ownership interest
in a third competitor, Xceligent. The Commission charged that the proposed acquisition would
have reduced competition in the markets for these real estate listing databases and information
services. To resolve these charges, the Commission issued a consent order restoring competition
that would have been lost. The order required CoStar to sell LoopNet’s ownership interest in
Xceligent, thus maintaining an independent third party in the market. The Commission also
ordered CoStar to lift non-compete provisions and allow its customers in long-term contracts to
terminate them early, allowing for competitors such as Xceligent to expand or enter more easily
into the commercial real estate information services market.
In Kinder Morgan,45 the Commission challenged Kinder Morgan, Inc.’s $38 billion
acquisition of El Paso Corporation. The Commission charged that the acquisition was
anticompetitive, and likely would have reduced competition in several natural gas pipeline
transportation and gas processing markets in the Rocky Mountains region. Kinder Morgan owns
more than 38,000 miles of pipelines and 180 terminals in North America for the transportation
and storage of natural gas and other energy products. El Paso also produces, processes, and
transports natural gas, and owns, or has interests in, more than 43,000 miles of natural gas
pipelines and gathering systems. The Commission’s consent order required Kinder Morgan to
sell three natural gas pipelines and two gas-processing plants and associated storage capacity in
the Rocky Mountain region. The divestitures thus settled the Commission’s charges that the
acquisition likely would have been anticompetitive by restoring competition in the pipeline
transportation and natural gas processing markets.
In Johnson & Johnson,46 the Commission challenged Johnson & Johnson’s $21.3 billion
44
In the matter of CoStar Group, Inc., Lonestar Acquisition Sub, Inc., and LoopNet, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4368
(proposed order issued Apr. 26, 2012).
45
In the matter of Kinder Morgan, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4355 (proposed order issued May 1, 2012).
46
In the matter of Johnson & Johnson, Dkt. No. C-4363 (proposed order issued June 15, 2012).
18
acquisition of rival Synthes, Inc. Johnson & Johnson and Synthes are competing manufacturers
of medical devices. The Commission charged that Johnson & Johnson’s acquisition of Synthes
likely would be anticompetitive and reduce competition for volar distal plating systems, which
are medical devices used for surgically treating serious wrist fractures. Volar distal plating
systems are surgically implanted on the underside of the wrist to achieve proper alignment of the
radius bone following a fracture. The Commission’s consent order required Johnson & Johnson
to sell its volar distal radius plating system, Distal Volar Radius, and the balance of its product
line for treating traumatic injuries to Biomet, Inc. By restoring the competition that otherwise
would have been eliminated, the divestitures resolved the Commission’s concern that the
acquisition would illegally reduce competition for these medical devices.
In Koninklijke Ahold N.V./Safeway,47 the Commission challenged Koninklijke Ahold
N.V.’s acquisition of Genuardi’s supermarket chain from Safeway, Inc. Ahold, the parent
company of Giant Food Stores, LLC, owns or has interest in 2,970 supermarkets and specialty
stores with net 2010 sales of $36.8 billion. Genuardi’s is a chain of supermarkets in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area acquired by Safeway in 2001. The Commission charged that
Ahold’s acquisition of Genuardi’s would reduce the number of supermarket competitors in
Newtown, Pennsylvania’s local grocery market from three to two. The Commission preserved
competition by requiring Ahold to sell a supermarket in Newtown, Pennsylvania, to McCaffrey’s
supermarkets.
In Novartis, AG/Fougera,48 the Commission challenged Novartis AG’s $1.5 billion
acquisition of rival pharmaceutical firm, Fougera Holdings, Inc. The Commission charged that
Novartis’ acquisition likely would have harmed competition in the markets for three skin care
drugs: 1) generic calcipotriene topical solution, used to treat chronic, moderately severe scalp
psoriasis; 2) generic lidocaine-prilocaine cream, used by hospitals as a local anesthetic to prevent
pain resulting from injections and surgery; and 3) generic metronidazole topical gel, used to treat
rosacea, a condition that causes chronically red facial skin. In each of the markets, the
Commission alleged that the proposed acquisition would eliminate one of a limited number of
suppliers and cause significant competitive harm by facilitating price increases – or eliminating
price decreases – after the acquisition was completed. To resolve these charges, the Commission
issued a consent order that required Novartis to end its marketing agreement with Tolmar, Inc.,
which allowed it to sell the three generic skin care drugs and return all of the rights to distribute,
market, and sell these products to Tolmar. The Commission also charged that Novartis’
acquisition would eliminate potential competition in a fourth market, the market for the sale of
diclofenac sodium gel, used to treat actinic keratosis. The only version of this gel available is
Solaraze, the branded drug sold by Fougera. Novartis, through its prior agreement with Tolmar,
was the first to file with the FDA for an approval of a generic form of Solaraze. The consent
order required Novartis to return all rights to develop, distribute, market, and sell the generic
diclofenac sodium gel to Tolmar, thus resolving the Commission’s concerns about the
acquisition’s likely impact on competition.
47
In the matter of Koninklijke Ahold N.V. and Safeway, Inc., Dkt. No. C-4367 (proposed order issued
June 15, 2012).
48
In the matter of Novartis, AG, Dkt. No. C-4364 (proposed order issued July 16, 2012).
19
In Renown Health,49 the Commission challenged Renown Health’s acquisitions of two
local cardiology groups in the Reno, NV area, Sierra Nevada Cardiology Associates (SNCA) and
Reno Heart Physicians (RHP). Renown is the largest provider of acute care hospital services in
northern Nevada. Prior to the acquisitions, virtually all of the cardiologists in the Reno area were
affiliated with either SNCA or RHP; Renown Health did not employ any cardiologists. The FTC
charged that Renown Health’s acquisitions of SNCA’s and RHP’s medical practices created a
highly concentrated market for the provision of adult cardiology services in the Reno area. The
Commission’s consent order required Renown to release its staff cardiologists from “noncompete” contract clauses, allowing up to 10 of them to join competing cardiology practices,
thus restoring competition in the market for adult cardiology services in Reno, NV.
ONGOING REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continually review the impact of the
premerger notification program on the business community and antitrust enforcement. As
indicated in past annual reports, the HSR program ensures that virtually all relatively large
mergers or acquisitions that affect consumers in the United States will be reviewed by the
antitrust agencies prior to consummation. The agencies generally have the opportunity to
challenge unlawful transactions before they occur, thus avoiding the problem of constructing
effective post-acquisition relief. As a result, the HSR Act is doing what Congress intended,
giving the government the opportunity to investigate and challenge those relatively large mergers
that are likely to harm consumers before injury can arise. Prior to the premerger notification
program, businesses could, and frequently did, consummate transactions that raised significant
antitrust concerns before the antitrust agencies had the opportunity to consider adequately their
competitive effects. The enforcement agencies were forced to pursue lengthy post-acquisition
litigation, during the course of which harm from the consummated transaction continued (and
afterwards as well, where achievement of effective post-acquisition relief was not practicable).
Because the premerger notification program requires reporting before consummation, this
problem has been significantly reduced.
Always cognizant of the program’s impact and effectiveness, the enforcement agencies
continue to seek ways to speed up the review process and reduce burdens for companies. As in
past years, the agencies will continue their ongoing assessment of the HSR program to increase
accessibility, promote transparency, and reduce the burden on the filing parties without
compromising the agencies’ ability to investigate and interdict proposed transactions that may
substantially lessen competition.
49
In the matter of Renown Health, Dkt. No. C-4366 (proposed order issued Aug. 6, 2012).
20
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A -
Summary of Transactions, Fiscal Years 2003 - 2012
Appendix B -
Number of Transactions reported and Filings Received by Month for
Fiscal Years 2003 - 2012
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit A -
Statistical Tables for Fiscal year 2012, Presenting Data Profiling
Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Filings and Enforcement
Interests
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS
FISCAL YEARS 2003 - 2012
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
2003
2004
2008
2009
2010
Transactions Reported
1,014
1,428 1,675 1,768 2,201 1,726
716
1,166 1,450 1,429
Filings Received1
2,001
2,825 3,287 3,510 4,378 3,455 1,411 2,318 2,882 2,829
968
1,377 1,610 1,746 2,108 1,656
684
1,128 1,414 1,400
35
35
50
45
63
41
31
42
55
49
15
20
25
28
31
21
15
20
24
20
1.5%
1.5%
1.6%
1.6%
1.5%
1.3%
2.2%
1.8%
1.7%
1.4%
20
15
25
17
32
20
16
22
31
29
2.1%
1.1%
1.6%
1.0%
1.5%
1.2%
2.3%
2.0%
2.2%
2.1%
700
1,241 1,385 1,468 1,840 1,385
575
953
1,157 1,094
Granted5
606
943
997
1,098 1,402 1,021
396
704
888
902
Not Granted5
94
298
388
370
179
249
269
192
Adjusted Transactions In Which A
Second Request Could Have Been
Issued2
Investigations in Which Second Requests
Were Issued
FTC3
Percent4
DOJ3
Percent4
Transactions Involving a Request For
Early Termination5
2005
2006
2007
438
364
2011
2012
Note: The data for FY 2004 and FY 2005 “Transactions Reported” and for FY 2004 – FY 2007 “Filings Received” reflect corrections to some prior Annual reports to account for a
coding error. Additionally, the data for FY 2010 and FY 2011 reflect corrections to the previously published DOJ number of investigations in which second requests were issued and
the percentage of transactions in which second requests were issued by DOJ.
1
Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person when a transaction is reported. Only one application is received when an
acquiring party files for an exemption under Section 7A (c )(6) or (c )(8) of the Clayton Act.
2
These figures omit from the total number of transactions reported all transactions for which the agencies were not authorized to request additional information. These include (1)
incomplete transactions (only one party filed a complete notification); (2) transactions reported pursuant to the exemption provisions of Sections 7A (c) (6) and 7A(c)(8) of the
Act; (3) transactions which were found to be non-reportable; and (4) transactions withdrawn before the waiting period began. In addition, where a party filed more than one
notification in the same year to acquire voting securities of the same corporation, e.g., filing one threshold and later filing for a higher threshold, only a single consolidated
transaction has been counted because as a practical matter the agencies do not issue more than one Second Request in such a case. These statistics also omit from the total number
the transactions reported secondary acquisitions filed pursuant to 801.4 of the Premerger Notification rules. Secondary acquisitions have been deducted in order to be consistent
with the statistics presented in most of the prior annual reports.
3
These statistics are based on the date the request was issued and not the date the investigation was opened.
4
Second Requests investigations are a percentage of the total number of adjusted transactions. The total percentage reflected in Figure 2 may not equal the sum of reported
component values due to rounding.
5
These statistics are based on the date of the HSR filing and not the date action was taken on the request.
APPENDIX B
NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS REPORTED
AND
FILINGS RECEIVED BY MONTH
FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2003 - 2012
APPENDIX B
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS REPORTED BY MONTH FOR FISCAL YEARS
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
October
77
93
139
130
201
158
91
66
128
122
November
104
127
160
148
189
191
85
135
217
169
December
78
143
126
137
151
172
37
84
91
95
January
93
85
138
142
143
158
42
62
97
104
February
71
109
99
124
157
119
32
61
81
90
March
74
137
121
150
194
131
42
116
97
111
April
92
127
121
125
156
128
60
92
96
96
May
83
125
171
158
250
150
58
108
142
117
June
80
117
153
172
202
146
51
108
117
142
July
86
123
118
141
219
128
62
94
120
130
August
85
134
170
186
200
126
77
120
164
133
September
91
108
159
155
139
119
79
120
100
120
TOTAL
1,014
1,428
1,675
1,768
2,201
1,726
716
1,166
1,450
1,429
Note: The data for FY 2004 and FY 2005 “Transactions Reported” reflect corrections to some prior Annual reports to account for a coding error.
APPENDIX B
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF FILINGS RECEIVED1 BY MONTH FOR FISCAL YEARS
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
October
148
185
277
261
401
319
185
146
252
242
November
206
254
324
311
376
380
165
242
422
332
December
150
280
238
260
294
343
79
177
193
188
January
179
161
259
279
288
316
77
126
188
203
February
146
207
201
257
317
246
63
116
157
185
March
144
277
239
309
381
242
81
232
195
215
April
182
245
242
270
312
272
119
182
190
193
May
168
258
337
300
481
294
114
216
284
231
June
158
241
297
346
403
293
99
213
231
275
July
170
234
236
255
441
259
121
187
240
269
August
164
270
328
367
396
251
149
238
329
259
September
186
213
309
295
288
240
159
243
201
237
TOTAL
2,001
2,825
3,287
3,510
4,378
3,455
1,411
2,318
2,882
2,829
Note: The data for FY 2004 – FY 2007 “Filings Received” reflect corrections to some prior Annual reports to account for a coding error.
1
Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person, when the transaction is reported. Only one filing is received when an
acquiring person files for a transaction that is exempt under Sections 7A(c)(6) and (c)(8) of the Clayton Act.
EXHIBIT A
STATISTICAL TABLES
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2012
DATA PROFILING HART-SCOTT-RODINO PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION FILINGS AND ENFORCEMENT INTERESTS
TABLE I
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
2
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION (BY SIZE RANGE)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
4
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M 5
4
0.3%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50M - 100M 5
240
17.1%
21
5
8.8%
2.1%
10.8%
1
3
0.4%
1.3%
1.7%
100M - 150M 5
298
21.3%
24
9
8.1%
3.0%
11.1%
2
1
0.7%
0.3%
1.0%
150M - 200M 5
133
9.5%
8
7
6.0%
5.3%
11.3%
2
1
1.5%
0.8%
2.3%
200M - 300M 5
158
11.3%
14
7
8.9%
4.4%
13.3%
2
4
1.3%
2.5%
3.8%
300M - 500M 5
203
14.5%
21
12
10.3%
5.9%
16.3%
2
3
1.0%
1.5%
2.5%
500M - 1000M5
208
14.9%
20
11
9.6%
5.3%
14.9%
3
7
1.4%
3.4%
4.8%
Over 1000M 5
156
11.1%
27
20
17.3%
12.8%
30.1%
8
10
5.1%
6.4%
11.5%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE II
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
2
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION (CUMULATIVE)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
4
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES
NUMBER
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF
SECOND REQUESTS
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
LESS THAN 50M 5
4
0.3%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
LESS THAN 100M 5
244
17.4%
21
5
10.2%
2.4%
12.6%
1
3
2.0%
6.1%
8.2%
LESS THAN 150M 5
542
38.7%
45
14
21.8%
6.8%
28.6%
3
4
6.1%
8.2%
14.3%
LESS THAN 200M 5
675
48.2%
53
21
25.7%
10.2%
35.9%
5
5
10.2%
10.2%
20.4%
LESS THAN 300M 5
833
59.5%
67
28
32.5%
13.6%
46.1%
7
9
14.3%
18.4%
32.7%
LESS THAN 500M 5
1,036
74.0%
88
40
42.7%
19.4%
62.1%
9
12
18.4%
24.5%
42.9%
LESS THAN 1000M 5
1,239
88.5%
108
51
52.4%
24.8%
77.2%
12
19
24.5%
38.8%
63.3%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
135
71
65.5%
34.5%
100.0%
20
29
40.8%
59.2%
100.0%
TABLE III
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE GRANTING OF CLEARANCE BY AGENCY
CLEARANCE GRANTED AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
CLEARANCES
GRANTED TO
AGENCY
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
TRANSACTIONS IN EACH
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
TOTAL NUMBER
OF CLEARANCES
PER AGENCY
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES
GRANTED
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M 5
0
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50M - 100M 5
21
5
26
8.8%
2.1%
10.8%
15.6%
7.0%
10.2%
2.4%
12.6%
100M - 150M 5
24
9
33
8.1%
3.0%
11.1%
17.8%
12.7%
11.7%
4.4%
16.0%
150M - 200M 5
8
7
15
6.0%
5.3%
11.3%
5.9%
9.9%
3.9%
3.4%
7.3%
200M - 300M 5
14
7
21
8.9%
4.4%
13.3%
10.4%
9.9%
6.8%
3.4%
10.2%
300M - 500M 5
21
12
33
10.3%
5.9%
16.3%
15.6%
16.9%
10.2%
5.8%
16.0%
500M - 1000M5
20
11
31
9.6%
5.3%
14.9%
14.8%
15.5%
9.7%
5.3%
15.0%
Over 1000M 5
27
20
47
17.3%
12.8%
30.1%
20.0%
28.2%
13.1%
9.7%
22.8%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
135
71
206
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
100.0%
100.0%
65.5%
34.5%
100.0%
TABLE IV
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH SECOND REQUESTS WERE ISSUED
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
INVESTIGATIONS IN
WHICH SECOND
REQUEST WERE
ISSUED 3
SECOND REQUESTS ISSUED AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
TOTAL NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTIONS IN
EACH TRANSACTION
RANGE GROUP
TOTAL NUMBER OF
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M 5
0
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50M - 100M 5
1
3
4
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
1.3%
1.7%
2.0%
6.1%
8.2%
100M - 150M 5
2
1
3
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.7%
0.3%
1.0%
4.1%
2.0%
6.1%
150M - 200M 5
2
1
3
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
1.5%
0.8%
2.3%
4.1%
2.0%
6.1%
200M - 300M 5
2
4
6
0.1%
0.3%
0.4%
1.3%
2.5%
3.8%
4.1%
8.2%
12.2%
300M - 500M 5
2
3
5
0.1%
0.2%
0.4%
1.0%
1.5%
2.5%
4.1%
6.1%
10.2%
500M - 1000M5
3
7
10
0.2%
0.5%
0.7%
1.4%
3.4%
4.8%
6.1%
14.3%
20.4%
Over 1000M 5
8
10
18
0.6%
0.7%
1.3%
5.1%
6.4%
11.5%
16.3%
20.4%
36.7%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
20
29
49
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
40.8%
59.2%
100.0%
TABLE V
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
ACQUISITIONS BY REPORTING THRESHOLD
HSR TRANSACTIONS
THRESHOLD 6
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
THRESHOLD GROUP
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
THRESHOLD GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
$50M (as adjusted)
95
6.8%
2
1
2.1%
1.1%
3.2%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
$100M (as adjusted)
98
7.0%
1
0
1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
$500M (as adjusted)
29
2.1%
2
0
6.9%
0.0%
6.9%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
ASSETS ONLY
453
32.4%
45
21
9.9%
4.6%
14.6%
7
13
1.5%
2.9%
4.4%
25%
6
0.4%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50%
719
51.4%
85
49
11.8%
6.8%
18.6%
13
16
1.8%
2.2%
4.0%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE VI
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTION BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRING PERSON
HSR TRANSACTIONS
ASSET RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
NUMBER
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
151
10.8%
1
1
0.7%
0.7%
1.3%
0
1
0.0%
0.7%
0.7%
50M - 100M
18
1.3%
2
2
11.1%
11.1%
22.2%
0
1
0.0%
5.6%
5.6%
100M - 150M
36
2.6%
2
1
5.6%
2.8%
8.3%
0
1
0.0%
2.8%
2.8%
150M - 200M
30
2.1%
2
1
6.7%
3.3%
10.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
200M - 300M
40
2.9%
4
2
10.0%
5.0%
15.0%
1
0
2.5%
0.0%
2.5%
300M - 500M
76
5.4%
4
3
5.3%
3.9%
9.2%
1
0
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%
500M - 1000M
133
9.5%
9
5
6.8%
3.8%
10.5%
1
2
0.8%
1.5%
2.3%
Over 1000M
916
65.4%
111
56
12.1%
6.1%
18.2%
17
24
1.9%
2.6%
4.5%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE VII
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTION BY SALES OF ACQUIRING PERSON
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SALES RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
7
124
8.9%
2
1
1.6%
0.8%
2.4%
1
0
0.8%
0.0%
0.8%
50M - 100M
7
33
2.4%
2
1
6.1%
3.0%
9.1%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100M - 150M
7
35
2.5%
2
2
5.7%
5.7%
11.4%
0
1
0.0%
2.9%
2.9%
150M - 200M
7
25
1.8%
2
2
8.0%
8.0%
16.0%
1
0
4.0%
0.0%
4.0%
200M - 300M
7
63
4.5%
2
1
3.2%
1.6%
4.8%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
300M - 500M
7
86
6.1%
5
6
5.8%
7.0%
12.8%
0
3
0.0%
3.5%
3.5%
500M - 1000M
7
148
10.6%
11
5
7.4%
3.4%
10.8%
3
4
2.0%
2.7%
4.7%
Over 1000M
7
791
56.5%
108
53
13.7%
6.7%
20.4%
15
20
1.9%
2.5%
4.4%
Sales Not Available 7
95
6.8%
1
0
1.1%
0.0%
1.1%
0
1
0.0%
1.1%
1.1%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE VIII
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTION BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES8
HSR TRANSACTIONS
ASSET RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
NUMBER
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
8
213
15.2%
19
7
8.9%
3.3%
12.2%
1
1
0.5%
0.5%
0.9%
50M - 100M
8
208
14.9%
21
8
10.1%
3.8%
13.9%
3
1
1.4%
0.5%
1.9%
100M - 150M
8
136
9.7%
21
7
15.4%
5.1%
20.6%
3
2
2.2%
1.5%
3.7%
150M - 200M
8
73
5.2%
6
4
8.2%
5.5%
13.7%
1
2
1.4%
2.7%
4.1%
200M - 300M
8
126
9.0%
10
8
7.9%
6.3%
14.3%
2
2
1.6%
1.6%
3.2%
300M - 500M
8
97
6.9%
6
4
6.2%
4.1%
10.3%
1
4
1.0%
4.1%
5.2%
500M - 1000M
8
108
7.7%
8
8
7.4%
7.4%
14.8%
0
4
0.0%
3.7%
3.7%
Over 1000M
8
272
19.4%
26
16
9.6%
5.9%
15.4%
5
9
1.8%
3.3%
5.1%
Assets Not Available 8
167
11.9%
18
9
10.8%
5.4%
16.2%
4
4
2.4%
2.4%
4.8%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE IX
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
TRANSACTION BY SALES OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES 9
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SALES RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
NUMBER
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
10
227
16.2%
23
8
10.1%
3.5%
13.7%
0
1
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
50M - 100M
10
225
16.1%
20
10
8.9%
4.4%
13.3%
2
1
0.9%
0.4%
1.3%
100M - 150M
10
142
10.1%
13
2
9.2%
1.4%
10.6%
3
1
2.1%
0.7%
2.8%
150M - 200M
10
120
8.6%
15
3
12.5%
2.5%
15.0%
1
1
0.8%
0.8%
1.7%
200M - 300M
10
118
8.4%
11
5
9.3%
4.2%
13.6%
3
2
2.5%
1.7%
4.2%
300M - 500M
10
119
8.5%
11
10
9.2%
8.4%
17.6%
3
5
2.5%
4.2%
6.7%
500M - 1000M
10
130
9.3%
13
8
10.0%
6.2%
16.2%
2
2
1.5%
1.5%
3.1%
Over 1000M
10
248
17.7%
23
15
9.3%
6.0%
15.3%
5
6
2.0%
2.4%
4.4%
Sales not Available 10
71
5.1%
6
10
8.5%
14.1%
22.5%
1
10
1.4%
14.1%
15.5%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
1,400
100.0%
135
71
9.6%
5.1%
14.7%
20
29
1.4%
2.1%
3.5%
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2011 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
000 13
Not Available
100
7.1%
0.6%
1
0
1
0
1
1
112 13
Animal Production
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
1
1
0
0
0
211 13
Oil and Gas Extraction
19
1.4%
-0.1%
0
1
1
0
0
0
212 13
Mining (except Oil and Gas)
7
0.5%
-0.1%
1
1
2
0
1
1
213 13
Support Activities for Mining
12
0.9%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
221 13
Utilities
34
2.4%
0.0%
0
1
1
0
0
0
236 13
Construction of Buildings
3
0.2%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
237 13
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction
9
0.6%
0.1%
0
1
1
0
1
1
238 13
Specialty Trade Contractors
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
311 13
Food and Kindred Products
28
2.0%
-0.4%
5
3
8
0
0
0
312 13
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
10
0.7%
0.6%
1
2
3
0
2
2
313 13
Textile Mills
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
315 13
Apparel Manufacturing
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
316 13
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
321 13
Wood Product Manufacturing
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
322 13
Paper Manufacturing
12
0.9%
0.2%
0
1
1
0
1
1
323 13
Printing and Related Support Actitivies
1
0.1%
-0.3%
1
0
1
0
0
0
324 13
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
5
0.4%
-0.3%
2
0
2
1
0
1
325 13
Chemical Manufacturing
95
6.8%
1.3%
30
2
32
3
0
3
326 13
Plastics and Rubber Manfuacturing
20
1.4%
0.0%
2
1
3
0
0
0
327 13
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
7
0.5%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2011 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
331 13
Primary Metal Manufacturing
19
1.4%
0.1%
1
3
4
0
1
1
332 13
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
17
1.2%
-0.4%
2
0
2
0
0
0
333 13
Machinery Manufacturing
31
2.2%
0.2%
1
5
6
0
1
1
334 13
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
37
2.6%
-0.5%
7
4
11
1
1
2
335 13
Electrical Equipment, Applicance, and Component
Manufacturing
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
6
0.4%
-0.5%
1
1
2
0
0
0
336 13
41
2.9%
0.0%
6
2
8
1
1
2
339 13
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
32
2.3%
0.9%
11
0
11
0
0
0
423 13
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods
63
4.5%
-3.6%
3
1
4
1
0
1
424 13
Merchant Wholesales, Nondurable Goods
73
5.2%
-0.3%
10
4
14
2
1
3
425 13
Wholesale Electric Markets and Agent and Brokers
2
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
441 13
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers
6
0.4%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
442 13
Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores
3
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
443 13
Miscellaneous Repair Services
1
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
444 13
Electronics and Appliance Stores
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
445 13
Food and Beverage Stores
5
0.4%
-0.2%
3
0
3
1
0
1
446 13
Health and Personal Care Stores
10
0.7%
0.2%
3
1
4
0
0
0
447 13
Gasoline Stations
5
0.4%
-0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
448 13
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
451 13
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music Stores
4
0.3%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
452 13
General Merchandise Stores
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
453 13
Miscellaneous Store Retailers
3
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2011 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
454 13
Nonstore Retailers
12
0.9%
0.1%
3
0
3
1
0
1
481 13
Air Transportation
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
483 13
Water Transportation
4
0.3%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
484 13
Truck Transportation
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
486 13
Pipeline Transportation
7
0.5%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
488 13
Support Actitivies for Transportation
6
0.4%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
492 13
Couriers
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
511 13
Publishing Industries (except Internet)
51
3.6%
0.5%
1
8
9
0
5
5
512 13
Motion Pictures and Sound Recording Industries
5
0.4%
0.1%
1
0
1
1
0
1
515 13
Broadcasting (except Internet)
12
0.9%
0.1%
0
1
1
0
1
1
517 13
Telecommunications
34
2.4%
-0.3%
2
5
7
0
3
3
518 13
Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data
Processing Services
Other Information Services
10
0.7%
-0.8%
0
2
2
0
1
1
19
1.4%
0.8%
2
1
3
0
0
0
522 13
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
27
1.9%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
523 13
Securitites, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial
Investments and Related Activities
Insurance Carriers and Related Actitivities
147
10.5%
2.9%
1
2
3
0
0
0
52
3.7%
-0.3%
2
9
11
1
3
4
525 13
Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
18
1.3%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
531 13
Real Estate
7
0.5%
0.1%
1
0
1
1
0
1
532 13
Rental and Leasing Services
10
0.7%
0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
533 13
Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except
Copyrighted Works)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
7
0.5%
0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
85
6.1%
0.0%
4
3
7
1
2
3
519 13
524 13
541 13
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2011 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
551 13
Management Companies and Enterprises
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
561 13
Administrative and Support Services
33
2.4%
0.4%
3
0
3
1
0
1
562 13
Waste Management and Remediation Services
7
0.5%
0.3%
0
2
2
0
2
2
591 13
All Other Support
3
0.2%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
1
1
0
0
0
611 13
Educational Services
9
0.6%
0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
621 13
Ambulatory Health Care Services
16
1.1%
-1.0%
1
0
1
0
0
0
622 13
Hospitals
35
2.5%
0.4%
15
1
16
4
1
5
623 13
Nursing Care Facilities
4
0.3%
0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
711 13
Performing Arts, Spector Sports, and Related Industries
1
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
713 13
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries
8
0.6%
0.4%
2
0
2
0
0
0
721 13
Accommodation
4
0.3%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
722 13
Food Services and Drinking Places
19
1.4%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
811 13
Repairs and Maintenance
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
812 13
Personal and Laundry Services
6
0.4%
0.2%
0
1
1
0
0
0
813 13
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar
Organizations
Administration of Human Resource Programs
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,400
100.0%
135
71
206
20
29
49
923 13
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2012
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2011 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
000 13
Not Available
66
4.7%
2.6%
7
11
18
0
1
1
0
112 13
Animal Production
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
2
2
0
0
0
1
113 13
Forestry and and Logging
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
211 13
Oil and Gas Extraction
25
1.8%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
212 13
Mining (except Oil and Gas)
4
0.3%
-0.3%
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
213 13
Support Activities for Mining
18
1.3%
-0.8%
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
221 13
Utilities
36
2.6%
-0.9%
0
1
1
0
0
0
17
236 13
Construction of Buildings
9
0.6%
0.5%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
237 13
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction
11
0.8%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
1
1
3
238 13
Specialty Trade Contractors
6
0.4%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
311 13
Food and Kindred Products
27
1.9%
-0.3%
2
0
2
0
0
0
10
312 13
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
11
0.8%
0.3%
2
1
3
0
2
2
4
313 13
Textile Mills
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
314 13
Textile Products
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
315 13
Apparel Manufacturing
2
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
316 13
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
321 13
Wood Product Manufacturing
3
0.2%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
322 13
Paper Manufacturing
13
0.9%
0.1%
1
0
1
0
1
1
5
323 13
Printing and Related Support Actitivies
4
0.3%
0.1%
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
324 13
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
13
0.9%
0.3%
2
1
3
1
0
1
1
325 13
Chemical Manufacturing
61
4.4%
-1.0%
14
2
16
3
0
3
28
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2012
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2011 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
326 13
Plastics and Rubber Manfuacturing
28
2.0%
0.3%
5
1
6
0
0
0
7
327 13
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
9
0.6%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
331 13
Primary Metal Manufacturing
16
1.1%
0.2%
0
4
4
0
1
1
7
332 13
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
19
1.4%
-0.4%
2
0
2
0
0
0
2
333 13
Machinery Manufacturing
48
3.4%
0.6%
2
4
6
0
1
1
15
334 13
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
60
4.3%
0.8%
9
3
12
1
1
2
12
335 13
Electrical Equipment, Applicance, and Component
Manufacturing
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
13
0.9%
-0.1%
1
1
2
0
0
0
2
42
3.0%
0.4%
5
3
8
1
1
2
11
337 13
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
2
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
339 13
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
23
1.6%
-0.4%
8
0
8
0
0
0
12
423 13
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods
74
5.3%
-1.6%
2
1
3
1
0
1
23
424 13
Merchant Wholesales, Nondurable Goods
75
5.4%
0.2%
17
4
21
2
1
3
25
425 13
Wholesale Electric Markets and Agent and Brokers
2
0.1%
-0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
441 13
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers
7
0.5%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
442 13
Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
443 13
Miscellaneous Repair Services
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
444 13
Electronics and Appliance Stores
2
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
445 13
Food and Beverage Stores
7
0.5%
0.4%
3
0
3
1
0
1
3
446 13
Health and Personal Care Stores
8
0.6%
0.2%
3
0
3
0
0
0
2
447 13
Gasoline Stations
8
0.6%
0.0%
2
0
2
0
0
0
1
448 13
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores
8
0.6%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
336 13
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2012
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2011 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
451 13
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music Stores
1
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
452 13
General Merchandise Stores
12
0.9%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
453 13
Miscellaneous Store Retailers
5
0.4%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
454 13
Nonstore Retailers
15
1.1%
0.0%
2
0
2
1
0
1
8
482 13
Railroad Transportation
3
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
483 13
Water Transportation
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
484 13
Truck Transportation
3
0.2%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
486 13
Pipeline Transportation
16
1.1%
0.4%
2
0
2
0
0
0
5
488 13
Support Actitivies for Transportation
7
0.5%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
492 13
Couriers
1
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
493 13
Warehousing and Storage
1
0.1%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
511 13
Publishing Industries (except Internet)
66
4.7%
0.5%
1
3
4
0
5
5
21
512 13
Motion Pictures and Sound Recording Industries
7
0.5%
0.1%
2
0
2
1
0
1
4
515 13
Broadcasting (except Internet)
12
0.9%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
516 13
Internet Publishing and Broadcasting
1
0.1%
-0.6%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
517 13
Telecommunications
28
2.0%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
3
3
9
518 13
Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data
Processing Services
Other Information Services
34
2.4%
0.0%
1
5
6
0
1
1
5
22
1.6%
1.2%
2
0
2
0
0
0
8
522 13
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
22
1.6%
-0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
7
523 13
Securitites, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial
Investments and Related Activities
Insurance Carriers and Related Actitivities
33
2.4%
-0.6%
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
43
3.1%
-0.5%
1
10
11
1
3
4
25
519 13
524 13
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2012
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2011 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
525 13
Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
1
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
531 13
Real Estate
5
0.4%
0.0%
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
532 13
Rental and Leasing Services
8
0.6%
0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
5
533 13
Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted
Works)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
14
1.0%
-0.7%
2
1
3
0
0
0
3
111
7.9%
-1.1%
4
6
10
1
2
3
32
541 13
561 13
Administrative and Support Services
35
2.5%
0.3%
1
0
1
1
0
1
10
562 13
Waste Management and Remediation Services
9
0.6%
0.3%
0
2
2
0
2
2
5
611 13
Educational Services
4
0.3%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
621 13
Ambulatory Health Care Services
22
1.6%
-1.6%
4
0
4
0
0
0
7
622 13
Hospitals
30
2.1%
0.1%
14
1
15
4
1
5
22
623 13
Nursing Care Facilities
5
0.4%
0.2%
3
0
3
0
0
0
2
711 13
Performing Arts, Spector Sports, and Related Industries
8
0.6%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
713 13
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries
8
0.6%
0.4%
3
0
3
0
0
0
5
721 13
Accommodation
5
0.4%
-0.4%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
722 13
Food Services and Drinking Places
19
1.4%
0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
811 13
Repairs and Maintenance
7
0.5%
-0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
812 13
Personal and Laundry Services
5
0.4%
0.2%
1
1
2
0
0
0
3
923 13
Administration of Human Resource Programs
1
0.1%
5000000.0%
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1,400
100.0%
135
71
206
20
29
49
452
1 Fiscal year 2012 figures include transactions reported between October 1, 2011 and September 30, 2012.
2 The size of transaction is based on the aggregate total amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests and/or assets held by the acquiring person as a result of the transaction
and are taken from the response to Item 2 (d)(iii), 2 (d)(vii), and 2(d)(ix) of the Notification and Report Form.
3 These statistics are based on the date the Second Request was issued.
4 During fiscal year 2012, 1429 transactions were reported under the HSR Premerger Notification program. The smaller number, 1400, reflects the adjustments to eliminate the
following types of transactions: (1) transactions reported under Section 7A(c)(6) and (c)(8) (transactions involving certain regulated industries and financial businesses); (2)
transactions deemed non-reportable; (3) incomplete transactions (only one party in each transaction filed a compliant notification); and (4) transactions withdrawn before the
waiting period began. The table does not, however, exclude competing offers or multiple HSR transactions resulting from a single business transaction (where there are multiple
acquiring persons or acquired persons).
5 The total number of filings under $50M submitted in Fiscal Year 2012
reflects corrective filings.
6 In February 2001, legislation raised the size of transaction from $15 million to $50 million with annual adjustments beginning in February 2005.
7 The category labeled “Sales Not Available” includes newly-formed acquiring persons, foreign acquiring person with no United States revenues, and acquiring persons who had
not derived any revenues from their investments at the time of filing.
8 Assets of an acquired entity are not available when the acquired entity’s financial data is consolidated within its ultimate parent.
9 Sales of an acquired entity are taken from responses to Item 4(a) and (b) (SEC documents and annual reports) or item 5 (dollar revenues) of the Premerger Notification and Report
Form.
10 This category includes acquisition of newly-formed entities from which no sales were generated, and acquisitions of assets which produced no sales revenues during the prior
year to filing the Notification and Report Form.
11 The 3-digit codes are part of the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) established by the United States Government North American Industrial
Classification System 1997, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. The NAICS groups used in this table were determined from responses submitted
by the parties to Item 5 of the Premerger Notification and Report Form.
12 This represents the deviation from the fiscal year 2011 percentage.
13 This category includes transactions by newly-formed entities.
14 The intra-industry transactions column identifies the number of acquisitions in which both the acquiring and acquired person derived revenues from the same 3-digit NAICS
code.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.