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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of

)

)

)

Eusebio Juarez-Rufino,

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Appellant.

__________________________________________)

Docket No. 9444

DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................. i

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................iii

I.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE.................................................................................... 2

A.

HISA and the Industry Regulatory System............................................... 2

B.

The HIWU Search....................................................................................... 5

C.

Mr. Juarez’s Explanation to HIWU. .......................................................... 8

D.

Proceedings Before the Oaklawn Park Stewards. ................................... 11

E.

The Arbitration Proceeding. ..................................................................... 12

F.

The Arbitrator’s Decision.......................................................................... 14

G.

Commencement of this Review Proceeding. ............................................ 19

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW................................................................. 21

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW. ........................................................................................... 21

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES............................................................................... 22

A.

HIWU Proved Mr. Juarez Violated Rule 3214(a). ................................... 22

B.

Mr. Juarez’s Defenses of Lack of Knowledge and Intent. ....................... 23

V. SANCTIONS ISSUES........................................................................................... 23

A.

The Two-Year Ineligibility Period Should Not Be Eliminated for

No Fault or Negligence (“NF”) or Reduced for No Significant Fault

or Negligence (“NSF”). .............................................................................. 23

1.

Overview of the NF and NSF Defenses. .......................................... 23

2.

Must NF or NSF be Considered?...................................................... 24

a. The Basis for the Evidentiary Hearing....................................... 24

b. Mr. Juarez’s “Fundamental Fairness” Argument. ..................... 26

c. The NF and NSF Defenses.......................................................... 29

3.

Mr. Terrazas’s Account of the Events. ............................................. 29

a. The Predator’s Attack.................................................................. 30

b. Obtaining the Two Syringes........................................................ 31

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c. Treating the Injured Roosters..................................................... 33

d. The “Forgotten” Syringes. ........................................................... 35

e. Details. Details. Details. ............................................................. 37

f. The Bottom Line. ......................................................................... 41

4.

Consideration of NSF........................................................................ 44

a. NSF: Objective Considerations. .................................................. 45

b. NSF: Subjective Considerations. ................................................ 47

5.

B.

C.

Consideration of NF.......................................................................... 49

The Fine Imposed is Increased, While the Adjudication Costs Will

Be Unchanged. .......................................................................................... 50

1.

The Fine. ........................................................................................... 50

2.

Arbitration Costs............................................................................... 52

Aggravating Circumstances Will Not Be Applied. .................................. 53

VI. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 56

ii

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

General

ADMC – Anti-Doping and Medication Control (Rule Series 3000)

Authority – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority

HISA – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60

HIWU – Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit

Review Proceeding

AB – Appeal Book

AB2 – Appeal Book 2 (Arbitration hearing transcript)

AuOBr. – Authority’s Opening Brief

AuPFOF – Authority’s Proposed Findings of Fact

AuPCOL – Authority’s Proposed Conclusion of Law

AuRBr. – Authority’s Reply Brief

AuX – Authority’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit

CX – Court’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit

JOBr. – Juarez’s Opening Brief

JPFOF – Juarez’s Proposed Findings of Fact

JPCOL – Juarez’s Proposed Conclusions of Law

JRBr. – Juarez’ Reply Brief

JRAuPFOF – Juarez’s Reply to the Authority’s Proposed Findings of Fact

JX – Juarez Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit

Tr. – Transcript of February 19, 2026 Evidentiary Hearing

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The Horseracing Integrity and Welfare Unit (“HIWU”), a private body,

enforces thoroughbred horseracing rules adopted under the federal Horseracing

Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). 1 In January 2025, HIWU investigators

searched the SUV owned by appellant Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, a thoroughbred

racehorse trainer, at Oaklawn Park Racetrack in Hot Springs, Arkansas. In the

SUV’s front-seat center console, the investigators discovered two filled hypodermic

syringes. Laboratory analysis later determined the syringes contained a substance

that is prohibited in racehorses covered by HISA.

Mr. Juarez told the investigators “he didn’t know how [the syringes] got” into

his vehicle, and that he did not know “what substance the two syringes contained.” 2

He further said “he had recently picked up his vehicle from the . . . repair shop, and

that . . . the mechanic must have left them in there.” 3

Subsequently, HIWU charged Mr. Juarez with violating one of the HISA

Rules, and an Arbitrator heard the charge under applicable procedural Rules.

Mr. Juarez’s principal defense was that the syringes were not his. Instead, he

maintained, the automobile mechanic who had serviced his SUV had obtained the

syringes to treat injured roosters that the mechanic raised. When the mechanic

1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051 et seq.; Rule 3010(e)(1). Capitalized terms used, but not defined, in this

Decision, are from HISA Rule 1020 of the General Provisions included in the Anti-Doping and

Medication Control Program rules. Other abbreviations are set forth in the Table of Abbreviations.

References to a “Rule” are to those promulgated under HISA, unless otherwise identified.

2 AB 141 (Bennett report), AB2 709 (Bennett).

3 AB2 709 (Bennett).

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returned the SUV to Mr. Juarez, the mechanic forgot he had put the syringes in the

SUV’s console and, thus, never told Mr. Juarez about them.

The Arbitrator excluded the auto mechanic as a witness at the evidentiary

hearing held and thereafter ruled against Mr. Juarez. He awarded sanctions that

include a two-year period of suspension, which prevents Mr. Juarez from working at

HISA-covered racetracks throughout the country. Mr. Juarez has brought this

proceeding to review the Arbitrator’s determination and the sanctions imposed. As

in the arbitration hearing, this proceeding turns on Mr. Juarez’s contention that he

knew nothing about the two syringes, which, he maintains, the automobile

mechanic had obtained while he had the SUV for servicing.

To more fully develop the facts, I directed an evidentiary hearing, at which

Mr. Juarez’s auto mechanic testified. Based on this now-augmented record, I find

Mr. Juarez’s defense unworthy of belief. Therefore, I affirm the Arbitrator’s decision

and the resulting sanctions.

I.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE.

A.

HISA and the Industry Regulatory System.

Congress enacted HISA in 2020 to provide national uniformity to safety and

substance control in the nation’s thoroughbred racing industry. 4 Among other

things, HISA recognized the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the

“Authority”), a private, independent, self-regulatory, nonprofit corporation, and

4

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60.

2

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charged it with responsibility to “develop[] and implement[] a horseracing antidoping and medication control program” throughout the United States. 5

The Authority promulgated, and the Federal Trade Commission approved,

regulatory rules, which include the statutorily-required anti-doping and medication

control (“ADMC”) Program. 6 HISA and the ADMC Program rules address, in

summary: (1) the persons and thoroughbred racehorses the Program covers; (2) the

substances that are banned outright or subject to threshold presence requirements,

or are regulated as controlled medications; (3) the conduct constituting violations

and corresponding sanctions; and (4) investigation and enforcement in furtherance

of the statute. 7 Under the ADMC Program, the more serious violations are AntiDoping Rule Violations (“ADRVs”), which cover Banned Substances set out in the

Prohibited List issued by the Authority. 8 Banned Substances are “prohibited at all

times” and “should never be in a horse’s system . . . as they serve no legitimate

treatment purpose.” 9

The Authority has contracted with HIWU to implement and enforce the

ADMC Program on behalf of the Authority. 10 HIWU charges of ADRVs are heard by

5

Id. § 3052(a).

Id. §§ 3053, 3055, 3057. Order Approving the ADMC Rule Proposed by HISA (Mar. 27, 2023),

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P222100CommissionOrderAntiDopingMedication.pdf;

88 Fed. Reg. 27894, 2023 WL 3199867 (May 3, 2023) (FTC Notice of Final Rule, effective May 22,

2023), https://hisaus.org/regulations?modal-shown=true#equine-anti-doping-and-controlledmedication-protocol-rules.

6

7

See generally ADMC Rule 3000 series.

8

See also Rules 1020 (definition of ADRV), 3111(a) (Prohibited Substances).

9 Rule 3010(c).

Series).

See also Rule 4111; 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Jan. 26, 2023) (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000

10 15 U.S.C. §§ 3054(e)(1)(B)-(E), 3055; Rules 3010(e)(1), 5720(a).

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an Internal Adjudication Panel, which may, as here, consist of a single arbitrator. 11

The FTC has authority to review Arbitrator decisions resolving HIWU-initiated

enforcement proceedings. 12 Further review is available under the Administrative

Procedures Act. 13

HISA applies to Covered Persons, a term that includes trainers and their

employees. 14 ADMC Program Rule 3214(a) prohibits “Possession of a Banned

Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification for such Possession.” HISA

Rule 1020 defines “Possession,” providing in pertinent part:

Possession means actual, physical possession, or constructive possession

(which shall be found only if the Covered Person has exclusive control or

intends to exercise exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance . . . or the

premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists).

The Rule imposes strict liability, regardless of knowledge or intent, except

where “constructive Possession” is charged. 15 Mr. Juarez, however, has never

argued the Rule 3214(a)’s constructive Possession provision applies. Equally

important, Rule 3214(a) prohibits Possession regardless of whether the Covered

Person administers the Banned Substance to a Covered Horse. 16

11 Rules 3360, 7020.

12 15 U.S.C. § 3058; FTC Rules 1.145-.148.

See 87 Fed. Reg. 60077 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Final Rule).

13 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.

14 Rule 1020 (definition).

Id.; Matter of Shell (“Shell II”), No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16 (FTC ALJ Mar. 6, 2025):

HIWU v. Poole, JAMS Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8 (Aug. 8, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Matter of

Poole, No. 9417, 2023 WL 8435860 (FTC ALJ Nov. 13, 2023).

15

16 Rule 3214.

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Mr. Juarez similarly does not argue that the “compelling justification”

defense, embedded in Rule 3214(a), applies to his case. However, the Rules provide

for two other defenses: (1) No Fault or Negligence (“NF”); and (2) No Significant

Fault or Negligence (“NSF”). If the person charged can prove there was NF on their

part, then Rule 3224 eliminates sanctions entirely. If NSF is proven, sanctions may

be reduced, albeit not eliminated, under Rule 3225. These defenses do need to be

considered, and I discuss them later in this Decision.

Violation of Rule 3214(a) carries a mandatory two-year Ineligibility period for

a first offender, which prohibits their participation in HISA-governed thoroughbred

racing nationally. Additional sanctions include a potential monetary fine, and

payment of adjudication and legal costs. 17 Both equine sporting association codes

and those in sports generally include analogous provisions covering possession of

proscribed substances. 18

B.

The HIWU Search.

During the period relevant to this case, Mr. Juarez was employed as an

“exercise rider” for another Trainer. 19 However, he has “registered [with the

17 Rules 3212, 3223(b). HISA Rule 1020 defines “the penalties resulting from the occurrence of one or

more [Rule] violations” as “Consequences,” which parties often refer to as “sanctions,” a term also

used, but not defined, in the Rules. For simplicity, I use the term “sanctions.”

See e.g., Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication

Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed. 2025); World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Code, Article 2.6 (2021);

USADA v. Drummond, Case No. AAA 01-14-000-6146, at 19 (Dec. 17, 2014) (“The Panel rejects

Drummond’s contention that actual possession requires his specific intent to have under his custody

and control a particular banned substance whose characteristics were fully known to him.”); Eder v.

International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS 2007/A/1286, 1288 & 1289, at ¶¶ 42, 52 (Jan. 4, 2008)

(possession does not require proving “subjective intent,” or “intent to use”); Diethart v. IOC, CAS

2007/A/1290, at ¶ 40 (Jan. 4, 2008) (possession “constitutes in itself an anti-doping rules violation”).

18

19 AB2 824-25, 829 (Juarez). See also AB at 98-99 (EAD Notice), 160, 163 (HIWU Investigative

/Interview Report including Juarez HISA registration number), 573 (Juarez Prehearing Brief).

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Authority] as a covered person,” and thus “agree[d] to comply with the rules.” 20

There is no dispute Mr. Juarez is subject to the prohibitions in the ADMC

Program. 21

As summarized above, HIWU’s search of Mr. Juarez’s SUV at Oaklawn Park

Racetrack, conducted on January 29, 2025, revealed two hypodermic syringes in the

vehicle’s front-seat center console. 22 Both syringes “were fully loaded.” 23 HIWU

seized them and sent them to a testing laboratory. Analysis determined that the

substance in the syringes was diisopropylamine (“dipa”). 24

Dipa is “a vasodilator, causing smooth muscle relaxation and widening of

blood vessels.” 25 It “can improve blood flow and increased oxygen delivery to various

parts of the body,” which can potentially “lead to performance enhancing effects in

racehorses.” 26 “[M]any trainers believe [dipa] improves the performance of their

horses,” enabling racehorses to “go farther faster,” without getting “as exhausted.” 27

See also AB at 160, 163 (HIWU Investigative/Interview Report including

Juarez HISA registration number).

20 AB2 893-94 (Juarez).

21 AB2 897-98 (Juarez). See also id. at 900; Rule 1020 (“Covered Person” means “all Trainers . . . and

the . . . employees of such Persons; any other Persons required to be registered with the Authority;

and any other horse support personnel who are engaged in the care, treatment, training, or racing of

Covered Horses.”).

22 AB 143 (photos showing location of syringes in the SUV), AB2 696-97, 704-08, 690 (Mr. Juarez’s

counsel stipulating that “[t]he vehicle was searched and the syringes were found in the center

console.”).

23 AB2 743 (Bennett).

See also AB 143 (photos of syringes).

See AB 769 (Mr. Juarez’s counsel

stipulating that “what was in the syringes is what Industrial [the laboratory] says was in those.”).

24 AB 155, 157 (laboratory certificates), AB2 712-14 (Bennett).

25 AB 178, at ¶ 5 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.).

See also AB2 at 750 (Hardy).

26 AB 179, at ¶¶ 5-6 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.), AB2 752-53 (Hardy).

27 AB2 715 (Bennett), 753 (Hardy).

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Dipa lacks FDA approval “in any species. . . . [T]here’s no peer-reviewed

scientific evidence supporting efficacy or safety data in any species.” 28 Therefore,

under the Rules, dipa is a Banned Substance, the use of which “is prohibited at all

times.” 29 It also is banned by international equine competition bodies. 30 Mr. Juarez

admittedly knew “there’s a list that tells you what substances and drugs are not

allowed to be present in a race track or present in a racehorse at race time. . . .” 31

He also “admit[s] it would be absolutely improper for [him] to possess the

syringes. 32

Upon HIWU discovering the filled syringes during its search, Mr. Juarez

denied knowing they were in his SUV. 33 He “said he had recently picked up his

vehicle from the mechanic repair shop, and that they [sic] the mechanic must have

left them in there.” 34 HIWU did not credit Mr. Juarez’s comments during the search

and in April 2025 notified him of his possible violation of Rule 3214(a), based on his

Possession of dipa. 35

HIWU’s notice letter stated in part that:

28

Id. 753 (Hardy). See also AB 179, at ¶ 9 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.).

29 Rule 4111. See 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000 Series); AB 179, at ¶¶ 7-9 (Hardy Wit.

Stmt.).

30 AB2 752, 765-66 (Hardy).

31 Id. 895 (Juarez). See also id. at 897 (Mr. Juarez “agree[s] [diisopropylamine’s] on the prohibited

list.”).

32

Id. 825.

33

Id. 832-33, 925-26.

34

Id. 709 (Bennett). See also id. at 833-34, 837 (“I said probably the mechanic.”), 888 (Juarez).

35 AB 97 (EAD Notice).

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During the search of your vehicle, Investigators found in the lower center

console two syringes with capped needles attached that each contained an

unknown clear liquid. . . .

Industrial Laboratories. . .analyzed [the liquid in the syringes] and. . .

confirm[ed] that Diisopropylamine was. . . in the liquid. 36

HIWU further informed Mr. Juarez “[i]f it is agreed or determined that an AntiDoping Rule Violation has occurred,” Mr. Juarez could be subject to sanctions. 37

HIWU also advised that “[a]t this time prior to the issuance of a formal charge for

the alleged violation, you have the opportunity to provide an explanation to

HIWU.” 38

C.

Mr. Juarez’s Explanation to HIWU.

Mr. Juarez took up HIWU’s offer to explain his version of the facts. In a

written factual narrative, his counsel stated: “CP [Mr. Juarez, the Covered Person]

did not ‘own’ or control or intend to possess the substance found in the vehicle. The

substance was intended for use by another man to treat injured farm animals. . . .” 39

This “other man” was his automobile mechanic, Mr. Luis Terrazas, who had

previously serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 40 Counsel’s response included a thenunsigned affidavit—bearing a typed date of February 1, 2025—in which Mr.

36

Id. 101, 102.

37

Id. 98.

38

Id. 101.

39

Id. 167 (Counsel’s response to EAD Notice).

40

Id. 167.

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Terrazas provided his account of what had transpired. 41 He further submitted an

alleged receipt for Mr. Terrazas’s work. 42

According to Mr. Terrazas’s unsigned affidavit, he serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV

during the period January 13-28, 2025. 43 Mr. Juarez brought his SUV in because it

“had been repeatedly overheating.” 44 In order to replicate and then repair the

condition, Mr. Terrazas “drove the SUV several times over the course of about one

week.” 45 Mr. Terrazas had obtained the two filled syringes from “a friend” in order

“to administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at [his] home

later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.” 46

Mr. Terrazas “put the two syringes” into the console of Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 47

The syringes, however, were not used, as Mr. Terrazas’s wife suggested an

alternative treatment, which was successful. 48 Mr. Terrazas returned the SUV to

Mr. Juarez on January 28, 2025—the day before HIWU’s search at Oaklawn Park. 49

However, he never removed the two syringes from Mr. Juarez’s SUV and “never told

[Mr. Juarez he] had put the syringes in the SUV console[.]” 50

41

Id. 171, 173.

42

Id. 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Prehearing Brief) & 175 (repair shop receipt), AB2 847-50 (Juarez).

43 AB 171, at ¶¶ 2, 4 (unsigned affidavit).

44

Id. at ¶ 2. See also AB2 at 843-44 (Juarez).

45 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit).

See also AB2 at 845 (Juarez).

46 AB 171-72, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit).

47

Id.

48

Id. 172, at ¶¶ 8-9.

49

Id. 171, at ¶ 4.

50

Id. 172, at ¶¶ 11-12.

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Upon receiving the SUV back from Mr. Terrazas, Mr. Juarez drove it to

Oaklawn Park the next day without doing an “inventory [of] the contents of his

vehicle. He was unaware of the prohibited substance being present, conspicuously

in view, in the front seat center console.” 51 As counsel put it: “Words spoken at the

time of the search show CP [Mr. Juarez] was unaware. The conspicuous location

supports the notion.” 52

Based on a report from “Australian racing industry experts”—referred to but

not then provided—Mr. Juarez’s counsel maintained that testing of vitamin B-15

“can show up as diisopropylanine.” 53 He further stated the substance in the seized

syringes “is routinely used for treating game fowl. . . . The reasonable explanation is

that Mr. Terrazas intended to use the substance, not CP.” 54

HIWU determined that Mr. Juarez’s explanation “lacked credibility,” and

thus charged Mr. Juarez with “a Possession ADRV. . . .” 55 This was not Mr. Juarez’s

first encounter with HIWU and dipa, however. In April 2024, HIWU discovered a

used syringe, which tested positive for dipa, during a search of the vehicle

Mr. Juarez’s wife had driven to Oaklawn Park. 56 Mrs. Juarez allegedly had used the

Id. 167 (counsel’s statement). See also AB2 at 836 (Juarez) (After receiving the SUV back from

Mr. Terrazas in the evening, “the next day I just jump on and go. I mean, I never . . . I never

searched the car, I never look into the car, and I mean, I just start the car and go to work.”).

51

52 AB 167.

53

Id. 169.

54

Id. 168, 169.

55

Id. 643, at ¶ 2.21 (Corrected Final Decision). See also id. 80-81, at ¶ 25 (HIWU Prehearing Brief).

56 AB2 692-93, 713 (Bennett), 860-65, 902-03, 904 (Juarez).

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dipa to treat roosters that the couple raised. 57 HIWU did not then charge

Mr. Juarez with any ADRV. 58

D.

Proceedings Before the Oaklawn Park Stewards.

Besides HIWU charging Possession of dipa in this case, the Oaklawn Park

stewards charged Mr. Juarez with a violation of Racetrack Safety Program Rule

2230(e), which prohibits any person from “possessing a . . . syringe capable of

accepting a needle or injectable of any kind” on the racetracks. 59 Hearings were

conducted before the stewards, who ruled against Mr. Juarez, and, for reasons not

pertinent here, Mr. Juarez eventually agreed to a 30-day suspension and $2,000

fine. 60 Mr. Terrazas testified in that stewards’ case. 61

Mr. Juarez’s counsel has made much of the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing,

contending that it should either preclude any sanctions in this case, or at least limit

those that can be imposed. 62 As later discussed, I reject this position as without

merit. 63

57

Id. 862, 905 (Juarez).

58

Id. 693 (Bennett), 865-66 (Juarez).

59 AB 643, at ¶ 2.27 (Corrected Final Decision).

See also id. 580 (Agreed Order).

Id. 581, at ¶ 2 (Agreed Order). According to Mr. Juarez’s counsel, the stewards held a “summary

suspension” hearing shortly after HIWU’s search and after that a “merits hearing” on April 28, 2025.

Id. 168 (undated statement), 679-81. See also AB2 838-39 (Mr. Juarez testified at the summary

hearing about “a week later.”), 842 (there was a second hearing).

60

61 AB2 799-808 (Juarez counsel), 839-40, 842-43, 858 (Juarez); Review Pet. at 4, 6.

See AB2 679-83, 685-88 (Juarez counsel opening), 721-24, 730-33, 741 (Bennett), 828, 838-43, 85657, 859-60, 866-68 (Juarez), 955-61, 964-66, 969 (Juarez counsel closing); JPFOF ¶¶ 10, 12-15, 17;

JPCOL ¶ 14; JOBr. at 2; JRBr. at 1-4.

62

63

See pp. 26-28 below; JRBr. at 1-4.

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E.

The Arbitration Proceeding.

In May 2025, HIWU issued its EAD Charge Letter, alleging that Mr. Juarez’s

Possession of dipa violated Rule 3214(a), and an arbitration was begun. 64 In June

2025, the Arbitrator issued Procedural Order No. 1, which set a September 2025 for

the hearing on the merits. 65 The Order further: (1) established the schedule for the

parties to submit prehearing briefs in August 2025; (2) required disclosure of each

side’s witnesses and corresponding witness statements to accompany their prehearing briefs; (3) directed the parties to submit any stipulation of facts shortly

before the hearing dates, and to coordinate on scheduling witnesses. 66 The Order

also provided that “[a]ll deadlines and requirements stated herein will be strictly

enforced.” 67

Things did not proceed smoothly, however. First, Mr. Juarez failed to serve

his prehearing brief and related hearing submissions by the August deadline, and

HIWU moved for a default judgment. 68 After a September conference at which both

sides appeared, the Arbitrator denied HIWU’s motion. 69 At this point, Mr. Juarez

had identified no hearing witnesses, but instead argued that “HIWU should know

what [his] defense and evidence and witnesses would be based upon [Mr. Juarez’s]

64 AB 5 (HIWU letter to JAMS), 123 (EAD Charge letter).

65

Id. 643-44, at ¶¶ 3.1-.3 (Corrected Final Decision).

66

Id. 644-45, at ¶ 3.4.

67

Id. 645, at ¶ 3.4.

68

Id. at ¶¶ 3.5-.7.

69

Id. at ¶¶ 3.8-.10 (Corrected Final Decision), 568 (Procedural Order No. 2).

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prior litigation in the HISA Stewart’s Ruling,” referred to above. 70 The Arbitrator

“ruled that [Mr. Juarez] is entitled to due process and should, at a minimum, be

afforded the opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses called by [HIWU] and to

make an argument in his defense at the Hearing on the merits.” 71

With the September merits hearing only a few days away, Mr. Juarez’s

defense to HIWU’s Possession charge was, in summary, that: (1) he “did not

inventory the contents of” his SUV before driving it to Oaklawn Park on the day of

the search, and thus “was unaware of the prohibited substance [dipa] being present

in the front seat center console” 72; (3) “he did not ‘own,’ control, or intend to possess

the substance/syringes,” which Mr. Terrazas allegedly had intended to use “to treat

injured farm animals” 73; and (3) “he did not have any viable cause to purposely

bring the [dipa] within the enclosure as it was not even a racing day.” 74

Two days before the September arbitration hearing, Mr. Juarez served his

prehearing brief, which identified Mr. Terrazas as a witness and summarized the

facts Mr. Juarez had offered to HIWU months earlier in response to HIWU’s EAD

Notice Letter. 75 Among the proposed exhibits was a now-signed and notarized

version of the Terrazas affidavit, dated February 1, 2025. 76 Other proposed exhibits

70

Id. at ¶ 3.9 (Corrected Final Decision).

71

Id. at ¶ 3.10.

72

Id. 643, at ¶ 2.22.

73

Id. at ¶ 2.23.

74

Id.

75

Id. 570 et seq. (Juarez Prehearing Brief)

76

Id. 583 (unsigned affidavit) & 586 (signature page).

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included the repair shop receipt, dated January 28, 2025, also previously provided

to HIWU. 77

HIWU promptly moved to exclude Mr. Juarez’s untimely submission or,

alternatively, for a continuance of the hearing, set to begin in less than 48 hours. 78

The Arbitrator granted exclusionary relief:

[Mr. Juarez’s] untimely witness[], Luis Terrazas . . . , [is] hereby excluded

from the Hearing on the Merits for this matter tomorrow. Further, the

untimely documents [Mr. Juarez] provided to [HIWU] and filed with on

September 9, 2025 are hereby excluded from the Hearing on the Merits

tomorrow.” 79

F.

The Arbitrator’s Decision.

The hearing proceeded as scheduled. HIWU produced witness testimony and

documentary evidence to support its Possession charge. Mr. Juarez did not dispute

that: (1) dipa is a Banned Substance; (2) he had Possession of it in his SUV on the

date of HIWU’s search; (3) he had no “compelling justification” to have the dipa; and

(4) he had an obligation to inventory the SUV when Mr. Terrazas returned it to him

the day before the search and failed to do so. 80

Besides calling Brian Bennett, one of the HIWU investigators who

participated in searching Mr. Juarez’s SUV, HIWU also called Dr. Michael Hardy,

its Chief of Science. Among other things, Dr. Hardy testified that:

77

See id. 597 (repair shop receipt).

78

Id. 604 (HIWU Motion to Exclude).

Id. 613, at ¶ 7 (Ruling on Motion to Exclude). See also id. 646, at ¶¶ 3.18-.20 (Corrected Final

Decision).

79

80

Id. 654, at ¶ 7.1, 656-57, at ¶¶ 7.6-.8 (Corrected Final Decision).

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a. The two syringes discovered in Mr. Juarez’s SUV were of volumes

“consistent with routine volumes of controlled medications that may be

administered to the racehorse depending on the substance that’s being

administered.” 81

b. Their needle size “is consistent with the size of needle routinely used to

administer intravenous or intramuscular injections in the racehorse.” 82

c. The needles would not “be used on chickens or roosters.” 83

More specifically, using photos, Dr. Hardy compared different size syringes

and needles. The larger one was consistent with the two found in Mr. Juarez’s SUV.

The smaller one was recommended for “avian species.” 84 As he explained, if the

larger syringe and needle were used to inject a rooster there was “a significant risk

to inadvertent hemorrhaging and muscle damage, . . . which could be

incapacitating” to the rooster. 85 Moreover, the volume of substance injected into a

rooster “would be much smaller” than that given to a horse. Depending on the

substance, a larger injection could “overdose” a rooster. 86 In sum, “the syringe size

81 AB2 754-55 (Hardy).

82 Id. 755. See also id. 775-76 (the needle size in the seized syringes “would be consistent with one

that you could give to a horse,” based on the “size of their blood vessels”).

83

Id. 755.

84 Id. 757-58. See AB 15, 17-21 (photos) and video at 1:24:35-1:30:18 (Hardy) (Sept. 11, 2025 hearing

video screen sharing photos).

85 AB2 758 (Hardy).

86

Id. 759.

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and needle size and volume of the syringe size are consistent with substances that

may be administered to a horse, both intravenously and intramuscularly.” 87

Mr. Juarez himself was the only defense witness. He maintained that, from

his experience treating chickens, a large hypodermic needle could be used. 88 He also

was permitted to testify regarding matters relating to Mr. Terrazas. 89 The repair

shop receipt, excluded by the Arbitrator’s prehearing ruling, was “ultimately

admitted into evidence.” 90

Mr. Juarez testified that, upon discovery of the two syringes, he told the

HIWU investigators he “didn’t know whose they were,” and said his “SUV had

recently been returned . . . from a shop.” 91 Then, once HIWU’s search ended, “the

first thing” he did was “finish[] my job and I called Luis.” 92 The two knew each

other. Both raise chickens. 93 According to Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas “said he called

one of his friends,” because Mr. Terrazas had “some injured roosters.” 94 The friend

gave him the two syringes, and said “try this. It might help your injured roosters.” 95

Mr. Terrazas also told Mr. Juarez that “he [Mr. Terrazas] took my truck [to his

87

Id. 778.

88

Id. 854-55 (Juarez).

89

Id. 850-51, 853-54.

90

Id. 849.

Id. 832-34. See also id. 837 (“I said probably the mechanic . . . the mechanic put it there”), 857 (“I

don’t even know that it [the syringes] was there.”), 880 (“I don’t know what’s in the truck.).

91

92

Id. 850-51.

93 Id. 851-52. See AB 167, at ¶ 4 (unnumbered) (The two were “previously acquainted.”) (counsel’s

response to EAD Notice).

94 AB2 854 (Juarez).

95

Id.

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friend’s], and when he come back [to Mr. Terrazas’s house], they [sic] never took

them [the syringes] out.” 96 Instead, Mr. Terrazas “told me he forgot it.” 97

However, Mr. Juarez’s testimony on what, exactly, he learned from

Mr. Terrazas about the rooster attack, and when he learned it, is inconsistent. On

cross-examination, he said: “You know, we was talking back and forth, so was a

week and a half . . . a week, week and a half after I dropped the car or something

like that.” 98 But Mr. Juarez maintains that he delivered his SUV to Mr. Terrazas

for servicing on January 13, 2025. The HIWU search took place on January 29—

more than two weeks later. 99 The imprecision on the date might be overlooked as

attributable to the mistaken recollection.

However, Mr. Juarez’s continued testimony undercuts that explanation:

Ms. Heath [counsel for HIWU]: Okay. Did [Mr. Terrazas] tell you he was

going to pick up the medicine in your vehicle?

Mr. Juarez: No. He not told me specifically he’s going to pick up the medicine

in my vehicle. He said he’s going to go and somebody’s going to give him some

medicine, he’s going to go and get it.

....

And I said, “Okay, see if it’s doing better.” And I said, “Okay.” But he not

specifically say what car, he . . . but I know my car was there and he got, let

me say trust, like, he can . . . he can drive my car and run, you know. 100

96

Id.

Id. 853. See also id. 872 (Mr. Terrazas “admitted that he left them there”), 873-74 (Mr. Terrazas’s

intent was “to treat the roosters,” and he “just forget [sic] about it”), 874-75 (“his wife give an oral

application to the roosters and they somehow got better.”), 875-76 (Mr. Terrazas said “he just didn’t

have to use the needles” and “he did not remove” them for the SUV), 876-77 (Mr. Terrazas “felt bad

about it”).

97

98

Id. 917 (ellipses in original).

99

Id. 834-35.

100

Id. 918-19 (ellipses in original; emphases added).

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This conversation on the rooster attack sounds like one that Mr. Juarez and

Mr. Terrazas had before the HIWU search, not after. And that is consistent with

Mr. Juarez’s “week, week and a half” estimate for when, after delivering the SUV,

the two spoke.

In any event, after receiving the witness testimony and exhibits, the

Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez in violation of Rule 3214(a)’s Possession prohibition.

Discussing the evidence proving Possession in greater detail, the Arbitrator held

that Mr. Juarez “had exclusive control” over his SUV, where the dipa was found. 101

And although Mr. Juarez argued “he was not conscious of the Diisopropylamine

being in his vehicle because his vehicle had been in the shop and his mechanic must

have placed the Diisopropylamine filled syringes inside his center console,” that was

“of no legal moment under the definition of Possession.” 102

That left for determination whether Mr. Juarez had proven either No Fault

or Negligence (“NF”) or No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”) as a defense. I

again defer discussing the details of the two defenses until later on. Suffice it at this

point to say that, after analyzing the facts, the Arbitrator determined that

Mr. Juarez’s fault was “considerable.” 103 Therefore, Mr. Juarez “should suffer a

101 AB 657, at ¶ 7.10 (Corrected Final Decision).

102

Id. at ¶¶ 7.8, 7.9.

103

Id. 659, at ¶¶ 7.19 & 7.20. See generally id. 658, at ¶¶ 7.15-.17 (discussing the NSF analysis).

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period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months, commencing with

the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 104

Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions against

Mr. Juarez:

1. A two-year period of Ineligibility.

2. A fine of $10,000, reduced from $25,000 maximum, inasmuch as there was

no evidence Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or gained any benefit from

Possession of the dipa.

3. A contribution of $8,000 toward HIWU’s share of the arbitration costs. 105

The Arbitrator further directed HIWU to publish his decision in accordance with

applicable Rules. 106 The Authority subsequently imposed the sanctions arising from

the arbitration.

G.

Commencement of this Review Proceeding.

As HISA permits, Mr. Juarez sought review of the Arbitrator’s decision and

the sanctions imposed. 107 His principal basis for overturning the decision and

sanctions arises from the Arbitrator’s exclusion of “a necessary defense witness”—

Mr. Terrazas—despite his alleged “prior timely identification of that witness.” 108 In

seeking review, Mr. Juarez requested an evidentiary hearing, where Mr. Terrazas

104

Id. 659, at ¶ 7.22.

105

Id. 659-61, at ¶¶ 7.23-.29, 8.1. See Rule 3223 (prescribing the applicable sanctions).

106 AB 660, at ¶7.30 (Corrected Final Decision) (citing Rules 3231 and 3630).

107

See 15 U.S.C. § 3058; FTC Rules 1.145-.148.

108 Review Pet. at 2.

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could testify, as well as a stay of the sanctions imposed. In a prior Order, I resolved

both matters in favor of Mr. Juarez. 109

Regarding Mr. Terrazas’s exclusion as a witness at the arbitration hearing, I

noted that his evidence “was the centerpiece to [Mr. Juarez’s] entire case. If Mr.

Terrazas testified along the lines in the purported affidavit, and after crossexamination proved to be credible, analysis of HIWU’s Possession charge could

change markedly. . . . Mr. Terrazas’s testimony, if believed, could move the needle

on Mr. Juarez’s NF and NSF defenses, potentially reducing the otherwise

mandatory two-year Ineligibility period.” 110 I concluded that Mr. Terrazas’s

testimony “was so potentially exculpatory that its exclusion impairs the due process

protection applicable in HIWU cases.” 111 Therefore, I directed that an evidentiary

hearing be held to receive his testimony. In addition, I analyzed the factors required

to determine whether to stay the sanctions imposed on Mr. Juarez and granted that

relief as well.

Mr. Terrazas subsequently testified at the evidentiary hearing held in

February 2026. I discuss his testimony below.

109

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2025 FTC Lexis 122 (ALJ Dec. 2, 2025).

110

Id. at *21.

111

Id. at *23.

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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

The issues presented for review are:

1. Did HIWU prove that Mr. Juarez violated Rule 3214(a) by having

Possession of dipa, a Banned Substance, at Oaklawn Park racetrack on January 29,

2025?

2. If liability for violating Rule 3214(a) is proven:

a. Has Mr. Juarez shown either No Fault or Negligence (“NF”), which

eliminates any sanctions, or No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”), which

reduces the sanctions, that may otherwise be imposed; and

b. What sanctions should be imposed?

III.

SCOPE OF REVIEW.

HISA civil sanctions, imposed for Rule violations, are reviewable by an FTC

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upon application of the person aggrieved and

thereafter by the Commission itself on a discretionary basis. 112 The ALJ reviews:

“whether—

(i) a person has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts or

practices, as the Authority has found the person to have engaged in or

omitted;

(ii) such acts, practices, or omissions are in violation of this [chapter] or the

anti-doping and medication control or racetrack safety rules approved by the

Commission; or

112 15 U.S.C. §§ 3058(b)-(c); FTC Rules 1.146-.147.

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(iii) the final civil sanction of the Authority was arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 113

The ALJ’s review of the IAP member’s decision is de novo— “as if it had not

been heard before, and as if no decision previously had been entered.” 114 The ALJ

must determine the merits of the Rule violation charged, and whether the sanctions

the Authority imposed were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 115 In exercising review authority, the ALJ

may “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for further proceedings, in whole

or in part” and “make any finding or conclusion that, in [their] judgment . . . is

proper and based on the record.” 116

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES.

A.

HIWU Proved Mr. Juarez Violated Rule 3214(a).

It is undisputed that: (1) Mr. Juarez was in Possession of two syringes that

contained dipa at Oaklawn Park racetrack on January 29, 2025; (2) Dipa is a

Banned Substance under the HISA Rules; and (3) Mr. Juarez did not have a

113 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A).

See also FTC Rule 1.146(b)(1)-(3).

Shane v. Albertson’s Inc., 504 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (review under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim) (quoting Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001,

1004 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Harris v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292, 1295 (11th Cir.

2022) (“De novo means . . . a fresh, independent determination of the ‘matter’”) (quoting with

approval Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Reyes-Colón v. United States,

974 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) (“review . . . de novo . . . is a legalistic way of saying we critique the

judge’s decision without giving any deference to his views”); Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental

Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court’s grant of summary judgment [is

reviewed] de novo,” and “[i]n so doing, we need not defer to factual findings rendered by the district

court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aquarius Marine Co. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.

1995) (on de novo review, the appellate court “give[s] no deference to the lower court”).

114

115 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(1)-(3).

116 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).

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“compelling justification” for having the dipa that HIWU discovered. On these

undisputed facts, the Arbitrator concluded that HIWU proved Mr. Juarez violated

Rule 3214(a) to his comfortable satisfaction. I similarly so find.

B.

Mr. Juarez’s Defenses of Lack of Knowledge and Intent.

Mr. Juarez maintains that when he drove his SUV to Oaklawn Park

racetrack on January 29, 2025, he did not know there were two syringes containing

dipa in the vehicles console and, hence, did not know he was in Possession of a

Banned Substance. 117 Further, he argues he did not intend to administer the dipa to

a Covered Horse. 118 However, as noted earlier, Rule 3214(a) calls for strict liability.

Neither Mr. Juarez’s claimed lack of knowledge of the dipa, nor his intent regarding

its use, are a defense, but instead may only be considered in the NF or NSF

analysis, which I consider below.

V.

SANCTIONS ISSUES.

A.

The Two-Year Ineligibility Period Should Not Be Eliminated for No

Fault or Negligence (“NF”) or Reduced for No Significant Fault or

Negligence (“NSF”).

1.

Overview of the NF and NSF Defenses.

Under Rule 3224(a), by proving NF on his part Mr. Juarez can eliminate the

Ineligibility and monetary sanctions that may be imposed for Possession of dipa.

NF, which applies only “in exceptional circumstances,” requires Mr. Juarez to show

that he “did not know or suspect, and could not reasonably have known or

117

See, e.g., JPFOF ¶ 6; JPCOL ¶¶ 4, 6 & Ultimate Finding ¶ A; JOBr. at 1, 2.

118

See, e.g., JPFOF ¶¶ 6, 9, 10, 31 & Ultimate Finding ¶ B; JOBr. at 1, 3.

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suspected, even with the exercise of utmost caution” that he was committing an

ADRV by having dipa at Oaklawn Park racetrack. 119 Failing proof of NF, under

Rule 3225(a) he may reduce the sanctions by showing he had NSF. 120 NSF requires

Mr. Juarez to prove that, “viewed in the totality of the circumstances and taking

into account the criteria for No Fault or Negligence,” his conduct “was not

significant in relationship to” the Possession ADRV charged. 121 Much like NF, NSF

applies “where the circumstances are truly exceptional and not in the vast majority

of cases.” 122 Both equine sporting association codes and those in sports generally

include analogous provisions. 123

Before discussing the two defenses, however, I address whether there is any

need to do so at all.

2.

Must NF or NSF be Considered?

a.

The Basis for the Evidentiary Hearing.

In requesting an evidentiary hearing and a stay of the sanctions imposed,

Mr. Juarez argued that excluding Mr. Terrazas as an arbitration witness violated

constitutional due process, as well as various HISA Rules. 124 As noted, neither

Mr. Juarez’s knowledge of the dipa in his SUV, nor his intent to administer it to a

119 Rules 1020 (NF definition), 3224(b).

120

See generally Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *40-46; Matter of Poole, 2023 WL 8435860 at *2.

121 Rule 1020 (definition of NSF).

122

Ali Alabbar v. FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, at ¶¶ 12.17(1), 12.18 (Sept. 27, 2013) (cleaned up).

See, e.g., FEI Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed.

2025); WADA Code, Article 2.6 (2021).

123

124

See Review Pet. at 2, 5, 7, 9.

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Covered Horse, are defenses to Possession. However, in considering Mr. Juarez’s

argument, I wrote that testimony from Mr. Terrazas could be relevant to NF or NSF

defenses. 125 If Mr. Terrazas’s testimony were believed, under NF or NSF, that could

“potentially reduc[e] the otherwise mandatory two-year Ineligibility period.” 126

Thus, I held that, since he was entitled to due process protection under the

HISA and FTC Rules, “a fair and impartial resolution of the case would have been

better assured by not excluding” Mr. Terrazas as a witness. Accordingly, I held that

an evidentiary hearing to receive Mr. Terrazas’s testimony should be conducted. 127

Now, however, the rub is this:

Although the Arbitrator analyzed and rejected NSF, and by necessary

implication NF, as defenses, in seeking review here Mr. Juarez did not explicitly

raise either defense, independent of the due process and HISA Rule arguments he

did assert. 128 He also did not raise either defense in his opening papers arguing the

merits of this review; by contrast, the Authority has raised and discussed these

defenses. 129 Ordinarily, Mr. Juarez’s omission would end the matter. 130 And,

125

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, 2025 FTC Lexis 122, at *29.

126

Id. at *21.

127

Id. at *27-28. See id. at *19-23.

128

See Review Pet.

129 AuPCOL ¶¶ 4-5; AuOBr. at 15, 16, 18-19, 21-23; AuRBr. at 16.

130 See, e.g., Hussein v. Maait, 129 F.4th 99, 123 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[A]rguments not made in an

appellant’s opening brief are waived even if the appellant pursued those arguments in the district

court or raised them in a reply brief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sawyers v. Norton, 962

F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues [presented below, but] not raised in the opening brief are

deemed abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted); Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047,

1065-66 (11th Cir. 2012) (The Court of Appeals would not consider arguments made during oral

argument, but not made in the appellant’s opening brief).

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because Mr. Juarez has not raised the defenses that seemingly could render

Mr. Terrazas’s testimony relevant, arguably his testimony should not be admitted

into the record at all, much less evaluated as worthy or unworthy of belief.

b.

Mr. Juarez’s “Fundamental Fairness” Argument.

The concern I have with this course of action, however, is that Mr. Juarez

does press his contention that it violates “fundamental fairness” to impose sanctions

in addition to those arising from the Oaklawn Park stewards proceeding as both

cases “arise from a single act of possession involving the same items.” 131 He further

asserts that sanctioning him in this proceeding “for the same operative facts” would

“be duplicative and disproportionate. . . .” 132 Therefore, sanctions, he contends,

should “be limited to, and not exceed, the prior 30-day suspension.” 133 To be sure,

Mr. Juarez’s argument is not well-developed, and I reject his defense as

insufficiently presented to warrant further consideration. 134

I also reject Mr. Juarez’s argument on the merits for these reasons:

131 JPCOL ¶ 15.

132

Id. ¶ 14; JOBr. at 2.

133 JOBr. at 2.

See, e.g., Kelley v. Alpine Site Servs., Inc., 110 F.4th 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Appellants are

required to present an argument and citations to supporting authority for each contention in their

brief. They must provide meaningful analyses for each issue and present more than conclusory

allusions as to their arguments for the issues to be properly raised on appeal.”); Twin City Fire Ins.

Co. v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., 118 F.4th 567, 574 n.8 (3d Cir. 2024) (A contention “mentioned only

in passing” is “forfeited.”) (citing authorities); Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2010)

(“[T]his is an appropriate case in which to apply the venerable precept that appellate arguments

advanced in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by citations to relevant authority, are deemed

waived.”); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts do not sit as self-directed

boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and

argued by the parties. . . . We therefore decline to entertain appellant’s asserted but unanalyzed . . .

claim.”).

134

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First of all, Mr. Juarez asserts that “[t]he identical evidence—same items,

same testimony, same alleged inconsistencies—has already been evaluated twice by

the Oaklawn Park Stewards.” 135 That statement—made without record support—is

simply false—so much so that it is hard to believe Mr. Juarez’s counsel made it in

good faith. HIWU’s only two witnesses—investigator Bennett and expert witness,

Dr. Hardy—both testified in the arbitration hearing that they did not testify before

the Oaklawn Park stewards. 136 Mr. Juarez never offered into evidence in the

arbitration, or on this review, the contents of the Oaklawn Park stewards

proceedings. The Arbitrator himself told Mr. Juarez’s counsel, “none of that

evidence is before me. It’s never been submitted in this case.” 137 And, of course,

statements concerning those proceedings by Mr. Juarez’s counsel during the

arbitration or on this review—however often repeated—are not evidence in this

case. Even allowing for the admission of hearsay in HISA-related proceedings,

Mr. Juarez’s counsel cannot declare himself to be an uncalled, unsworn, and unexamined witness.

The only testimony from the Oaklawn Park stewards proceedings in this case

comes from the Authority, which offered excerpts on cross-examination of

Mr. Terrazas during the evidentiary hearing. 138 Post-hearing, I requested the

Authority to submit transcription of the audio excerpts that were introduced as

135 JRBr. at 1.

136 AB2 721 (Bennett), 784-86 (Hardy).

137

Id. 816.

138 AuX 2-4.

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exhibits, which it submitted as highlighted parts of an entire transcribed stewards

proceeding. However, I reviewed only the highlighted excerpts, and not the rest.

Second, in the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing, Mr. Juarez was held liable

for possessing the two syringes found in his SUV in violation of racetrack rules. 139

Here, Mr. Juarez’s ADRV is based on Possession of the Banned Substance, dipa,

that the syringes contained. 140 Although arising from the same search, the

violations are separate and distinct. Mr. Juarez cites no authority that precludes

sanctions in this case, regardless of how the stewards’ case was resolved. 141

Finally, I am mindful, based on comments during that arbitration hearing

and other material submitted, that there was some “confusion” or “jurisdictional

thing” arising from the stewards proceedings, which resulted in an eventual Agreed

Order between the Authority and Mr. Juarez. 142 However, on this review neither

side explained specifically what this was all about, or whether it was material to

any aspect of this review. Regardless, the Agreed Order itself settled only Mr.

Juarez’s violation of Racetrack Safety Rule 2230(e), which prohibits possession of “a

hypodermic needle, [or] syringe capable of accepting a needle” at HISA-covered

racetracks. 143 Accordingly, Mr. Juarez cannot seriously argue that the Oaklawn

Park stewards proceedings resolves or otherwise limits the sanctions in this case.

139 AB 580-81 (Agreed Order), AB2 680-81 (Juarez counsel), 838-39, 867-68 (Juarez).

140 AB 123-24 (Charge Letter).

Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“there are two offenses” whenever

each offense “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”).

141

142 AB2 682 (Juarez counsel), AB 580 (Agreed Order).

describing the “confusion” in general terms).

See also AB 576 (Juarez prehearing brief

143 AB 580, at ¶¶ 2 & 4, 581, at ¶¶ 1 & 2 (Agreed Order).

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c.

The NF and NSF Defenses.

Despite this, however, Mr. Juarez’s fundamental fairness argument

intertwines with the NF and NSF defenses that formed the basis for receiving

Mr. Terrazas’s testimony and determining whether or not it has exculpatory effect.

In their merits papers, both sides have briefed this very issue. 144 Accordingly, I will

review Mr. Terrazas’s testimony and then discuss the NF and NSF defenses.

3.

Mr. Terrazas’s Account of the Events.

Mr. Juarez professes to have had no knowledge that his SUV had two

syringes containing dipa when HIWU searched the vehicle. Mr. Terrazas, his only

source of potentially corroborating proof, allegedly swore in his affidavit that:

I put the two syringes . . . into the front seat center console compartment of

the SUV. . . . When I placed the two syringes in the console, it was my intent

to administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at my

home later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.

They appeared near death. A friend suggested the injections and gave me the

two syringes.

Neither syringe was ever administered to the farm animals. When I got home

the day I acquired the syringes, my wife suggested giving the animals an oral

medication. We did that. Within 4-6 hours the animals significantly

recovered. All eventually survived the attack.

Because the animals recovered quickly, I never used either syringe. . . . 145

Mr. Terrazas further swears he “never removed the two syringes” from the SUV’s

console, and “never told” Mr. Juarez about them. 146

144 JPFOF ¶¶ 13-30, JOBr. at 1-2, JRBr. at 2-3; AuPFOF ¶¶ 32-48 & AuOBr. at 17-21; AuRBr. at 16.

145 CX 1, at ¶¶ 7-9 (emphasis added) (Terrazas Affidavit).

146

Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.

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On direct examination during the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas

confirmed the basic affidavit scenario, explaining further that the injured “farm

animals” were roosters. 147 The “oral medication” the roosters received, Mr. Terrazas

also testified, were antibiotics and pain relief pills that a veterinarian had

previously prescribed for Mr. Terrazas’s dog. 148 By the time the hearing concluded,

however, Mr. Terrazas’s account was in shambles.

a.

The Predator’s Attack.

Mr. Terrazas testified that his “roosters got attacked with a fox,” which he

later “saw” and “caught . . . with [a] trap” “about a week later.” 149 But Mr. Juarez

himself told the Arbitrator the predator was a “raccoon.” 150 At the evidentiary

hearing, Mr. Terrazas eventually equivocated: “Could have been a racoon, could be

a fox.” 151

Mr. Terrazas discovered the aftermath of the attack in the morning. 152

“[S]ome” of the fowl, Mr. Terrazas testified, died during the attack, with their

“heads torn off” and “feathers all over the place.” 153 His affidavit does not mention

any of this, even though Mr. Terrazas testified he “was really sad about . . . losing

all those chickens.” 154 In his affidavit, Mr. Terrazas swore that, after the fowl

147 Tr. 15-18, 25-26, 28-29; CX 1, at ¶¶ 7-9 (Terrazas Affidavit).

148 Tr. 19, 41-42.

149

Id. 15, 40, 47-48.

150 AB 573 (Juarez prehearing brief).

151 Tr. 15, 40, 47-49, 50-51.

152

Id. 39-40, 65.

153

Id. 65. See also id. at 40-41, 51.

154

Id. 41, 52, 66 (“Nobody asked me.”).

30

See also Tr. at 31, 38-39, 43.

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received alternative treatment, “[a]ll eventually survived the attack.” 155 His

explanation for the sentence and the omissions generally was: “I’m not worried

about the ones that they’re already dead. Worried about the ones I can help.” 156

Mr. Terrazas further testified that “about six” fowl were injured—“three

make it and three died. Or two—two make it, somewhere around that area. . . .

Three and three.” 157 However, at the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing, when he

referred to the injured fowl, there were only “three. Three of them.” 158

b.

Obtaining the Two Syringes.

Mr. Terrazas testified that he obtained the two syringes from a “friend,”

“Juan,” whom he has known for “about three years” and who also raises roosters. 159

The two first connected “[w]ith the chickens.” 160 Mr. Terrazas further testified:

[W]e just get together sometimes and just hang out, exchange chickens, and

stuff like that.

....

They have at the fair, you know, they have these shows that you take them

over there and, you know, just sell them and stuff like that. 161

Reminded that, at the stewards hearing, Mr. Terrazas said his friend’s name

was “Antonio,” Mr. Terrazas testified at the evidentiary hearing that “[h]is name is

155 CX 1, at ¶ 8.

156 Tr. 41.

157

Id. 51, 53.

158 AuX 3, at 00:31:24 (transcription).

159 Tr. 15, 31-32.

160

Id. 33. See also id. at 17.

161 Id. 33-34. See also id. at 35 (They “met at events for roosters. . . . The fairgrounds they have in

Hot Springs County.”).

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Juan Antonio.” 162 Asked for Juan Antonio’s last name, Mr. Terrazas testified, “I

can’t remember his last name, to be honest.” 163

Mr. Terrazas had never before asked Juan for medication for his fowl. 164

However, “[i]n the back of my mind I remembered this friend, and so I called him to

see if he can help.” 165 Juan said, “I’ve got this, you want to try it. I said, why not,”

supposedly without knowing what the two syringes contained. 166 By contrast, at the

stewards hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified he asked “Antonio for vitamins to treat

[his] birds. . . .” 167

At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas said he “didn’t ask [Juan] for a

second syringe. . . . I just take whatever he can provide.” 168 However, once again, his

stewards’ hearing testimony was different:

[H]e gave me one [syringe] that it was a medium sized . . . he’s like, “This is

plenty.” I just say, “Man, give me some more [unintelligible]. I pay you.”

That’s why he end up giving me the second one. . . . 169

The stewards’ hearing testimony was played, and the examination continued:

Q: [Counsel for the Authority]: Did you ask for the second syringe?

A: I have, yeah. 170

162

Id. 32-33.

163

Id. 33.

164

Id. 38. See also id. at 39 (This was “just [a] one-time thing.”).

165

Id. 37.

166

Id. 38. See also id. at 15-16, 39, 53-54.

167

Id. 39; AuX 2, at 20:18 (Juarez asked him for “vitamins or something like that”) (transcription).

168 Tr. 57.

169 AuX 5, at 00:26:31 (transcription).

170 Tr. 58.

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c.

Treating the Injured Roosters.

On direct examination, Mr. Terrazas explained his intent in obtaining the

two syringes:

Q [Counsel for Mr. Juarez]: What did you intend to do with the syringes, sir?

A: Well, I was going to use them for the roosters, but, you know, whenever I

come back home, my wife suggested—you know, because we had a dog that it

was having problems with cancer. So, you know, I was in a hurry, I just used

those pills for the roosters. 171

This treatment sequence dissolved on cross-examination, however.

At the stewards’ hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified he gave the pills to his

injured roosters before obtaining the syringes from Juan:

I was going to put them [the syringe contents] on my chickens. The thing is

that I give them [the roosters] some to [sic] my dog medicine before then in

the morning time. By the time that I come back [from Juan’s], they were

doing better. . . . 172

After hearing his stewards’ hearing testimony, Mr. Terrazas admitted telling the

stewards that his roosters “were all doing better by giving them the medication.” 173

However, later in the evidentiary hearing, he backtracked:

[H]onestly I don’t know if I did it [gave the pills to the roosters] before I left

there—I went to get the medicine or after. I mean, I was stressed out. . . .

Honestly, I don’t remember exactly what happened, you know, on what

sequence it happened. 174

171

Id. 16-17 (emphasis added).

172 AuX 2, at 20:43 (transcription) (emphasis added).

173 Tr. 53.

174

Id. 66. See also id. at 44, 46-47.

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See also Tr. at 52-53 (testimony played).

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Despite Mr. Terrazas’s professed lack of recollection, he dug the hole deeper.

Asked why, after returning with the syringes, he did not use them, he testified:

Because I see that they were doing better. And I didn’t know exactly what the

fluid was inside the syringes. So, you know, I figured instead of taking a

chance, I’d just wait it out a little bit since I was already providing the other

medicine, just don’t want to put too much medicine and end up killing them.

....

I see that they were doing better, so I just kept using those pills. . . . 175

Mr. Terrazas wasn’t through digging, however. Asked about using syringes that he

admitted were bigger than those he had used on a rooster, Mr. Terrazas testified:

“That wasn’t my intent to use those syringes. . . . That was the only place to store

that liquid. He [Juan] didn’t have a special container to give me, so he just gave me

that.” 176

And that testimony from Mr. Terrazas itself contradicted evidence from

Mr. Juarez. Discussing the syringe needle size that could be used with a rooster,

Mr. Juarez maintained that it was “not necessary . . . [to] need to use” a small

needle; “you go in the [rooster’s] chest. So another type of needle, they still go on the

chicken chest.” 177 By contrast, Dr. Hardy, HIWU’s expert, testified the size of the

syringes and needles HIWU discovered were “consistent with [that] routinely used

175

Id. 68, 69 (emphasis added).

176

Id. 56-57 (emphasis added). See generally id. at 56 (testifying regarding the syringe sizes).

177 AB2 855 (Juarez).

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to administer . . . injections in the racehorse,” and, if used with a rooster, raised “a

significant risk to inadvertent hemorrhaging and muscle damage. . . .” 178

d.

The “Forgotten” Syringes.

Upon discovering the predator attack one morning, Mr. Terrazas called

veterinarians, but “nobody wanted to look at” the injured roosters. 179 He

“remembered this friend,” Juan, whom he called “to see if he can help.” 180 Juan said

“yeah, you want to try something. . . . I just jumped in the car”—Mr. Juarez’s

SUV—and “went straight to his house,” a 40-to-45-minute drive. 181 Mr. Terrazas

obtained the two syringes, returned home, attended briefly to a customer at his

repair shop (next door to his house), and checked on his roosters, which were doing

better. 182

At that point, with the syringes still in the SUV, Mr. Terrazas decided to

“wait it out.” 183 The roosters had recovered within “two or three days.” 184

Mr. Terrazas “just completely forgot about those syringes.” 185 It never occurred to

him to ask Juan if he wanted them back, nor did he think he “might need those

syringes in the future.” 186 They remained in the SUV, supposedly forgotten and

178

Id. 754-55, 758 (Hardy).

179 Tr. 37, 39-40, 65.

180

Id. 37.

181

Id. 15, 65, 66.

182

Id. 17, 31, 66-67.

183

Id. 68.

184

Id. 69.

185

Id. See also id. at 17, 19.

186

Id. 69.

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unbeknownst to Mr. Juarez, until Mr. Juarez called Mr. Terrazas after the HIWU

search. 187

Mr. Terrazas “forgotten syringes” testimony is, however, implausible for

several reasons.

First, recall that Mr. Juarez left his SUV with Mr. Terrazas because the

engine was overheating. Mr. Terrazas kept the vehicle at the shop so that he could

try to replicate the problem by driving the SUV. 188 Mr. Terrazas had the SUV for an

extended period; it took “that long, because it wasn’t replicating the problem. . . .” 189

And there is no evidence that Mr. Terrazas had fixed the SUV before his roosters

were attacked. Just the opposite, Mr. Terrazas testified the attack came about “a

week” after Mr. Terrazas received the SUV—“could be a little more, little bit

less.” 190 Mr. Terrazas ordered the parts he determined were needed to repair the

SUV later on. 191

It strains credulity to believe that Mr. Terrazas would take the SUV on a trip

to a location 40-45 minutes away knowing that the vehicle might overheat and leave

him needing a towing service. Similarly, having urgently driven to and returned

from Juan’s to obtain syringes to treat his injured roosters—an 80-to-90 minute

187

Id. 18-20, 48, AB2 850-51.

188 Tr. 13-14, 31.

189

Id. 77.

190

Id. 64-65.

191

Id. 21-22 (showing January 23 and 25 dates).

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roundtrip—it is not believable that Mr. Terrazas—who was “really sad” and

“stressed out” over the predator attack—suddenly experienced amnesia too.

e.

Details. Details. Details.

Sometimes, inability to remember details can be attributed to the fallibility of

memory, or discounted as relating to a tangential matter. But “arguably minor or

irrelevant” inconsistencies can have a “cumulative effect” that supports an “adverse

credibility finding”—particularly when, as here, the inconsistencies accompany

inability to get the big picture straight as well. 192 Here, for example:

1. Mr. Juarez maintains that Mr. Terrazas had his SUV from January 13 to

28, 2025. 193 Since Mr. Juarez drove the vehicle to Oaklawn Park early on January

29, the date of HIWU’s search, and Mr. Terrazas’s receipt for repairs is dated

January 28, the return date seems reasonable. The January 13 start date, on the

other hand, lacks corroboration. On direct examination, Mr. Terrazas claimed to fix

the January 13 drop-off date through his “business records.” 194 But on further

examination, he conceded no document confirms that date. 195 Instead, he used the

January 28 date on his receipt for services to estimate back to when he received the

Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). See also United States v.

Vaughn, No.: 14-23 (JLL), 2015 WL 6948577, at *18 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2015) (“[T]he cumulative effect

192

of the inconsistencies . . . [are] such that the Court finds the Government’s professions of simple

misunderstanding or inadvertent error not credible.”); United States v. Ruffino, 592 F. Supp. 409,

414 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, especially when

given under oath, impose on the court the burden of considering whether they pertain to matters of

importance or unimportant details.”)

193 Tr. 13-14.

194

Id. 13.

195

Id. 77 (“I don’t have a way to track” the delivery date).

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SUV. 196 Mr. Juarez himself testified repeatedly, on both direct and crossexamination, that Mr. Terrazas had the SUV for “about three weeks or so.” 197

2. Based on the receipt for services, Mr. Terrazas testified to returning the

SUV to Mr. Juarez on January 28. 198 The HIWU search was the next day, and

Mr. Juarez—who maintains he knew nothing about the syringes—testified he was

“in shock” after HIWU discovered them. 199 He said “the first thing” after the search

ended, “I finished my job and I called Luis.” 200 Compare Mr. Terrazas’s testimony:

Q [the Court]: When after returning the car to Mr. Juarez did you learn that

Mr. Juarez had had some trouble with the racing, the racetrack officials?

A: Was probably [a] few days after that. I don’t know exactly how many days,

to be honest, but it wasn’t very long at all. 201

While Mr. Juarez’s account might be plausible, Mr. Terrazas’s is not. When the two

spoke, Mr. Juarez would surely have conveyed to Mr. Terrazas his professed urgent

need to find out whether Mr. Terrazas could explain the syringes. The seriousness

of the situation for Mr. Juarez would not have been lost on Mr. Terrazas, and it

would have stuck in his mind. His friend, after all, was in big trouble, and it was his

fault. In testifying to the conversation, it is not likely Mr. Terrazas would place it a

“few days” after he had returned the SUV.

196

Id. 78.

197 AB2 834 (emphasis added), 889, 913 (Juarez).

198 Tr. 14.

199 AB2 832 (Juarez).

200

Id. 850-51.

201 Tr. 72 (emphasis added).

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3. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified that the substance in the

syringes was “a lighter white, clear-ish. . . . It was like a light, whiter.” 202 But at the

stewards’ hearing, Mr. Terrazas said it was “like a brownish.” 203 The photo evidence

demonstrates that the substance is clear in color. 204

4. The center console in the front seat of Mr. Juarez’s SUV has two

compartments, one on top of the (lower) other. 205 The photo of HIWU’s search shows

the syringes discovered in the lower compartment. 206 At the evidentiary hearing,

Mr. Terrazas testified he put the two syringes in the top compartment. 207 Asked

whether he understood “that’s not where the syringes were found, Mr. Terrazas

said: “I don’t know where they were found. It might have been underneath. . . . It’s

the same console.” 208 Contrary to Mr. Juarez’s own testimony, the syringes were not

“in plain view” and would not be found by “just lift[ing] the console. . . .” 209

5. Mr. Juarez’s counsel represented at the arbitration hearing that Mr.

Terrazas “testified at the [Oaklawn Park stewards] summary suspension hearing”

and “again at the merits hearing.” 210 However, Mr. Juarez himself testified that at

202

Id. 54.

203 AuX 4, at 00:28:21 (transcription).

See also Tr. at 55.

204 AB 108-09, 111-12 (photos).

205

Id. 143 (photos of SUV console), AB2 705-06 (Bennett).

206 AuX 7.

207 Tr. 16, 60-61, AuX 6b.

208 Tr. 61, 62.

See also id. at 705-06 (Bennett) (As he “began [his] search” from “the

driver’s side,” he “really couldn’t see that [he] could access that [console],” but “noticed’ once he “got

over to the passenger side . . . there’s a storage compartment there.”).

209 AB2 845-46 (Juarez).

210

Id. 808.

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the summary hearing, Mr. Terrazas’s “signed and notarized” affidavit was

“presented,” and that Mr. Terrazas testified at the merits hearing. 211 At the

evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified, in one breath, that he appeared before

the stewards “on two separate occasions,” and, in another, “[j]ust one time.” 212

6. Mr. Terrazas’s very affidavit, dated and notarized as of February 1, 2025,

raises questions. 213 After learning of HIWU’s search from Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas

spoke by phone with Mr. Juarez’s counsel about “how the syringes came to be in the

vehicle. . . .” 214 The conversation, Mr. Terrazas testified, “that was like way after”

talking to Mr. Juarez. 215

However, Mr. Terrazas also testified he signed the affidavit on February 1,

2025—three days after the HIWU search. 216 Yet, in April 2025—more than two

months later—Mr. Juarez’s counsel submitted an unsigned version of the affidavit

to HIWU, which bore only the typed February 1, 2025 date. 217

Mr. Terrazas’s signed affidavit did not appear in the arbitration until

September 2025. At that point, Mr. Juarez’s counsel attached it to his prehearing

brief, then still bearing the unsigned signature page with the typed February 1,

2025 date, followed by an executed and notarized page that does not bear an

211

Id. 839-40, 842-43.

212 Tr. 20, 69-70.

213 CX 1.

214 Tr. 49.

215

Id. 48 (emphasis added).

216

Id. 71.

217 AB 79-80, at ¶¶ 20-23, 95, 171-73 (HIWU prehearing brief with exhibit).

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independent notarization date. 218 The signed page is a copy that is dissimilar in

appearance from the two preceding pages. 219

If Mr. Juarez did, indeed, sign the affidavit on February 1—three days after

the search—there is no explanation for Mr. Juarez’s counsel submitting the

unsigned version to HIWU more than two months later.

f.

The Bottom Line.

The “law has long recognized that a person who is deemed unbelievable as to

one material fact may be disbelieved in all other respects.” 220 Mr. Terrazas’s

inability to testify credibly on matters—whether big or small—is a telltale sign of

fabrication. His lack of credibility infects Mr. Juarez’s own defense to HIWU’s

charge. As I wrote in deciding to hear Mr. Terrazas’s testimony: “Mr. Juarez ha[s]

no other explanation for what HIWU found. . . . [T]he evidence from Mr. Terrazas

[is] the centerpiece to [his] entire case.” 221 The evidentiary hearing showed that the

“centerpiece” is simply a mirage.

218

Id. 570-71, 583-86.

219

Id. 586.

Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005). See also, e.g., The Santissima

Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 339 (1822) (“[W]here the party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot

220

be presumed liable to mistake,” the principle false in one, false in all, applies with strongest force);

Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single instance of false testimony may . . .

infect the balance of the [party’s] uncorroborated . . . evidence.”); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d

1382, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (upholding a jury instruction that “[i]f you believe that any

witness has willfully testified falsely with respect to any material fact which the witness can not

reasonably be mistaken about, then you may, if you deem fit to do so, disregard all or any part of the

testimony of that witness or you may accept such portion of his testimony as you find worthy of

belief”).

221

Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2025 FTC Lexis 122, at *18-19, 21.

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Mr. Terrazas and Mr. Juarez have been friends for at least four years. 222

Their families socialize together from time to time: “We have cookouts and . . . his

family come over or we go to his house and stuff like that.” 223 Both individuals share

an interest in raising roosters. 224 Bias and partiality are plain enough. But here, it

is not simply a matter of the weight to be given to Mr. Terrazas’s testimony.

Unlike Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas has no involvement in the racing

industry. 225 Since raising roosters is legal in Arkansas, it is unlikely that

Mr. Terrazas would get into trouble by claiming to having two syringes to be used to

treat injured roosters he raised. By contrast, Mr. Juarez faced serious consequences

as a result of having syringes containing a Banned Substance at Oaklawn Park

racetrack. From all the evidence introduced, the reasonable inference is that, once

HIWU discovered Mr. Juarez in Possession of the dipa-filled syringes, Mr. Juarez

called Mr. Terrazas so that the two could cook up a far-fetched explanation for the

presence of the two syringes with dipa in Mr. Juarez’s SUV. Mr. Terrazas would, in

effect, “take the fall.” This was one friend doing another a favor.

In Mr. Juarez’s reply brief, his counsel contends that all this is attributable to

testimony “from non-native English speakers, recollection of routine agricultural

practices, and questioning that demands artificial precision about trivial details.” 226

222 AB2 826 (Juarez); Tr. 30-31.

years.”).

See also Tr. 25; JPFOF ¶ 8 (The two “[h]ave know each other for 6

223 Tr. 25.

224

Id. 12-13, 25, 29.

225 AB2 871-72 (Juarez); Tr. 12, 30.

226 JRBr. at 3.

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I have read both Mr. Juarez’s and Mr. Terrazas’s testimony more than once and

borne in mind English likely is not their native language. Still, I am hard-pressed to

find many instances where either individual professed a lack of understanding or

difficulty expressing himself. I do not find the contention by Mr. Juarez’s counsel

credible. There is too much that doesn’t add up.

If, as I have concluded, Mr. Juarez’s innocuous account is untrue, it may

fairly be inferred that the dipa in the seized syringes was intended for a different—

likely prohibited—use. While working as an exercise rider for Ingrid Mason,

Mr. Juarez not only was paid $1,000 a week to care for the horses, but also would

receive a bonus based on the purse “if a horse did well.” 227 Mr. Juarez thus had an

incentive to inject a Covered Horse with a Banned Substance such as dipa,

considered by some to be performance-enhancing, to benefit financially.

In Datunashvili v. UWW, 228 the athlete introduced into evidence a video that

was proven, and then admitted, to be false. The Panel’s observation is apropos:

“Innocent athletes simply do not create video reproductions of events and hold them

out as true representations of contemporaneous events until challenged under

cross-examination.” 229 They similarly do not enlist a friend to fabricate a story and

offer it as a defense until exposed on cross-examination.

In a prior HISA case, I considered NF and NSF where, based on the required

de novo review, I concluded that the appellant’s “version of the facts. . . [was] not

227 AB2 912 (Juarez)

. See also id. at 717, 720-23 (Bennett).

228 CAS 2024/A/10931 (Nov. 17, 2025).

229

Id. at ¶ 267.

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only unpersuasive, but—more likely than not—contrived.” 230 In these

circumstances, I held that the appellant’s “NF and NSF defenses fail as a matter of

law. A contrived set of facts simply cannot satisfy the ‘no’ element, which is a

condition of each defense.” 231 I reach that same assessment of Mr. Juarez’s version

of the facts here. Because his “injured rooster story” is fabricated, the NF and NSF

defenses fail as a matter of law. Nevertheless, as an alternative ground for my

sanctions rulings, I will analyze, first, the NSF defense to Mr. Juarez’s Possession

ADRV, and thereafter the NF defense.

4.

Consideration of NSF.

Besides considering “the totality of the circumstances,” analysis of NSF also

takes account of the three-tiered approach applied in Cilic v. ITF, 232 which adjusts

the maximum period of ineligibility and appropriate fines where NSF is shown.

Under the Cilic framework the NSF analysis requires consideration of both

“objective” and “subjective” elements of fault: “The objective element describes what

standard of care could have been expected from a reasonable person in the athlete’s

situation. The subjective element describes what could have been expected from

that particular athlete, in light of [their] personal capacities.” 233

Matter of Overly, No. 9443, at 69 (FTC ALJ Jan. 27, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files

/ftc_gov/pdf/614746.2026.01.27_administrative_law_judge_decision_on_application_for_review.pdf,

app. for review, FTC (Feb. 26, 2026).

230

231

Id. at 70.

232 CAS 2013/A/3327 (Apr. 11, 2014).

Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71. See also, e.g., Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *41-42; Poole, JAMS

Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.16-.20, aff’d, 2023 WL 8435860, at *5-7 (discussing the arbitrator’s

three-tiered analysis).

233

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The conclusion of the analysis places the offender in one of three ineligibility

ranges, depending on degree of fault. As adapted for HISA cases under Rule

3225(a), the tiers are:

a. Slight or Insignificant Fault – 3 to 10 months;

b. Moderate Fault – 10 to 17 months; and

c. Significant Fault – 17 to 24 months. 234

Considering Mr. Juarez’s NSF argument, the Arbitrator determined that

Mr. Juarez’s “objective” and “subjective” fault were considerable.” 235 Therefore,

Mr. Juarez “should suffer a period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24

months, commencing with the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 236 Two-years

Ineligibility is the maximum authorized for a first-time Possession violation. 237

a.

NSF: Objective Considerations.

The “objective” analysis of NSF focuses on “what standard of care could have

been expected from a reasonable person in [Mr. Juarez’s] situation.” 238

HISA’s ADMC Program, which took effect in May 2023, represented a change

in the horseracing industry nationwide. Various ADRVs and defenses were defined,

and a Prohibited List was created for designated substances. Stringent sanctions for

Possession of Banned Substances, among other ADRVs, were adopted. In

anticipation of the ADMC Program taking effect, the Authority and HIWU reached

234 Rule 3225(a). See, e.g., Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *42. See also Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at

¶ 69.

235 AB 659, at ¶¶ 7.19-.20 (Corrected Final Decision).

236

Id. at ¶ 7.22.

237

Id. 660, at ¶¶ 7.20-.22.

238

Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71.

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out publicly to educate industry participants. Dr. Mary Scollay, then HIWU’s Chief

of Science, stated publicly that the Program is “your new bible” and advised

industry members to “be more conservative and be more cautious of medication

than you have been. . . .” 239

In March 2023, a leading trade publication quoted HIWU Executive Director

Ben Mosier: “HIWU has been working with state racing commissions and racing

participants for months to educate all the sport’s stakeholders on the new rules,

including through in-person and virtual presentations and the library of resources

on our website.” 240 HIWU’s 2023 Annual Report summarized the outreach:

“Education on HISA’s ADMC Program was a year-long endeavor” which included (1)

“37 on-site presentation delivered at racetracks, training centers, and conferences”;

and (2) “40+” “website . . . educational materials, and on-call assistance.” 241

In these circumstances, a reasonable Trainer would have sought to assure

their understanding of the new regulatory program and, among other things,

reviewed the proposed and adopted ADMC Program Rules. Indeed, Trainers are

required specifically “to be knowledgeable” of the ADMC Program Rules. 242

239 Dan Ross, HIWU’s Scollay: New Medication Rules ‘Your New Bible’,

Thoroughbred Daily News

(Dec. 5, 2022), https://www.thoroughbreddailynews.com/hiwus-scollay-new-medication-rules-yournew-bible/.

240 U.S. Thoroughbred Racing Enters New Era As HISA’s Uniform Anti-Doping Program Takes

Effect, Paulick Report (Mar. 27, 2023).

See also HISA ADMC Program in Full Swing Under HIWU,

BloodHorse (June 6, 2023); Top 10 Ways HISA’s Anti-Doping And Medication Control (ADMC)

Program Will Change Racing, BloodHorse (Mar. 16, 2023); HISA Q&A: The ADMC Program,

Thoroughbred Daily News (Mar. 8, 2023).

241 2023 HIWU Annual Report at 32, 33.

242 Rule 3040(a)(1).

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A reasonable Trainer would also have been mindful of the conduct the ADMC

Program Rules prohibited and have seen that Possession and Administration of a

Banned Substance are separate ADRVs, each of which carries a two-year

Ineligibility period for a first violation. 243 Thus, Possession alone is treated the

same as actual Administration of a Banned Substance into a Covered Horse.

In consequence, a reasonable Trainer would recognize that any vehicle the

Trainer brings to a Racetrack subject to the ADMC Program Rules should be free of

any Banned Substance, absent the Trainer’s ability to meet the “compelling

justification” exception in Rule 3214(a)’s Possession prohibition. Where the vehicle

that the Trainer regularly takes to a HISA-covered Racetrack was not within the

Trainer’s exclusive control, a reasonable Trainer would inspect the vehicle’s

contents before driving it to the Racetrack. That inspection would include checking

specifically in parts of the vehicle where substances could be stored.

Mr. Juarez testified that he was aware, at least generally, of the ADMC

Program Rules and their prohibition of Banned Substances. 244 But this is the least

amount care that might be expected of a reasonable Trainer. Objective

considerations do not support a sanctions reduction under Rule 3225.

b.

NSF: Subjective Considerations.

NSF’s subjective element considers “what could have been expected from

[Mr. Juarez], in light of [his] personal capacit[y].” 245

243

See Rules 3214(a) & (c) and 3223(b).

244 AB2 894-95 (Juarez).

245

Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71.

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Mr. Juarez admitted, on direct examination, that “under the rules, it was

[his] obligation to inventory, to look in every nook and cranny of the vehicle before

[he] went inside the [Oaklawn Park] enclosure and [he] didn’t do it.” 246 Thus, he

testified he did not know the dipa in the two syringes was in his SUV. That conduct

alone tilts the NSF analysis towards “considerable,” and away from “slight.”

Mr. Juarez failure to check out his SUV after Mr. Terrazas returned it tilts

still more toward “considerable” for at least three additional reasons. First,

Mr. Juarez admitted knowing that Mr. Terrazas had previously used syringes,

supposedly for his roosters. 247 Second, Mr. Juarez knew that HIWU could search his

SUV, as he had “been through this process a couple times before.” 248 Third, HIWU’s

search of his wife’s car less than a year earlier had revealed syringes with dipa,

although Mr. Juarez was not charged with a violation as a result. Accordingly,

Mr. Juarez should have been particularly sensitive to the need to inspect his SUV

after Mr. Terrazas returned the vehicle.

Equally significant, despite his professed awareness of the ADMC Program

Rules, Mr. Juarez testified to lacking familiarity that dipa, a potentially

performance enhancing substance, was a Banned Substance:

See also id. at 836 (After receiving the SUV back from Mr. Terrazas in the

evening, “the next day I just jump on and go. I mean, I never . . . I never searched the car, I never

look into the car, and I mean, I just start the car and go to work.”), 889-90 (Mr. Juarez did not look

through the SUV.), 915 (Mr. Juarez did not “conduct an inspection,” although he knew he had “a

duty to ensure that you don’t intentionally or unintentionally bring anything onto the backside of a

track that shouldn’t be there.”)

246 AB2 926-27 (Juarez).

247

Id. 888-89.

248

Id. 897. See id. at 896, 915-16.

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I don’t know how HIWU have it . . . but it’s no [sic] illegal to buy. I mean, you

can go online and you can buy it.

....

I don’t know before [the HIWU search],” that dipa was a Banned

Substance. 249

The veracity of testimony is, however, suspect in view of HIWU’s prior discovery of

dipa in his wife’s vehicle.

Mr. Juarez’s willingness to offer an untruthful defense to HIWU’s Possession

charge is itself a consideration in assessing whether any reduction for NSF is

warranted. 250 Nothing else about NSF’s subjective considerations moves his fault

level downward. Accordingly, I find no basis for adjusting the mandatory two-year

Ineligibility period called for by Rule 3223(b).

5.

Consideration of NF.

Since, under his NSF analysis, the Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez’s fault

“considerable,” it necessarily followed he could not eliminate sanctions entirely

under an NF analysis. Thus, the Arbitrator did not discuss NF further. I, too,

conclude that NSF analysis yields no Ineligibility reduction. Indeed, the augmented

record on this review reinforces that determination.

249

Id. 882, 897.

250 Cf. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (There is no constitutional violation where the

sentencing court enhances the defendant’s sentence based on a finding that the defendant committed

perjury); United States v. Balogun, 463 Fed. Appx. 476, 486 (6th Cir. 2012) (Penalty enhancement

was appropriate where the defendant’s testimony was intentionally and knowingly fabricated, was

“material,” and was “designed to attempt to mislead the jury.”); United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d

783, 788 (1st Cir.1991) (“Once the district court found that the Appellant’s testimony was

intentionally untrue and constituted perjury,” a sentencing enhancement was mandatory).

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Detailed analysis of NF need not be undertaken. Mr. Juarez admittedly failed

to check his SUV for any Banned Substance. That admission alone establishes that

NF does not apply. Mr. Juarez has not shown he “did not know or suspect, and could

not reasonably have known or suspected, even with the exercise of utmost caution”

that he was committing an ADRV by having dipa in his Possession at Oaklawn

Park. 251

B.

The Fine Imposed is Increased, While the Adjudication Costs Will Be

Unchanged.

1.

The Fine.

In addition to a period of Ineligibility, Rule 3223(b) permits fines in a

discretionary amount, authorizing for a first offense “up to” $25,000 or twenty-five

percent of the purse, whichever is greater.” The latter is inapplicable here. That the

fine should “follow”—that is, “be commensurate with”—the fault “is a useful

convention”—a well-recognized default principle, but subject to individual case

adjustment. 252 Although the Arbitrator did not reduce the Ineligibility period, he

awarded a fine of only $10,000, reduced from the maximum based on the absence of

evidence that Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or benefitted from Possession of the

dipa. 253

Cf. FIS v. Johaug, CAS 2017/A/5015 & 5110, ¶ 190 (Aug. 21,

2017) (“[A]thletes have a duty to cross-check assurances given by a doctor even where such a doctor

is a sports specialist.”); Carriere Zwei, FEI Tribunal Decision, Case No. 2007/08, at ¶ 4.1x (Aug. 10,

2007) (despite assurances of a stable veterinarian that a supplement with a “suspicious name” would

not increase testosterone level, an equestrian rider “acted with gross negligence and disregard to the

risks” by not “receiving written advices [sic] from renowned veterinarians”).

251 Rules 1020 (NF definition), 3224(b).

252

See Matter of Overly, No. 9449, at 92-93; Poole, JAMS Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.24-.25, aff’d,

2023 WL 8435860, at *5.

253 AB 660, at ¶ 7.26 (Corrected Final Decision).

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My review here is de novo and based on the full record, including the

testimony of Mr. Terrazas, which the Arbitrator did not have. I find no basis for

reducing the fine from the $25,000 maximum. The Possession prohibition in Rule

3214(a) is a strict liability violation. 254 Intent and actual or potential benefit are

irrelevant as a matter of law except insofar as either may bear on the NF or NSF

analysis. Lack of a bad intent, or the absence of individual benefit, are simply part

of the “utmost caution” or “totality of the circumstances” analyses that NF or NSF

take into account.

Here, the evidence—and my de novo assessment of the veracity of the

evidence Mr. Juarez introduced—weigh so heavily against him that neither

professed lack of intent to cheat or to benefit reduce the Ineligibility period.

Therefore, they do not provide any cognizable offset against the $25,000 maximum

fine. Indeed, if, as I have concluded, Mr. Juarez has fabricated his defense, then

there is indeed wrongdoing, committed before the Arbitrator and attempted on this

review. Maximum deterrence is appropriate when, as here, evidence that is more

likely than not false is offered in an effort to influence the fact-finding process.

Thus, in reducing the fine from the $25,000 maximum to $10,000, the

Arbitrator relied on considerations that fail to justify departing from the

“convention” adopted in HSIA cases that the fine should “follow” the fault. The

reduction is “not in accordance with law.” 255 On review, I may “modify, [or] set

254 See Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16; Poole, JAMS Case 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8, aff’d,

2023 WL 8435860, at *7.

See Singh v. Clinton, 618 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Whether agency action is not in

accordance with law is a question of statutory interpretation, rather than an assessment of

255

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aside, . . . in whole or in part,” the sanctions imposed, and “make any finding or

conclusion that, in [the Court’s] judgment . . . is proper and based on the record.” 256

Therefore, I hold that the $25,000 maximum fine should be imposed.

The Authority seeks an additional $5,000 fine for Aggravating

Circumstances. 257 However, as discussed below, I am not increasing the fine on that

basis.

2.

Arbitration Costs.

Rule 3223(b) also permits an award of “some or all” of adjudication and legal

costs. The Arbitrator exercised his discretion under Rule 3223(b) to assess $8,000 in

arbitration costs against Mr. Juarez, payable at the end of his Ineligibility period. 258

The Arbitrator acknowledged this was “not a scientific calculation,” but took

account instead of “the circumstances and the ease with which [Mr. Juarez] could

have avoided his predicament or the expense of arbitration fees by HIWU balanced

against his conduct and the circumstances.” 259 HIWU did not detail its arbitration

costs to the Arbitration. So, I accept without change the $8,000 amount awarded as

reasonable.

reasonableness in the instant case.”) (cleaned up). Cf. Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, 815

F. Supp. 3d 1, at *45 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2025) (Action is “not in accordance with law if it violates some

extant federal statute or regulation.”) (cleaned up); Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 35

(D.D.C. 2025) (The “not in accordance with law” element “applies to actions that failed to meet

statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.”) (cleaned up), appeal pending, No. 25-5145

(and related numbers) (D.C. Cir.).

256 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).

257

AuPCOL ¶ 6 & ¶ 7 (Proposed Order); AuOBr. at 19-21.

258 AB 660, at ¶ 7.29 (Corrected Final Decision).

259

Id.

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C.

Aggravating Circumstances Will Not Be Applied.

Rule 3227(a) provides that, absent exceptions inapplicable here, an individual

held to have committed an ADRV may be subject to additional sanctions “if the

Agency [that is, HIWU] establishes that Aggravating Circumstances are present”

and not rebutted. Under Rule 3227, as relevant here Aggravating Circumstances

permit Ineligibility to be “increased by up to 2 years,” and the fine by “up to

$10,000.” “Aggravating Circumstances” include “deceptive or obstructive conduct to

avoid the . . . adjudication of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation . . . for which the

Covered Person has not been separately sanctioned for Tampering.” 260 The

“deceptive or obstructive conduct” can include conduct in the adjudication

proceeding itself: Mr. Juarez “sought to muddy the waters from first to last both

prior to and during this Arbitration by provision of false evidence.” 261

Thus, the Authority argues:

[Mr. Juarez’s] manufacture of a concocted story to explain his violation of

Rule 3214(a) was an Aggravating Circumstance pursuant to Rule 3227,

260 Rule 3227(b)(4); Rule 1020 (definition).

261 Lewis-Parry v. USADA at ¶ 114 (Dec. 4, 2020) (finding aggravating circumstances),

https://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/Chi-Lewis-Parry-Decision.pdf. See also, e.g.,

Datunashvili, CAS 2024/A/10931, at ¶ 267 (The athlete offered into evidence a fabricated video “put

forward as accurate in [the] first instance until challenged under cross examination.”); Rivera v.

USADA, at ¶¶ 69, 75-76 (Jan. 19, 2018) (The athlete submitted “manufactured evidence and falsified

documents,” gave testimony that “was vague, dissembling and contradictory”—and hence, not

“credible”—and in discussing Aggravating Circumstances, “admitted” a document he submitted “was

fraudulent, but continued to conceal his knowledge” that other evidence “were also fraudulent.”),

https://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/USADAv.Rivera_Award.pdf; Matter of. Kulakivskiy at

¶¶ 39, 46 (June 21, 2013) (The Athlete “was complicit” in providing an “untruthful statement,” and

testified “in a less than credible fashion,” concerning the source of the banned substances “prior to

and during the hearing.”), https://resources.world.rugby/worldrugby/document/2021/01/13/f9209b36bfa3-4e23-ba85-d9979f113861/TMG-096091-48-12-1-Decision-final-.pdf. Cf. United States v.

Andersen, 45 F.3d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1995) (Because “[t]he FDA represents the public,” “a deliberate

attempt to mislead the FDA” provided grounds for an upward sentencing enhancement).

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which necessitates increased Consequences for [Mr. Juarez] of at least a one

(1) year period of Ineligibility and a $5,000 fine. 262

As noted earlier, I too am concerned that Mr. Juarez’s account of the facts is

fabricated. That said, I nevertheless will not apply Rule 3227’s Aggravating

Circumstances provision for two reasons.

First, Rule 3227(a) refers expressly to “the Agency”—HIWU—“establish[ing]

that Aggravating Circumstances are present.” 263 Here, in its Charge Letter HIWU

advised Mr. Juarez of the risks if Aggravating Circumstances were proven. But its

prehearing brief in the Arbitration did not mention the subject. 264 Similarly, HIWU

never raised Aggravating Circumstances during the hearing itself. Accordingly,

unlike other cases, HIWU did not attempt to “establish”—nor did the Arbitrator

discuss—Aggravating Circumstances. 265 An element of Rule 3227 was not satisfied

or even vetted in the arbitration.

Second, absent unusual circumstances, the Authority should be bound by

HIWU decisions at the arbitration level. 266 FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) reinforces that

default position: “Except for good cause shown, no assignment of error by the

aggrieved party may rely on any question of fact or law not presented to the

Authority.” Although the Rule speaks of matters asserted “by the aggrieved

262 AuPCOL ¶ 6.

263 Emphasis added.

264 AB 124 (Charge Letter), 72 & 92 (Prehearing Brief: “Relief Sought”).

See id. 235, at ¶¶ 6.79-81, 244, & ¶¶ 7.61-62 (Matter of Shell); id. 297, at ¶¶ 6.2 & 6.4, 306, at

¶ 6.33 & 309, at ¶ 6.51 (Matter of Lynch).

265

266

See Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *24 & n.25, *39.

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party”—typically, the HISA-regulated individual—serious questions would arise if

the Authority were not comparably constrained. Federal courts, of course, have

their own counterpart to Rule 1.146(a)(1). “Absent exceptional circumstances, a

party cannot raise legal issues on appeal that it failed to raise in the district

court.” 267

The Authority could have argued (although it has not) that the “good cause”

or “exceptional circumstances” gloss apply since the record now includes

Mr. Terrazas’s testimony. So, the constellation of facts available to inform whether

there is “deceptive or obstructive conduct,” needed for Aggravated Circumstances, is

different than that available to HIWU in the arbitration.

On the other hand, the evidentiary hearing itself flows from HIWU’s

objection to Mr. Terrazas testifying in the arbitration. If HIWU had refrained from

opposing, and if Mr. Terrazas had testified, perhaps HIWU would have had the

same array of facts as the Authority has on this review. But because HIWU’s

strategic decision created the condition relied on by the Authority to justify

interjecting the new issue, there is a certain “heads I win, tails you lose” outcome

that favors applying the default rule, not the exception.

Taking account of the entire course of proceedings, I deny the Authority’s

Aggravating Circumstances argument. This ruling is, however, without prejudice to

267 Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See also Sheet Metal Workers’ Health

and Welfare Fund of N.C. v. Law Off. of Michael A. DeMayo, LLP, 21 F.4th 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2021)

(discussing reasons for the practice rule).

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the relief that might otherwise be imposed in any other proceedings arising from

the facts of this case.

VI.

CONCLUSION.

I have considered all the matters raised in Mr. Juarez’s papers on this review

and find them unpersuasive. I AFFIRM: (1) the Arbitrator’s determination that

Mr. Juarez violated Rule 3214(a); (2) the two-year period of Ineligibility imposed;

and (3) the award of $8,000 in litigation costs. I SET ASIDE the fine of $10,000 and

DIRECT that a fine of $25,000 be imposed.

The stay of sanctions, previously ordered, is hereby VACATED as of the date

of this Decision.

ORDERED:

Jay L. Himes

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Date: April 28, 2026

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