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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
15-Jul-2015
___________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________
English - Or. English
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
COMPETITION COMMITTEE
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
Unclassified
Cancels & replaces the same document of 15 June 2015
ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
-- 2014 --
16-18 June 2015
This report is submitted by The United States to the Competition Committee FOR DISCUSSION at its
forthcoming meeting to be held on 16-18 June 2015.
English - Or. English
JT03380181
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of
international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................3
1.1
2.
Changes in law or policies ....................................................................................................................3
2.1
3.
International Antitrust Cooperation Developments...................................................................17
Outreach ....................................................................................................................................19
Regulatory and Trade Policy Matters ................................................................................................19
6.1
7.
Enforcement of Pre-merger Notification Rules .........................................................................11
Select Significant Merger Matters .............................................................................................11
DOJ Public Merger Investigations and Challenges ...................................................................14
International antitrust cooperation and outreach ................................................................................17
5.1
5.2
6.
Staffing and Enforcement Statistics ............................................................................................4
Antitrust Cases in the Courts .......................................................................................................5
Statistics on Private and Government Cases Filed ......................................................................6
Significant Enforcement Actions ................................................................................................7
Advisory Letters from the FTC .................................................................................................10
Business Reviews Conducted by the DOJ.................................................................................10
Enforcement of antitrust laws and policies; mergers and concentrations ...........................................11
4.1
4.2
4.2.2
5.
Changes in Antitrust Rules, Policies, or Guidelines....................................................................3
Enforcement of antitrust law and policies: actions against anticompetitive practices ..........................4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
4.
Senior Leadership Update ...........................................................................................................3
Regulatory Policies ...................................................................................................................19
New Studies Related to Antitrust Policy ............................................................................................22
7.1
7.2
7.3
Joint Conferences and Reports ..................................................................................................22
FTC Conferences, Reports, and Economic Working Papers.....................................................22
DOJ Economic Working Papers................................................................................................23
APPENDICES ...............................................................................................................................................24
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
1.
Introduction
1.
This report describes federal antitrust developments in the United States for the period of October
1, 2013 through September 30, 2014 (“FY 2014”).1 It summarizes the competition enforcement and policy
activities of both the Antitrust Division (“Division”) of the U.S. Department of Justice (“Department” or
“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission” or “FTC”). The two agencies are collectively
referred to throughout this report as the “Antitrust Agencies” or “Agencies.” For additional information on
the Agencies’ activities during FY 2014, see the FTC’s Annual Highlights 2014, available at
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2014, and the DOJ’s Spring 2015 Division Update,
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/division-update-spring-2015.
1.1
Senior Leadership Update
2.
On April 29, 2014, Terrell McSweeny began her term as FTC Commissioner that ends on
September 25, 2017.
3.
Brent Snyder became Deputy Assistant Attorney General (DAAG) for Criminal Enforcement on
November 26, 2013, and Nancy L. Rose became DAAG for Economic Analysis on September 8, 2014.
4.
On September 29, 2014, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez appointed Francine Lafontaine as the
Director of the Bureau of Economics. On October 21, 2014, Chairwoman Ramirez appointed Ashkan
Soltani as Chief Technologist. On December 16, 2014, Chairwoman Ramirez appointed Marina Lao as
Director of the Office of Policy Planning.
2.
Changes in law or policies
2.1
Changes in Antitrust Rules, Policies, or Guidelines
5.
Sharing Cyber Security Information. On April 20, 2014, the FTC and the Division jointly issued
a policy statement regarding the sharing of cyber security information, making clear that properly designed
cyber threat information sharing is not likely to raise antitrust concerns and can help secure the nation’s
networks of information and resources. The Agencies recognize that sharing cyber threat information can
improve the security, availability, integrity, and efficiency of information systems in the United States.
The Agencies also recognize that sharing cyber security information is very different from sharing
competitively sensitive information, such as current or future prices and output or business plans. Cyber
security information is typically technical in nature and covers a limited type of information. The policy
provides the analytical framework for information sharing among private entities and is consistent with a
business review letter issued in October 2000, in which the Division stated that it had no intention of taking
enforcement action against the proposed exchange of cyber security information. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-doj-issue-antitrust-policy-statement-sharingcybersecurity.
6.
On March 28, 2014, the Division announced a new streamlined procedure to lower the costs and
expedite the review process for parties seeking to modify or terminate old antitrust settlements and litigated
judgments. The new voluntary procedure can be used by parties seeking to modify or terminate perpetual
decrees–settlements and litigated judgments–entered prior to 1980, when the Division determined that
perpetual decrees were not in the public interest. Since that time, decrees have included “sunset” provisions
that automatically terminate them after a term of years, not to exceed 10 years. Under the new protocol,
1
In some sections of the Report, e.g., the following section on Senior Leadership Update, more recent
information is provided.
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
the requesting party will publish, at its own expense, notice of its intent to seek termination or
modification, and invite interested parties to provide the Division with relevant information; the Division
will no longer seek extensive discovery or conduct an in-depth investigation into the relevant markets. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/304744.htm.
3.
Enforcement of antitrust law and policies: actions against anticompetitive practices
3.1
Staffing and Enforcement Statistics
3.1.1
FTC
7.
During FY 2014, the FTC employed approximately 538 staff and spent approximately $129.5
million in furtherance of its Maintaining Competition mission.
8.
During FY 2014, 1,618 proposed mergers and acquisitions were reported for review under the
HSR Act, a 25.8 percent increase from the number of HSR transactions reported during FY 2013. The
Commission staff issued requests for additional information (“second requests”) in 28 transactions. The
Commission challenged 17 mergers, 13 of which were settled with consent orders, three in which the
transaction was abandoned or restructured as a result of antitrust concerns raised during the investigation,
and one in which the Commission initiated administrative litigation. In the case in which the Commission
issued an administrative complaint, the Commission also voted to seek a preliminary injunction in federal
court to permanently enjoin the acquisition pending resolution of the Commission’s administrative
litigation.
9.
During FY 2014, the FTC staff opened 26 non-merger initial phase investigations. The
Commission brought eight non-merger enforcement actions, six of which were resolved by a consent
order, one administrative complaint that was later resolved with a consent, and one permanent injunction
action in federal court.
10.
During FY 2014, the Commission filed amicus curiae briefs in 11 cases (ten before federal
appeals courts and one before a federal district court). The Commission provided one advisory opinion
(see Section 3.5 below) and submitted 16 advocacy filings. See http://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy.
3.1.2
DOJ
11.
At the end of FY 2014, the Division had 615 employees: 303 attorneys, 48 economists, 121
paralegals, and 143 other professional staff. For FY 2014, the Division received an appropriation of
$160.4 million.
12.
During FY 2014, the Division opened 113 investigations and filed 53 civil and criminal cases in
federal district court. The Division filed 45 criminal cases, in which it charged a total of 18 corporations
and 44 individuals with federal crimes. The Division obtained just over $1.9 billion in criminal fines
against 25 corporate defendants and 24 individuals. The courts sentenced 21 individuals, with an average
sentence of just over two years.
13.
During FY 2014, the Division investigated 80 mergers and challenged seven of them in court; 9
transactions were restructured or abandoned prior to the filing of a complaint as a result of an
announcement by the Division that it would otherwise challenge the transaction. In addition, the Division
screened a total of 544 bank mergers. The Division opened 88 civil investigations (merger and nonmerger), and issued 331 civil investigative demands (a form of compulsory process). The Division filed
one non-merger civil complaint.
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3.2
Antitrust Cases in the Courts
3.2.1
United States Supreme Court
14.
On February 25, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, affirming the FTC’s position that a state may not give private
market participants unsupervised authority to suppress competition even if they act through a formally
designated “state agency.” The North Carolina dental board’s members, primarily dentists, were drawn
from the very occupation they regulate, and they barred non-dentists from offering competing teeth
whitening services to consumers. The Court’s decision makes clear that state agencies constituted in this
manner are subject to the federal antitrust laws unless the state actively supervises their decisions.
15.
The Court’s decision affirms a 2013 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit
upholding a 2011 Decision and Order by the FTC that the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
illegally thwarted lower-priced competition by engaging in anticompetitive conduct to prevent non-dentists
from providing teeth whitening services to consumers in the state. The FTC rejected the Dental Board's
claim that the Board’s conduct is protected from federal antitrust scrutiny by the state action doctrine. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/02/statement-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez-ussupreme-court-ruling.
3.2.2
U.S. Court of Appeals Cases
16.
On July 10, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided United States v.
Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, in which the court affirmed the criminal convictions of two individual and two
corporate defendants for participating in an international conspiracy between Taiwanese and Korean
electronics manufacturers to fix prices for liquid crystal display panels known as TFT-LCDs. The court
rejected the argument that the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule, should apply to the conspiracy
because of its foreign character. The court also rejected several defense arguments based on the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. 6a (“FTAIA”). The court held that in light of the
substantial volume of goods sold to customers in the United States, the verdict – both the indictment and
the proof at trial – could be sustained as import commerce falling within the Sherman Act, to which the
FTAIA did not apply.
17.
In January 2015, the court denied the defendants’ rehearing petitions. At the same time, it
amended its opinion to further hold that the Sherman Act also applied because the foreign sales of panels
that were incorporated into finished consumer products ultimately sold in the United States had a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, and thereby satisfied the effects
exception to the FTAIA.
18.
On June 4, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Lotes Co., Ltd. v. Hon
Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., 753 F.3d 395, in which the district court had dismissed, for lack of
jurisdiction under the FTAIA the claims of the plaintiff Taiwanese electronics manufacturer alleging that a
group of five competing electronics firms attempted to leverage their ownership of certain key patents to
gain control of a new standard for USB connectors and, by extension, to gain monopoly power over the
USB connector industry. The Second Circuit held that the requirements of the FTAIA are substantive and
not jurisdictional; that foreign anticompetitive conduct has a “direct” effect on U.S. domestic or import
commerce under the FTAIA when there is a reasonably proximate causal nexus between the conduct and
the effect; but affirmed the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that any effect alleged by the
plaintiff did not “give rise to” the plaintiff’s claims under a separate provision of the FTAIA.
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19.
On April 22, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a FTC Decision and
Order that finding that ProMedica Health System’s acquisition of rival St. Luke’s Hospital was
anticompetitive and likely would lead to higher prices for consumers in the Toledo, Ohio area. The FTC
staff challenged the acquisition in January 2011, alleging that the loss of competition would significantly
harm patients, employers, and employees in the Toledo area by eliminating significant, beneficial
competition between ProMedica and St. Luke’s through the creation of a combined hospital system with an
increased ability to obtain supra-competitive reimbursement rates from commercial health plans, and,
ultimately, from their members. In an Initial Decision, Chief Administrative Law Judge D. Michael
Chappell ruled largely in favor of the FTC staff.
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/04/federal-appeals-court-upholds-ftc-order-finding-ohio-hospital.
3.2.3
U.S. District Court Cases
20.
On September 23, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California decided In
re Transpacific Passenger Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134104, likely
the first case to consider whether the filed-rate doctrine applies to the international airline industry. A class
of individuals who purchased air transportation services from a group of international airlines alleged that
the airlines fixed various prices for international flights between the U.S. and Asia/Oceania. The airlines
raised as a defense the filed-rate doctrine, which provides that to the extent Congress has given an agency
the authority to set rates, and the agency has exercised that authority, the rates are just and reasonable as a
matter of law and cannot be challenged under federal antitrust law. The court held that Congress gave the
Department of Transportation (“DOT’) authority over all of the rates and charges at issue in the case; that
DOT exercised that authority over the rates that the defendants actually filed with the DOT (known as
Class B and C airfares); but the DOT did not exercise that authority over the rates that defendants did not
file with the DOT (including Class A airfares and fuel surcharges).
21.
On January 16, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York decided
United States v. Apple Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 263, an extension of the court’s 2013 final judgment against
Apple for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by facilitating and encouraging various book publishers
to collectively raise e-book prices. That final judgment and accompanying injunction created the position
of court-appointed External Monitor to evaluate Apple’s internal antitrust compliance policies and antitrust
training program. In the 2014 order, the court denied Apple’s motion to stay the monitorship and rejected
Apple’s objections to how the monitorship was ordered, how the Monitor conducted himself since his
appointment, and arguments that the Monitor should be disqualified because of fee disputes and lack of
impartiality.
3.3
Statistics on Private and Government Cases Filed
22.
According to the 2014 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, 799 new civil antitrust actions, both government and private, were filed in the federal district courts
in
FY
2014.
See
Table
C-2A
of
the
report,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/appendices/C02ASep14.pdf.
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3.4
Significant Enforcement Actions
3.4.1
DOJ Criminal Enforcement
23.
In FY 2014, the Division charged 44 individuals, including 22 auto parts executives and 11 real
estate investors, with criminal antitrust offenses. Twenty-one individuals were sentenced to serve time in jail.
The average number of individuals sentenced to jail terms, and the average length of those terms, continue to
increase. From 1990-1999, the average number of individuals sentenced to prison was 13; this number
increased to 21 for the 2000-2009 period, and to 29 for 2010-2014. The average prison sentence for 19901999 was 8 months; for 2000-2009 it was 20 months, and for 2010-2014, it increased to 25 months.
24.
In the first ever extradition on an antitrust charge, Romano Pisciotti, an Italian national, was
extradited from Germany on a charge of participating in the conspiracy to suppress and eliminate
competition by rigging bids, fixing prices, and allocating market shares for marine hose sold in the United
States and elsewhere. Mr. Pisciotto was charged with participating in the conspiracy from 1999 to 2006;
his 2010 indictment was unsealed in 2013, and after extradition, he appeared in the U.S. District Court for
the
Southern
District
of
Florida
on
April
4,
2014.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/304888.htm. On April 24, 2014, Mr. Pisciotti pled
guilty and was sentenced to serve two years in prison, with credit for the 9 months and 16 days he was held
in
custody
of
the
German
government
pending
his
extradition.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/305376.htm.
25.
In connection with the Division’s environmental services investigation, the Division also
successfully extradited Mr. John Bennet, a Canadian national charged with a kickback and fraud conspiracy
and major fraud against the United States. As part of the alleged schemes, between 2000 and 2004 the coconspirators exchanged kickbacks for the award of subcontracts at New Jersey Superfund environmental
clean-up sites. Mr. Bennet made his initial appearance in U.S. District Court in Newark,
New Jersey on November 17, 2014. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/309928.htm.
26.
In FY 2014, an additional nine companies and 22 individuals were charged with participating in
conspiracies to fix prices and rig bids in the ongoing investigation of automobile parts. These cases
involved more than 20 different auto parts ranging from brake hoses to spark plugs to seatbelts. The
Division continues to cooperate on this investigation with its counterparts in Japan, South Korea, the
European Commission, Canada, and other jurisdictions. As of April, 2015, the auto parts investigation has
resulted in charges against 34 companies and 52 individuals. In total, 29 executives have pleaded guilty
and been sentenced to an average of nearly 15 months in jail. Additionally, 34 corporations have pleaded
guilty or agreed to plead guilty and have agreed to pay more than $2.4 billion in criminal fines. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/auto-parts-investigation-2015.
27.
In FY 2014 the Division continued to prosecute collusion and fraud in the financial services
industry, including real estate investors and bidders at tax lien auctions. From 2009 to April 2015, the
Division has obtained 109 convictions and more than $1.3 billion in corporate fines, penalties, and
settlements from the investigation and prosecution of collusion and fraud in the municipal bond securities,
LIBOR, real estate, and tax lien industries. In FY 2014, 30 individuals were charged in the real estate
foreclosure auction investigations. As of April, 2015, 81 individuals have pleaded guilty or been convicted
and 21 are awaiting trial. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/real-estate-foreclosureauctions-investigation-2015. In the tax liens investigation, in FY 2014, five individuals and two companies
were charged. Overall, as of April 2015, 16 individuals and five companies have been charged; 15
convictions have been obtained; and $2 million in criminal fines have been imposed. Four individuals and
two companies are still awaiting trial. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/municipal-taxlien-auctions-investigation-2015.
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28.
Nine individuals and three companies have pleaded guilty or been convicted of charges arising
out of the environmental services investigation. As of April 2015, more than $6 million in criminal fines
and restitution have been imposed and six defendants have been sentenced to serve prison sentences; the
last defendant to be sentenced received a 14-year sentence, the longest jail term ever imposed involving an
antitrust crime in a multi-count indictment.
See http://www.justice.gov/atr/divisionupdate/2015/environmental-services-investigation-2015.
29.
In FY 2014, the Division continued its ongoing investigation into a single, world-wide
conspiracy involving price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation in international ocean shipping
services for roll-on, roll-off cargo to and from the United States and elsewhere. Roll-on, roll-off cargo is
non-containerized cargo that can be both rolled onto and off of an ocean-going vessel; examples include
new and used cars and trucks and construction and agricultural equipment. Three companies (Kawasaki
Kisen Kaisha Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, and Compañia Sud Americana de Vapores S.A.) have
pled guilty, and have been sentenced to pay total fines of over $136 million, and four corporate executives
have pled guilty and been sentenced to prison terms of 14, 15, 18, and 18 months, respectively. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2015/312415.htm;
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/310793.htm;
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/308903.htm;
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/308903.htm;
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/304053.htm.
3.4.2
DOJ Civil Non-Merger Enforcement
30.
American Express. The Division filed suit on October 4, 2010, challenging rules American
Express, MasterCard, and Visa instituted that prevented merchants from offering consumers discounts or
rewards for using competing card brands and from providing information about the costs associated with
the use of their credit cards. These policies caused consumers to pay more for their purchases and raised
merchant costs. The Division reached a settlement with MasterCard and Visa, which the court approved in
July 2011, in which both companies agreed to eliminate the anticompetitive provisions. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/262867.htm.
31.
In the summer of 2014, Division’s suit against American Express went to trial for seven weeks.
On February 19, 2015, the court ruled that American Express’s policies violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Under the court order issued on April 30, 2015, merchants must be permitted to offer discounts,
express a preference, and engage in other conduct to encourage the use of a particular credit card. The
order also requires American Express to repeal any rules blocking merchant steering, notify merchants of
their freedom to engage in steering activities, and adopt measures to ensure its employees understand that
they
cannot
continue
to
block
steering
from
the
merchants.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2015/313617.htm.
32.
eBay. In 2012, the Division filed a civil antitrust suit to challenge eBay’s agreement not to
recruit or hire employees from Intuit Inc. Division staff worked closely with the California Attorney
General’s Office, which filed a similar lawsuit. The Division sought to prevent eBay from upholding its
agreement with Intuit or entering into similarly anticompetitive agreements with other companies. These
types of agreements eliminate competition to hire affected employees, depriving them of access to
improved
job
and
salary
opportunities.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/288865.htm. On May 1, 2014, the Division reached
a settlement with eBay, which was approved by the court. The settlement prohibits eBay from entering or
maintaining agreements relating to employee hiring and retention for five years, including any agreement
that prevents any person from soliciting, cold calling, recruiting, hiring, or otherwise competing for
employees. This lawsuit was the Division’s most recent challenge to a “no-poach” agreement; earlier
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cases involving Adobe Systems Inc., Apple Inc., Google Inc., Intel Corp., Intuit Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd., and
Pixar resulted in consent decrees. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/305616.htm.
33.
Samsung. On February 7, 2014, the Division closed its investigation of Samsung Electronics
Co. Ltd’s use of standards-essential patents that it had committed to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms to exclude certain Apple, Inc. products from the U.S. market. Samsung obtained
exclusion orders from the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) relating to certain iPhone and iPad
models. The U.S. Trade Representative reviewed the ITC exclusion order against Apple and overturned it
on public interest grounds. As a result, the Division determined that no further action was required. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/303547.htm.
3.4.3
FTC Non-Merger Enforcement Actions
34.
Federal Trade Commission v. AbbVie Inc., et al. On September 8, 2014, the FTC filed a
complaint in federal district court charging several major pharmaceutical companies with illegally blocking
American consumers’ access to lower-cost versions of the blockbuster drug AndroGel. The FTC’s
complaint alleges that AbbVie Inc. and its partner Besins Healthcare Inc. filed baseless patent infringement
lawsuits against potential generic competitors to delay the introduction of lower-priced versions of the
testosterone replacement drug AndroGel. While the lawsuits were pending, AbbVie entered into an
allegedly anticompetitive pay-for-delay settlement agreement with Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
allegedly to further delay generic drug competition. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/09/ftc-sues-pharmaceutical-companies-illegally-blocking-consumer.
35.
In the Matter of National Association of Residential Property Managers, Inc. and In the Matter of
National Association of Teachers of Singing, Inc. On August 22, 2014, the National Association of
Residential Property Managers, Inc. (“NARPM”) and the National Association of Teachers of Singing, Inc.
(“NATS”) agreed to eliminate provisions in their respective codes of ethics that limit competition among
their members. The FTC’s complaint against NARPM, which represents more than 4,000 real estate
managers, brokers, and agents, alleges that NARPM and its members restrained competition in violation of
the FTC Act through provisions in its code of ethics that restrict comparative advertising and solicitation of
competitors’ clients. In a separate complaint, the FTC charged that NATS, which represents more than
7,300 vocal arts teachers in the United States, restrained competition in violation of the FTC Act through a
code of ethics provision that prohibits members from soliciting students from other members. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/08/settle-ftc-charges-professional-associationsproperty-managers.
36.
In the Matter of InstantUPCCodes.com and In the Matter of 680 Digital, Inc. On July 21,
2014, two Internet resellers of UPC barcodes used by retailers for price scanning and inventory purposes
settled charges that they violated the FTC Act by inviting competitors to join in a collusive scheme to raise
the prices charged for barcodes sold online.
In separate complaints, the FTC charged that
InstantUPCCodes.com and its principal, Jacob J. Alifraghis, and 680 Digital, Inc., d/b/a Nationwide
Barcode and its principal, Philip B. Peretz, violated the FTC Act by inviting competitors to collude to raise
prices for barcodes sold over the Internet.
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/07/two-barcode-resellers-settle-ftc-charges-principals-invited.
37.
In the Matter of Tecnica Group S.p.A. and In the Matter of Marker Völkl (International)
GmbH. On May 19, 2014, ski equipment manufacturers Marker Völkl (International) GmbH and Tecnica
Group S.p.A. settled FTC charges that for many years they illegally agreed not to compete for one
another’s ski endorsers or employees. The orders settling the FTC’s charges bar each firm from engaging
in similar anticompetitive conduct in the future. The FTC alleged that starting in 2004 Marker Völkl and
Tecnica agreed not to compete with each other to secure endorsements by professional skiers, in violation
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the FTC charged that Marker Völkl agreed not to solicit,
recruit, or contact any skier who previously endorsed Tecnica skis, and Tecnica agreed to a similar
arrangement with respect to Marker Völkl’s endorsers. In addition, the complaint stated that in 2007, the
companies expanded the scope of their non-compete agreement to cover all of their employees. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ski-manufacturers-marker-volkl-tecnica-settle-ftccollusion.
38.
In the Matter of Music Teachers National Association, Inc. and In the Matter of California
Association of Legal Support Professionals. On December 16, 2013, two professional associations, of
music teachers and legal support services providers, agreed to eliminate provisions in their codes of ethics
that limited competition among their members. The FTC’s complaint against the Music Teachers National
Association, Inc., which represents over 20,000 music teachers nationwide, alleged that the association and
its members restrained competition in violation of the FTC Act through a code of ethics provision that
restricted members from soliciting clients from rival music teachers. In a separate complaint, the FTC
charged that the California Association of Legal Support Professionals, which represents companies and
individuals that provide legal support services in California, violated the FTC Act through code of ethics
provisions that restrained its members from competing against each other on price, disparaging each other
through advertising, and soliciting legal support professionals for employment.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/professional-associations-settle-ftc-chargeseliminating-rules.
3.5
Advisory Letters from the FTC
39.
Under its Rules, the Commission or its staff may offer industry guidance in the form of advisory
opinions regarding proposed conduct in matters of significant public interest. These competition advisory
opinions inform the public about the Commission’s analysis in novel or important areas of antitrust law. In
FY 2014, FTC staff issued one advisory opinion, discussed below. For more information on the
Commission’s advisory letters, see http://www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions.
40.
Quest NPIA. On March 7, 2014, FTC staff issued a letter advising Quest Analytics Group that
its proposal to operate a prescription drug program for the benefit of a group of non-profit schools,
colleges, and universities would fall within the Non-Profit Institutions Act (“NPIA”). The NPIA provides
an exemption for certain non-profit entities to the Robinson-Patman Act, a U.S. antitrust statute that
prohibits certain price discrimination. The staff letter concluded that, consistent with Supreme Court and
prior Commission precedent, the schools, colleges, and universities could purchase discounted specialty
drugs through Quest’s proposed program without violating the Robinson-Patman Act, because 1) the
proposed program will benefit only non-profit entities eligible for the NPIA exemption, 2) the purchases
appear to fit within the NPIA’s “own use” requirement, and 3) sufficient safeguards exist to ensure that no
ineligible for-profit entity will benefit from the NPIA exemption. See https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/03/ftc-staff-opinion-rx-program-operated-benefit-non-profit-schools.
3.6
Business Reviews Conducted by the DOJ
41.
Under the Department’s business review procedure, a person may submit a proposed business
action to the Department and receive a statement as to whether the Department would likely challenge the
action under the antitrust laws. The Department issued one business review letter in FY 2014. Business
review letters can be found at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/letters.html#page=page-0.
42.
On September 23, 2014, the Department announced it would not challenge a proposal by two
chassis leasing companies that would allow the interchange of chassis, used for intermodal transportation
of marine containers, among their separately managed chassis pools. The proposal responded to
10
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
congestion at California port terminals and shortages of chassis caused by the requirement that motor
carriers drop off chassis at a location operated by the pool from which the chassis originated. The proposal
is not likely to produce anticompetitive effects because the parties will a) continue to manage their
respective pools; b) independently establish their published merchant haulage rates; c) compete openly
with one another and other chassis providers; d) negotiate independently with other users in the region for
access to chassis; and e) use a third-party service provider to support the operations of the agreement.
4.
Enforcement of antitrust laws and policies; mergers and concentrations
4.1
Enforcement of Pre-merger Notification Rules
43.
Berkshire Hathaway. On August 20, 2014, at the request of the FTC, the Division filed a civil
suit against Berkshire Hathaway Inc. for violating the pre-merger reporting and waiting requirements when
it acquired voting securities of USG Corp. in December 2013. As a result of the acquisition, Berkshire
Hathaway held approximately 28 percent of USG voting securities, valued at more than $950 million.
Under the terms of the consent decree filed simultaneously with the charges, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. must
pay
an
$896,000
civil
penalty
for
its
violation.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/308144.htm.
4.2
Select Significant Merger Matters
4.2.1
FTC Merger Investigations and Challenges
44.
In the Matter of Fidelity National Financial, Inc., and Lender Processing Services. On December
13, 2014, Fidelity National Financial, Inc. agreed to settle FTC charges that its proposed $2.9 billion
acquisition of Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS”) would have likely substantially lessened
competition by combining the firms’ title plant assets in several local markets in Oregon. To preserve
competition, the settlement required Fidelity to sell a copy of LPS’s title plants in six Oregon counties and
an ownership interest equivalent to LPS’s share of a jointly owned title plant in the Portland, Oregon,
metropolitan area. These divestitures were designed to counteract the likely anticompetitive effects of the
transaction, while preserving any efficiencies that might arise from the combination of Fidelity and LPS.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/ftc-puts-conditions-fidelity-nationalfinancials-acquisition.
45.
In the Matter of Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc. and Insight Pharmaceuticals Corporation.
On August 28, 2014, pharmaceutical company Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc. (“Prestige”), the maker of
Dramamine, agreed to divest assets and marketing rights for the over-the-counter motion sickness drug
Bonine to settle FTC charges that Prestige’s acquisition of Insight Pharmaceuticals Corp. (“Insight”) would
likely have been anticompetitive. The FTC’s settlement with Prestige required the company to divest
Bonine to Wellspring Pharmaceuticals within 10 days after the acquisition takes place. According to the
FTC’s complaint, Prestige’s Dramamine, which was the best-selling branded product in the market for
over-the-counter motion sickness drugs, and Insight’s Bonine, were the only two branded products with
significant sales. Absent a remedy, the acquisition would have eliminated the close competition between
Dramamine and Bonine, likely leading to higher prices for consumers. See https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/08/ftc-puts-conditions-proposed-acquisition-insight-pharmaceuticals.
46.
In the Matter of Akorn, Inc. On August 4, 2014, pharmaceutical company Akorn, Inc. agreed
to sell its rights to develop, manufacture, and market the generic injectable tuberculosis drug, rifampin, in
order to settle FTC charges that Akorn’s acquisition of VersaPharm Inc. and its parent company, VPI
Holdings Corp., would likely have been anticompetitive. The FTC’s settlement with Akorn required the
company to divest its Abbreviated New Drug Application for generic injectable rifampin – which was
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
pending before the Food and Drug Administration – to Watson Laboratories, Inc. Akorn proposed to
acquire VersaPharm for approximately $324 million, under an agreement dated May 9, 2014. According
to the FTC’s complaint, only VersaPharm and two other firms had FDA approval to sell generic injectable
rifampin. There were no viable substitutes for rifampin as a course of treatment for tuberculosis. Absent
the acquisition, Akorn likely would have entered the market for generic injectable rifampin in the near
future, resulting in a significant price reduction for the drug. According to the FTC’s complaint, if Akorn
were to consummate its acquisition of VersaPharm, as originally proposed, the combined company would
have likely foregone or delayed the introduction of Akorn’s generic injectable rifampin. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/08/ftc-puts-conditions-akorn-incs-proposedacquisition-versapharm.
47.
In the Matter of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International and Precision Dermatology. On
July 3, 2014, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. (“Valeant”) and Precision Dermatology, Inc.
(“Precision”) agreed to sell or relinquish rights to Precision’s branded single-agent topical tretinoins and
generic Retin-A, common acne treatments, to settle FTC charges that Valeant’s proposed $475 million
acquisition of Precision would likely have been anticompetitive. According to the FTC complaint,
Valeant’s acquisition of Precision would have likely reduced competition in the market for branded and
generic single-agent topical tretinoins, and in a separate market for generic Retin-A. Valeant and Precision
were the only two significant suppliers of branded single-agent topical tretinoins, and the acquisition would
have eliminated competition between them. The companies were also the two largest suppliers of generic
Retin-A. The acquisition would allegedly have given Valeant a monopoly in four of five versions of
generic Retin-A and reduced competition in the remaining version. See
https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2014/07/ftc-puts-conditions-valeant-pharmaceuticals-proposed-acquisition.
48.
In the Matter of Visant/Jostens/American Achievement. On April 17, 2014, Jostens, Inc.
(“Jostens”) announced that it would abandon plans to acquire Acquisition of American Achievement Corp.
(“AAC”). Earlier that day the FTC voted to seek a preliminary injunction in federal court to stop Jostens,
one of the nation’s largest sellers of high school and college class rings, from proceeding with the
approximately $500 million proposed acquisition of its close rival, AAC. The FTC charged that the
proposed combination of Jostens and AAC would likely have been anticompetitive and led to higher prices
and reduced service for both high school and college students who buy class rings. The FTC also approved
an administrative complaint, alleging that a combined Jostens/AAC would control an unduly high
percentage of the high school and college rings markets with only one smaller meaningful competitor in
both markets. The complaint alleged that Jostens’ acquisition of AAC would have eliminated head-to-head
competition between the two companies, allowing the combined firm to raise prices, while reducing the
incentives to provide better quality and service to students and making it easier for the two remaining
competitors to coordinate. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/statement-ftcbureau-competition-director-deborah-feinstein.
49.
In the Matter of Akorn and Hi-Tech Pharmacal. On April 14, 2014, Akorn Enterprises, Inc.
and Hi-Tech Pharmacal, Inc. agreed to sell the rights and assets to three generic prescription eye
medications and two generic topical anesthetics to Watson Laboratories, Inc., to settle FTC charges that
Akorn’s proposed $640 million acquisition of Hi-Tech would have been anticompetitive and led to higher
prices for consumers. The order settling the FTC’s charges is designed to remedy the alleged
anticompetitive effect of the proposed transaction. It requires the parties to sell either Akorn’s or HiTech’s rights and assets to each of the five drug products to Watson, and requires Akorn to assign Watson
its contract for making branded and generic EMLA cream within 10 days after the deal is consummated.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-puts-conditions-akorn-enterprisesproposed-purchase-hi-tech.
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
50.
In the Matter of CoreLogic, Inc. On March 24, 2014, CoreLogic, Inc. agreed to settle FTC
charges that its proposed $661 million acquisition of DataQuick Information Systems, Inc. from TPG VI
Ontario 1 AIV L.P. (“TPG”) would likely have substantially lessened competition in the market for
national assessor and recorder bulk data. According to the FTC’s complaint, the proposed combination of
CoreLogic’s and DataQuick’s national assessor and recorder bulk data businesses would have eliminated
one of only three providers of national assessor and recorder bulk data. The complaint alleged that the
proposed acquisition would have increased the risk of anticompetitive coordination between the remaining
two market participants and the risk that CoreLogic would unilaterally exercise market power and raise
prices to customers. To preserve competition that would allegedly be lost due to the acquisition, the FTC’s
settlement order requires CoreLogic to license to Renwood RealtyTrac (“RealtyTrac”) national assessor
and recorder bulk data as well as several ancillary data sets that DataQuick provides to its customers. The
order allows RealtyTrac to offer customers the data and services that DataQuick used to offer and to
become an effective competitor in the market. RealtyTrac operated an online marketplace of foreclosure
real property listings and provided national foreclosure data services to real estate consumers, investors,
and professionals.
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/ftc-puts-conditionscorelogic-incs-proposed-acquisition-dataquick.
51.
In the Matter of Bi-Lo Holdings, LLC. On February 25, 2014, grocery store operator Bi-Lo
Holdings, LLC, the parent of Bi-Lo and Winn Dixie grocery store chains, agreed to sell 12 supermarkets in
Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to settle FTC charges that its proposed $265 million acquisition of
154 stores from Delhaize America — 73 Sweetbay supermarkets (and leases to 10 closed stores), as well
as 71 Harveys supermarkets and 10 Reid’s supermarkets — would have harmed competition in several
local markets in those states. The FTC settlement preserves competition in 11 local markets in the three
states. According to the FTC’s complaint, Bi-Lo’s acquisition of the Delhaize stores would likely have
harmed consumers through higher prices, diminished quality and reduced service levels in several markets
in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftcrequires-bi-lo-sell-12-supermarkets-florida-georgia-south.
52.
In the Matter of Endo Health Solutions Inc., Boca Life Science Holdings, LLC, and Boca
Pharmacal, LLC. On January 31, 2014, pharmaceutical companies Endo Health Solutions Inc. (“Endo”)
and Boca Life Science Holdings, LLC and Boca Pharmacal, LLC (“Boca”) agreed to a settlement resolving
FTC charges that Endo’s acquisition of Boca would be anticompetitive. Under the settlement, the
companies relinquished their rights to market and distribute four generic multivitamin fluoride drops for
children, and sold three other generic drugs in development. According to the FTC’s complaint, Endo’s
acquisition of Boca as originally proposed likely would have caused U.S. consumers to pay significantly
higher prices for these generic drugs. Boca was the exclusive marketer and distributor of the four
prescription multivitamin drop products, which were owned and manufactured by Sonar Products, Inc., and
competed with Endo in the sale of these products. According to the complaint, the proposed acquisition
also would have eliminated one likely future entrant from a very limited pool of future entrants in each of
the three other generic drug markets. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftcputs-conditions-endo-health-solutions-acquisition-boca-life.
53.
In the Matter of Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. On January 31, 2014, Thermo Fisher Scientific
Inc. (“Thermo Fisher”), a leading manufacturer of products used in scientific research, agreed to sell assets
to GE Healthcare to settle FTC charges that its proposed $13.6 billion acquisition of Life Technologies
Corporation (“Life”) would likely substantially lessen competition. According to the FTC’s complaint,
aside from Thermo Fisher and Life, there were few meaningful competitors in the three relevant markets
the Commission identified – siRNA reagents, cell culture media, and cell culture sera. Moreover, the two
merging companies were particularly close competitors in each relevant market, and because they were
difficult markets to enter, the deal as proposed would likely have substantially lessened competition in
each market. The FTC alleged that the combined company would have had a share of more than 50
13
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
percent of the worldwide market for individual siRNA reagents, and greater than 90 percent of the market
for siRNA reagent libraries. Post-acquisition, Thermo Fisher would have had at least a 50 percent share of
the worldwide market for cell culture media, and 60 percent of the market for cell culture sera.
Throughout the investigation, FTC staff cooperated with competition agencies reviewing the transaction in
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea and Lithuania. See
54.
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-puts-conditions-thermo-fisherscientific-incs-proposed.
55.
In the Matter of Community Health Systems and Health Management Associates. On
January 22, 2014, the FTC required one of the nation’s largest hospital operators, Community Health
Systems, Inc. (“CHS”) to divest hospitals and related assets, including outpatient facilities, in Alabama and
South Carolina as a condition of its $7.6 billion acquisition of rival health system Health Management
Associates, Inc. (“HMA”). The divestitures resolved Commission charges that the combination would
likely have substantially lessened competition for general acute care inpatient services sold to commercial
health plans and provided to commercially insured patients in two local markets in Alabama and South
Carolina. Absent relief, CHS’s acquisition of HMA would have eliminated valuable price and quality
competition that benefitted local patients in these markets. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/01/ftc-requires-community-health-systems-inc-divest-two-hospitals.
56.
In the Matter of AB Acquisition, LLC. On December 23, 2013, the FTC required the parent
company of Albertson’s LLC, AB Acquisition LLC, to sell two stores in Texas to settle charges that its
proposed acquisition of United Supermarkets LLC is likely to substantially lessen competition in violation
of Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. According to the FTC’s complaint, the
proposed merger of Albertson’s and United was likely to reduce competition in local grocery markets
within Amarillo and Wichita Falls, which would harm consumers through higher prices, lower quality, and
reduced service levels. To preserve competition in these markets, Albertson’s sold its lone stores in
Amarillo and Wichita Falls, Texas, to MAL Enterprises, Inc., which operates under the Lawrence Brothers
IGA, Cash Saver and Save-A-Lot supermarket banners. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2013/12/ftc-requires-albertsons-supermarkets-sell-two-texas-stores.
57.
In the Matter of Service Corporation International and Stewart Enterprises, Inc. On
December 23, 2013, Service Corporation International (SCI), the nation’s largest provider of funeral and
cemetery services, agreed to sell 53 funeral homes and 38 cemeteries to resolve FTC charges that its
proposed $1.4 billion acquisition of Stewart Enterprises, Inc. (Stewart) was likely to have substantially
lessened competition in 59 communities throughout the United States. The complaint alleged that each of
these local markets for funeral and cemetery services was highly concentrated, and that the deal as
proposed would have eliminated direct competition between the two firms. The FTC charged that the deal
would have enabled the merged firm to unilaterally raise prices charged to consumers in these local
markets and would have substantially increased the risk of collusion between SCI and the few remaining
competitors in the affected local areas. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/ftcputs-conditions-service-corporation-internationals-proposed.
4.2.2
DOJ Public Merger Investigations and Challenges
58.
Flakeboard/SierraPine. On October 1, 2014, the Division announced that Flakeboard America
Ltd. had abandoned its planned acquisition of one medium-density fiberboard (“MDF”) and two
particleboard mills from SierraPine. The Division had expressed concerns about the transaction’s likely
anticompetitive effects in the MDF market in California, Oregon, and Washington. The proposed merger
would have given the combined firm a 58 percent market share for the thicker and denser grades of MDF
that Flakeboard and SierraPine sell on the West Coast, enabling Flakeboard to raise prices by restricting
14
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
the amount of MDF available. The transaction also raised concerns of possible postmerger coordination on
output
and
prices
between
Flakeboard
and
its
few
remaining
rivals.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/309005.htm.
59.
Moreover, on November 7, 2014, the Division announced a settlement with Flakeboard America
for disgorgement and civil penalties under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7A of the HSR Act,
respectively, to redress the parties’ allegedly illegal premerger coordination. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/309786.htm.
60.
Tyson Foods/Hillshire Brands. On August 27, 2014, the Division and the States of Illinois,
Iowa, and Missouri filed a civil suit to block Tyson Foods, Inc.’s $8.5 billion acquisition of the Hillshire
Brands Company. The Division simultaneously filed a proposed settlement, which the court approved,
requiring Tyson to divest Heinhold Hog Markets, its sow purchasing business, to an independent buyer
approved by the Division. Under the original proposal, the combined firm would have accounted for more
than a third of sow purchases from U.S. farmers, and this would likely reduce competition in the market for
sows. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/308299.htm.
61.
Sinclair/Perpetual. On July 15, 2014, the Division and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
filed a civil suit to block Sinclair Broadcast Group’s $963 million acquisition of Perpetual Corp. The
Division simultaneously filed a proposed settlement, later approved by the court, requiring the parties to
divest their interests in WHTM-TV, an ABC affiliate in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to Media General.
Without the divesture, Sinclair would have owned or controlled three of the six broadcast television
stations in the Harrisburg-Lancaster-Lebanon-York designated market area, likely to lead to price increases
for broadcast television spot advertising in parts of central Pennsylvania.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/307134.htm.
62.
Martin Marietta/Texas Industries. On June 26, 2014, the Division and the State of Texas filed
a civil suit to block Martin Marietta Materials Inc.’s $2.7 billion acquisition of Texas Industries Inc. The
Division simultaneously filed a proposed settlement, which the court approved, requiring Martin Marietta
to divest an Oklahoma quarry and two Texas rail yards to an independent buyer approved by the Division.
As originally proposed, the acquisition would have combined two of the three suppliers of aggregate
(crushed stone) approved for use by the Texas Department of Transportation (“DOT”), impacting
customers
handling
DOT
projects
in
the
Dallas
metropolitan
area.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/306733.htm.
63.
Ardent Mills JV. On May 20, 2014, the Division filed a civil suit to block the formation of
Ardent Mills, a flour milling joint venture between ConAgra Foods, Inc., Cargill Inc., CHS Inc., and
Horizon Milling LLC. The Division simultaneously filed a proposed settlement, which the court approved,
requiring the parties to divest mills in four states to Miller Milling Company LLC, and prohibiting the
companies from engaging in certain information exchanges relating to wheat purchases and customer use
of wheat. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/306051.htm.
64.
Louisiana-Pacific/Ainsworth. On May 14, 2014, the Division announced that Louisiana-Pacific
Corp. (“LP”) had abandoned its planned acquisition of Ainsworth Lumber Co. Ltd. after the Division had
expressed concerns about the transaction’s likely anticompetitive effects on the oriented strand board
(“OSB”) market in the Pacific Northwest and Upper Midwest region. Under the proposed merger, the
combined firm would have had 63 percent market share in the Pacific Northwest and a 55 percent market
share in the Upper Midwest, enabling LP to better target its customers in these areas for price increases.
The proposed transaction also raised the concern that by gaining control over Ainsworth, LP would be able
to better restrict OSB supply in these regions, and coordinate output and price decisions with the remaining
15
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
competitors. The Division closely coordinated its investigation with Canada’s Competition Bureau. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/305936.htm.
65.
Heraeus/Midwest Instrument. On January 2, 2014, the Division filed suit to require Heraeus
Electro-Nite LLC to divest certain assets from its 2009 acquisition of Midwest Instrumental Company Inc.,
which Heraeus was not required to report under the premerger notification laws. The Division
simultaneously filed a proposed settlement, which the court later approved, requiring Heraeus to divest a
package of assets to an identified purchaser, Keystone. The proposed settlement also requires Heraeus to
waive non-compete provisions that it had imposed on some former employees, and to notify the Division
of any future acquisitions in the market of sensors and instruments that might otherwise not be subject to
the
reporting
requirements
of
the
premerger
notification
law.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/302701.htm.
66.
Gannet/Belo. On December 16, 2013, the Division filed suit to block Gannett’s proposed
acquisition of Belo, valued at approximately $2 billion, and Sander Media LLC’s related acquisition of six
Belo television stations that Gannett cannot hold under Federal Communications Commission rules. At the
same time, the Division filed a proposed settlement to resolve its competitive concerns by requiring Belo
and Sander to divest their interests in a CBS affiliate station in St. Louis. The proposed transaction would
have given Gannett a dominant position in broadcast television spot advertising in the St. Louis designated
market area, resulting in higher prices to advertisers. The proposed settlement requires Gannett, Belo, and
Sander to divest all assets used primarily in the operation of the CBS affiliate to an independent buyer
approved by the Division. See http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/302344.htm.
67.
US Airways/American Airlines. On August 13, 2013, the Division, seven state attorneys
general, and the District of Columbia filed a civil suit to block the $11 billion merger between US Airways
Group Inc. (“US Air”) and AMR Corp., the parent company of American Airlines. The lawsuit alleged
that the bulk of domestic routes were already highly concentrated, and that the proposed transaction would
not only result in the world’s largest airline, but also would allow four airlines to control more than 80
percent of domestic commercial air travel. The planned merger between US Air and American would have
eliminated direct competition between the two companies. These airlines were head-to-head competitors
for nonstop service on routes worth approximately $2 billion in annual route-wide revenues, and competed
directly on more than a thousand routes where one or both offered connecting service. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/299960.htm.
68.
On November 12, 2013, the Division and the states reached a proposed settlement with US Air
and AMR Corp. The agreement requires the companies to divest slots and gates to low-cost carriers at key
constrained airports nationwide, including airports in Washington DC, New York, Boston, Chicago,
Dallas, Los Angeles, and Miami, in order to enhance system-wide competition. These divestitures include
138 slots at Reagan National and LaGuardia airports. This settlement will increase the presence of low cost
carriers at key airports, enhancing meaningful competition in the industry and benefiting air travellers. See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/301616.htm. On April 25, 2014, the district court
approved
the
decree
and
entered
final
judgment.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/305491.htm.
16
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
5.
International antitrust cooperation and outreach
5.1
International Antitrust Cooperation Developments
69.
In FY 2014, the Antitrust Agencies continued to play a lead role in promoting cooperation and
convergence toward sound competition policies internationally, through building strong bilateral ties with
major enforcement partners and participation in multilateral bodies such as the Competition Committee of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), International Competition
Network (“ICN”), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), and the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”).
70.
On September 16, 2014, the Agencies announced that they had signed an antitrust cooperation
agreement with Colombia’s Superintendence of Industry and Commerce. The agreement contains
provisions for antitrust enforcement cooperation and coordination, consultations with respect to
enforcement actions, and technical cooperation, and is subject to effective confidentiality protections. The
agreement also includes mutual acknowledgment of the importance of antitrust cooperation, including
information sharing and coordination of enforcement actions. See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/09/federal-trade-commission-department-justice-sign-antitrust;
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f309000/309025.pdf.
71.
On May 20, 2014, FTC Chairwoman Ramirez, FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, and
DOJ DAAG Leslie Overton met with officials from China’s antitrust agencies to follow up on the U.S. and
Chinese agencies’ high-level dialogue regarding antitrust developments and priorities. The FTC and DOJ
officials met with Shang Ming, Director General of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), Hu Zucai, Vice Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC), Xu Kunlin, Director General of NDRC’s Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, and Ren
Airong, Director General of the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), to discuss antitrust issues of mutual interest. See
72.
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-chairwoman-meets-officials-chineseantitrust-agencies.
73.
On March 25, 2014, the DOJ, the FTC, and the Canadian Competition Bureau issued a set of
“best practices” to make more transparent how they coordinate merger reviews that affect the United States
and Canada. The best practices set forth how effective day-to-day cooperation works between the two U.S.
agencies and the Competition Bureau, including how the agencies communicate with each other, benefit
from the similarity of their respective merger review timetables, cooperate in the analysis of evidence, use
waivers of confidentiality provided by the parties, and address remedies and settlements. The best
practices also seek to promote cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and Canadian agencies in
order to enhance the likelihood of consistent outcomes when the same merger is reviewed in both
countries. In addition, the best practices acknowledge the contribution that merging parties can make in
facilitating cooperation, and provide guidance to firms about how to work with the agencies to coordinate
and
facilitate
the
reviews
of
their
proposed
transactions.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/304654.pdf; https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/03/us-canadian-antitrust-agencies-issue-best-practices-coordinating.
74.
On February 13, 2014, the heads of the Agencies met in Washington with their counterparts from
Mexico’s Federal Commission on Economic Competition and Canada’s Competition Bureau to discuss
their mutual efforts to ensure continued effective antitrust enforcement cooperation in their increasingly
interconnected markets. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, including recent enforcement
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
developments, cooperation and mutual support, and priority setting and efficiency in resource constrained
environments.
75.
During FY 2014, the Agencies cooperated on merger reviews – often pursuant to waivers from
parties and third parties – with many competition agencies around the world, including those of Australia,
Canada, China, the European Union, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United
Kingdom. To foster convergence with counterparts, the Agencies also held bilateral antitrust consultations
with the Japan Fair Trade Commission and the Korea Fair Trade Commission.
76.
The FTC cooperated with foreign counterparts on 31 merger and six non-merger investigations
with many competition agencies around the world. Investigations on which the FTC cooperated with
foreign counterparts included Medtronic’s acquisition of Covidien, in which the FTC worked with antitrust
agencies in Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico to reach consistent results. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc-puts-conditions-medtronics-proposedacquisition-covidien. Commission staff cooperation with non-U.S. counterparts also included extensive
coordination on a number of non-public matters in which the Commission ultimately closed its
investigation without taking enforcement action or that resulted in abandonment of the transaction by the
parties, some after second requests were issued.
77.
In FY 2014, the Division cooperated with international counterparts on many civil non-merger,
merger, and cartel investigations. Among the Division’s most notable instances of international
cooperation was its LP/Ainsworth matter (see above, para 69). In May 2014, Louisiana-Pacific abandoned
its plan to acquire Ainsworth Lumber Co., its close competitor in the sale of a type of manufactured woodbased panel called oriented strand board, after the Division expressed concerns about the transaction’s
likely anticompetitive effects. With waivers from the parties early in the investigation, the Division was
able to achieve an unprecedented level of cooperation with the Canadian Competition Bureau (“CCB”).
The Division and CCB conducted joint interviews, CCB attended party depositions taken by the Division,
and Division and CCB attorneys and economists held frequent, approaching daily, calls on theories of
harm and analytical approaches. This level of cooperation allowed each agency to reach its own
independent determination of how to proceed, but to do so more efficiently than working alone. In total,
the Division cooperated with international counterparts in roughly a dozen merger investigations in FY
2014. The Division also coordinated and cooperated with competition agencies in other jurisdictions in
many ongoing international cartel investigations.
78.
During FY 2014, the Agencies continued to play leadership roles in the International Competition
Network (“ICN”) and served as ICN Steering Group Members. At the ICN’s annual conference in
Marrakesh, Morocco on April 22-25, 2014, the ICN adopted new recommended practices for predatory
pricing analysis and competition assessment, and approved new work product on international merger
enforcement cooperation, confidentiality protections during investigations, digital evidence gathering and
leniency policies. See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/.
79.
During FY 2014, the Division continued to serve as co-chair of the ICN Cartel Working Group,
together with Germany’s Bundeskartellamt and the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets.
The group revised a reference guide for agencies on digital evidence gathering to showcase the range of
ICN member approaches to digital evidence gathering techniques and also to identify good practices and
procedures. See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1006.pdf. The group
also drafted a reference guide on cooperation with procurement agencies, to provide competition
authorities with practical tools for building constructive relationships with public procurement bodies.
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
80.
In FY 2014, the FTC served as co-chair of the ICN’s Agency Effectiveness Working Group
(“AEWG”), together with the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority and the Norwegian
Competition Committee. The FTC co-led the Investigative Process Project, which resulted in ICN
guidance on investigative process to promote fair and informed enforcement. In 2014, the working group
also produced a report on confidentiality protections that underscored common approaches to these
practices.
See
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1028.pdf;
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/international-competition-network-adoptsrecommended-practices.
81.
During FY 2014, both Agencies contributed to a two-year ICN Merger Working Group project
on international merger enforcement cooperation. The Agencies participated in a teleseminar series on that
topic, and helped to prepare a practical guide for agencies on merger cooperation.
See
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1031.pdf.
5.2
Outreach
82.
In FY 2014, the Agencies continued to engage in technical cooperation on competition law and
policy matters to their international counterparts. In FY 2014, the FTC continued its robust technical
assistance program in which it shares the agency’s experience with competition and consumer protection
agencies around the world, conducting 42 programs in 28 countries, including Brazil, Bulgaria, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Slovenia,
South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam. The FTC also conducted judicial training in the Mexico and Panama.
83.
As part of its ongoing effort to build effective relationships, the FTC provides opportunities for
staff from foreign agencies to spend several months working directly with FTC staff on investigations
through its International Fellows and Interns program. In FY 2014, the FTC hosted five international
fellows from Argentina, Chile, the European Union, Japan, and Mexico. These assignments provide
valuable opportunities for participants to obtain a deeper understanding of their international partners’ laws
and challenges. This knowledge provides critical support for coordinated enforcement and promotes
cooperation and convergence towards sound policy.
84.
In FY 2014 Division attorneys and economists traveled to Peru, Romania, Vietnam, India,
Turkey, South Africa, Hungary, El Salvador, Honduras, South Korea, Mexico and Thailand (12 countries)
for technical cooperation programs. A total of 17 travelers participated in 14 different trips.
6.
Regulatory and Trade Policy Matters
6.1
Regulatory Policies
6.1.1
DOJ Activities: Federal and State Regulatory Matters
85.
In a May 14, 2014, letter to the FCC, the Division reiterated its views expressed in April 11, 2013
comments, that FCC rules should ensure that the smaller nationwide wireless networks, which currently
lack substantial low-frequency spectrum, have an opportunity to acquire such spectrum, as this could
improve the competitive dynamic in the wireless market and benefit consumers.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/305961.pdf.
86.
On February 20, 2014, the Division filed an ex parte submission with the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) relating to the FCC’s Quadrennial Regulatory Review of its
Broadcast Ownership Rules, including its rules on attribution and various forms of “sharing” agreements
between broadcast stations. The filing described DOJ’s enforcement experience in the broadcast television
and radio industries, including its experience analyzing a variety of cooperation or “sharing” agreements
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
such as joint sales agreements (“JSAs”), shared services agreements (“SSAs”), and local news service
(“LNS”) agreements. Such arrangements often confer influence or control of one broadcast competitor
over another. Failure to account for the effects of such arrangements can create opportunities to
circumvent FCC ownership limits and the goals those limits are intended to advance. As a consequence,
the Department encouraged the FCC’s ownership “attribution” rules to treat any two stations participating
in a JSA (or agreement similar in substance to a JSA) as under common ownership. Furthermore, even
where a sharing agreement did not create an attributable interest under the FCC’s bright-line rules, the
submission suggested that the FCC should scrutinize agreements on a case-by-case basis and take action
where
those
agreements
do
not
serve
the
public
interest.
See
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/303880.pdf.
6.1.2
FTC Staff Activities: Federal and State Regulatory Matters
87.
Health Care. In FY 2014, FTC staff issued advocacy comments to legislators in Massachusetts
and Missouri, as well as a policy paper, addressing the scope of practice of advanced practice nurses. The
policy paper suggests that state legislators should be cautious when evaluating proposals to limit the scope
of practice of Advanced Practice Registered Nurses. By limiting the range of services APRNs may
provide and the extent to which they can practice independently, such proposals may reduce competition
that benefits consumers. See https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-missouri-house-representatives-regarding-missouri-house-bills-1481-1491/140505missouriaprn.pdf;
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/policy-perspectivescompetition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses/140307aprnpolicypaper.pdf;
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-massachusettshouse-representatives-regarding-house-bill-6-h.2009-concerning-supervisory-requirements-nursepractitioners-nurse-anesthetists/140123massachusettnursesletter.pdf.
88.
Health Care. On October 6, 2014, FTC staff, in response to a notice requesting public
comments, urged the Texas State Board of Dental Examiners to reject two proposed rules that impose new
restrictions on the ability of Texas dentists to enter into contracts with non-dentists, such as dental service
organizations, for the provision of nonclinical, administrative services. The comment explains that such
restrictions may reduce competition, likely resulting in higher prices and reduced access to dental services,
especially
for
underserved
populations.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-texas-state-boarddental-examiners/141006tsbdecomment1.pdf.
89.
Transportation. In May 2014, FTC staff submitted written comments to legislators in Missouri
and New Jersey in response to requests for comment on legislative proposals that would alter the ability of
automobile manufacturers to sell their cars directly to consumers. The proposed Missouri bill would
expand current prohibitions of such sales by franchisors to also include sales by any manufacturer,
regardless of whether they use independent dealers. In New Jersey, several bills would create limited
exceptions to state law that, as currently interpreted, requires motor vehicles to be sold only through
independent auto dealers. According to the FTC staff, current laws in both jurisdictions “operate as a
special protection for [independent motor vehicle dealers] – a protection that is likely harming both
competition and consumers.” The comments note the staff’s strong opposition to state laws that mandate a
single
method
of
distributing
automobiles
to
consumers.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-missouri-houserepresentatives-regarding-house-bill-1124-which-would-expand/140515mo-autoadvocacy.pdf;
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-new-jersey-generalassembly-regarding-assembly-bills-2986-3096-3041-3216-which/140516nj-autoadvocacy.pdf.
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
90.
Transportation. On March 26, 2014, FTC staff, in response to a request from a State Senator,
provided written comments to the Illinois State Senate on the competitive impact of repealing the state’s
prohibition on the sale or long-term lease of vehicles on Sundays. The staff comment states that repealing
the mandatory Sunday closing provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code would enhance competition and
benefit consumers.
See https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-illinois-state-senate-regarding-senate-bill-2629-which-would-repealcertain/140327illinoisautostaffcomment.pdf.
91.
Utilities. On March 10, 2014, FTC staff submitted a comment in response to a request from the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (“Mass. DPU”) for comments on its
investigation of dynamic pricing for residential electricity customers. Dynamic prices are rates that vary
over time, based on wholesale electricity prices and transmission congestion conditions. According to the
comment, with dynamic pricing, customers who respond to incentives to trim demand for power during
peak demand periods can save money, lessen environmental impact, and reduce the costs and improve the
reliability of the electric system. Such actions benefit all customers, even those who do not respond to the
incentives. The staff comment identifies fundamental difficulties in reconciling the “basic” rate-regulated
service in Massachusetts with rapid innovations in services and equipment – such as “smart” appliances
and electric cars – that enable customers to respond to incentives to reduce electricity consumption during
peak demand. To reach this goal, the comment recommends that the Mass. DPU adopt a peak-time rebate
plan once appropriate electric meters, as well as consumer education and consumer protection programs,
are in place. See https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-commentmassachusetts-department-public-utilities-regarding-its-investigation-timevarying/140318dpustaffcomment.pdf.
92.
Utilities. On January 13, 2014, the FTC staff submitted a comment in response to a request from
the District of Columbia Public Service Commission (“DC PSC”) for comments on Potomac Electric
Power Company’s (“Pepco’s”) proposed dynamic pricing program for residential customers. Pepco’s
proposal would offer cost savings to customers who respond to incentives to reduce electricity
consumption during peak demand periods – incentives made possible via use of devices such as “smart”
electric meters. The FTC staff comment encourages the DC PSC to adopt the proposal as “a constructive
initial step toward improving the efficiency of the electric system in a way that can benefit many customers
but also leave the existing price structure in place for customers who do not (or cannot) respond to the
efficiency incentives.” It also recommends that the DC PSC “periodically review the effects of the
proposed approach with a focus on the accuracy of the price signals being conveyed, consumer
participation in and satisfaction with the program, and methods to enhance consumer participation and
satisfaction over time.” See https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftcstaff-reply-comment-district-columbia-public-service-commission-concerning-proposed-program.10861109/140117dcdynamicpricing.pdf.
6.1.3
DOJ and FTC Trade Policy Activities
93.
The Agencies are involved in interagency discussions and decision-making with respect to the
formulation and implementation of U.S. international trade and investment policy as concerns competition
policy. The Agencies participate in interagency trade policy discussions chaired by the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, and provide antitrust and other legal advice to U.S. trade agencies. In addition, the
Division works with other Department components (including the Civil, Criminal, and Environmental and
Natural Resources Divisions) on international trade and investment issues that affect those components or
the Department as a whole. The FTC coordinates on consumer protection aspects of trade policy with a
number of U.S. government agencies.
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
94.
The Agencies also participate in negotiations and working groups related to regional and bilateral
trade agreements. The FTC and the DOJ participate in competition policy discussions and negotiations
associated with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (“TTIP”).
7.
New Studies Related to Antitrust Policy
7.1
Joint Conferences and Reports
95.
Conditional Pricing Practices Workshop. On June 23, 2014, the FTC and DOJ held a public
workshop to explore the economics and legal policy implications of certain pricing practices, such as
loyalty and bundled pricing. The workshop consisted of presentations and roundtable discussions that
focused on practices in which prices are explicitly or effectively contingent on commitments to purchase or
sell a specified share or volume of a single product or a mix of multiple products. Workshop participants
considered theoretical and empirical developments in the economic understanding of these practices,
discussed developments in the relevant case law, and assessed the implications for the proper treatment of
these practices under the antitrust laws.
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2014/06/conditional-pricing-practices-economic-analysis-legal-policy.
7.2
FTC Conferences, Reports, and Economic Working Papers
7.2.1
Conferences and Workshops
96.
Health Care Competition Workshop. On March 20-21, 2014, the FTC held a public workshop
to study certain activities and trends that may affect competition in the evolving health care industry. The
workshop explored current developments related to professional regulation of health care providers,
innovations in health care delivery, advancements in health care technology, measuring and assessing
health care quality, and price transparency of health care services. See https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/events-calendar/2014/03/examining-health-care-competition.
97.
Follow-On Biologics Workshop. On February 4, 2014, the FTC held a workshop to explore
competition issues involving biologic medicines and follow-on biologics. The workshop focused on issues
including the potential impact of state regulations affecting competition and how regulations might be
structured to facilitate competition while still protecting patient health and safety. The workshop also
covered the experience of other countries with follow-on biologic competition.
See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/02/follow-biologics-workshop-impact-recentlegislative-regulatory.
98.
Sixth Annual Microeconomics Conference. On November 7-8, 2013, the FTC held its sixth
annual conference on microeconomics, bringing together researchers from academia, government agencies,
and other organizations to discuss economic issues in antitrust and consumer protection. See
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/11/sixth-annual-microeconomics-conference.
7.2.2
Bureau of Economics Working Papers
99.
The FTC’s Bureau of Economics issued the following working papers during FY 2014. The
papers are available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/economics-research/workingpapers.
Daniel O’Brien and Doug Smith, Privacy in Online Markets: A Welfare Analysis of Demand
Rotations, August 2014
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DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
Matthew Chesnes, The Impact of Outages on Prices and Investment in the US Oil Refining
Industry, June 2014
Matthew Chesnes, Weijia (Daisy) Dai, Ginger Jin, Banning Foreign Pharmacies from Sponsored
Search: The Online Consumer Response, April 2014
Nathan Wilson, Market Structure as a Determinant of Patient Care Quality, March 2014
7.3
DOJ Economic Working Papers
7.3.1.
DOJ Economic Analysis Group Discussion Papers
100.
The DOJ Economic Analysis Group issued the following papers during FY 2014. The papers are
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/discussion_papers.htm.
Craig T. Peters, Bargaining Power and the Effects of Joint Negotiation: The “Recapture Effect,”
EAG 14-3, September 2014
Mitsukuni Nishida and Marc Remer, Search, Price Dispersion, and Local Competition:
Estimating Heterogeneous Search Costs in Retail Gasoline Markets, EAG 14-2, July 2014
Alexander MacKay, Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer, and Gloria Sheu, Bias in Reduced-Form
Estimates of Pass-through, EAG 14-1, February 2014
Matthew R. Backus, Joseph Uri Podwol, and Henry S. Schneider, Search Costs and Equilibrium
Price Dispersion in Auction Markets, EAG 13-2, November 2013
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APPENDICES
Department of Justice: Fiscal Year 2014 FTE2 and Resources by Enforcement Activity
FTE
Amount ($ in thousands)
Criminal Enforcement
262
$64,160
Civil Enforcement
392
$96,240
Total
654
$160,400
Federal Trade Commission: Fiscal Year 2014 Competition Mission
FTE and Dollars by Program, Bureau & Office
FTE
Amount ($ in thousands)
Bureau of Economics
271.7
76.0
47,351.1
13,095.8
Regional Offices
24.6
5,351.1
Mission Support
128.9
56,604.4
Premerger Notification
Bureau of Competition
26.7
4,304.8
Bureau of Economics
Regional Offices
0.2
0.3
23.6
42.7
Bureau of Economics
130.9
40.8
23,383.5
6,892.4
Regional Offices
14.7
3,303.0
Bureau of Economics
5.0
---
806.8
---
Regional Offices
---
0.8
Total
Promoting Competition
Mission
Bureau of Competition
Merger & Joint
Venture
Enforcement
Bureau of Competition
Merger & Joint
Venture
Compliance
Bureau of Competition
2
An “FTE” or “full time equivalent” amounts to one employee working full time for a full year. Because the
number of employees fluctuates throughout the year through hiring, attrition, and varying schedules, an
agency typically has more employees than FTEs (e.g., two employees working 20 hours per week for one
full year equals one FTE).
24
DAF/COMP/AR(2015)10
Nonmerger Enforcement
Bureau of Competition 94.2
Bureau of Economics
17.8
Regional Offices 7.2 1,453.3
FTE
Amount ($ in thousands)
FTE
Amount ($ in thousands)
15,903.0
3,167.1
Nonmerger Compliance
Bureau of Competition 0.1 17.5
Bureau of Economics
--- --Regional Offices --- ---
Antitrust Policy Analysis
Bureau of Competition 0.1 16.1
Bureau of Economics
9.0 1,514.7
Regional Offices --- --Other Direct
Bureau of Competition
14.7
2,919.4
Bureau of Economics
8.2 1,498.0
Regional Offices 2.4 551.3
Support 128.9
56,604.4
25
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.