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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
__________________________________________
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In the Matter of
)
)
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Eusebio Juarez-Rufino,
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Appellant.
__________________________________________)
Docket No. 9444
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................. i
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................iii
I.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE.................................................................................... 2
A.
HISA and the Industry Regulatory System............................................... 2
B.
The HIWU Search....................................................................................... 5
C.
Mr. Juarez’s Explanation to HIWU. .......................................................... 8
D.
Proceedings Before the Oaklawn Park Stewards. ................................... 11
E.
The Arbitration Proceeding. ..................................................................... 12
F.
The Arbitrator’s Decision.......................................................................... 14
G.
Commencement of this Review Proceeding. ............................................ 19
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW................................................................. 21
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW. ........................................................................................... 21
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES............................................................................... 22
A.
HIWU Proved Mr. Juarez Violated Rule 3214(a). ................................... 22
B.
Mr. Juarez’s Defenses of Lack of Knowledge and Intent. ....................... 23
V. SANCTIONS ISSUES........................................................................................... 23
A.
The Two-Year Ineligibility Period Should Not Be Eliminated for
No Fault or Negligence (“NF”) or Reduced for No Significant Fault
or Negligence (“NSF”). .............................................................................. 23
1.
Overview of the NF and NSF Defenses. .......................................... 23
2.
Must NF or NSF be Considered?...................................................... 24
a. The Basis for the Evidentiary Hearing....................................... 24
b. Mr. Juarez’s “Fundamental Fairness” Argument. ..................... 26
c. The NF and NSF Defenses.......................................................... 29
3.
Mr. Terrazas’s Account of the Events. ............................................. 29
a. The Predator’s Attack.................................................................. 30
b. Obtaining the Two Syringes........................................................ 31
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c. Treating the Injured Roosters..................................................... 33
d. The “Forgotten” Syringes. ........................................................... 35
e. Details. Details. Details. ............................................................. 37
f. The Bottom Line. ......................................................................... 41
4.
Consideration of NSF........................................................................ 44
a. NSF: Objective Considerations. .................................................. 45
b. NSF: Subjective Considerations. ................................................ 47
5.
B.
C.
Consideration of NF.......................................................................... 49
The Fine Imposed is Increased, While the Adjudication Costs Will
Be Unchanged. .......................................................................................... 50
1.
The Fine. ........................................................................................... 50
2.
Arbitration Costs............................................................................... 52
Aggravating Circumstances Will Not Be Applied. .................................. 53
VI. CONCLUSION...................................................................................................... 56
ii
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
General
ADMC – Anti-Doping and Medication Control (Rule Series 3000)
Authority – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority
HISA – Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60
HIWU – Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit
Review Proceeding
AB – Appeal Book
AB2 – Appeal Book 2 (Arbitration hearing transcript)
AuOBr. – Authority’s Opening Brief
AuPFOF – Authority’s Proposed Findings of Fact
AuPCOL – Authority’s Proposed Conclusion of Law
AuRBr. – Authority’s Reply Brief
AuX – Authority’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit
CX – Court’s Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit
JOBr. – Juarez’s Opening Brief
JPFOF – Juarez’s Proposed Findings of Fact
JPCOL – Juarez’s Proposed Conclusions of Law
JRBr. – Juarez’ Reply Brief
JRAuPFOF – Juarez’s Reply to the Authority’s Proposed Findings of Fact
JX – Juarez Evidentiary Hearing Exhibit
Tr. – Transcript of February 19, 2026 Evidentiary Hearing
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The Horseracing Integrity and Welfare Unit (“HIWU”), a private body,
enforces thoroughbred horseracing rules adopted under the federal Horseracing
Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). 1 In January 2025, HIWU investigators
searched the SUV owned by appellant Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, a thoroughbred
racehorse trainer, at Oaklawn Park Racetrack in Hot Springs, Arkansas. In the
SUV’s front-seat center console, the investigators discovered two filled hypodermic
syringes. Laboratory analysis later determined the syringes contained a substance
that is prohibited in racehorses covered by HISA.
Mr. Juarez told the investigators “he didn’t know how [the syringes] got” into
his vehicle, and that he did not know “what substance the two syringes contained.” 2
He further said “he had recently picked up his vehicle from the . . . repair shop, and
that . . . the mechanic must have left them in there.” 3
Subsequently, HIWU charged Mr. Juarez with violating one of the HISA
Rules, and an Arbitrator heard the charge under applicable procedural Rules.
Mr. Juarez’s principal defense was that the syringes were not his. Instead, he
maintained, the automobile mechanic who had serviced his SUV had obtained the
syringes to treat injured roosters that the mechanic raised. When the mechanic
1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051 et seq.; Rule 3010(e)(1). Capitalized terms used, but not defined, in this
Decision, are from HISA Rule 1020 of the General Provisions included in the Anti-Doping and
Medication Control Program rules. Other abbreviations are set forth in the Table of Abbreviations.
References to a “Rule” are to those promulgated under HISA, unless otherwise identified.
2 AB 141 (Bennett report), AB2 709 (Bennett).
3 AB2 709 (Bennett).
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returned the SUV to Mr. Juarez, the mechanic forgot he had put the syringes in the
SUV’s console and, thus, never told Mr. Juarez about them.
The Arbitrator excluded the auto mechanic as a witness at the evidentiary
hearing held and thereafter ruled against Mr. Juarez. He awarded sanctions that
include a two-year period of suspension, which prevents Mr. Juarez from working at
HISA-covered racetracks throughout the country. Mr. Juarez has brought this
proceeding to review the Arbitrator’s determination and the sanctions imposed. As
in the arbitration hearing, this proceeding turns on Mr. Juarez’s contention that he
knew nothing about the two syringes, which, he maintains, the automobile
mechanic had obtained while he had the SUV for servicing.
To more fully develop the facts, I directed an evidentiary hearing, at which
Mr. Juarez’s auto mechanic testified. Based on this now-augmented record, I find
Mr. Juarez’s defense unworthy of belief. Therefore, I affirm the Arbitrator’s decision
and the resulting sanctions.
I.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE.
A.
HISA and the Industry Regulatory System.
Congress enacted HISA in 2020 to provide national uniformity to safety and
substance control in the nation’s thoroughbred racing industry. 4 Among other
things, HISA recognized the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the
“Authority”), a private, independent, self-regulatory, nonprofit corporation, and
4
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3051-60.
2
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charged it with responsibility to “develop[] and implement[] a horseracing antidoping and medication control program” throughout the United States. 5
The Authority promulgated, and the Federal Trade Commission approved,
regulatory rules, which include the statutorily-required anti-doping and medication
control (“ADMC”) Program. 6 HISA and the ADMC Program rules address, in
summary: (1) the persons and thoroughbred racehorses the Program covers; (2) the
substances that are banned outright or subject to threshold presence requirements,
or are regulated as controlled medications; (3) the conduct constituting violations
and corresponding sanctions; and (4) investigation and enforcement in furtherance
of the statute. 7 Under the ADMC Program, the more serious violations are AntiDoping Rule Violations (“ADRVs”), which cover Banned Substances set out in the
Prohibited List issued by the Authority. 8 Banned Substances are “prohibited at all
times” and “should never be in a horse’s system . . . as they serve no legitimate
treatment purpose.” 9
The Authority has contracted with HIWU to implement and enforce the
ADMC Program on behalf of the Authority. 10 HIWU charges of ADRVs are heard by
5
Id. § 3052(a).
Id. §§ 3053, 3055, 3057. Order Approving the ADMC Rule Proposed by HISA (Mar. 27, 2023),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/P222100CommissionOrderAntiDopingMedication.pdf;
88 Fed. Reg. 27894, 2023 WL 3199867 (May 3, 2023) (FTC Notice of Final Rule, effective May 22,
2023), https://hisaus.org/regulations?modal-shown=true#equine-anti-doping-and-controlledmedication-protocol-rules.
6
7
See generally ADMC Rule 3000 series.
8
See also Rules 1020 (definition of ADRV), 3111(a) (Prohibited Substances).
9 Rule 3010(c).
Series).
See also Rule 4111; 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Jan. 26, 2023) (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 3054(e)(1)(B)-(E), 3055; Rules 3010(e)(1), 5720(a).
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an Internal Adjudication Panel, which may, as here, consist of a single arbitrator. 11
The FTC has authority to review Arbitrator decisions resolving HIWU-initiated
enforcement proceedings. 12 Further review is available under the Administrative
Procedures Act. 13
HISA applies to Covered Persons, a term that includes trainers and their
employees. 14 ADMC Program Rule 3214(a) prohibits “Possession of a Banned
Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification for such Possession.” HISA
Rule 1020 defines “Possession,” providing in pertinent part:
Possession means actual, physical possession, or constructive possession
(which shall be found only if the Covered Person has exclusive control or
intends to exercise exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance . . . or the
premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists).
The Rule imposes strict liability, regardless of knowledge or intent, except
where “constructive Possession” is charged. 15 Mr. Juarez, however, has never
argued the Rule 3214(a)’s constructive Possession provision applies. Equally
important, Rule 3214(a) prohibits Possession regardless of whether the Covered
Person administers the Banned Substance to a Covered Horse. 16
11 Rules 3360, 7020.
12 15 U.S.C. § 3058; FTC Rules 1.145-.148.
See 87 Fed. Reg. 60077 (Oct. 4, 2022) (Final Rule).
13 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06.
14 Rule 1020 (definition).
Id.; Matter of Shell (“Shell II”), No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16 (FTC ALJ Mar. 6, 2025):
HIWU v. Poole, JAMS Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8 (Aug. 8, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Matter of
Poole, No. 9417, 2023 WL 8435860 (FTC ALJ Nov. 13, 2023).
15
16 Rule 3214.
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Mr. Juarez similarly does not argue that the “compelling justification”
defense, embedded in Rule 3214(a), applies to his case. However, the Rules provide
for two other defenses: (1) No Fault or Negligence (“NF”); and (2) No Significant
Fault or Negligence (“NSF”). If the person charged can prove there was NF on their
part, then Rule 3224 eliminates sanctions entirely. If NSF is proven, sanctions may
be reduced, albeit not eliminated, under Rule 3225. These defenses do need to be
considered, and I discuss them later in this Decision.
Violation of Rule 3214(a) carries a mandatory two-year Ineligibility period for
a first offender, which prohibits their participation in HISA-governed thoroughbred
racing nationally. Additional sanctions include a potential monetary fine, and
payment of adjudication and legal costs. 17 Both equine sporting association codes
and those in sports generally include analogous provisions covering possession of
proscribed substances. 18
B.
The HIWU Search.
During the period relevant to this case, Mr. Juarez was employed as an
“exercise rider” for another Trainer. 19 However, he has “registered [with the
17 Rules 3212, 3223(b). HISA Rule 1020 defines “the penalties resulting from the occurrence of one or
more [Rule] violations” as “Consequences,” which parties often refer to as “sanctions,” a term also
used, but not defined, in the Rules. For simplicity, I use the term “sanctions.”
See e.g., Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication
Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed. 2025); World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Code, Article 2.6 (2021);
USADA v. Drummond, Case No. AAA 01-14-000-6146, at 19 (Dec. 17, 2014) (“The Panel rejects
Drummond’s contention that actual possession requires his specific intent to have under his custody
and control a particular banned substance whose characteristics were fully known to him.”); Eder v.
International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS 2007/A/1286, 1288 & 1289, at ¶¶ 42, 52 (Jan. 4, 2008)
(possession does not require proving “subjective intent,” or “intent to use”); Diethart v. IOC, CAS
2007/A/1290, at ¶ 40 (Jan. 4, 2008) (possession “constitutes in itself an anti-doping rules violation”).
18
19 AB2 824-25, 829 (Juarez). See also AB at 98-99 (EAD Notice), 160, 163 (HIWU Investigative
/Interview Report including Juarez HISA registration number), 573 (Juarez Prehearing Brief).
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Authority] as a covered person,” and thus “agree[d] to comply with the rules.” 20
There is no dispute Mr. Juarez is subject to the prohibitions in the ADMC
Program. 21
As summarized above, HIWU’s search of Mr. Juarez’s SUV at Oaklawn Park
Racetrack, conducted on January 29, 2025, revealed two hypodermic syringes in the
vehicle’s front-seat center console. 22 Both syringes “were fully loaded.” 23 HIWU
seized them and sent them to a testing laboratory. Analysis determined that the
substance in the syringes was diisopropylamine (“dipa”). 24
Dipa is “a vasodilator, causing smooth muscle relaxation and widening of
blood vessels.” 25 It “can improve blood flow and increased oxygen delivery to various
parts of the body,” which can potentially “lead to performance enhancing effects in
racehorses.” 26 “[M]any trainers believe [dipa] improves the performance of their
horses,” enabling racehorses to “go farther faster,” without getting “as exhausted.” 27
See also AB at 160, 163 (HIWU Investigative/Interview Report including
Juarez HISA registration number).
20 AB2 893-94 (Juarez).
21 AB2 897-98 (Juarez). See also id. at 900; Rule 1020 (“Covered Person” means “all Trainers . . . and
the . . . employees of such Persons; any other Persons required to be registered with the Authority;
and any other horse support personnel who are engaged in the care, treatment, training, or racing of
Covered Horses.”).
22 AB 143 (photos showing location of syringes in the SUV), AB2 696-97, 704-08, 690 (Mr. Juarez’s
counsel stipulating that “[t]he vehicle was searched and the syringes were found in the center
console.”).
23 AB2 743 (Bennett).
See also AB 143 (photos of syringes).
See AB 769 (Mr. Juarez’s counsel
stipulating that “what was in the syringes is what Industrial [the laboratory] says was in those.”).
24 AB 155, 157 (laboratory certificates), AB2 712-14 (Bennett).
25 AB 178, at ¶ 5 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.).
See also AB2 at 750 (Hardy).
26 AB 179, at ¶¶ 5-6 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.), AB2 752-53 (Hardy).
27 AB2 715 (Bennett), 753 (Hardy).
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Dipa lacks FDA approval “in any species. . . . [T]here’s no peer-reviewed
scientific evidence supporting efficacy or safety data in any species.” 28 Therefore,
under the Rules, dipa is a Banned Substance, the use of which “is prohibited at all
times.” 29 It also is banned by international equine competition bodies. 30 Mr. Juarez
admittedly knew “there’s a list that tells you what substances and drugs are not
allowed to be present in a race track or present in a racehorse at race time. . . .” 31
He also “admit[s] it would be absolutely improper for [him] to possess the
syringes. 32
Upon HIWU discovering the filled syringes during its search, Mr. Juarez
denied knowing they were in his SUV. 33 He “said he had recently picked up his
vehicle from the mechanic repair shop, and that they [sic] the mechanic must have
left them in there.” 34 HIWU did not credit Mr. Juarez’s comments during the search
and in April 2025 notified him of his possible violation of Rule 3214(a), based on his
Possession of dipa. 35
HIWU’s notice letter stated in part that:
28
Id. 753 (Hardy). See also AB 179, at ¶ 9 (Hardy Wit. Stmt.).
29 Rule 4111. See 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000 Series); AB 179, at ¶¶ 7-9 (Hardy Wit.
Stmt.).
30 AB2 752, 765-66 (Hardy).
31 Id. 895 (Juarez). See also id. at 897 (Mr. Juarez “agree[s] [diisopropylamine’s] on the prohibited
list.”).
32
Id. 825.
33
Id. 832-33, 925-26.
34
Id. 709 (Bennett). See also id. at 833-34, 837 (“I said probably the mechanic.”), 888 (Juarez).
35 AB 97 (EAD Notice).
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During the search of your vehicle, Investigators found in the lower center
console two syringes with capped needles attached that each contained an
unknown clear liquid. . . .
Industrial Laboratories. . .analyzed [the liquid in the syringes] and. . .
confirm[ed] that Diisopropylamine was. . . in the liquid. 36
HIWU further informed Mr. Juarez “[i]f it is agreed or determined that an AntiDoping Rule Violation has occurred,” Mr. Juarez could be subject to sanctions. 37
HIWU also advised that “[a]t this time prior to the issuance of a formal charge for
the alleged violation, you have the opportunity to provide an explanation to
HIWU.” 38
C.
Mr. Juarez’s Explanation to HIWU.
Mr. Juarez took up HIWU’s offer to explain his version of the facts. In a
written factual narrative, his counsel stated: “CP [Mr. Juarez, the Covered Person]
did not ‘own’ or control or intend to possess the substance found in the vehicle. The
substance was intended for use by another man to treat injured farm animals. . . .” 39
This “other man” was his automobile mechanic, Mr. Luis Terrazas, who had
previously serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 40 Counsel’s response included a thenunsigned affidavit—bearing a typed date of February 1, 2025—in which Mr.
36
Id. 101, 102.
37
Id. 98.
38
Id. 101.
39
Id. 167 (Counsel’s response to EAD Notice).
40
Id. 167.
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Terrazas provided his account of what had transpired. 41 He further submitted an
alleged receipt for Mr. Terrazas’s work. 42
According to Mr. Terrazas’s unsigned affidavit, he serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV
during the period January 13-28, 2025. 43 Mr. Juarez brought his SUV in because it
“had been repeatedly overheating.” 44 In order to replicate and then repair the
condition, Mr. Terrazas “drove the SUV several times over the course of about one
week.” 45 Mr. Terrazas had obtained the two filled syringes from “a friend” in order
“to administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at [his] home
later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.” 46
Mr. Terrazas “put the two syringes” into the console of Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 47
The syringes, however, were not used, as Mr. Terrazas’s wife suggested an
alternative treatment, which was successful. 48 Mr. Terrazas returned the SUV to
Mr. Juarez on January 28, 2025—the day before HIWU’s search at Oaklawn Park. 49
However, he never removed the two syringes from Mr. Juarez’s SUV and “never told
[Mr. Juarez he] had put the syringes in the SUV console[.]” 50
41
Id. 171, 173.
42
Id. 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Prehearing Brief) & 175 (repair shop receipt), AB2 847-50 (Juarez).
43 AB 171, at ¶¶ 2, 4 (unsigned affidavit).
44
Id. at ¶ 2. See also AB2 at 843-44 (Juarez).
45 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit).
See also AB2 at 845 (Juarez).
46 AB 171-72, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit).
47
Id.
48
Id. 172, at ¶¶ 8-9.
49
Id. 171, at ¶ 4.
50
Id. 172, at ¶¶ 11-12.
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Upon receiving the SUV back from Mr. Terrazas, Mr. Juarez drove it to
Oaklawn Park the next day without doing an “inventory [of] the contents of his
vehicle. He was unaware of the prohibited substance being present, conspicuously
in view, in the front seat center console.” 51 As counsel put it: “Words spoken at the
time of the search show CP [Mr. Juarez] was unaware. The conspicuous location
supports the notion.” 52
Based on a report from “Australian racing industry experts”—referred to but
not then provided—Mr. Juarez’s counsel maintained that testing of vitamin B-15
“can show up as diisopropylanine.” 53 He further stated the substance in the seized
syringes “is routinely used for treating game fowl. . . . The reasonable explanation is
that Mr. Terrazas intended to use the substance, not CP.” 54
HIWU determined that Mr. Juarez’s explanation “lacked credibility,” and
thus charged Mr. Juarez with “a Possession ADRV. . . .” 55 This was not Mr. Juarez’s
first encounter with HIWU and dipa, however. In April 2024, HIWU discovered a
used syringe, which tested positive for dipa, during a search of the vehicle
Mr. Juarez’s wife had driven to Oaklawn Park. 56 Mrs. Juarez allegedly had used the
Id. 167 (counsel’s statement). See also AB2 at 836 (Juarez) (After receiving the SUV back from
Mr. Terrazas in the evening, “the next day I just jump on and go. I mean, I never . . . I never
searched the car, I never look into the car, and I mean, I just start the car and go to work.”).
51
52 AB 167.
53
Id. 169.
54
Id. 168, 169.
55
Id. 643, at ¶ 2.21 (Corrected Final Decision). See also id. 80-81, at ¶ 25 (HIWU Prehearing Brief).
56 AB2 692-93, 713 (Bennett), 860-65, 902-03, 904 (Juarez).
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dipa to treat roosters that the couple raised. 57 HIWU did not then charge
Mr. Juarez with any ADRV. 58
D.
Proceedings Before the Oaklawn Park Stewards.
Besides HIWU charging Possession of dipa in this case, the Oaklawn Park
stewards charged Mr. Juarez with a violation of Racetrack Safety Program Rule
2230(e), which prohibits any person from “possessing a . . . syringe capable of
accepting a needle or injectable of any kind” on the racetracks. 59 Hearings were
conducted before the stewards, who ruled against Mr. Juarez, and, for reasons not
pertinent here, Mr. Juarez eventually agreed to a 30-day suspension and $2,000
fine. 60 Mr. Terrazas testified in that stewards’ case. 61
Mr. Juarez’s counsel has made much of the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing,
contending that it should either preclude any sanctions in this case, or at least limit
those that can be imposed. 62 As later discussed, I reject this position as without
merit. 63
57
Id. 862, 905 (Juarez).
58
Id. 693 (Bennett), 865-66 (Juarez).
59 AB 643, at ¶ 2.27 (Corrected Final Decision).
See also id. 580 (Agreed Order).
Id. 581, at ¶ 2 (Agreed Order). According to Mr. Juarez’s counsel, the stewards held a “summary
suspension” hearing shortly after HIWU’s search and after that a “merits hearing” on April 28, 2025.
Id. 168 (undated statement), 679-81. See also AB2 838-39 (Mr. Juarez testified at the summary
hearing about “a week later.”), 842 (there was a second hearing).
60
61 AB2 799-808 (Juarez counsel), 839-40, 842-43, 858 (Juarez); Review Pet. at 4, 6.
See AB2 679-83, 685-88 (Juarez counsel opening), 721-24, 730-33, 741 (Bennett), 828, 838-43, 85657, 859-60, 866-68 (Juarez), 955-61, 964-66, 969 (Juarez counsel closing); JPFOF ¶¶ 10, 12-15, 17;
JPCOL ¶ 14; JOBr. at 2; JRBr. at 1-4.
62
63
See pp. 26-28 below; JRBr. at 1-4.
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E.
The Arbitration Proceeding.
In May 2025, HIWU issued its EAD Charge Letter, alleging that Mr. Juarez’s
Possession of dipa violated Rule 3214(a), and an arbitration was begun. 64 In June
2025, the Arbitrator issued Procedural Order No. 1, which set a September 2025 for
the hearing on the merits. 65 The Order further: (1) established the schedule for the
parties to submit prehearing briefs in August 2025; (2) required disclosure of each
side’s witnesses and corresponding witness statements to accompany their prehearing briefs; (3) directed the parties to submit any stipulation of facts shortly
before the hearing dates, and to coordinate on scheduling witnesses. 66 The Order
also provided that “[a]ll deadlines and requirements stated herein will be strictly
enforced.” 67
Things did not proceed smoothly, however. First, Mr. Juarez failed to serve
his prehearing brief and related hearing submissions by the August deadline, and
HIWU moved for a default judgment. 68 After a September conference at which both
sides appeared, the Arbitrator denied HIWU’s motion. 69 At this point, Mr. Juarez
had identified no hearing witnesses, but instead argued that “HIWU should know
what [his] defense and evidence and witnesses would be based upon [Mr. Juarez’s]
64 AB 5 (HIWU letter to JAMS), 123 (EAD Charge letter).
65
Id. 643-44, at ¶¶ 3.1-.3 (Corrected Final Decision).
66
Id. 644-45, at ¶ 3.4.
67
Id. 645, at ¶ 3.4.
68
Id. at ¶¶ 3.5-.7.
69
Id. at ¶¶ 3.8-.10 (Corrected Final Decision), 568 (Procedural Order No. 2).
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prior litigation in the HISA Stewart’s Ruling,” referred to above. 70 The Arbitrator
“ruled that [Mr. Juarez] is entitled to due process and should, at a minimum, be
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses called by [HIWU] and to
make an argument in his defense at the Hearing on the merits.” 71
With the September merits hearing only a few days away, Mr. Juarez’s
defense to HIWU’s Possession charge was, in summary, that: (1) he “did not
inventory the contents of” his SUV before driving it to Oaklawn Park on the day of
the search, and thus “was unaware of the prohibited substance [dipa] being present
in the front seat center console” 72; (3) “he did not ‘own,’ control, or intend to possess
the substance/syringes,” which Mr. Terrazas allegedly had intended to use “to treat
injured farm animals” 73; and (3) “he did not have any viable cause to purposely
bring the [dipa] within the enclosure as it was not even a racing day.” 74
Two days before the September arbitration hearing, Mr. Juarez served his
prehearing brief, which identified Mr. Terrazas as a witness and summarized the
facts Mr. Juarez had offered to HIWU months earlier in response to HIWU’s EAD
Notice Letter. 75 Among the proposed exhibits was a now-signed and notarized
version of the Terrazas affidavit, dated February 1, 2025. 76 Other proposed exhibits
70
Id. at ¶ 3.9 (Corrected Final Decision).
71
Id. at ¶ 3.10.
72
Id. 643, at ¶ 2.22.
73
Id. at ¶ 2.23.
74
Id.
75
Id. 570 et seq. (Juarez Prehearing Brief)
76
Id. 583 (unsigned affidavit) & 586 (signature page).
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included the repair shop receipt, dated January 28, 2025, also previously provided
to HIWU. 77
HIWU promptly moved to exclude Mr. Juarez’s untimely submission or,
alternatively, for a continuance of the hearing, set to begin in less than 48 hours. 78
The Arbitrator granted exclusionary relief:
[Mr. Juarez’s] untimely witness[], Luis Terrazas . . . , [is] hereby excluded
from the Hearing on the Merits for this matter tomorrow. Further, the
untimely documents [Mr. Juarez] provided to [HIWU] and filed with on
September 9, 2025 are hereby excluded from the Hearing on the Merits
tomorrow.” 79
F.
The Arbitrator’s Decision.
The hearing proceeded as scheduled. HIWU produced witness testimony and
documentary evidence to support its Possession charge. Mr. Juarez did not dispute
that: (1) dipa is a Banned Substance; (2) he had Possession of it in his SUV on the
date of HIWU’s search; (3) he had no “compelling justification” to have the dipa; and
(4) he had an obligation to inventory the SUV when Mr. Terrazas returned it to him
the day before the search and failed to do so. 80
Besides calling Brian Bennett, one of the HIWU investigators who
participated in searching Mr. Juarez’s SUV, HIWU also called Dr. Michael Hardy,
its Chief of Science. Among other things, Dr. Hardy testified that:
77
See id. 597 (repair shop receipt).
78
Id. 604 (HIWU Motion to Exclude).
Id. 613, at ¶ 7 (Ruling on Motion to Exclude). See also id. 646, at ¶¶ 3.18-.20 (Corrected Final
Decision).
79
80
Id. 654, at ¶ 7.1, 656-57, at ¶¶ 7.6-.8 (Corrected Final Decision).
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a. The two syringes discovered in Mr. Juarez’s SUV were of volumes
“consistent with routine volumes of controlled medications that may be
administered to the racehorse depending on the substance that’s being
administered.” 81
b. Their needle size “is consistent with the size of needle routinely used to
administer intravenous or intramuscular injections in the racehorse.” 82
c. The needles would not “be used on chickens or roosters.” 83
More specifically, using photos, Dr. Hardy compared different size syringes
and needles. The larger one was consistent with the two found in Mr. Juarez’s SUV.
The smaller one was recommended for “avian species.” 84 As he explained, if the
larger syringe and needle were used to inject a rooster there was “a significant risk
to inadvertent hemorrhaging and muscle damage, . . . which could be
incapacitating” to the rooster. 85 Moreover, the volume of substance injected into a
rooster “would be much smaller” than that given to a horse. Depending on the
substance, a larger injection could “overdose” a rooster. 86 In sum, “the syringe size
81 AB2 754-55 (Hardy).
82 Id. 755. See also id. 775-76 (the needle size in the seized syringes “would be consistent with one
that you could give to a horse,” based on the “size of their blood vessels”).
83
Id. 755.
84 Id. 757-58. See AB 15, 17-21 (photos) and video at 1:24:35-1:30:18 (Hardy) (Sept. 11, 2025 hearing
video screen sharing photos).
85 AB2 758 (Hardy).
86
Id. 759.
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and needle size and volume of the syringe size are consistent with substances that
may be administered to a horse, both intravenously and intramuscularly.” 87
Mr. Juarez himself was the only defense witness. He maintained that, from
his experience treating chickens, a large hypodermic needle could be used. 88 He also
was permitted to testify regarding matters relating to Mr. Terrazas. 89 The repair
shop receipt, excluded by the Arbitrator’s prehearing ruling, was “ultimately
admitted into evidence.” 90
Mr. Juarez testified that, upon discovery of the two syringes, he told the
HIWU investigators he “didn’t know whose they were,” and said his “SUV had
recently been returned . . . from a shop.” 91 Then, once HIWU’s search ended, “the
first thing” he did was “finish[] my job and I called Luis.” 92 The two knew each
other. Both raise chickens. 93 According to Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas “said he called
one of his friends,” because Mr. Terrazas had “some injured roosters.” 94 The friend
gave him the two syringes, and said “try this. It might help your injured roosters.” 95
Mr. Terrazas also told Mr. Juarez that “he [Mr. Terrazas] took my truck [to his
87
Id. 778.
88
Id. 854-55 (Juarez).
89
Id. 850-51, 853-54.
90
Id. 849.
Id. 832-34. See also id. 837 (“I said probably the mechanic . . . the mechanic put it there”), 857 (“I
don’t even know that it [the syringes] was there.”), 880 (“I don’t know what’s in the truck.).
91
92
Id. 850-51.
93 Id. 851-52. See AB 167, at ¶ 4 (unnumbered) (The two were “previously acquainted.”) (counsel’s
response to EAD Notice).
94 AB2 854 (Juarez).
95
Id.
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friend’s], and when he come back [to Mr. Terrazas’s house], they [sic] never took
them [the syringes] out.” 96 Instead, Mr. Terrazas “told me he forgot it.” 97
However, Mr. Juarez’s testimony on what, exactly, he learned from
Mr. Terrazas about the rooster attack, and when he learned it, is inconsistent. On
cross-examination, he said: “You know, we was talking back and forth, so was a
week and a half . . . a week, week and a half after I dropped the car or something
like that.” 98 But Mr. Juarez maintains that he delivered his SUV to Mr. Terrazas
for servicing on January 13, 2025. The HIWU search took place on January 29—
more than two weeks later. 99 The imprecision on the date might be overlooked as
attributable to the mistaken recollection.
However, Mr. Juarez’s continued testimony undercuts that explanation:
Ms. Heath [counsel for HIWU]: Okay. Did [Mr. Terrazas] tell you he was
going to pick up the medicine in your vehicle?
Mr. Juarez: No. He not told me specifically he’s going to pick up the medicine
in my vehicle. He said he’s going to go and somebody’s going to give him some
medicine, he’s going to go and get it.
....
And I said, “Okay, see if it’s doing better.” And I said, “Okay.” But he not
specifically say what car, he . . . but I know my car was there and he got, let
me say trust, like, he can . . . he can drive my car and run, you know. 100
96
Id.
Id. 853. See also id. 872 (Mr. Terrazas “admitted that he left them there”), 873-74 (Mr. Terrazas’s
intent was “to treat the roosters,” and he “just forget [sic] about it”), 874-75 (“his wife give an oral
application to the roosters and they somehow got better.”), 875-76 (Mr. Terrazas said “he just didn’t
have to use the needles” and “he did not remove” them for the SUV), 876-77 (Mr. Terrazas “felt bad
about it”).
97
98
Id. 917 (ellipses in original).
99
Id. 834-35.
100
Id. 918-19 (ellipses in original; emphases added).
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This conversation on the rooster attack sounds like one that Mr. Juarez and
Mr. Terrazas had before the HIWU search, not after. And that is consistent with
Mr. Juarez’s “week, week and a half” estimate for when, after delivering the SUV,
the two spoke.
In any event, after receiving the witness testimony and exhibits, the
Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez in violation of Rule 3214(a)’s Possession prohibition.
Discussing the evidence proving Possession in greater detail, the Arbitrator held
that Mr. Juarez “had exclusive control” over his SUV, where the dipa was found. 101
And although Mr. Juarez argued “he was not conscious of the Diisopropylamine
being in his vehicle because his vehicle had been in the shop and his mechanic must
have placed the Diisopropylamine filled syringes inside his center console,” that was
“of no legal moment under the definition of Possession.” 102
That left for determination whether Mr. Juarez had proven either No Fault
or Negligence (“NF”) or No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”) as a defense. I
again defer discussing the details of the two defenses until later on. Suffice it at this
point to say that, after analyzing the facts, the Arbitrator determined that
Mr. Juarez’s fault was “considerable.” 103 Therefore, Mr. Juarez “should suffer a
101 AB 657, at ¶ 7.10 (Corrected Final Decision).
102
Id. at ¶¶ 7.8, 7.9.
103
Id. 659, at ¶¶ 7.19 & 7.20. See generally id. 658, at ¶¶ 7.15-.17 (discussing the NSF analysis).
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period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months, commencing with
the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 104
Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions against
Mr. Juarez:
1. A two-year period of Ineligibility.
2. A fine of $10,000, reduced from $25,000 maximum, inasmuch as there was
no evidence Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or gained any benefit from
Possession of the dipa.
3. A contribution of $8,000 toward HIWU’s share of the arbitration costs. 105
The Arbitrator further directed HIWU to publish his decision in accordance with
applicable Rules. 106 The Authority subsequently imposed the sanctions arising from
the arbitration.
G.
Commencement of this Review Proceeding.
As HISA permits, Mr. Juarez sought review of the Arbitrator’s decision and
the sanctions imposed. 107 His principal basis for overturning the decision and
sanctions arises from the Arbitrator’s exclusion of “a necessary defense witness”—
Mr. Terrazas—despite his alleged “prior timely identification of that witness.” 108 In
seeking review, Mr. Juarez requested an evidentiary hearing, where Mr. Terrazas
104
Id. 659, at ¶ 7.22.
105
Id. 659-61, at ¶¶ 7.23-.29, 8.1. See Rule 3223 (prescribing the applicable sanctions).
106 AB 660, at ¶7.30 (Corrected Final Decision) (citing Rules 3231 and 3630).
107
See 15 U.S.C. § 3058; FTC Rules 1.145-.148.
108 Review Pet. at 2.
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could testify, as well as a stay of the sanctions imposed. In a prior Order, I resolved
both matters in favor of Mr. Juarez. 109
Regarding Mr. Terrazas’s exclusion as a witness at the arbitration hearing, I
noted that his evidence “was the centerpiece to [Mr. Juarez’s] entire case. If Mr.
Terrazas testified along the lines in the purported affidavit, and after crossexamination proved to be credible, analysis of HIWU’s Possession charge could
change markedly. . . . Mr. Terrazas’s testimony, if believed, could move the needle
on Mr. Juarez’s NF and NSF defenses, potentially reducing the otherwise
mandatory two-year Ineligibility period.” 110 I concluded that Mr. Terrazas’s
testimony “was so potentially exculpatory that its exclusion impairs the due process
protection applicable in HIWU cases.” 111 Therefore, I directed that an evidentiary
hearing be held to receive his testimony. In addition, I analyzed the factors required
to determine whether to stay the sanctions imposed on Mr. Juarez and granted that
relief as well.
Mr. Terrazas subsequently testified at the evidentiary hearing held in
February 2026. I discuss his testimony below.
109
Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2025 FTC Lexis 122 (ALJ Dec. 2, 2025).
110
Id. at *21.
111
Id. at *23.
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II.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
The issues presented for review are:
1. Did HIWU prove that Mr. Juarez violated Rule 3214(a) by having
Possession of dipa, a Banned Substance, at Oaklawn Park racetrack on January 29,
2025?
2. If liability for violating Rule 3214(a) is proven:
a. Has Mr. Juarez shown either No Fault or Negligence (“NF”), which
eliminates any sanctions, or No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”), which
reduces the sanctions, that may otherwise be imposed; and
b. What sanctions should be imposed?
III.
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
HISA civil sanctions, imposed for Rule violations, are reviewable by an FTC
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upon application of the person aggrieved and
thereafter by the Commission itself on a discretionary basis. 112 The ALJ reviews:
“whether—
(i) a person has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts or
practices, as the Authority has found the person to have engaged in or
omitted;
(ii) such acts, practices, or omissions are in violation of this [chapter] or the
anti-doping and medication control or racetrack safety rules approved by the
Commission; or
112 15 U.S.C. §§ 3058(b)-(c); FTC Rules 1.146-.147.
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(iii) the final civil sanction of the Authority was arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 113
The ALJ’s review of the IAP member’s decision is de novo— “as if it had not
been heard before, and as if no decision previously had been entered.” 114 The ALJ
must determine the merits of the Rule violation charged, and whether the sanctions
the Authority imposed were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 115 In exercising review authority, the ALJ
may “affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for further proceedings, in whole
or in part” and “make any finding or conclusion that, in [their] judgment . . . is
proper and based on the record.” 116
IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES.
A.
HIWU Proved Mr. Juarez Violated Rule 3214(a).
It is undisputed that: (1) Mr. Juarez was in Possession of two syringes that
contained dipa at Oaklawn Park racetrack on January 29, 2025; (2) Dipa is a
Banned Substance under the HISA Rules; and (3) Mr. Juarez did not have a
113 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A).
See also FTC Rule 1.146(b)(1)-(3).
Shane v. Albertson’s Inc., 504 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (review under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim) (quoting Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001,
1004 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Harris v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292, 1295 (11th Cir.
2022) (“De novo means . . . a fresh, independent determination of the ‘matter’”) (quoting with
approval Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987)); Reyes-Colón v. United States,
974 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) (“review . . . de novo . . . is a legalistic way of saying we critique the
judge’s decision without giving any deference to his views”); Amparan v. Lake Powell Car Rental
Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court’s grant of summary judgment [is
reviewed] de novo,” and “[i]n so doing, we need not defer to factual findings rendered by the district
court.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aquarius Marine Co. v. Pena, 64 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.
1995) (on de novo review, the appellate court “give[s] no deference to the lower court”).
114
115 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(2)(A); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(1)-(3).
116 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).
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“compelling justification” for having the dipa that HIWU discovered. On these
undisputed facts, the Arbitrator concluded that HIWU proved Mr. Juarez violated
Rule 3214(a) to his comfortable satisfaction. I similarly so find.
B.
Mr. Juarez’s Defenses of Lack of Knowledge and Intent.
Mr. Juarez maintains that when he drove his SUV to Oaklawn Park
racetrack on January 29, 2025, he did not know there were two syringes containing
dipa in the vehicles console and, hence, did not know he was in Possession of a
Banned Substance. 117 Further, he argues he did not intend to administer the dipa to
a Covered Horse. 118 However, as noted earlier, Rule 3214(a) calls for strict liability.
Neither Mr. Juarez’s claimed lack of knowledge of the dipa, nor his intent regarding
its use, are a defense, but instead may only be considered in the NF or NSF
analysis, which I consider below.
V.
SANCTIONS ISSUES.
A.
The Two-Year Ineligibility Period Should Not Be Eliminated for No
Fault or Negligence (“NF”) or Reduced for No Significant Fault or
Negligence (“NSF”).
1.
Overview of the NF and NSF Defenses.
Under Rule 3224(a), by proving NF on his part Mr. Juarez can eliminate the
Ineligibility and monetary sanctions that may be imposed for Possession of dipa.
NF, which applies only “in exceptional circumstances,” requires Mr. Juarez to show
that he “did not know or suspect, and could not reasonably have known or
117
See, e.g., JPFOF ¶ 6; JPCOL ¶¶ 4, 6 & Ultimate Finding ¶ A; JOBr. at 1, 2.
118
See, e.g., JPFOF ¶¶ 6, 9, 10, 31 & Ultimate Finding ¶ B; JOBr. at 1, 3.
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suspected, even with the exercise of utmost caution” that he was committing an
ADRV by having dipa at Oaklawn Park racetrack. 119 Failing proof of NF, under
Rule 3225(a) he may reduce the sanctions by showing he had NSF. 120 NSF requires
Mr. Juarez to prove that, “viewed in the totality of the circumstances and taking
into account the criteria for No Fault or Negligence,” his conduct “was not
significant in relationship to” the Possession ADRV charged. 121 Much like NF, NSF
applies “where the circumstances are truly exceptional and not in the vast majority
of cases.” 122 Both equine sporting association codes and those in sports generally
include analogous provisions. 123
Before discussing the two defenses, however, I address whether there is any
need to do so at all.
2.
Must NF or NSF be Considered?
a.
The Basis for the Evidentiary Hearing.
In requesting an evidentiary hearing and a stay of the sanctions imposed,
Mr. Juarez argued that excluding Mr. Terrazas as an arbitration witness violated
constitutional due process, as well as various HISA Rules. 124 As noted, neither
Mr. Juarez’s knowledge of the dipa in his SUV, nor his intent to administer it to a
119 Rules 1020 (NF definition), 3224(b).
120
See generally Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *40-46; Matter of Poole, 2023 WL 8435860 at *2.
121 Rule 1020 (definition of NSF).
122
Ali Alabbar v. FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, at ¶¶ 12.17(1), 12.18 (Sept. 27, 2013) (cleaned up).
See, e.g., FEI Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed.
2025); WADA Code, Article 2.6 (2021).
123
124
See Review Pet. at 2, 5, 7, 9.
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Covered Horse, are defenses to Possession. However, in considering Mr. Juarez’s
argument, I wrote that testimony from Mr. Terrazas could be relevant to NF or NSF
defenses. 125 If Mr. Terrazas’s testimony were believed, under NF or NSF, that could
“potentially reduc[e] the otherwise mandatory two-year Ineligibility period.” 126
Thus, I held that, since he was entitled to due process protection under the
HISA and FTC Rules, “a fair and impartial resolution of the case would have been
better assured by not excluding” Mr. Terrazas as a witness. Accordingly, I held that
an evidentiary hearing to receive Mr. Terrazas’s testimony should be conducted. 127
Now, however, the rub is this:
Although the Arbitrator analyzed and rejected NSF, and by necessary
implication NF, as defenses, in seeking review here Mr. Juarez did not explicitly
raise either defense, independent of the due process and HISA Rule arguments he
did assert. 128 He also did not raise either defense in his opening papers arguing the
merits of this review; by contrast, the Authority has raised and discussed these
defenses. 129 Ordinarily, Mr. Juarez’s omission would end the matter. 130 And,
125
Matter of Juarez-Rufino, 2025 FTC Lexis 122, at *29.
126
Id. at *21.
127
Id. at *27-28. See id. at *19-23.
128
See Review Pet.
129 AuPCOL ¶¶ 4-5; AuOBr. at 15, 16, 18-19, 21-23; AuRBr. at 16.
130 See, e.g., Hussein v. Maait, 129 F.4th 99, 123 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[A]rguments not made in an
appellant’s opening brief are waived even if the appellant pursued those arguments in the district
court or raised them in a reply brief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sawyers v. Norton, 962
F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues [presented below, but] not raised in the opening brief are
deemed abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted); Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047,
1065-66 (11th Cir. 2012) (The Court of Appeals would not consider arguments made during oral
argument, but not made in the appellant’s opening brief).
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because Mr. Juarez has not raised the defenses that seemingly could render
Mr. Terrazas’s testimony relevant, arguably his testimony should not be admitted
into the record at all, much less evaluated as worthy or unworthy of belief.
b.
Mr. Juarez’s “Fundamental Fairness” Argument.
The concern I have with this course of action, however, is that Mr. Juarez
does press his contention that it violates “fundamental fairness” to impose sanctions
in addition to those arising from the Oaklawn Park stewards proceeding as both
cases “arise from a single act of possession involving the same items.” 131 He further
asserts that sanctioning him in this proceeding “for the same operative facts” would
“be duplicative and disproportionate. . . .” 132 Therefore, sanctions, he contends,
should “be limited to, and not exceed, the prior 30-day suspension.” 133 To be sure,
Mr. Juarez’s argument is not well-developed, and I reject his defense as
insufficiently presented to warrant further consideration. 134
I also reject Mr. Juarez’s argument on the merits for these reasons:
131 JPCOL ¶ 15.
132
Id. ¶ 14; JOBr. at 2.
133 JOBr. at 2.
See, e.g., Kelley v. Alpine Site Servs., Inc., 110 F.4th 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Appellants are
required to present an argument and citations to supporting authority for each contention in their
brief. They must provide meaningful analyses for each issue and present more than conclusory
allusions as to their arguments for the issues to be properly raised on appeal.”); Twin City Fire Ins.
Co. v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., 118 F.4th 567, 574 n.8 (3d Cir. 2024) (A contention “mentioned only
in passing” is “forfeited.”) (citing authorities); Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2010)
(“[T]his is an appropriate case in which to apply the venerable precept that appellate arguments
advanced in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by citations to relevant authority, are deemed
waived.”); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[C]ourts do not sit as self-directed
boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and
argued by the parties. . . . We therefore decline to entertain appellant’s asserted but unanalyzed . . .
claim.”).
134
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First of all, Mr. Juarez asserts that “[t]he identical evidence—same items,
same testimony, same alleged inconsistencies—has already been evaluated twice by
the Oaklawn Park Stewards.” 135 That statement—made without record support—is
simply false—so much so that it is hard to believe Mr. Juarez’s counsel made it in
good faith. HIWU’s only two witnesses—investigator Bennett and expert witness,
Dr. Hardy—both testified in the arbitration hearing that they did not testify before
the Oaklawn Park stewards. 136 Mr. Juarez never offered into evidence in the
arbitration, or on this review, the contents of the Oaklawn Park stewards
proceedings. The Arbitrator himself told Mr. Juarez’s counsel, “none of that
evidence is before me. It’s never been submitted in this case.” 137 And, of course,
statements concerning those proceedings by Mr. Juarez’s counsel during the
arbitration or on this review—however often repeated—are not evidence in this
case. Even allowing for the admission of hearsay in HISA-related proceedings,
Mr. Juarez’s counsel cannot declare himself to be an uncalled, unsworn, and unexamined witness.
The only testimony from the Oaklawn Park stewards proceedings in this case
comes from the Authority, which offered excerpts on cross-examination of
Mr. Terrazas during the evidentiary hearing. 138 Post-hearing, I requested the
Authority to submit transcription of the audio excerpts that were introduced as
135 JRBr. at 1.
136 AB2 721 (Bennett), 784-86 (Hardy).
137
Id. 816.
138 AuX 2-4.
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exhibits, which it submitted as highlighted parts of an entire transcribed stewards
proceeding. However, I reviewed only the highlighted excerpts, and not the rest.
Second, in the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing, Mr. Juarez was held liable
for possessing the two syringes found in his SUV in violation of racetrack rules. 139
Here, Mr. Juarez’s ADRV is based on Possession of the Banned Substance, dipa,
that the syringes contained. 140 Although arising from the same search, the
violations are separate and distinct. Mr. Juarez cites no authority that precludes
sanctions in this case, regardless of how the stewards’ case was resolved. 141
Finally, I am mindful, based on comments during that arbitration hearing
and other material submitted, that there was some “confusion” or “jurisdictional
thing” arising from the stewards proceedings, which resulted in an eventual Agreed
Order between the Authority and Mr. Juarez. 142 However, on this review neither
side explained specifically what this was all about, or whether it was material to
any aspect of this review. Regardless, the Agreed Order itself settled only Mr.
Juarez’s violation of Racetrack Safety Rule 2230(e), which prohibits possession of “a
hypodermic needle, [or] syringe capable of accepting a needle” at HISA-covered
racetracks. 143 Accordingly, Mr. Juarez cannot seriously argue that the Oaklawn
Park stewards proceedings resolves or otherwise limits the sanctions in this case.
139 AB 580-81 (Agreed Order), AB2 680-81 (Juarez counsel), 838-39, 867-68 (Juarez).
140 AB 123-24 (Charge Letter).
Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (“there are two offenses” whenever
each offense “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”).
141
142 AB2 682 (Juarez counsel), AB 580 (Agreed Order).
describing the “confusion” in general terms).
See also AB 576 (Juarez prehearing brief
143 AB 580, at ¶¶ 2 & 4, 581, at ¶¶ 1 & 2 (Agreed Order).
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c.
The NF and NSF Defenses.
Despite this, however, Mr. Juarez’s fundamental fairness argument
intertwines with the NF and NSF defenses that formed the basis for receiving
Mr. Terrazas’s testimony and determining whether or not it has exculpatory effect.
In their merits papers, both sides have briefed this very issue. 144 Accordingly, I will
review Mr. Terrazas’s testimony and then discuss the NF and NSF defenses.
3.
Mr. Terrazas’s Account of the Events.
Mr. Juarez professes to have had no knowledge that his SUV had two
syringes containing dipa when HIWU searched the vehicle. Mr. Terrazas, his only
source of potentially corroborating proof, allegedly swore in his affidavit that:
I put the two syringes . . . into the front seat center console compartment of
the SUV. . . . When I placed the two syringes in the console, it was my intent
to administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at my
home later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.
They appeared near death. A friend suggested the injections and gave me the
two syringes.
Neither syringe was ever administered to the farm animals. When I got home
the day I acquired the syringes, my wife suggested giving the animals an oral
medication. We did that. Within 4-6 hours the animals significantly
recovered. All eventually survived the attack.
Because the animals recovered quickly, I never used either syringe. . . . 145
Mr. Terrazas further swears he “never removed the two syringes” from the SUV’s
console, and “never told” Mr. Juarez about them. 146
144 JPFOF ¶¶ 13-30, JOBr. at 1-2, JRBr. at 2-3; AuPFOF ¶¶ 32-48 & AuOBr. at 17-21; AuRBr. at 16.
145 CX 1, at ¶¶ 7-9 (emphasis added) (Terrazas Affidavit).
146
Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
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On direct examination during the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas
confirmed the basic affidavit scenario, explaining further that the injured “farm
animals” were roosters. 147 The “oral medication” the roosters received, Mr. Terrazas
also testified, were antibiotics and pain relief pills that a veterinarian had
previously prescribed for Mr. Terrazas’s dog. 148 By the time the hearing concluded,
however, Mr. Terrazas’s account was in shambles.
a.
The Predator’s Attack.
Mr. Terrazas testified that his “roosters got attacked with a fox,” which he
later “saw” and “caught . . . with [a] trap” “about a week later.” 149 But Mr. Juarez
himself told the Arbitrator the predator was a “raccoon.” 150 At the evidentiary
hearing, Mr. Terrazas eventually equivocated: “Could have been a racoon, could be
a fox.” 151
Mr. Terrazas discovered the aftermath of the attack in the morning. 152
“[S]ome” of the fowl, Mr. Terrazas testified, died during the attack, with their
“heads torn off” and “feathers all over the place.” 153 His affidavit does not mention
any of this, even though Mr. Terrazas testified he “was really sad about . . . losing
all those chickens.” 154 In his affidavit, Mr. Terrazas swore that, after the fowl
147 Tr. 15-18, 25-26, 28-29; CX 1, at ¶¶ 7-9 (Terrazas Affidavit).
148 Tr. 19, 41-42.
149
Id. 15, 40, 47-48.
150 AB 573 (Juarez prehearing brief).
151 Tr. 15, 40, 47-49, 50-51.
152
Id. 39-40, 65.
153
Id. 65. See also id. at 40-41, 51.
154
Id. 41, 52, 66 (“Nobody asked me.”).
30
See also Tr. at 31, 38-39, 43.
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received alternative treatment, “[a]ll eventually survived the attack.” 155 His
explanation for the sentence and the omissions generally was: “I’m not worried
about the ones that they’re already dead. Worried about the ones I can help.” 156
Mr. Terrazas further testified that “about six” fowl were injured—“three
make it and three died. Or two—two make it, somewhere around that area. . . .
Three and three.” 157 However, at the Oaklawn Park stewards hearing, when he
referred to the injured fowl, there were only “three. Three of them.” 158
b.
Obtaining the Two Syringes.
Mr. Terrazas testified that he obtained the two syringes from a “friend,”
“Juan,” whom he has known for “about three years” and who also raises roosters. 159
The two first connected “[w]ith the chickens.” 160 Mr. Terrazas further testified:
[W]e just get together sometimes and just hang out, exchange chickens, and
stuff like that.
....
They have at the fair, you know, they have these shows that you take them
over there and, you know, just sell them and stuff like that. 161
Reminded that, at the stewards hearing, Mr. Terrazas said his friend’s name
was “Antonio,” Mr. Terrazas testified at the evidentiary hearing that “[h]is name is
155 CX 1, at ¶ 8.
156 Tr. 41.
157
Id. 51, 53.
158 AuX 3, at 00:31:24 (transcription).
159 Tr. 15, 31-32.
160
Id. 33. See also id. at 17.
161 Id. 33-34. See also id. at 35 (They “met at events for roosters. . . . The fairgrounds they have in
Hot Springs County.”).
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Juan Antonio.” 162 Asked for Juan Antonio’s last name, Mr. Terrazas testified, “I
can’t remember his last name, to be honest.” 163
Mr. Terrazas had never before asked Juan for medication for his fowl. 164
However, “[i]n the back of my mind I remembered this friend, and so I called him to
see if he can help.” 165 Juan said, “I’ve got this, you want to try it. I said, why not,”
supposedly without knowing what the two syringes contained. 166 By contrast, at the
stewards hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified he asked “Antonio for vitamins to treat
[his] birds. . . .” 167
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas said he “didn’t ask [Juan] for a
second syringe. . . . I just take whatever he can provide.” 168 However, once again, his
stewards’ hearing testimony was different:
[H]e gave me one [syringe] that it was a medium sized . . . he’s like, “This is
plenty.” I just say, “Man, give me some more [unintelligible]. I pay you.”
That’s why he end up giving me the second one. . . . 169
The stewards’ hearing testimony was played, and the examination continued:
Q: [Counsel for the Authority]: Did you ask for the second syringe?
A: I have, yeah. 170
162
Id. 32-33.
163
Id. 33.
164
Id. 38. See also id. at 39 (This was “just [a] one-time thing.”).
165
Id. 37.
166
Id. 38. See also id. at 15-16, 39, 53-54.
167
Id. 39; AuX 2, at 20:18 (Juarez asked him for “vitamins or something like that”) (transcription).
168 Tr. 57.
169 AuX 5, at 00:26:31 (transcription).
170 Tr. 58.
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c.
Treating the Injured Roosters.
On direct examination, Mr. Terrazas explained his intent in obtaining the
two syringes:
Q [Counsel for Mr. Juarez]: What did you intend to do with the syringes, sir?
A: Well, I was going to use them for the roosters, but, you know, whenever I
come back home, my wife suggested—you know, because we had a dog that it
was having problems with cancer. So, you know, I was in a hurry, I just used
those pills for the roosters. 171
This treatment sequence dissolved on cross-examination, however.
At the stewards’ hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified he gave the pills to his
injured roosters before obtaining the syringes from Juan:
I was going to put them [the syringe contents] on my chickens. The thing is
that I give them [the roosters] some to [sic] my dog medicine before then in
the morning time. By the time that I come back [from Juan’s], they were
doing better. . . . 172
After hearing his stewards’ hearing testimony, Mr. Terrazas admitted telling the
stewards that his roosters “were all doing better by giving them the medication.” 173
However, later in the evidentiary hearing, he backtracked:
[H]onestly I don’t know if I did it [gave the pills to the roosters] before I left
there—I went to get the medicine or after. I mean, I was stressed out. . . .
Honestly, I don’t remember exactly what happened, you know, on what
sequence it happened. 174
171
Id. 16-17 (emphasis added).
172 AuX 2, at 20:43 (transcription) (emphasis added).
173 Tr. 53.
174
Id. 66. See also id. at 44, 46-47.
33
See also Tr. at 52-53 (testimony played).
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Despite Mr. Terrazas’s professed lack of recollection, he dug the hole deeper.
Asked why, after returning with the syringes, he did not use them, he testified:
Because I see that they were doing better. And I didn’t know exactly what the
fluid was inside the syringes. So, you know, I figured instead of taking a
chance, I’d just wait it out a little bit since I was already providing the other
medicine, just don’t want to put too much medicine and end up killing them.
....
I see that they were doing better, so I just kept using those pills. . . . 175
Mr. Terrazas wasn’t through digging, however. Asked about using syringes that he
admitted were bigger than those he had used on a rooster, Mr. Terrazas testified:
“That wasn’t my intent to use those syringes. . . . That was the only place to store
that liquid. He [Juan] didn’t have a special container to give me, so he just gave me
that.” 176
And that testimony from Mr. Terrazas itself contradicted evidence from
Mr. Juarez. Discussing the syringe needle size that could be used with a rooster,
Mr. Juarez maintained that it was “not necessary . . . [to] need to use” a small
needle; “you go in the [rooster’s] chest. So another type of needle, they still go on the
chicken chest.” 177 By contrast, Dr. Hardy, HIWU’s expert, testified the size of the
syringes and needles HIWU discovered were “consistent with [that] routinely used
175
Id. 68, 69 (emphasis added).
176
Id. 56-57 (emphasis added). See generally id. at 56 (testifying regarding the syringe sizes).
177 AB2 855 (Juarez).
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to administer . . . injections in the racehorse,” and, if used with a rooster, raised “a
significant risk to inadvertent hemorrhaging and muscle damage. . . .” 178
d.
The “Forgotten” Syringes.
Upon discovering the predator attack one morning, Mr. Terrazas called
veterinarians, but “nobody wanted to look at” the injured roosters. 179 He
“remembered this friend,” Juan, whom he called “to see if he can help.” 180 Juan said
“yeah, you want to try something. . . . I just jumped in the car”—Mr. Juarez’s
SUV—and “went straight to his house,” a 40-to-45-minute drive. 181 Mr. Terrazas
obtained the two syringes, returned home, attended briefly to a customer at his
repair shop (next door to his house), and checked on his roosters, which were doing
better. 182
At that point, with the syringes still in the SUV, Mr. Terrazas decided to
“wait it out.” 183 The roosters had recovered within “two or three days.” 184
Mr. Terrazas “just completely forgot about those syringes.” 185 It never occurred to
him to ask Juan if he wanted them back, nor did he think he “might need those
syringes in the future.” 186 They remained in the SUV, supposedly forgotten and
178
Id. 754-55, 758 (Hardy).
179 Tr. 37, 39-40, 65.
180
Id. 37.
181
Id. 15, 65, 66.
182
Id. 17, 31, 66-67.
183
Id. 68.
184
Id. 69.
185
Id. See also id. at 17, 19.
186
Id. 69.
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unbeknownst to Mr. Juarez, until Mr. Juarez called Mr. Terrazas after the HIWU
search. 187
Mr. Terrazas “forgotten syringes” testimony is, however, implausible for
several reasons.
First, recall that Mr. Juarez left his SUV with Mr. Terrazas because the
engine was overheating. Mr. Terrazas kept the vehicle at the shop so that he could
try to replicate the problem by driving the SUV. 188 Mr. Terrazas had the SUV for an
extended period; it took “that long, because it wasn’t replicating the problem. . . .” 189
And there is no evidence that Mr. Terrazas had fixed the SUV before his roosters
were attacked. Just the opposite, Mr. Terrazas testified the attack came about “a
week” after Mr. Terrazas received the SUV—“could be a little more, little bit
less.” 190 Mr. Terrazas ordered the parts he determined were needed to repair the
SUV later on. 191
It strains credulity to believe that Mr. Terrazas would take the SUV on a trip
to a location 40-45 minutes away knowing that the vehicle might overheat and leave
him needing a towing service. Similarly, having urgently driven to and returned
from Juan’s to obtain syringes to treat his injured roosters—an 80-to-90 minute
187
Id. 18-20, 48, AB2 850-51.
188 Tr. 13-14, 31.
189
Id. 77.
190
Id. 64-65.
191
Id. 21-22 (showing January 23 and 25 dates).
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roundtrip—it is not believable that Mr. Terrazas—who was “really sad” and
“stressed out” over the predator attack—suddenly experienced amnesia too.
e.
Details. Details. Details.
Sometimes, inability to remember details can be attributed to the fallibility of
memory, or discounted as relating to a tangential matter. But “arguably minor or
irrelevant” inconsistencies can have a “cumulative effect” that supports an “adverse
credibility finding”—particularly when, as here, the inconsistencies accompany
inability to get the big picture straight as well. 192 Here, for example:
1. Mr. Juarez maintains that Mr. Terrazas had his SUV from January 13 to
28, 2025. 193 Since Mr. Juarez drove the vehicle to Oaklawn Park early on January
29, the date of HIWU’s search, and Mr. Terrazas’s receipt for repairs is dated
January 28, the return date seems reasonable. The January 13 start date, on the
other hand, lacks corroboration. On direct examination, Mr. Terrazas claimed to fix
the January 13 drop-off date through his “business records.” 194 But on further
examination, he conceded no document confirms that date. 195 Instead, he used the
January 28 date on his receipt for services to estimate back to when he received the
Berri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). See also United States v.
Vaughn, No.: 14-23 (JLL), 2015 WL 6948577, at *18 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2015) (“[T]he cumulative effect
192
of the inconsistencies . . . [are] such that the Court finds the Government’s professions of simple
misunderstanding or inadvertent error not credible.”); United States v. Ruffino, 592 F. Supp. 409,
414 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of a witness, especially when
given under oath, impose on the court the burden of considering whether they pertain to matters of
importance or unimportant details.”)
193 Tr. 13-14.
194
Id. 13.
195
Id. 77 (“I don’t have a way to track” the delivery date).
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SUV. 196 Mr. Juarez himself testified repeatedly, on both direct and crossexamination, that Mr. Terrazas had the SUV for “about three weeks or so.” 197
2. Based on the receipt for services, Mr. Terrazas testified to returning the
SUV to Mr. Juarez on January 28. 198 The HIWU search was the next day, and
Mr. Juarez—who maintains he knew nothing about the syringes—testified he was
“in shock” after HIWU discovered them. 199 He said “the first thing” after the search
ended, “I finished my job and I called Luis.” 200 Compare Mr. Terrazas’s testimony:
Q [the Court]: When after returning the car to Mr. Juarez did you learn that
Mr. Juarez had had some trouble with the racing, the racetrack officials?
A: Was probably [a] few days after that. I don’t know exactly how many days,
to be honest, but it wasn’t very long at all. 201
While Mr. Juarez’s account might be plausible, Mr. Terrazas’s is not. When the two
spoke, Mr. Juarez would surely have conveyed to Mr. Terrazas his professed urgent
need to find out whether Mr. Terrazas could explain the syringes. The seriousness
of the situation for Mr. Juarez would not have been lost on Mr. Terrazas, and it
would have stuck in his mind. His friend, after all, was in big trouble, and it was his
fault. In testifying to the conversation, it is not likely Mr. Terrazas would place it a
“few days” after he had returned the SUV.
196
Id. 78.
197 AB2 834 (emphasis added), 889, 913 (Juarez).
198 Tr. 14.
199 AB2 832 (Juarez).
200
Id. 850-51.
201 Tr. 72 (emphasis added).
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3. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified that the substance in the
syringes was “a lighter white, clear-ish. . . . It was like a light, whiter.” 202 But at the
stewards’ hearing, Mr. Terrazas said it was “like a brownish.” 203 The photo evidence
demonstrates that the substance is clear in color. 204
4. The center console in the front seat of Mr. Juarez’s SUV has two
compartments, one on top of the (lower) other. 205 The photo of HIWU’s search shows
the syringes discovered in the lower compartment. 206 At the evidentiary hearing,
Mr. Terrazas testified he put the two syringes in the top compartment. 207 Asked
whether he understood “that’s not where the syringes were found, Mr. Terrazas
said: “I don’t know where they were found. It might have been underneath. . . . It’s
the same console.” 208 Contrary to Mr. Juarez’s own testimony, the syringes were not
“in plain view” and would not be found by “just lift[ing] the console. . . .” 209
5. Mr. Juarez’s counsel represented at the arbitration hearing that Mr.
Terrazas “testified at the [Oaklawn Park stewards] summary suspension hearing”
and “again at the merits hearing.” 210 However, Mr. Juarez himself testified that at
202
Id. 54.
203 AuX 4, at 00:28:21 (transcription).
See also Tr. at 55.
204 AB 108-09, 111-12 (photos).
205
Id. 143 (photos of SUV console), AB2 705-06 (Bennett).
206 AuX 7.
207 Tr. 16, 60-61, AuX 6b.
208 Tr. 61, 62.
See also id. at 705-06 (Bennett) (As he “began [his] search” from “the
driver’s side,” he “really couldn’t see that [he] could access that [console],” but “noticed’ once he “got
over to the passenger side . . . there’s a storage compartment there.”).
209 AB2 845-46 (Juarez).
210
Id. 808.
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the summary hearing, Mr. Terrazas’s “signed and notarized” affidavit was
“presented,” and that Mr. Terrazas testified at the merits hearing. 211 At the
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Terrazas testified, in one breath, that he appeared before
the stewards “on two separate occasions,” and, in another, “[j]ust one time.” 212
6. Mr. Terrazas’s very affidavit, dated and notarized as of February 1, 2025,
raises questions. 213 After learning of HIWU’s search from Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas
spoke by phone with Mr. Juarez’s counsel about “how the syringes came to be in the
vehicle. . . .” 214 The conversation, Mr. Terrazas testified, “that was like way after”
talking to Mr. Juarez. 215
However, Mr. Terrazas also testified he signed the affidavit on February 1,
2025—three days after the HIWU search. 216 Yet, in April 2025—more than two
months later—Mr. Juarez’s counsel submitted an unsigned version of the affidavit
to HIWU, which bore only the typed February 1, 2025 date. 217
Mr. Terrazas’s signed affidavit did not appear in the arbitration until
September 2025. At that point, Mr. Juarez’s counsel attached it to his prehearing
brief, then still bearing the unsigned signature page with the typed February 1,
2025 date, followed by an executed and notarized page that does not bear an
211
Id. 839-40, 842-43.
212 Tr. 20, 69-70.
213 CX 1.
214 Tr. 49.
215
Id. 48 (emphasis added).
216
Id. 71.
217 AB 79-80, at ¶¶ 20-23, 95, 171-73 (HIWU prehearing brief with exhibit).
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independent notarization date. 218 The signed page is a copy that is dissimilar in
appearance from the two preceding pages. 219
If Mr. Juarez did, indeed, sign the affidavit on February 1—three days after
the search—there is no explanation for Mr. Juarez’s counsel submitting the
unsigned version to HIWU more than two months later.
f.
The Bottom Line.
The “law has long recognized that a person who is deemed unbelievable as to
one material fact may be disbelieved in all other respects.” 220 Mr. Terrazas’s
inability to testify credibly on matters—whether big or small—is a telltale sign of
fabrication. His lack of credibility infects Mr. Juarez’s own defense to HIWU’s
charge. As I wrote in deciding to hear Mr. Terrazas’s testimony: “Mr. Juarez ha[s]
no other explanation for what HIWU found. . . . [T]he evidence from Mr. Terrazas
[is] the centerpiece to [his] entire case.” 221 The evidentiary hearing showed that the
“centerpiece” is simply a mirage.
218
Id. 570-71, 583-86.
219
Id. 586.
Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005). See also, e.g., The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283, 339 (1822) (“[W]here the party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot
220
be presumed liable to mistake,” the principle false in one, false in all, applies with strongest force);
Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single instance of false testimony may . . .
infect the balance of the [party’s] uncorroborated . . . evidence.”); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d
1382, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (upholding a jury instruction that “[i]f you believe that any
witness has willfully testified falsely with respect to any material fact which the witness can not
reasonably be mistaken about, then you may, if you deem fit to do so, disregard all or any part of the
testimony of that witness or you may accept such portion of his testimony as you find worthy of
belief”).
221
Matter of Juarez-Rufino, No. 9444, 2025 FTC Lexis 122, at *18-19, 21.
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Mr. Terrazas and Mr. Juarez have been friends for at least four years. 222
Their families socialize together from time to time: “We have cookouts and . . . his
family come over or we go to his house and stuff like that.” 223 Both individuals share
an interest in raising roosters. 224 Bias and partiality are plain enough. But here, it
is not simply a matter of the weight to be given to Mr. Terrazas’s testimony.
Unlike Mr. Juarez, Mr. Terrazas has no involvement in the racing
industry. 225 Since raising roosters is legal in Arkansas, it is unlikely that
Mr. Terrazas would get into trouble by claiming to having two syringes to be used to
treat injured roosters he raised. By contrast, Mr. Juarez faced serious consequences
as a result of having syringes containing a Banned Substance at Oaklawn Park
racetrack. From all the evidence introduced, the reasonable inference is that, once
HIWU discovered Mr. Juarez in Possession of the dipa-filled syringes, Mr. Juarez
called Mr. Terrazas so that the two could cook up a far-fetched explanation for the
presence of the two syringes with dipa in Mr. Juarez’s SUV. Mr. Terrazas would, in
effect, “take the fall.” This was one friend doing another a favor.
In Mr. Juarez’s reply brief, his counsel contends that all this is attributable to
testimony “from non-native English speakers, recollection of routine agricultural
practices, and questioning that demands artificial precision about trivial details.” 226
222 AB2 826 (Juarez); Tr. 30-31.
years.”).
See also Tr. 25; JPFOF ¶ 8 (The two “[h]ave know each other for 6
223 Tr. 25.
224
Id. 12-13, 25, 29.
225 AB2 871-72 (Juarez); Tr. 12, 30.
226 JRBr. at 3.
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I have read both Mr. Juarez’s and Mr. Terrazas’s testimony more than once and
borne in mind English likely is not their native language. Still, I am hard-pressed to
find many instances where either individual professed a lack of understanding or
difficulty expressing himself. I do not find the contention by Mr. Juarez’s counsel
credible. There is too much that doesn’t add up.
If, as I have concluded, Mr. Juarez’s innocuous account is untrue, it may
fairly be inferred that the dipa in the seized syringes was intended for a different—
likely prohibited—use. While working as an exercise rider for Ingrid Mason,
Mr. Juarez not only was paid $1,000 a week to care for the horses, but also would
receive a bonus based on the purse “if a horse did well.” 227 Mr. Juarez thus had an
incentive to inject a Covered Horse with a Banned Substance such as dipa,
considered by some to be performance-enhancing, to benefit financially.
In Datunashvili v. UWW, 228 the athlete introduced into evidence a video that
was proven, and then admitted, to be false. The Panel’s observation is apropos:
“Innocent athletes simply do not create video reproductions of events and hold them
out as true representations of contemporaneous events until challenged under
cross-examination.” 229 They similarly do not enlist a friend to fabricate a story and
offer it as a defense until exposed on cross-examination.
In a prior HISA case, I considered NF and NSF where, based on the required
de novo review, I concluded that the appellant’s “version of the facts. . . [was] not
227 AB2 912 (Juarez)
. See also id. at 717, 720-23 (Bennett).
228 CAS 2024/A/10931 (Nov. 17, 2025).
229
Id. at ¶ 267.
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only unpersuasive, but—more likely than not—contrived.” 230 In these
circumstances, I held that the appellant’s “NF and NSF defenses fail as a matter of
law. A contrived set of facts simply cannot satisfy the ‘no’ element, which is a
condition of each defense.” 231 I reach that same assessment of Mr. Juarez’s version
of the facts here. Because his “injured rooster story” is fabricated, the NF and NSF
defenses fail as a matter of law. Nevertheless, as an alternative ground for my
sanctions rulings, I will analyze, first, the NSF defense to Mr. Juarez’s Possession
ADRV, and thereafter the NF defense.
4.
Consideration of NSF.
Besides considering “the totality of the circumstances,” analysis of NSF also
takes account of the three-tiered approach applied in Cilic v. ITF, 232 which adjusts
the maximum period of ineligibility and appropriate fines where NSF is shown.
Under the Cilic framework the NSF analysis requires consideration of both
“objective” and “subjective” elements of fault: “The objective element describes what
standard of care could have been expected from a reasonable person in the athlete’s
situation. The subjective element describes what could have been expected from
that particular athlete, in light of [their] personal capacities.” 233
Matter of Overly, No. 9443, at 69 (FTC ALJ Jan. 27, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/ftc_gov/pdf/614746.2026.01.27_administrative_law_judge_decision_on_application_for_review.pdf,
app. for review, FTC (Feb. 26, 2026).
230
231
Id. at 70.
232 CAS 2013/A/3327 (Apr. 11, 2014).
Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71. See also, e.g., Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *41-42; Poole, JAMS
Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.16-.20, aff’d, 2023 WL 8435860, at *5-7 (discussing the arbitrator’s
three-tiered analysis).
233
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The conclusion of the analysis places the offender in one of three ineligibility
ranges, depending on degree of fault. As adapted for HISA cases under Rule
3225(a), the tiers are:
a. Slight or Insignificant Fault – 3 to 10 months;
b. Moderate Fault – 10 to 17 months; and
c. Significant Fault – 17 to 24 months. 234
Considering Mr. Juarez’s NSF argument, the Arbitrator determined that
Mr. Juarez’s “objective” and “subjective” fault were considerable.” 235 Therefore,
Mr. Juarez “should suffer a period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24
months, commencing with the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 236 Two-years
Ineligibility is the maximum authorized for a first-time Possession violation. 237
a.
NSF: Objective Considerations.
The “objective” analysis of NSF focuses on “what standard of care could have
been expected from a reasonable person in [Mr. Juarez’s] situation.” 238
HISA’s ADMC Program, which took effect in May 2023, represented a change
in the horseracing industry nationwide. Various ADRVs and defenses were defined,
and a Prohibited List was created for designated substances. Stringent sanctions for
Possession of Banned Substances, among other ADRVs, were adopted. In
anticipation of the ADMC Program taking effect, the Authority and HIWU reached
234 Rule 3225(a). See, e.g., Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *42. See also Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at
¶ 69.
235 AB 659, at ¶¶ 7.19-.20 (Corrected Final Decision).
236
Id. at ¶ 7.22.
237
Id. 660, at ¶¶ 7.20-.22.
238
Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71.
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out publicly to educate industry participants. Dr. Mary Scollay, then HIWU’s Chief
of Science, stated publicly that the Program is “your new bible” and advised
industry members to “be more conservative and be more cautious of medication
than you have been. . . .” 239
In March 2023, a leading trade publication quoted HIWU Executive Director
Ben Mosier: “HIWU has been working with state racing commissions and racing
participants for months to educate all the sport’s stakeholders on the new rules,
including through in-person and virtual presentations and the library of resources
on our website.” 240 HIWU’s 2023 Annual Report summarized the outreach:
“Education on HISA’s ADMC Program was a year-long endeavor” which included (1)
“37 on-site presentation delivered at racetracks, training centers, and conferences”;
and (2) “40+” “website . . . educational materials, and on-call assistance.” 241
In these circumstances, a reasonable Trainer would have sought to assure
their understanding of the new regulatory program and, among other things,
reviewed the proposed and adopted ADMC Program Rules. Indeed, Trainers are
required specifically “to be knowledgeable” of the ADMC Program Rules. 242
239 Dan Ross, HIWU’s Scollay: New Medication Rules ‘Your New Bible’,
Thoroughbred Daily News
(Dec. 5, 2022), https://www.thoroughbreddailynews.com/hiwus-scollay-new-medication-rules-yournew-bible/.
240 U.S. Thoroughbred Racing Enters New Era As HISA’s Uniform Anti-Doping Program Takes
Effect, Paulick Report (Mar. 27, 2023).
See also HISA ADMC Program in Full Swing Under HIWU,
BloodHorse (June 6, 2023); Top 10 Ways HISA’s Anti-Doping And Medication Control (ADMC)
Program Will Change Racing, BloodHorse (Mar. 16, 2023); HISA Q&A: The ADMC Program,
Thoroughbred Daily News (Mar. 8, 2023).
241 2023 HIWU Annual Report at 32, 33.
242 Rule 3040(a)(1).
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A reasonable Trainer would also have been mindful of the conduct the ADMC
Program Rules prohibited and have seen that Possession and Administration of a
Banned Substance are separate ADRVs, each of which carries a two-year
Ineligibility period for a first violation. 243 Thus, Possession alone is treated the
same as actual Administration of a Banned Substance into a Covered Horse.
In consequence, a reasonable Trainer would recognize that any vehicle the
Trainer brings to a Racetrack subject to the ADMC Program Rules should be free of
any Banned Substance, absent the Trainer’s ability to meet the “compelling
justification” exception in Rule 3214(a)’s Possession prohibition. Where the vehicle
that the Trainer regularly takes to a HISA-covered Racetrack was not within the
Trainer’s exclusive control, a reasonable Trainer would inspect the vehicle’s
contents before driving it to the Racetrack. That inspection would include checking
specifically in parts of the vehicle where substances could be stored.
Mr. Juarez testified that he was aware, at least generally, of the ADMC
Program Rules and their prohibition of Banned Substances. 244 But this is the least
amount care that might be expected of a reasonable Trainer. Objective
considerations do not support a sanctions reduction under Rule 3225.
b.
NSF: Subjective Considerations.
NSF’s subjective element considers “what could have been expected from
[Mr. Juarez], in light of [his] personal capacit[y].” 245
243
See Rules 3214(a) & (c) and 3223(b).
244 AB2 894-95 (Juarez).
245
Cilic, CAS 2013/A/3327, at ¶ 71.
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Mr. Juarez admitted, on direct examination, that “under the rules, it was
[his] obligation to inventory, to look in every nook and cranny of the vehicle before
[he] went inside the [Oaklawn Park] enclosure and [he] didn’t do it.” 246 Thus, he
testified he did not know the dipa in the two syringes was in his SUV. That conduct
alone tilts the NSF analysis towards “considerable,” and away from “slight.”
Mr. Juarez failure to check out his SUV after Mr. Terrazas returned it tilts
still more toward “considerable” for at least three additional reasons. First,
Mr. Juarez admitted knowing that Mr. Terrazas had previously used syringes,
supposedly for his roosters. 247 Second, Mr. Juarez knew that HIWU could search his
SUV, as he had “been through this process a couple times before.” 248 Third, HIWU’s
search of his wife’s car less than a year earlier had revealed syringes with dipa,
although Mr. Juarez was not charged with a violation as a result. Accordingly,
Mr. Juarez should have been particularly sensitive to the need to inspect his SUV
after Mr. Terrazas returned the vehicle.
Equally significant, despite his professed awareness of the ADMC Program
Rules, Mr. Juarez testified to lacking familiarity that dipa, a potentially
performance enhancing substance, was a Banned Substance:
See also id. at 836 (After receiving the SUV back from Mr. Terrazas in the
evening, “the next day I just jump on and go. I mean, I never . . . I never searched the car, I never
look into the car, and I mean, I just start the car and go to work.”), 889-90 (Mr. Juarez did not look
through the SUV.), 915 (Mr. Juarez did not “conduct an inspection,” although he knew he had “a
duty to ensure that you don’t intentionally or unintentionally bring anything onto the backside of a
track that shouldn’t be there.”)
246 AB2 926-27 (Juarez).
247
Id. 888-89.
248
Id. 897. See id. at 896, 915-16.
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I don’t know how HIWU have it . . . but it’s no [sic] illegal to buy. I mean, you
can go online and you can buy it.
....
I don’t know before [the HIWU search],” that dipa was a Banned
Substance. 249
The veracity of testimony is, however, suspect in view of HIWU’s prior discovery of
dipa in his wife’s vehicle.
Mr. Juarez’s willingness to offer an untruthful defense to HIWU’s Possession
charge is itself a consideration in assessing whether any reduction for NSF is
warranted. 250 Nothing else about NSF’s subjective considerations moves his fault
level downward. Accordingly, I find no basis for adjusting the mandatory two-year
Ineligibility period called for by Rule 3223(b).
5.
Consideration of NF.
Since, under his NSF analysis, the Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez’s fault
“considerable,” it necessarily followed he could not eliminate sanctions entirely
under an NF analysis. Thus, the Arbitrator did not discuss NF further. I, too,
conclude that NSF analysis yields no Ineligibility reduction. Indeed, the augmented
record on this review reinforces that determination.
249
Id. 882, 897.
250 Cf. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (There is no constitutional violation where the
sentencing court enhances the defendant’s sentence based on a finding that the defendant committed
perjury); United States v. Balogun, 463 Fed. Appx. 476, 486 (6th Cir. 2012) (Penalty enhancement
was appropriate where the defendant’s testimony was intentionally and knowingly fabricated, was
“material,” and was “designed to attempt to mislead the jury.”); United States v. Austin, 948 F.2d
783, 788 (1st Cir.1991) (“Once the district court found that the Appellant’s testimony was
intentionally untrue and constituted perjury,” a sentencing enhancement was mandatory).
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Detailed analysis of NF need not be undertaken. Mr. Juarez admittedly failed
to check his SUV for any Banned Substance. That admission alone establishes that
NF does not apply. Mr. Juarez has not shown he “did not know or suspect, and could
not reasonably have known or suspected, even with the exercise of utmost caution”
that he was committing an ADRV by having dipa in his Possession at Oaklawn
Park. 251
B.
The Fine Imposed is Increased, While the Adjudication Costs Will Be
Unchanged.
1.
The Fine.
In addition to a period of Ineligibility, Rule 3223(b) permits fines in a
discretionary amount, authorizing for a first offense “up to” $25,000 or twenty-five
percent of the purse, whichever is greater.” The latter is inapplicable here. That the
fine should “follow”—that is, “be commensurate with”—the fault “is a useful
convention”—a well-recognized default principle, but subject to individual case
adjustment. 252 Although the Arbitrator did not reduce the Ineligibility period, he
awarded a fine of only $10,000, reduced from the maximum based on the absence of
evidence that Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or benefitted from Possession of the
dipa. 253
Cf. FIS v. Johaug, CAS 2017/A/5015 & 5110, ¶ 190 (Aug. 21,
2017) (“[A]thletes have a duty to cross-check assurances given by a doctor even where such a doctor
is a sports specialist.”); Carriere Zwei, FEI Tribunal Decision, Case No. 2007/08, at ¶ 4.1x (Aug. 10,
2007) (despite assurances of a stable veterinarian that a supplement with a “suspicious name” would
not increase testosterone level, an equestrian rider “acted with gross negligence and disregard to the
risks” by not “receiving written advices [sic] from renowned veterinarians”).
251 Rules 1020 (NF definition), 3224(b).
252
See Matter of Overly, No. 9449, at 92-93; Poole, JAMS Case No. 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.24-.25, aff’d,
2023 WL 8435860, at *5.
253 AB 660, at ¶ 7.26 (Corrected Final Decision).
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My review here is de novo and based on the full record, including the
testimony of Mr. Terrazas, which the Arbitrator did not have. I find no basis for
reducing the fine from the $25,000 maximum. The Possession prohibition in Rule
3214(a) is a strict liability violation. 254 Intent and actual or potential benefit are
irrelevant as a matter of law except insofar as either may bear on the NF or NSF
analysis. Lack of a bad intent, or the absence of individual benefit, are simply part
of the “utmost caution” or “totality of the circumstances” analyses that NF or NSF
take into account.
Here, the evidence—and my de novo assessment of the veracity of the
evidence Mr. Juarez introduced—weigh so heavily against him that neither
professed lack of intent to cheat or to benefit reduce the Ineligibility period.
Therefore, they do not provide any cognizable offset against the $25,000 maximum
fine. Indeed, if, as I have concluded, Mr. Juarez has fabricated his defense, then
there is indeed wrongdoing, committed before the Arbitrator and attempted on this
review. Maximum deterrence is appropriate when, as here, evidence that is more
likely than not false is offered in an effort to influence the fact-finding process.
Thus, in reducing the fine from the $25,000 maximum to $10,000, the
Arbitrator relied on considerations that fail to justify departing from the
“convention” adopted in HSIA cases that the fine should “follow” the fault. The
reduction is “not in accordance with law.” 255 On review, I may “modify, [or] set
254 See Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16; Poole, JAMS Case 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8, aff’d,
2023 WL 8435860, at *7.
See Singh v. Clinton, 618 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Whether agency action is not in
accordance with law is a question of statutory interpretation, rather than an assessment of
255
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aside, . . . in whole or in part,” the sanctions imposed, and “make any finding or
conclusion that, in [the Court’s] judgment . . . is proper and based on the record.” 256
Therefore, I hold that the $25,000 maximum fine should be imposed.
The Authority seeks an additional $5,000 fine for Aggravating
Circumstances. 257 However, as discussed below, I am not increasing the fine on that
basis.
2.
Arbitration Costs.
Rule 3223(b) also permits an award of “some or all” of adjudication and legal
costs. The Arbitrator exercised his discretion under Rule 3223(b) to assess $8,000 in
arbitration costs against Mr. Juarez, payable at the end of his Ineligibility period. 258
The Arbitrator acknowledged this was “not a scientific calculation,” but took
account instead of “the circumstances and the ease with which [Mr. Juarez] could
have avoided his predicament or the expense of arbitration fees by HIWU balanced
against his conduct and the circumstances.” 259 HIWU did not detail its arbitration
costs to the Arbitration. So, I accept without change the $8,000 amount awarded as
reasonable.
reasonableness in the instant case.”) (cleaned up). Cf. Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS, 815
F. Supp. 3d 1, at *45 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2025) (Action is “not in accordance with law if it violates some
extant federal statute or regulation.”) (cleaned up); Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 35
(D.D.C. 2025) (The “not in accordance with law” element “applies to actions that failed to meet
statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.”) (cleaned up), appeal pending, No. 25-5145
(and related numbers) (D.C. Cir.).
256 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(3)(A)(ii-iii); FTC Rule 1.146(d)(3).
257
AuPCOL ¶ 6 & ¶ 7 (Proposed Order); AuOBr. at 19-21.
258 AB 660, at ¶ 7.29 (Corrected Final Decision).
259
Id.
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C.
Aggravating Circumstances Will Not Be Applied.
Rule 3227(a) provides that, absent exceptions inapplicable here, an individual
held to have committed an ADRV may be subject to additional sanctions “if the
Agency [that is, HIWU] establishes that Aggravating Circumstances are present”
and not rebutted. Under Rule 3227, as relevant here Aggravating Circumstances
permit Ineligibility to be “increased by up to 2 years,” and the fine by “up to
$10,000.” “Aggravating Circumstances” include “deceptive or obstructive conduct to
avoid the . . . adjudication of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation . . . for which the
Covered Person has not been separately sanctioned for Tampering.” 260 The
“deceptive or obstructive conduct” can include conduct in the adjudication
proceeding itself: Mr. Juarez “sought to muddy the waters from first to last both
prior to and during this Arbitration by provision of false evidence.” 261
Thus, the Authority argues:
[Mr. Juarez’s] manufacture of a concocted story to explain his violation of
Rule 3214(a) was an Aggravating Circumstance pursuant to Rule 3227,
260 Rule 3227(b)(4); Rule 1020 (definition).
261 Lewis-Parry v. USADA at ¶ 114 (Dec. 4, 2020) (finding aggravating circumstances),
https://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/Chi-Lewis-Parry-Decision.pdf. See also, e.g.,
Datunashvili, CAS 2024/A/10931, at ¶ 267 (The athlete offered into evidence a fabricated video “put
forward as accurate in [the] first instance until challenged under cross examination.”); Rivera v.
USADA, at ¶¶ 69, 75-76 (Jan. 19, 2018) (The athlete submitted “manufactured evidence and falsified
documents,” gave testimony that “was vague, dissembling and contradictory”—and hence, not
“credible”—and in discussing Aggravating Circumstances, “admitted” a document he submitted “was
fraudulent, but continued to conceal his knowledge” that other evidence “were also fraudulent.”),
https://www.usada.org/wp-content/uploads/USADAv.Rivera_Award.pdf; Matter of. Kulakivskiy at
¶¶ 39, 46 (June 21, 2013) (The Athlete “was complicit” in providing an “untruthful statement,” and
testified “in a less than credible fashion,” concerning the source of the banned substances “prior to
and during the hearing.”), https://resources.world.rugby/worldrugby/document/2021/01/13/f9209b36bfa3-4e23-ba85-d9979f113861/TMG-096091-48-12-1-Decision-final-.pdf. Cf. United States v.
Andersen, 45 F.3d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1995) (Because “[t]he FDA represents the public,” “a deliberate
attempt to mislead the FDA” provided grounds for an upward sentencing enhancement).
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which necessitates increased Consequences for [Mr. Juarez] of at least a one
(1) year period of Ineligibility and a $5,000 fine. 262
As noted earlier, I too am concerned that Mr. Juarez’s account of the facts is
fabricated. That said, I nevertheless will not apply Rule 3227’s Aggravating
Circumstances provision for two reasons.
First, Rule 3227(a) refers expressly to “the Agency”—HIWU—“establish[ing]
that Aggravating Circumstances are present.” 263 Here, in its Charge Letter HIWU
advised Mr. Juarez of the risks if Aggravating Circumstances were proven. But its
prehearing brief in the Arbitration did not mention the subject. 264 Similarly, HIWU
never raised Aggravating Circumstances during the hearing itself. Accordingly,
unlike other cases, HIWU did not attempt to “establish”—nor did the Arbitrator
discuss—Aggravating Circumstances. 265 An element of Rule 3227 was not satisfied
or even vetted in the arbitration.
Second, absent unusual circumstances, the Authority should be bound by
HIWU decisions at the arbitration level. 266 FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) reinforces that
default position: “Except for good cause shown, no assignment of error by the
aggrieved party may rely on any question of fact or law not presented to the
Authority.” Although the Rule speaks of matters asserted “by the aggrieved
262 AuPCOL ¶ 6.
263 Emphasis added.
264 AB 124 (Charge Letter), 72 & 92 (Prehearing Brief: “Relief Sought”).
See id. 235, at ¶¶ 6.79-81, 244, & ¶¶ 7.61-62 (Matter of Shell); id. 297, at ¶¶ 6.2 & 6.4, 306, at
¶ 6.33 & 309, at ¶ 6.51 (Matter of Lynch).
265
266
See Shell II, 2025 WL 1784696, at *24 & n.25, *39.
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party”—typically, the HISA-regulated individual—serious questions would arise if
the Authority were not comparably constrained. Federal courts, of course, have
their own counterpart to Rule 1.146(a)(1). “Absent exceptional circumstances, a
party cannot raise legal issues on appeal that it failed to raise in the district
court.” 267
The Authority could have argued (although it has not) that the “good cause”
or “exceptional circumstances” gloss apply since the record now includes
Mr. Terrazas’s testimony. So, the constellation of facts available to inform whether
there is “deceptive or obstructive conduct,” needed for Aggravated Circumstances, is
different than that available to HIWU in the arbitration.
On the other hand, the evidentiary hearing itself flows from HIWU’s
objection to Mr. Terrazas testifying in the arbitration. If HIWU had refrained from
opposing, and if Mr. Terrazas had testified, perhaps HIWU would have had the
same array of facts as the Authority has on this review. But because HIWU’s
strategic decision created the condition relied on by the Authority to justify
interjecting the new issue, there is a certain “heads I win, tails you lose” outcome
that favors applying the default rule, not the exception.
Taking account of the entire course of proceedings, I deny the Authority’s
Aggravating Circumstances argument. This ruling is, however, without prejudice to
267 Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See also Sheet Metal Workers’ Health
and Welfare Fund of N.C. v. Law Off. of Michael A. DeMayo, LLP, 21 F.4th 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2021)
(discussing reasons for the practice rule).
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the relief that might otherwise be imposed in any other proceedings arising from
the facts of this case.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
I have considered all the matters raised in Mr. Juarez’s papers on this review
and find them unpersuasive. I AFFIRM: (1) the Arbitrator’s determination that
Mr. Juarez violated Rule 3214(a); (2) the two-year period of Ineligibility imposed;
and (3) the award of $8,000 in litigation costs. I SET ASIDE the fine of $10,000 and
DIRECT that a fine of $25,000 be imposed.
The stay of sanctions, previously ordered, is hereby VACATED as of the date
of this Decision.
ORDERED:
Jay L. Himes
Jay L. Himes
Administrative Law Judge
Date: April 28, 2026
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