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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

__________________________________________

)

)

)

Dr. Larry Overly, DVM

)

)

Appellant.

)

__________________________________________)

In the Matter of

Docket No. 9443

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

AND APPLICATION FOR STAY

I.

Application for Review

This case arises from sanctions imposed against Dr. Larry Overly, a

veterinarian, for possession of testosterone and isoxsuprine in violation of rules

adopted to implement the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). 1

Dr. Overly has filed a Notice of Appeal and Application for Review of the sanctions

before the Federal Trade Commission (the “Review App.”). 2 Contemporaneously,

Dr. Overly filed an Application for Stay of Final Civil Sanction (the “Stay App.”). 3

The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”) timely filed its

1 See 15 U.S.C. § 3051 et seq. Capitalized terms used, but not defined, in this Order, are from HISA

Rule 1020 of the General Provisions and the Protocol. References to a “Rule” are to those

promulgated under HISA, unless otherwise identified.

2 15 U.S.C. § 3058; 16 C.F.R. § 1.146 (the “FTC Rules”).

3 15 U.S.C. § 3058(d); FTC Rule 1.148.

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response to the Application for Review and opposition to the Stay Application (the

“Review Resp.” and the “Stay Resp.”).

This Order resolves both matters.

A.

Summary of the Case and the Arbitrator’s Decision

The Authority has adopted, and the FTC has approved, various rules to

implement HISA, including those comprising the Anti-Doping and Medication

Control (“ADMC”) Program. Among other things, the ADMC Program prohibits

“Possession of a Banned Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification for

such Possession.” 4 The Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit (“HIWU”) enforces

these rules on behalf of the Authority. 5

In July 2024, HIWU discovered testosterone and isoxsuprine, both Banned

Substances, during a search of Dr. Overly’s veterinary vehicle (a Hummer) at Los

Alamitos Race Course in Cypress, California. In consequence, HIWU charged

Dr. Overly with two violations of Rule 3214(a). There is no dispute that: (1)

testosterone and isoxsuprine are Banned Substances under the Rules; and (2)

Dr. Overly was in Possession of both substances at Los Alamitos.

Therefore, the case turns on whether Dr. Overly proved a “compelling

justification” for having the two substances at Los Alamitos in July 2024. Dr. Overly

based his defense, in part, on the fact that his veterinary practice includes treating

horses not subject to HISA’s Rules (“non-Covered Horses”). In rounded terms, which

4 Rule 3214(a).

5 Rule 3010(e)(1).

2

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suffice for present purposes, approximately 70% of the horses he treats, both at Los

Alamitos and off-track, are non-Covered Horses. In addition, Dr. Overly introduced

evidence purporting to show that: (1) he treated one specific off-track horse, Cosmo,

with testosterone; and (2) he considered but rejected treating another off-track

horse, Brownie, with isoxsuprine.

After an evidentiary hearing, the Arbitrator held that Dr. Overly had failed

to establish a compelling justification defense. 6 The ADMC Rules also provide that

sanctions may be eliminated based on proof of no fault or negligence (“NF”) on

Dr. Overly’s part, or reduced if no significant fault or negligence (“NSF”) is proven. 7

The Arbitrator held that Dr. Overly failed to show NF, and that he was entitled

only to “a very slight” sanction reduction for NSF. 8

Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions:

Dr. Overly shall:

a. Be suspended for a period of Ineligibility of 23 months, commencing

immediately upon on the date of issuance of this Corrected Final Award, less

169 days credit for time served under the prior Period of Ineligibility and

subsequent Voluntary Provisional Suspension.

b. Be fined $25,000.00 (twenty five thousand U.S. dollars) to be paid to

HIWU by the end of the Period of Ineligibility; and

c. Be required to pay a contribution of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand U.S.

dollars) toward HIWU’s share of the arbitration costs of this proceeding by

the end of his Period of Ineligibility. 9

6 Review App., Ex. 1 (Corrected Final Decision), at ¶ 7.5.8.

7

Id. at ¶¶ 5.12-.14.

8

Id. at ¶¶ 7.8.3-.18.

9

Id. at ¶ 8.1. See also Review App., Ex. 2 (HISA Civil Sanction Notice).

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B.

The Application for Review

1.

Dr. Overly’s Arguments

Dr. Overly asserts that he proved the compelling justification defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. He claims to have relied on public remarks by

HIWU’s then-Chief of Science, Dr. Mary Scollay, during the period leading up to the

ADMC Program taking effect in May 2023. Dr. Scollay stated, in summary, that

veterinarians with partially Non-Covered practices are “able to possess a Banned

Substance because [HIWU and the Authority] don’t have authority to control the

medications they administer or carry for Non-Covered Horses . . . .” 10 In addition,

Dr. Overly argues that he introduced “records and testimony” to demonstrate he

possessed testosterone and isoxsuprine “in his Non-Covered [horse] practice.” 11

Dr. Overly also contends that the Arbitrator’s ruling on NF and NSF were

erroneous. The evidence adduced, he maintains, showed he “exercised the standard

of care” sufficient to establish NF, or “if there is any fault, . . . it is minimal.” 12

Accordingly, Dr. Overly maintains that the sanctions awarded were “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, prejudicial, or otherwise not in accordance with

law.” 13

10 Review App. at 1 (unnumbered page; internal quotation marks omitted).

11

Id. at 2 (unnumbered page).

12

Id.

13

Id.

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Finally, Dr. Overly requests an evidentiary hearing “to contest facts that the

Arbitrator claimed she found as well as the interpretation of the law that formed

the basis for the imposition of the Sanctions.” 14

2.

The Authority’s Response

In its response to Dr. Overly’s Application for Review, the Authority asserts,

in summary, that:

(1) The compelling justification defense is fact-specific. According to the

Authority, Dr. Overly “failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he

was justified in having Testosterone or Isoxsuprine at Los Alamitos for a legitimate

and legal veterinary purpose that was not connected to Covered Horses.” 15

(2) Dr. Overly’s claim of “compelling justification” for Possession “based on

the composition of his practice is a red herring that would render Rule 3214(a)

meaningless . . . .” 16 His argument, the Authority maintains, “is inconsistent with

this tribunal’s prior ruling that ‘compelling justification is the exception’ and should

‘be interpreted restrictively.’” 17

(3) Regarding both testosterone and isoxsuprine, the Arbitrator correctly held

that, based on the evidence introduced, Dr. Overly failed to show compelling

14

Id. at 2 (unnumbered page).

15 Review Resp. at 3 (footnote omitted).

16

Id. at 4.

17

Id., quoting Matter of Shell, FTC No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *12 (ALJ Mar. 6, 2025).

5

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justification for Possession in order to treat non-Covered Horses that were part of

his practice. 18

(4) The Authority further contends that there is no basis for rejecting the

Arbitrator’s NF and NSF rulings as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

prejudicial, or not in accordance with the law.” 19 To the contrary, the Arbitrator’s

decision, the Authority asserts, “was rationally connected to the facts and based on

the consideration of relevant factors.” 20

(5) Dr. Overly has failed to show grounds for an evidentiary hearing. The

Authority argues that Dr. Overly has not identified “any specific facts” that need to

be “supplement[ed]” or “contest[ed].” 21 Rather, the evidence before the Arbitrator

“can be reassessed or reweighed, as applicable.” 22

Thus, the Authority contends that the sanctions imposed should be upheld.

C.

Denial of Dr. Overly’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

FTC Rule 1.146(c)(2) provides that:

In reviewing the final civil sanction and decision of the Authority, the

Administrative Law Judge may rely in full or in part on the factual record

developed before the Authority through the disciplinary process under 15

U.S.C. 3057(c) and disciplinary hearings under Authority Rule Series 8300.

The record may be supplemented by an evidentiary hearing conducted by the

Administrative Law Judge to ensure each party receives a fair and impartial

hearing. Within 20 days of the filing of an application for review, based on

the application submitted by the aggrieved party or by the Commission and

18

Id. at 3-4.

19

Id. at 4.

20

Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).

21

Id.

22

Id. at 6.

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on any response by the Authority, the Administrative Law Judge will assess

whether:

(i)

The parties do not request to supplement or contest the facts found by

the Authority;

(ii)

The parties do not seek to contest any facts found by the Authority, but

at least one party requests to supplement the factual record;

(iii)

At least one party seeks to contest any facts found by the

Authority; . . . or

(v)

In the Administrative Law Judge’s view, the factual record is

insufficient to adjudicate the merits of the review proceeding. 23

FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) further states, in relevant part, that:

[I]f a hearing is requested, . . . the applicant must provide support for each

issue raised, citing to the Authority’s record when assignments of error are

based on the record, and citing to the principal legal authorities the applicant

relies upon . . . . 24

Dr. Overly’s Application for Review does not include any of the information

required by Rule 1.146(a)(1), nor any other specifics forming the basis for his

request for an evidentiary hearing. He does not assert, for example, any allegedly

erroneous exclusion or receipt of evidence, or other failure prejudicing his

opportunity to adduce relevant facts or otherwise limiting his defense, at the

arbitration hearing. He similarly has not set forth any additional evidence that he

would proffer at an evidentiary hearing.

Although Dr. Overly asserts, without elaboration, that he wishes “to contest

23 87 Fed. Reg. 60079-80 (Oct. 4, 2022). Inasmuch as “the Authority” does not, under the Rules, find

“facts” that form the basis for an ALJ’s review, I read Rule 1.146(c)(2) to refer to the “Arbitral Body,”

which is the fact finder and which may, as here, consist of a single arbitrator. See Rules 3261, 7020,

7060.

24 87 Fed. Reg. 60079.

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facts” the Arbitrator “claimed she found,” that is not a basis to require

supplementing the record; the de novo review standard, applicable here, already

affords Dr. Overly the room he seeks. 25 Thus, at bottom, Dr. Overly seeks only to

contest the weight given to the evidence in the record before the Arbitrator and to

argue the appropriateness of the Arbitrator’s sanctions award. But he has not called

into question his opportunity for a fair and impartial arbitration to resolve HIWU’s

charges. He further has not shown that the arbitration record is insufficient to

assure a similar full and impartial review.

Rule 1.146(a)(1) authorizes an ALJ, after receiving the Authority’s response

to an application for review, to determine “whether an evidentiary hearing . . . is

either unnecessary or necessary to supplement or to contest facts in the record

. . . .” 26 Accordingly, I can, and will, decide this proceeding on the arbitration record

and the parties’ briefs on this review.

D.

Required Filings

1. The parties are DIRECTED to concurrently file with the FTC’s Office of

the Secretary:

a. By December 15, 2025, “proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a

proposed order, together with a supporting legal brief providing the party’s

reasoning. Such filings, limited to 7,500 words, must be [contemporaneously]

25

Id. at 2 (unnumbered page). See 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(1); FTC Rules 1.146(b)(2) & (3).

Id. See also FTC Rule 1.146(c)(1) & (2), 87 Fed. Reg. 60079-80 (conferring administrative hearings

and factual review authority on the ALJ).

26

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served on the other party and contain references to the record and authorities

on which they rely.”

b. “Reply findings of fact, conclusions of law, and briefs, limited to 2,500

words, may be filed by each party within 10 days of service of the initial

filings.”—here, December 26, 2025 assuming initial filings are made on the

December 15 date. 27

In this case, these word limits apply to all of the opening filings in the aggregate,

and to all of the reply filings in the aggregate. They do not apply individually to

each filing listed.

The parties are reminded that any individual filing should bear a consecutive

page number. A subsequent Order will detail further the requirements for these

filings.

2. In addition to service with the Office of the Secretary, the parties must

transmit their filings: (a) to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (“OALJ”)

electronically by email (OALJ@ftc.gov): and (b) deliver by hand or overnight mail

one hard copy addressed as follows:

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Federal Trade Commission: Northeast Regional Office

1 Bowling Green

Room 318

New York, NY 10004

27 FTC Rule 1.146(c)(3), 87 Fed. Reg. 60080 (bracketed matter added for avoidance of doubt).

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II.

Application for a Stay Pending Review

Dr. Overly also seeks to stay the sanctions imposed by the Authority during

the pendency of this review. The Authority opposes stay relief. Under FTC Rule

1.148(c) & (d), an application for a stay of the sanctions imposed “must provide the

reasons a stay is . . . warranted by addressing the [following] factors . . . and the

facts relied upon”:

(1) The likelihood of the applicant’s success on review;

(2) Whether the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not

granted;

(3) The degree of injury to other parties or third parties if a stay is granted;

and

(4) Whether the stay is in the public interest. 28

Moreover, “[a] stay pending appeal is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of

administration and judicial review, so this extraordinary relief is never granted as a

matter of right.” 29

A.

Summary of the Parties’ Positions on the Stay Factors

Likelihood of Success: Dr. Overly asserts he is likely to succeed on de novo

review because, he contends, he proved “by a preponderance of the evidence, that he

. . . had [a] compelling justification for Possession of the Banned Substances at

28 87 Fed. Reg. 60083. See generally Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (adopting comparable

factors).

Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, No. 25-2089, 2025 WL 3135862, at *5 (1st Cir.

Nov. 9, 2025) (cleaned up), admin. stay extended, No. 25A539, 2025 WL 3145875 (U.S. Nov. 11, 2025)

(mem.). See also Media Matters for America v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *3 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 23, 2025) (A stay “pending appeal is an extraordinary form of relief.”) (cleaned up).

29

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issue.” Stay Application at 1 (unnumbered page). More specifically, Dr. Overly

asserts that:

(1) He relied on public guidance from Dr. Scollay on the ability of

veterinarians, such as him, to possess Banned Substances for use in “Non-Covered

[horse] practices . . . .”

(2) the HISA Rules do not define “compelling justification”;

(3) his “credible testimony” shows “the impracticality of requiring [him] . . .

to load and unload [his] truck” on a visit-by-visit basis so as to enable him to treat

the “approximately 67% Non-Covered horses” that comprise his practice;

(4) the Arbitrator erred in finding he failed to justify having testosterone and

isoxsuprine in his truck at Los Alamitos on July 23, 2024; and

(5) “his fault, if any, was on the lowest end of the spectrum such that the

penalties should be expunged and/or limited to the most minimal penalty

available.” 30

The Authority responds that the likelihood of Dr. Overly’s success on review

“is low” for the same reasons, summarized above, set forth in the Authority’s

Response to Dr. Overly’s Application for Review. 31

Irreparable Harm: Dr. Overly asserts he will suffer irreparable harm absent

a stay, as the sanctions, including his Ineligibility period and the publication of the

30 Stay App. at 1-2 (unnumbered pages).

31 Stay Resp. at 3-5.

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violation on HIWU’s website, have injured “his professional reputation and caused

loss of business prospects.” 32

The Authority responds that the public disclosure has already occurred, as,

Rule 3620 requires HIWU to publicly disclose a final decision made by the

Arbitrator within 20 days of the issuance of a decision. 33 Moreover, Dr. Overly

“chose to serve a Provisional Suspension on a voluntary basis pursuant to ADMC

Program Rule 3247.” 34 Finally, harm is “irreparable,” the Authority contends, only

“where there is no adequate remedy at law, such as monetary damages.” 35

Injury to Others: Dr. Overly asserts there is no risk of injury to other parties

or third parties if a stay is granted: “HIWU has no interest in the continued

enforcement of Sanctions that are the result of error and cannot withstand de novo

review.” 36 And, in any event any “low” risk of harm is “greatly outweighed” by his

“likely success on the merits and irreparable injury.” Id.

The Authority responds that granting the stay would “undermine the

Authority’s efforts to protect the integrity of horseracing and will harm other

Responsible Persons and the betting public by permitting [Dr. Overly’s continued

participation in thoroughbred horseracing]. It would also be contrary to the ADMC

Program’s mission to protect horse welfare.” 37

32 Stay App. at 2 (unnumbered page).

33 Stay Resp. at 5.

34

Id.

35

Id., quoting Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011).

36 Stay App. at 2 (unnumbered page).

37 Stay Resp. at 5 (bracketed matter inserted).

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“Responsible Person” means “the Trainer of the Covered Horse. If the

Covered Horse does not have a Trainer, the Responsible Person shall be the Owner

of the Covered Horse.” 38 The Authority’s point, as I understand it, is that the ADMC

Program’s Rules are designed not only to protect the health and safety of horses,

but also to have the prophylactic effect of impairing the ability of unscrupulous

Veterinarians, Owners and Trainers to have available Banned Substances to use to

give their horses a perceived competitive racing advantage over those who play by

the Rules. By thus promoting fair competition, the betting public’s interests are

similarly promoted.

The Public Interest: Dr. Overly asserts a stay is in the public interest, which

“is served by ensuring that governmental bodies comply with the law” and, in all

events, the other stay factors said to favor him, outweigh any harm to the public

interest. 39

The Authority responds that, while the public interest is served by

compliance law generally, “it is also served by individual compliance with the rules

and regulations validly promulgated by federal agencies.” 40 Here, the Authority

asserts, a stay “would be antithetical” to HISA’s purpose “to improve the integrity

and safety of horseracing by requiring a uniform anti-doping and medication control

program . . . .” 41

38 Rule 3030.

39 Stay App. at 2-3 (unnumbered pages; authorities omitted).

40 Stay Resp. at 6.

41

Id.

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B.

Denial of Dr. Overly’s Stay Motion

Dr. Overly had not met the requirements for a stay pending resolution of this

review proceeding.

Likelihood of Success and Irreparable Injury: On a stay motion, “[t]he first

two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” 42 Moreover, likely

success on the merits must be “better than negligible.” 43 Dr. Overly simply has not

shown a sufficient likelihood of prevailing on the merits to warrant a stay. Although

he disputes the Arbitrator’s findings in conclusory terms, he has not pointed to

specific parts of the factual record showing possible, much less sufficiently likely,

error. This is, however, a finding made solely on the papers submitted on

Dr. Overly’s stay application and not one based on the all the evidence before the

Arbitrator.

Second, Dr. Overly has not shown irreparable injury. As the Authority

argues, Rule 3620 requires public disclosure of the Arbitrator’s decision. Resulting

reputational harm claimed to arise from public disclosure therefore cannot,

standing alone, justify a stay; a more probing factual presentation must be offered.

Any arguable harm has already occurred and thus would be unaffected by issuing a

stay. Thus, for example, in Lukezic v. FINRA, the Court declined to find irreparable

injury, arising from publication of a pending professional disciplinary proceeding,

42

Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

Id. See also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (“Crossroads’ appeal shows little prospect of success—an arguably fatal flaw for a stay

application.”).

43

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where FINRA was required “to make information about ‘disciplinary proceedings’

available in a ‘readily accessible electronic or other process’[].” 44

Claimed loss of racing opportunities, and the corresponding potential for

winning purse money, is also generally insufficient: “Mere injuries, however

substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the

absence of a stay, are not enough.” 45 To be sure, there can be fact settings where

stay relief is nevertheless warranted, as the Authority’s citation to Janvey itself

recognizes. 46 However, Dr. Overly asserts, without fact elaboration, that the

sanctions imposed have “caused loss of business prospects . . . .” 47 That bare

assertion is not enough: “speculative injury is not sufficient.” 48

By contrast, in Dr. Overly’s only cited authority, the party seeking to

demonstrate irreparable injury introduced far more specific supporting facts: “(1)

lost sales and lost market share, (2) price erosion, (3) lost reputation and goodwill,

44 No. 25-cv-00623 (DLF), 2025 WL 2305859, at *1, 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2025), quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o3(i)(1), (5), appeal filed, No. 25-5327 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2025). See also Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 136

F. Supp. 3d 854, 871 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (police report was “already a matter of public record” and thus

“irrelevant to the question of irreparable injury”); Foster v. Cantil-Sakauye, No. 17-cv-02122-JSW,

2017 WL 6886326 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017) (no irreparable injury where professional discipline

had previously been publicly disclosed). Cf. Roudachevski v. All-American Care Cters, Inc., 648 F.3d

701, 703, 706-07 (8th Cir. 2011) (although healthcare facility notified its residents that plaintiff, a

physician, was terminated as a facility provider, no irreparable injury was proven).

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974), quoting with approval Virginia Petroleum Jobbers

Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Los Angeles Memorial

Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (“alleged [monetary]

45

injury . . . does not usually constitute irreparable injury”) (cleaned up).

46 See Janvey, 647 F.3d at 600 (noting, as exceptions, avoidance of multiplicity of suits or dissipation

of assets needed for relief).See also Lukezic, 2025 WL 2305859, at *3 (to constitute irreparable

injury, monetary loss must be “so severe as to cause extreme hardship to the business or threaten its

very existence.”) (cleaned up).

47 Stay App. at 2 (unnumbered page).

48

Janvey, 647 F.3d at 600 (cleaned up).

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and (4) lost research and development (“R&D”) and investments.” 49 The Federal

Circuit held the proof insufficient nonetheless. 50

Furthermore, Dr. Overly faces no current risk of monetary loss from the

sanctions themselves. The Arbitrator determined that Dr. Overly need only pay the

fine imposed and his cost contribution “by the end of his Period of Ineligibility.” 51 At

that point, “[t]o be reinstated after commission” of the Possession violations,

Dr. Overly “must have . . . paid any fines and . . . costs . . . unless an installment

plan was established . . . .” 52 Strictly speaking, in formally imposing the sanctions

the Arbitrator awarded, the Authority itself omitted express reference to payment

no later than the Ineligibility period’s end. This omission—permitting payment of a

monetary sanction to be deferred— is immaterial, however. The Authority has

stated publicly that it lacks authority to vary the sanctions awarded:

The [arbitrator’s] decision is ‘final and binding . . . . The Authority is legally

bound to impose civil sanctions determined through arbitration. There is

nothing in [HISA] or the rules comprising the ADMC Program that gives the

Authority the discretion to modify [an arbitrator’s] final decision.” 53

49

SmartSky Networks, LLC v. Gogo Bus. Aviation, LLC, No. 2023-1058, 2024 WL 358136, at *3

(Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2024).

50

Id. at *3-7.

51 Review App., Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 8.1(b) & (c).

52 Rule 3232(a).

Matter of Shell, 2024 WL 5078329, The Authority’s Response to October 29, 2024 Order at *4-5

(Nov. 12, 2024) (cleaned up). See also Matter of Shell, 2024 WL 5078331, HIWU’s Response to the

Order Directing Briefing at *3 (Nov. 12, 2024) (“[T]he Rules make clear that both HIWU and the

Authority are bound by an [arbitrator’s] Final Decision. . . . [A] final decision . . . that a violation . . .

has taken place and imposing . . . sanctions . . . shall be automatically and immediately recognized,

respected, enforced and given full force and effect by the Authority. . . . Both [the Authority and

HIWU] are . . . legally bound to impose the resulting sanctions and have no discretion otherwise.”)

(cleaned up).

53

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Equally important, in imposing sanctions, the Authority negated any

suggestion that it took issue with Dr. Overly deferring payment. The Authority

expressly stated that the fine “[has] been imposed . . . in accordance with ADMC

Program Rule 3223.” 54 This “in accordance” addition reflects the Authority’s

practical, publicly stated construction of the relevant Rule: “[u]nder Rule 3232(a),

[the Covered Person] is not required to pay these [fine and cost] amounts in full

until the end of his period of Ineligibility . . . .” 55 Thus, deferral apparently is the

Authority’s “normal practice.” 56 Since Dr. Overly’s need to pay the fine imposed is

more than a year away, the second stay factor “weighs against granting the stay

request.” 57

One further point. The Authority asserts that Dr. Overly’s claimed

irreparable injury is weakened, at least in part, by his acceptance of a Voluntary

Provisional Suspension. 58 However, the Authority has not offered material

supporting its factual contentions, and these matters are not otherwise part of the

record on Dr. Overly’s stay application. Accordingly, I disregard the Authority’s

argument.

54

See Review App., Ex. 2.

See Matter of Lewis, FTC No. 9434, 2024 WL 3618632, The Authority’s Response to Appellant’s

Application for a Stay, at *1 (July 12 [sic, 15], 2024) (emphasis added).

55

Serpe v. FTC, No. 0:24-cv-61939-DSL, Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Federal Trade

Commission’s Notice of Further Development at 2, ECF No. 61 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2025), citing

HIWU v. Parbhoo, JAMS No. 15010001079, at ¶ 9.1(4) (Aug. 26, 2025).

56

Matter of Shell, FTC No. 9435, 2024 WL 3824055, at *5 (ALJ Aug. 5, 2024) and Matter of Lewis,

2024 WL 3618639, at *3 (ALJ July 19, 2024) (both denying a stay where the fine did not have to be

paid “until the end of the period of ineligibility”).

57

58

See Stay Resp. at 5; Rule 3247.

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Injury to Others and the Public Interest: The third and fourth stay factors

also weigh against granting a stay. Stay relief pending review is “extraordinary”—

the exception, not the rule. 59 The ADMC Program protects the safety and integrity

of horseracing and the confidence of its stakeholders—including not only the public

but rivals themselves—in the fairness of thoroughbred racing competition. 60 Recent

comments by a once-elite human athlete on the overarching benefit of antidoping

rules in competitive sports are instructive. They apply to thoroughbred racing as

well:

I believe the use of performance enhancing substances destroys the

experience associated with extraordinary athletic achievement-ultimately

ruining the reason why people love to watch competitive sports in the first

place. . . . The use of performance enhancing substances cheapens this

experience.

Moreover, normalizing the use of performance enhancing substances

communicates the wrong values to young athletes . . . . A world where the

widespread use of performance enhancing substances is accepted is one

where the foundational values of good sportsmanship—honor, integrity,

valor, and pride—are lost and forgotten. 61

Dr. Overly has the burden of offering facts that inform the Court’s exercise of

discretion in his favor despite these weighty considerations. Instead, he asserts, in

substance, that no legitimate interest is served by permitting an allegedly

erroneous sanctions award to stand. But that argument could be made in any case

59

See, e.g., KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC, 119 F.4th 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

60

See Rule 3010(d)(7); Stay Resp. at 5.

61 Enhanced US LLC v. World Aquatics, No. 1:25-cv-07096-JMF, Declaration of Michael Phelps at

¶¶ 8, 9, ECF No. 69 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025). See also Enhanced US LLC, Declaration of Richard W.

Pound at ¶ 12, ECF No. 65 (Sept. 26, 2025) (If doping becomes “commonplace . . . [s]port loses

everything that it represents and encourages. The integrity of competitions and sport itself is

compromised.”). Pound is a “former Olympic swimmer.” Id. at ¶ 2.

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where review of sanctions imposed under the ADMC Program Rules is sought. It is,

therefore, insufficient to grant a stay.

Finally, in another HISA proceeding, I issued a decision that awarded a

$25,000 fine for a proven ADMC Program violation, even though the arbitrator had

not directed a fine. The Federal Trade Commission issued a sua sponte Order that,

among other things, stayed the fine pending the Commission’s further review. 62 I

understand that Order to be based on the particular facts of the Serpe case, and not

to establish that a fine imposed in a HISA case must, as a matter of law, be stayed

whenever the sanctioned party seeks ALJ or FTC review. Any such ruling would

upend the well-established stay principle, noted above, that loss of money or

business opportunity “weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” 63 That

sort of change generally would not be made by implication. 64

A stay of a fine award further would be unnecessary in most HISA cases

since the Authority’s practical construction of Rule 3232(a), also noted above,

recognizes that payment is not required until the related Ineligibility period ends.

Depending on the length of the Ineligibility, FTC review proceedings could often be

concluded first, thereby obviating any need to stay the fine.

*

*

*

62 Order Partially Staying Administrative Law Judge’s Decision, Granting Review, and Ordering

Briefing Schedule at 1, 2, Matter of Serpe, No. 9441 (FTC Sept. 15, 2025).

63

Sampson, 415 U.S. at 90.

64 Cf. Shalala v. Illinois Council On Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 18 (2000) (“This Court does not

normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio.”).

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For these reasons, Dr. Overly has not met the burden set forth in FTC Rule

1.148 to grant a stay during the pendency of this review proceeding. His application

for a stay is DENIED.

ORDERED:

Jay L. Himes

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Date: November 20, 2025

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