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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF COMPETITION
ANTITRUST DIVISION
hart-scott-rodino annual report
Fiscal Year 2018
Section 7A of the Clayton Act
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
(Forty-First Annual Report)
Joseph J. Simons
Makan Delrahim
Chairman
Federal Trade Commission
Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division
INTRODUCTION
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435 (“HSR Act”
or “the Act”), together with Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 15 of
the Clayton Act, enables the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division” or “Division”) to obtain effective
preliminary relief against anticompetitive mergers, and to prevent interim harm to competition and
consumers. The premerger notification program was instrumental in alerting the Commission and
the Division to transactions that became the subjects of the numerous enforcement actions brought in
fiscal year 2018 1 to protect consumers—individuals, businesses, and government—against
anticompetitive mergers.
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continue their efforts to protect competition by
identifying and investigating those mergers and acquisitions that raise potentially significant
competitive concerns. In fiscal year 2018, 2,111 transactions were reported under the HSR Act,
representing about a 2.9 percent increase from the 2,052 transactions reported in fiscal year 2017.
(See Figure 1 below.)
HSR Merger Transactions Reported
Fiscal Years 2009-2018
2,500
2,052
Number of Transactions
2,000
1,801
1,832
2015
2016
2,111
1,663
1,450
1,500
1,429
1,326
1,166
1,000
716
500
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Fiscal Year
(Figure 1)
1
Fiscal year 2018 covered the period of October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018.
2017
2018
During fiscal year 2018, the Commission brought 22 merger enforcement challenges. 2 In 12
matters, the Commission accepted consent orders for public comment, all of which resulted in final
orders. Five were abandoned or restructured as a result of antitrust concerns raised during the
investigation. And in five cases, the Commission initiated administrative or federal court litigation.
These enforcement actions preserved competition in numerous sectors of the economy, including
consumer goods and services, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, high tech and industrial goods, and
energy.
Again this year, the Commission resolved most merger enforcement actions by a negotiated
settlement. For instance, the Commission took action to preserve competition related to Northrop
Grumman’s proposed merger with Orbital ATK. Northrop supplies the U.S. government with
missile systems, including tactical missiles, strategic missiles, and missile defense interceptors.
Orbital ATK is the premier supplier of solid rocket motors, an essential input for missile systems.
The FTC required a firewall and non-discrimination provisions to prevent the vertical merger from
reducing competition for missile systems, which would have resulted in less innovation and higher
prices for taxpayers. In another settlement, the Commission also moved to preserve competition in
local retail fuel markets, challenging 7-Eleven’s proposed $3.3 billion acquisition of approximately
1,100 retail fuel outlets from Sunoco. The complaint alleged that, without divestitures, the
acquisition would increase the likelihood that 7-Eleven could have unilaterally raised prices or the
small number of remaining competitors could have increased prices by coordinating their actions in
more than 20 markets. The FTC required 7-Eleven to divest 26 7-Eleven retail fuel stations to
Sunoco and for Sunoco to retain 33 fuel stations it otherwise would have sold to 7-Eleven.
The Commission successfully blocked two proposed acquisitions by obtaining a preliminary
injunction in federal court; two other proposed mergers were abandoned after the Commission voted
to challenge them. In February, the FTC issued an administrative complaint and authorized staff to
seek a preliminary injunction to prevent the merger of Wilhelmsen Maritime and Drew Marine, the
two largest suppliers of water treatment chemicals and services used by large ships to maintain their
on-board ship equipment. The Commission issued an administrative complaint and sought a
preliminary injunction in federal court alleging that the combined firm would control at least 60
percent of the global marine water treatment chemical and service market. After the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia granted a preliminary injunction, the parties abandoned the
merger.
In December 2017, the Commission issued an administrative complaint challenging Tronox
Limited’s proposed acquisition of Cristal. The firms were the two largest suppliers of chloride
process titanium dioxide, a white pigment used in a variety of products including paint, industrial
coatings, plastics, and paper. According to the complaint, the transaction would have increased the
likelihood of coordination among the remaining competitors in the industry, as well as the likelihood
that Tronox could exercise market power to reduce future output and prices. After an administrative
hearing on the merits concluded in June 2018, changed circumstances led the FTC to file a motion for
a preliminary injunction in federal court to enjoin the transaction pending the outcome of the
administrative proceeding. In September 2018, the district court granted the FTC’s request for a
preliminary injunction. In December 2018, the administrative law judge issued an initial decision
2
To avoid double-counting, this Report includes only those merger enforcement actions in which the Commission or the
Antitrust Division took its first public action during fiscal year 2018.
2
upholding the FTC’s complaint. Tronox and Cristal agreed to settle the charges by divesting Cristal’s
North American titanium dioxide assets. The Commission’s final order requiring divestiture of these
assets ended the litigation over the proposed transaction.
During fiscal year 2018, the Antitrust Division challenged 17 merger transactions. The
Division resolved eight of these 17 cases by filing a complaint and proposed settlement
simultaneously in U.S. district court, and the Division brought suit to enjoin one transaction. Of the
remaining eight challenges, in four the parties abandoned the proposed transaction, and in the
remaining four the parties restructured the transaction to resolve the Division’s concerns.
The Division resolved the numerous horizontal and vertical concerns raised by Bayer AG’s
$66 billion acquisition of Monsanto Company by negotiating a divestiture package of businesses and
assets valued at approximately $9 billion. Bayer and Monsanto were two of the largest agricultural
companies in the world and the acquisition would have substantially lessened competition in 17
distinct agricultural markets. Under the terms of the final judgment filed simultaneously with the
complaint, the parties agreed to sell the divestiture businesses and assets to BASF SE, an experienced
chemical company with a substantial crop protection business.
The Division also challenged a consummated transaction, highlighting the importance of
remedying anticompetitive behavior whenever it is uncovered. The Division required TransDigm
Group Incorporated to unwind its acquisition of its only meaningful competitor for certain restraint
systems for commercial aircraft. TransDigm’s acquisition of SCHROTH Safety Products GmbH and
substantially all the assets of Takata Protection Systems, Inc. (collectively, SCHROTH) from Takata
Corporation eliminated all head-to-head competition between the two companies in the development,
manufacture, and sale of restraint systems used on commercial airplanes worldwide, which would
have resulted in higher prices for several types of restraint systems used on commercial airplanes and
diminished innovation in the development of new airplane restraints. Under the terms of the final
judgment filed simultaneously with the complaint, TransDigm agreed to divest all of the SCHROTH
assets it acquired from Takata.
The Division also worked to ensure that the Federal government and state governments
fostered competitive procurement markets. The Division expressed concerns earlier this year, for
example, about the proposed merger between Ultra Electronics Holdings plc and Sparton
Corporation, after which the parties abandoned their transaction. Ultra and Sparton are the only
suppliers of sonobuoys to the United States Navy. Since 2009, Ultra and Sparton have produced
sonobuoys through their joint venture, known as ERAPSCO, and have responded to the Navy’s
sonobuoy acquisition contracts with a sole ERAPSCO bid. However, after a joint investigation and
consultation with the Division, the Navy informed the companies that it was moving to a competitive
acquisition strategy and would seek to have the companies compete against each other for sonobuoy
procurement. The Division then informed the parties that their proposed merger raised significant
competitive concerns. Shortly thereafter, the parties abandoned their planned merger.
Similarly, the Division challenged three transactions where the proposed acquisitions would
likely have resulted in higher prices for Department of Transportation (DOT) qualified aggregate.
The Division, along with the states attorneys general, challenged, (1) Vulcan Materials Company’s
acquisition of Aggregates USA, LLC (Aggregates USA), which would have combined the only two
3
potential suppliers of DOT-qualified aggregate in parts of Tennessee and Virginia; (2) Martin
Marietta Materials, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Bluegrass Materials Company, LLC, which would
have substantially lessened competition for DOT-qualified aggregate in parts of Georgia and
Maryland; and (3) CRH Americas Materials, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of quarry assets from
Pounding Mill Quarry Corporation, which would have combined two of only three competitive
sources of DOT-qualified aggregate in southern West Virginia and would have strengthened CRH
Americas’ virtual monopoly in the supply of asphalt concrete in southern West Virginia.
In fiscal year 2018, the Commission’s Premerger Notification Office (PNO) continued to
respond to thousands of questions seeking information about the reportability of transactions under
the HSR Act, and the details involved in completing and filing the Notification and Report Form.
The PNO continued to provide information necessary for the notification process on its PNO
website, 3 which serves as an HSR practitioner’s primary source of information on the HSR form and
instructions for completing it, rules, current filing thresholds, notices of grants of early termination,
filing fee instructions, and procedures for submitting post-consummation filings. The website also
provides training materials for new practitioners, information on scheduled HSR events, frequently
asked questions regarding HSR filing requirements, and contact information for PNO staff. In
addition, the website includes a catalog of informal interpretation letters, giving practitioners ready
access to PNO staff interpretations of the HSR Act and rules. Finally, PNO staff continued to
provide tips for HSR practitioners in blog posts on the Commission’s Competition Matters blog. 4 As
always, PNO staff is available to help HSR practitioners comply with HSR notification requirements.
BACKGROUND OF THE HSR ACT
Section 201 of the HSR Act amended the Clayton Act by adding a new Section 7A, 15
U.S.C. § 18a. In general, the HSR Act requires that certain proposed acquisitions of voting
securities, non-corporate interests, or assets be reported to the Commission and the Antitrust Division
prior to consummation. The parties must then wait a specified period, usually 30 days (15 days in the
case of a cash tender offer or bankruptcy sale), before they may complete the transaction. Whether a
particular acquisition is subject to these requirements depends on the value of the acquisition and, in
certain acquisitions, the size of the parties as measured by their sales and assets. Acquisitions valued
below a certain threshold, acquisitions involving parties with assets and sales below a certain
threshold, and certain classes of acquisitions that are less likely to raise antitrust concerns are
excluded from the Act’s coverage.
The Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division, promulgated final rules implementing the premerger notification program on July 31, 1978.
At that time, a comprehensive Statement of Basis and Purpose was published, containing a sectionby-section analysis of the rules and an item-by-item analysis of the filing form. 5 The program
became effective on September 5, 1978. The Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant
Attorney General, has amended the rules and the filing form on many occasions over the years to
improve the program’s effectiveness and to lessen the burden of complying with the rules. 6
3
See https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program.
See https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/terms/368.
5
43 Fed. Reg. 33450 (July 31, 1978).
6
See https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/statute-rules-and-formal-interpretations/statements4
4
The primary purpose of the statutory scheme, as the legislative history makes clear, is to
provide the antitrust enforcement agencies with the opportunity to review mergers and acquisitions
before they occur. The premerger notification program, with its filing and waiting period
requirements, provides the agencies with both the time and the information necessary to conduct this
antitrust review. Much of the information for a preliminary antitrust evaluation is included in the
HSR form and the accompanying documents filed with the agencies by the parties to the proposed
transactions.
If either reviewing agency determines during the waiting period that further inquiry is
necessary, the reviewing agency is authorized by Section 7A(e) of the Clayton Act to issue a request
for additional information and documentary material (Second Request). 7 The Second Request
extends the waiting period for a specified period of time (usually 30 days, but 10 days in the case of a
cash tender offer or bankruptcy sale) after all parties have complied with the Second Request (or, in
the case of a tender offer or bankruptcy sale, after the acquiring person complies). This additional
time provides the reviewing agency with the opportunity to analyze the information and to take
appropriate action before the transaction is consummated. If the reviewing agency believes that a
proposed transaction may substantially lessen competition, it may seek an injunction in federal
district court to prohibit consummation of the transaction. The Commission also may challenge the
transaction in administrative litigation.
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The appendices to this Report provide a statistical summary of the operation of the premerger
notification program. For the ten-year period covering fiscal years 2009-2018, Appendix A shows
the number of transactions reported, the number of filings received, the number of merger
investigations in which Second Requests were issued, and the number of transactions in which
requests for early termination of the waiting period were received, granted, and not granted. 8
Appendix A also shows the number of transactions in which Second Requests could have been
issued, as well as the percentage of transactions in which Second Requests were issued. Appendix B
provides a month-by-month comparison of the number of transactions reported and the number of
filings received for fiscal years 2009 through 2018.
The statistics set out in these appendices show that the number of transactions reported in
fiscal year 2018 increased 2.9 percent from the number of transactions reported in fiscal year 2017.
In fiscal year 2018, 2,111 transactions were reported, whereas 2,052 were reported in fiscal year
2017. 9 Of the 2,111 reported transactions, Second Requests could have been issued in 2,028 of them.
basis-purpose.
7
15 U.S.C. §18a(e)(1)(a) (“The Federal Trade Commission or the Assistant Attorney General may, prior to the expiration of
the 30-day waiting period (or in the case of a cash tender offer, the 15-day waiting period)…require the submission of
additional information or documentary material relevant to the proposed acquisition”).
8
The term “transaction,” as used in Appendices A and B and Exhibit A to this Report, does not refer only to individual mergers
or acquisitions. A particular merger, joint venture, or acquisition may be structured such that it involves more than one filing
that must be made under the HSR Act.
9
This Report, like previous Reports, also includes annual data on adjusted transactions in which a Second Request could have
been issued (adjusted transactions). See Appendix A & Appendix A n.2 (explaining calculation of that data). There were
2,028 adjusted transactions in fiscal year 2018, and the data presented in the Tables and the percentages discussed in the text of
5
The statistics in Appendix A show that the number of merger investigations in which Second
Requests were issued in fiscal year 2018 decreased from the previous year. Second Requests were
issued in 45 merger investigations in fiscal year 2018 (26 issued by the FTC and 19 issued by the
Antitrust Division); Second Requests were issued in 51 merger investigations in fiscal year 2017 (33
issued by the FTC and 18 issued by the Antitrust Division). The percentage of transactions in which
a Second Request was issued decreased from 2.6 percent in fiscal year 2017 to 2.2 percent in fiscal
year 2018. See Figure 2 below.
Percentage of Transactions Resulting in Second Request
Fiscal Years 2009-2018
5.0%
4.5%
4.5%
3.7%
3.9%
Percent of Transactions
4.0%
3.7%
3.5%
3.2%
3.5%
3.0%
2.7%
2.6%
3.0%
2.2%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Fiscal year
(Figure 2)
The statistics in Appendix A also show that early termination of the waiting period is
requested in the majority of transactions. In fiscal year 2018, early termination was requested in
74.0 percent (1,500) of the adjusted transactions reported. In fiscal year 2017, early termination was
requested in 77.9 percent (1,552) of the transactions reported. The percentage of requests granted out
of the total requested decreased from 78.6 percent in fiscal year 2017 to 78.0 percent in fiscal year
2018.
this Report (e.g., percentage of transactions resulting in Second Requests) are based on this figure.
6
The tables (Tables I through XI) in Exhibit A contain information regarding the agencies’
enforcement activities for transactions reported in fiscal year 2018. The tables include information
showing various characteristics of transactions, the number and percentage of transactions in which
one antitrust agency granted the other clearance to commence an investigation, and the number of
merger investigations in which either agency issued a Second Request. For instance, Table III of
Exhibit A shows that in fiscal year 2018, the agencies received clearance to conduct an initial
investigation in 14.1 percent of the total number of transactions reported. The tables also provide the
number of transactions based on the dollar value of transactions reported and the reporting threshold
indicated in the notification report. In fiscal year 2018, the aggregate dollar value of reported
transactions was $2.2 trillion. 10
Tables X and XI provide the number of transactions by industry group in which the acquiring
person or the acquired entity derived the most revenue. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of
reportable transactions within industry groups for fiscal year 2018 based on the acquired entity’s
operations. 11
Percentage of Transactions By Industry Group of Acquired Entity
Fiscal Year 2018
Health Services,
4.2%
Chemicals &
Pharmaceuticals,
4.0%
Transportation, 2.8%
Energy & Natural
Resources, 6.3%
Consumer Goods &
Services, 31.0%
Information
Technology, 8.7%
Other, 20.2%
Manufacturing,
13.6%
Banking & Insurance,
9.2%
(Figure 3)
10
The information on the value of reported adjusted transactions for fiscal year 2018 is drawn from a database maintained by
the Premerger Notification Office.
11
The category designated as “Other” consists of industry segments that include construction, educational services, performing
arts, recreation, and other non-classifiable businesses.
7
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE PREMERGER PROGRAM
1.
Threshold Adjustments
The 2000 amendments to the HSR Act require the Commission to publish adjustments to the
Act’s jurisdictional and filing fee thresholds in the Federal Register annually, for each fiscal year
beginning on September 30, 2004, based on the change in the gross national product, in accordance
with Section 8(a)(5) of the Clayton Act. The Commission amended the rules in 2005 to provide a
method for future adjustments as required by the 2000 amendments, and to reflect the revised
thresholds contained in the rules. The Commission publishes the revised thresholds annually in
January, and they become effective 30 days after publication.
On January 29, 2018, the Commission published a notice 12 to reflect adjustment of the
reporting thresholds as required by the 2000 amendments 13 to Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §18a. The revised thresholds, including an increase in the size of transaction threshold from
$80.8 million to $84.4 million, became effective February 28, 2018.
2.
Compliance
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continued to monitor compliance with the
premerger notification program’s filing and waiting period requirements, and initiated a number of
compliance investigations in fiscal year 2018. The agencies use several methods to oversee
compliance, including monitoring news outlets and industry publications for transactions that may
not have been reported in accordance with the HSR Act’s requirements. Industry sources, such as
competitors, customers, and suppliers, interested members of the public, and, in certain cases, the
parties themselves, also provide the agencies with information about transactions and possible
violations of the Act’s requirements.
Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Act, any person that fails to comply with the Act’s notification
and waiting period requirements is liable for a civil penalty of up to $41,484 for each day the
violation continues. 14 The antitrust agencies examine the circumstances of each violation to
determine whether to seek penalties. 15 During fiscal year 2018, 33 post-consummation “corrective”
filings were received; however, the agencies did not bring any enforcement actions.
12
83 Fed. Reg. 4,050 (Jan. 29, 2018).
15 U.S.C. §18a(a). See Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762.
14
Dollar amounts specified in civil monetary penalty provisions within the Commission’s jurisdiction are adjusted for
inflation in accordance with the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-7 (Nov. 2, 2015). The adjustments have included an increase in the maximum civil penalty from $10,000 to
$11,000 for each day during which a person is in violation of Section 7A(g)(1) (61 Fed. Reg. 54548 (Oct. 21, 1996),
corrected at 61 Fed. Reg. 55840 (Oct. 29, 1996)), to $16,000 effective February 10, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 857 (Jan. 9,
2009)), to $40,000 effective August 1, 2016 (81 Fed. Reg. 42476 (June 30, 2016)), and to $41,484 effective January 22,
2018 (83 Fed. Reg. 2902 (Jan. 22, 2017)).
15
If parties inadvertently fail to file, the agencies generally will not seek penalties so long as the parties promptly submit
corrective filings after discovering the failure to file, submit an acceptable explanation of their failure to file, and have not
previously violated the Act.
13
8
MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY 16
1.
The Department of Justice
During fiscal year 2018, the Antitrust Division challenged 17 merger transactions that
it concluded would substantially lessen competition if allowed to proceed as proposed. In
nine of these challenges, the Antitrust Division filed a complaint in the U.S. district court. In
eight of these court challenges, the Division filed settlement papers simultaneously with the
complaint. The other court challenge was litigated in the U.S. district court and, after a trial
on its merits, the court found in favor of the Defendants. Of the eight fiscal year 2018
challenges where the Division did not file suit, the parties abandoned the proposed transaction
in four instances and in the remaining four, the parties restructured the transaction, resolving
the Division’s concerns. 17
In United States v. CenturyLink, Inc. and Level 3 Communications, Inc., 18 the Division
challenged the proposed acquisition of Level 3 Communications, Inc. by CenturyLink, Inc.
The complaint alleged that the transaction, as originally structured, would substantially lessen
competition for particular enterprise and wholesale telecommunications services in three
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) 19 by eliminating Level 3 as one of only three providers
of fiber-based local connectivity telecommunications services. The transaction also would
have substantially lessened competition for the sale of intercity dark fiber in 30 pairs of cities
by creating a duopoly in some cities and a monopoly in the remaining city pairs. A proposed
final judgment filed simultaneously with the complaint on October 2, 2017, required
CenturyLink to divest Level 3’s entire fiber-based metropolitan area network in Albuquerque,
New Mexico; Boise City-Nampa, Idaho; and Tucson, Arizona. The settlement also required
CenturyLink to transfer the IRU (Indefensible Right of Use) for 24 strands of dark fiber on 30
specified routes. The Court entered the final judgement on March 6, 2018.
In United States v. Entercom Communications Corporation and CBS Corporation, 20
the Division challenged Entercom Communications Corporation’s proposed acquisition of
certain broadcast radio stations from CBS Corporation. The complaint alleged that the
transaction, as originally structured, would eliminate the substantial head-to-head competition
16
The cases listed in this section were not necessarily reportable under the premerger notification program. Given the
confidentiality of information obtained pursuant to the Act, it would be inappropriate to identify the cases initiated
under the program except in those instances in which that information has already been disclosed.
17
(1) Knorr-Bremse AG’s proposed acquisition of Haldex AB; (2) Delta Air Lines Inc.’s proposed joint venture and
acquisition of an increased stake in Grupo Aeroméxico SAB de CV; (3) Proposed Schlumberger Ltd. and Weatherford
PLC OneStim Joint Venture; (4) Proposed merger between Ultra Electronics Holdings plc and Spartan Corporation;
(5) Sinclair Television Group, Inc.’s proposed acquisitions of Tribune Media Company and Bonten Media Group, Inc.;
(6) First Horizon National Corporation’s proposed acquisition of Capital Financial Bank Corporation; (7) First
Financial Bancorp’s proposed acquisition of Mainsource Financial Group, Inc.; and (8) Proposed combination of
Ygreen Energy Fund Inc. and Renovate America, Inc.
18
United States v. CenturyLink, Inc. and Level 3 Communications, Inc., No.1:17-cv-02028 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 2, 2017).
19
An MSA is a geographic region defined by the Office of Management and Budget for use by federal statistical
agencies, such as the Census Bureau. It is based on the concept of a core urban area with a large concentrated
population, plus adjacent communities having close economic social ties to the core.
20
United States v. Entercom Communications Corporation and CBS Corporation, No. 1:17-cv-2268 (D.D.C. filed
Nov. 1, 2017).
9
between Entercom and CBS in the sale of radio advertising to advertisers targeting Englishlanguage listeners in the Boston, Sacramento, and San Francisco Designated Market Areas
(DMAs) 21 (collectively, the Local Markets). This loss in competition likely would have
resulted in higher prices to advertisers in the Local Markets. At the same time the complaint
was filed, on November 1, 2017, the Division filed a proposed final judgment requiring the
parties to divest certain radio stations in the Local Markets. The court entered the final
judgment on January 31, 2018.
In United States v. AT&T Inc., DirectTV Group Holdings, LLC and Time Warner
Inc., the Division filed suit to enjoin AT&T Inc. from acquiring Time Warner Inc. The
complaint alleged that the transaction would provide AT&T with the incentive and ability to
charge its rival multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) supra-competitive
prices for TimeWarner networks which would result in reduced competition in the market for
pay TV and thus higher prices and less innovation for consumers. The complaint also alleged
that the merger would increase the likelihood of anticompetitive coordination that would
lessen competition from innovative providers of pay TV. On June 12, 2018, after a trial on its
merits, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the Defendants.
On February 26, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the district court’s decision.
22
In United States v. TransDigm Group Incorporated, 23 the Division challenged
TransDigm Group Inc.’s consummated acquisition of SCHROTH Safety Products GmbH
from Takata Corporation. The complaint alleged that the consummated transaction combined
TransDigm subsidiary, AmSafe Inc., the dominant supplier of restraint systems for
commercial aircraft, with its only meaningful competitor, SCHROTH. As a result, the
complaint alleged that the acquisition would likely lessen competition substantially for the
development, manufacture, and sale of restraint systems used on commercial airplanes
worldwide. This loss of competition likely would have resulted in higher prices for several
types of restraint systems used on commercial airplanes and diminished innovation in the
development of new airplane restraints. On December 21, 2017, at the same time the
complaint was filed, the Division filed a proposed final judgment requiring TransDigm to
divest all of the SCHROTH assets it acquired from Takata. The court entered the final
judgment on April 4, 2018.
In United States and State of Tennessee v. Vulcan Materials Company, SPO Partners
II, L.P. and Aggregates USA, LLC, 24 the Division along with the State of Tennessee
challenged the proposed acquisition of SPO Partners II, L.P.’s aggregates business,
Aggregates USA, LLC, by Vulcan Materials Company. The complaint alleged that the
acquisition, as originally structured, would combine the only two potential suppliers of
21
DMAs are industry-recognized geographic boundaries used in evaluating radio audience size and demographic
composition.
22
United States v. AT&T Inc., DirectTV Group Holdings, LLC and Time Warner Inc., No. 1:17-cv-2511 (D.D.C. filed
Nov. 20, 2017).
23
United States v. TransDigm Group Incorporated, No. 1:17-cv-2735 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 21, 2017).
24
United States v. Vulcan Materials Company, SPO Partners II, L.P. and Aggregates USA, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-2761
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 2017).
10
Tennessee and Virginia DOT-qualified aggregate in the Knoxville, Tennessee, Tri-Cities,
Tennessee, and Abingdon, Virginia markets. This combination likely would have
substantially lessened competition in these markets for DOT-qualified aggregate resulting in
higher prices and poorer customer service for aggregate customers in these areas. Under the
terms of a proposed final judgment filed simultaneously with the complaint on December 22,
2017, the parties agreed to divest 13 active quarries and yards and four inactive quarries in
east Tennessee and southwest Virginia. The court entered the final judgment on April 6,
2018.
In United States and State of Maryland v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., LG
Panadero, L.P., Panadero Corp., Panadero Aggregates Holdings, LLC, and Bluegrass
Materials Company, LLC, 25 the Division and the State of Maryland challenged Martin
Marietta Materials, Inc.’s proposed acquisition of Bluegrass Materials Company, LLC. The
complaint alleged that the acquisition, as initially structured, would eliminate head-to-head
competition between Martin Marietta and Bluegrass in supplying DOT-qualified aggregate to
customers in and immediately around Forsyth County and north Fulton County, Georgia, and
in and immediately around Washington County, Maryland. This loss of competition likely
would have resulted in increased prices and decreased customer service for aggregate
customers in these areas. A proposed final judgment, filed simultaneously with the complaint
on April 25, 2018, required Martin Marietta to divest quarries and related assets in Georgia
and Maryland. On July 16, 2018, the court entered the final judgment.
In United States v. CRH PLC, CRH Americas Materials, Inc., and Pounding Mill
Quarry Corporation, 26 the Division challenged CRH America Materials Inc.’s proposed
acquisition of quarry assets from Pounding Mill Quarry Corporation. The complaint alleged
that, as originally structured, the acquisition would combine two of only three competitive
sources of DOT-qualified aggregate in southern West Virginia resulting in higher prices for
aggregate customers in the area. The complaint also alleged that the acquisition would
strengthen CRH’s virtual monopoly in the supply of asphalt concrete in southern West
Virginia by eliminating Pounding Mill as a source of aggregate for its competitor. This loss in
competition would have provided CRH with the ability and incentive to disadvantage its
competitor by denying it access to aggregate, reliable delivery and competitive prices,
resulting in higher prices for the sale of asphalt concrete in the area. The Division filed a
complaint and proposed final judgment on June 22, 2018. The decree required CRH to divest
Pounding Mill’s quarry in Rocky Gap, Virginia. The court entered the final judgment on
November 28, 2019.
In United States v. Bayer AG and Monsanto Company, 27 the Division challenged
Bayer AG’s proposed $66 billion acquisition of Monsanto Company. Bayer and Monsanto
were two of the largest agricultural companies in the world. The complaint alleged that the
acquisition would substantially lessen competition in 17 agricultural product markets within
25
United States v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., LG Panadero, L.P., Panadero Corp., Panadero Aggregates
Holdings, LLC, and Bluegrass Materials Company, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-973 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 25, 2018).
26
United States v. CRH PLC, CRH Americas Materials, Inc., and Pounding Mill Quarry Corporation, No. 1:18-cv1473 (D.D.C. filed June 22, 2018).
27
United States v. Bayer AG and Monsanto Company, No.1:18-cv-1241 (D.D.C. filed May 29, 2018).
11
the following four broad categories: (1) genetically modified seeds and traits; (2) foundational
herbicides; (3) seed treatments; and (4) vegetable seeds. The loss of competition in each of
the affected markets would have resulted in higher prices, less innovation, fewer choices, and
lower-quality products for American farmers and customers. On May 29, 2018, the Division
filed a proposed final judgment simultaneously with the complaint. Under the terms of the
decree, Bayer agreed to divest businesses and assets valued at approximately $9 billion to
BASF. The required divestitures included the Bayer businesses that competed with
Monsanto; the Bayer seed treatment businesses that, when combined with Monsanto’s seed
business, would have given the company the incentive and ability to harm competition by
raising the prices it charged rival seed companies, intellectual property and research
capabilities and additional assets that were needed to give BASF the scale and scope to
compete with the combined company. On February 8, 2019, the court entered the final
judgment.
In United States v. The Walt Disney Company and Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 28
the Division challenged the acquisition by The Walt Disney Company of certain assets and
businesses of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., including Fox’s ownership of, or interests in, its
regional sports networks (RSNs), FX cable networks, National Geographic cable networks,
television studio, Hulu, film studio, and internal television businesses. The complaint alleged
that the acquisition would eliminate the head-to-head competition between Disney’s ESPN
franchise of networks and Fox’s portfolio of twenty-two RSNs in the licensing of cable sports
programing to multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD) in 25 Designated
Marketing Areas (DMA) across the United States. This loss in competition likely would have
resulted in increased MVPD licensing fees in each DMA market, and because licensing fees
typically are passed onto consumers, higher subscription fees for MVPD customers. On June
27, 2018, the Division filed a complaint and proposed final judgment requiring the parties to
divest all of Fox’s interests in its 22 RSNs.
2.
The Federal Trade Commission
During fiscal year 2018, the Commission challenged 22 merger enforcement
transactions that it concluded would substantially lessen competition if allowed to proceed as
proposed. In five cases, the Commission initiated administrative or federal court litigation.
In Wilhelmsen Maritime Services/Drew Marine, 29 the Commission filed an
administrative complaint challenging Wilhelmsen Maritime Services’ $400 million proposed
acquisition of Drew Marine Group, and authorized FTC staff to seek a preliminary injunction
in federal court to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of its administrative
proceeding. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely reduce competition
for certain marine water treatment chemicals and services used by global fleets, including
tankers, container ships, bulk carriers, cruise ships, and military support vessels to maintain
28
United States v. The Walt Disney Company and Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-5800 (S.D.N.Y. filed
June 27, 2018).
29
In the Matter of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen and Drew Marine Intermediate II B.V. and Drew Marine Group, Inc., FTC
Dkt. C-9380 (complaint filed on Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1710161/wilhelm-wilhelmsendrew-marine.
12
critical on-board ship equipment. Wilhelmsen Maritime Services and Drew Marine Group,
respectively, were the largest and second-largest suppliers of water treatment chemicals and
services and each other’s closest competitors. If consummated, the merger would have
resulted in a company with at least 60 percent of the global marine water treatment chemical
and service market. On July 21, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
granted a preliminary injunction. Shortly thereafter, Wilhelmsen and Drew abandoned their
proposed merger and the Commission dismissed its administrative complaint.
In Tronox/Cristal, 30 the Commission filed an administrative complaint challenging
Tronox’s $1.67 billion proposed acquisition of Cristal and authorized FTC staff to seek a
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of its administrative
proceeding. The Commission’s complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely
reduce competition in the North American market for chloride process titanium dioxide
(TiO2). The combined firm and the other top supplier, Chemours, would have controlled the
vast majority of chloride TiO2 sales in North America. If consummated, the acquisition
would have increased the risk of coordinated interaction among the remaining competitors and
the risk of future anticompetitive output reductions by Tronox. On September 5, 2018, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the FTC’s request for a preliminary
injunction pending the outcome of the administrative trial. On December 14, Chief
Administrative Law Judge Chappell ruled in favor of FTC staff, holding that the proposed
acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the relevant market for the sale of
chloride process titanium dioxide. The Commission accepted a settlement that required
Tronox to divest Cristal’s North American titanium dioxide assets; the final order requiring
divestiture issued on May 28, 2019.
In J.M. Smucker/Conagra, 31 the Commission filed an administrative complaint
challenging Smucker’s $285 million proposed acquisition of Conagra’s Wesson cooking oil
brand and authorized FTC staff to seek a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo
pending the outcome of its administrative proceeding. The Commission’s complaint alleged
that the proposed merger would likely lessen competition between Smucker’s Crisco brand
and Wesson’s canola and vegetable cooking oils. According to the complaint, documents
suggested that Crisco and Wesson compete intensely for sales to retailers and the merger
would eliminate price competition between the two brands. Shortly after the Commission
filed its complaint, the parties abandoned the transaction.
In CDK/Auto/Mate, 32 the Commission filed an administrative complaint challenging
CDK’s $190 million proposed acquisition of Auto/Mate and authorized FTC staff to seek a
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of its administrative
proceeding. The complaint alleged that by acquiring Auto/Mate, CDK would become the
largest provider of Dealer Management System software in the United States. Car dealerships
30
In the Matter of Tronox Limited and National Industrialization Company, FTC Dkt. C-9377 (complaint filed on Dec.
5, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0085/tronoxcristal-usa.
31
In the Matter of J.M. Smucker Co. and Conagra Brands, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-9831 (complaint filed on Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0182/jm-smuckerconagra-matter.
32
In the Matter of CDK Global, Inc. and Auto/Mate, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-9382 (complaint filed on Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0156/cdk-global-automate-matter.
13
use this software to manage all aspects of their business. According to the complaint,
although smaller than CDK and Reynolds & Reynolds, Auto/Mate had been winning new
business by offering dealers lower prices, free software, flexible contract terms, and high
quality customer service. The proposed merger would have eliminated this beneficial
competition. Shortly after the Commission filed its complaint, the parties abandoned the
transaction.
In Otto Bock/Freedom Innovations, 33 the Commission filed an administrative complaint
challenging the consummated merger of two prosthetics manufacturers that are top sellers of
prosthetic knees equipped with microprocessors. According to the complaint, Otto Bock’s
consummated acquisition of FIH Group Holdings (Freedom Innovations) harmed competition
in the United States for microprocessor prosthetic knees by eliminating head-to-head
competition between the two companies. On May 6, 2019, Chief Administrative Law Judge
Chappell ruled in favor of FTC staff. He found that the direct competition between Otto Bock
and FIH in the microprocessor prosthetic knee market had enabled clinic customers to
negotiate lower prices and spurred innovation. As a result, the acquisition would have
significantly increased concentration in the MPK market, giving rise to a presumption that it
would have lessened competition. The ALJ ordered Otto Bock to divest FIH’s assets to a
Commission-approved buyer. This matter is before the Commission on appeal.
The Commission also accepted for public comment and finalized consent orders in the
following 12 merger matters.
In Becton, Dickinson/C.R. Bard, 34 the Commission challenged Becton, Dickinson’s $24
billion proposed acquisition of C.R. Bard. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger
would likely harm competition in two medical device markets: tunneled home drainage
catheter systems and soft tissue core needle biopsy devices. Becton, Dickinson and C.R. Bard
were the top two suppliers in the United States for these devices. The Commission issued a
consent order requiring Becton, Dickinson to divest its soft tissue core needle biopsy device
business and C.R. Bard’s tunneled home drainage catheter system business to Utah-based
medical device supplier Merit Medical Systems. Following a public comment period, the
Commission approved the final order on January 19, 2018.
In Agrium/Potash, 35 the Commission challenged Agrium’s $13.8 billion proposed
acquisition of Potash. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely harm
competition in two markets: the North American market for SPA, a highly concentrated form
of phosphoric acid that contains the essential crop nutrient phosphate, and the market for 6567 percent concentration nitric acid sold to customers near and to the east of the parties’ nitric
33
In the Matter of Otto Bock HealthCare North America, FTC Dkt. C-9378 (complaint filed on Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0231/otto-bock-healthcarefreedom-innovations.
34
In the Matter of Becton, Dickinson and Company and C.R. Bard, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-4637 (final order issued on Jan.
19, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0140/becton-dickinson-company-cr-bard-incmatter company-cr-bard-inc-matter.
35
In the Matter of Agrium Inc. and Potash Corporation, FTC Dkt. C-4638 (final order issued on Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/161-0232/agrium-inc-potash-corporation-nutrien-ltd.
14
acid plants in Ohio. Without a remedy, the merger would have eliminated the head-to-head
competition between Agrium and Potash for the sales of SPA and nitric acid. The
Commission issued a consent order requiring Agrium to divest two facilities located in Idaho
and Ohio. Following a public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on
February 5, 2018.
In Seven & i/Sunoco, 36 the Commission challenged 7-Eleven’s (Seven & i is 7Eleven’s parent company) $3.3 billion proposed acquisition of approximately 1,100 Sunoco
retail fuel outlets. According to the complaint, the proposed merger would likely harm
competition in 76 local markets across 20 metropolitan statistical areas. The complaint
alleged that without a remedy, the acquisition increased the likelihood that 7-Eleven could
have unilaterally raised prices or that the small number of remaining competitors could
increase prices by coordinating their actions. The Commission issued a consent order
requiring 7-Eleven to divest 26 retail fuel outlets it owned to Sunoco. The order also required
Sunoco to retain 33 fuel outlets that 7-Eleven otherwise would have acquired. Following a
public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on March 26, 2018.
In Red Ventures/Bankrate, 37 the Commission challenged Red Ventures’ $1.4 billion
proposed acquisition of Bankrate. The Commission's complaint alleged that the proposed
merger would likely harm competition in the market for third-party paid referral services for
senior living facilities. According to the complaint, two of Red Ventures’ largest shareholders
jointly owned A Place for Mom.com (APFM), the largest provider of such services, and they
also owned a 34 percent stake, plus significant management rights, in the owner of APFM’s
most significant competitor, Caring.com. The Commission alleged that the combination of
interests gave the firms the ability and incentive to reduce competition between APFM and
Caring.com. To remedy these concerns and maintain competition, the Commission issued a
consent order requiring the parties to divest Caring.com no later than six months after the
acquisition and provide transition services to the buyer. The parties were also required to
establish firewalls related to Caring.com’s confidential business information. Following a
public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on March 1, 2018.
In Alimentation Couche-Tard/Holiday, 38 the Commission challenged Alimentation
Couche-Tard’s $1.6 billion proposed acquisition of 380 retail fuel outlets owned by Holiday
Companies. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely reduce the number
of independent market participants from three to two or from four to three in ten local
markets, increasing the likelihood that ACT could act unilaterally or in coordination with the
remaining firms to reduce competition. To remedy these concerns, the Commission issued a
consent order requiring ACT to identify a buyer or buyers and divest ten fuel stations in
Minnesota and Wisconsin. Following a public comment period, the Commission approved
36
In the Matter of Seven & I Holdings Co., LTD and Sunoco LP, FTC Dkt. C-4641 (final order issued on Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0126-c-4641/seven-i-holdings-7-eleven-sunoco.
37
In the Matter of Red Ventures Holdco, LP and Bankrate, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-4627 (final order issued on Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/file-no-1710196/red-ventures-holdco-bankrate.
38
In the Matter of Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. and CrossAmerica Partners LP, FTC Dkt. C-4635 (final order
issued on Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1710184/alimentation-couche-tardcrossamerica-partners-matter.
15
the final order on February 15, 2018.
In Alimentation Couche-Tard/Jet-Pep, 39 the Commission challenged Alimentation
Couche-Tard’s proposed acquisition of 120 Jet-Pep retail fuel outlets. The complaint alleged
that without a remedy, ACT’s acquisition of Jet-Pep would likely reduce the number of
independent market participants in three local markets to three or fewer participants and
would have increased the likelihood that ACT could have exercised market power. To
remedy these concerns, the Commission issued a consent order requiring ACT to divest one
retail fuel outlet in Brewton, one in Monroeville, and one in Valley, Alabama. Following a
public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on January 5, 2018.
In Grifols/Biotest, 40 the Commission challenged Grifols’ $286 million proposed
acquisition of Biotest’s U.S. operations. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger
would likely harm competition in the markets for the collection of human blood plasma in
Lincoln, Nebraska, Augusta, Georgia, and Youngstown, Ohio. Grifols and Biotest were the
only companies operating collection centers in these markets and the proposed merger would
have resulted in a merger-to-monopoly in these cities. To remedy these concerns, the
Commission issued a consent order requiring Grifols to divest blood plasma collection centers
in each of these cities. Under the terms of the consent order, Grifols divested its plasma
collection centers to KedPlasma. The complaint also alleges that, absent a remedy, the
acquisition would harm the U.S. market for hepatitis B immune globulin (HBIG), a plasmaderived injectable medicine that provides hepatitis B antibodies for preventing hepatitis B
infections. When Grifols announced the proposed acquisition in December 2017, Biotest US
owned 41 percent of ADMA Biologics, Inc., which has the largest share in the U.S. market for
HBIG and competes with Grifols and one other supplier. Biotest US had transferred its
ownership share in ADMA to The Biotest Divestiture Trust, the parent company of Biotest
US. Because Grifols was only seeking to acquire Biotest US and not its parent, Grifols did
not acquire any ownership interest in ADMA under the proposed acquisition. The order
prohibited Grifols from acquiring, without prior notification, any ownership interest in ADMA
or obtaining any rights to nominate or obtain representation on the ADMA Board of Directors.
Following a public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on September
17, 2018.
In Northrop Gruman/Orbital, 41 the Commission challenged Northrop’s $7.8 billion
proposed acquisition of Orbital, an aerospace and defense contractor. The complaint alleged
that the proposed merger would likely reduce competition in the solid rocket motor (SRM)
market. Orbital is the premier supplier of SRMs that propel missiles to their targets and are
essential for missile systems sold to the Department of Defense. According to the complaint,
39
In the Matter of Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. and CrossAmerica Partners LP, FTC Dkt. C-4631 (final order
issued on Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1710207/alimentation-couchetard-crossamerica-partners.
40
In the Matter of Grifols, S.A., FTC Dkt. C-4654 (final order issued on Sept. 17, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/181-0081/grifols-sa-grifols-shared-services-north-america-incmatter.
41
In the Matter of Northrop Gruman Corporation and Orbital ATK, FTC Dkt. C-4652 (final order issued on Dec. 3,
2018), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/181-0005-c-4652/northrop-grumman-orbital-atk.
16
Northrop would have had the incentive to withhold access to SRMs or increase prices of
SRMs to its competitors. As a result, competitors would have been forced to increase prices,
or decide not to compete at all, which would have decreased the competitive pressure on
Northrop. To remedy these concerns, the Commission issued a consent order requiring
Northrop to separate the operation of its SRM business from the rest of the company’s
operations with a firewall. The order also appointed a compliance officer from the
Department of Defense to oversee Northrop’s conduct pursuant to this consent order.
Following a public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on December 3,
2018.
In CRH/Ash Grove, 42 the Commission challenged CRH’s $3.5 billion proposed
acquisition of Ash Grove Cement Company. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger
would likely harm competition in the markets for portland cement in Montana; sand and
gravel in Omaha, Nebraska, and Council Bluffs, Iowa; and crushed limestone in the Johnson
County, Kansas area. According to the complaint, the proposed merger would reduce the
number of significant competitors in each of these markets, thereby increasing the likelihood
that the merged company could have unilaterally exercised market power. To remedy these
concerns, the Commission issued a consent order requiring CRH to divest its cement plant and
quarry in Three Forks, Montana; a sand-and-gravel operation in Omaha, Nebraska; and two
hot-mix asphalt plants and three limestone quarries in Olathe and Louisburg, Kansas.
Following a public comment period, the Commission approved the final order on August 1,
2018.
In Penn National Gaming/Pinnacle, 43 the Commission challenged Penn National’s
$2.8 billion proposed acquisition of Pinnacle. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger
would likely harm competition for casino services in St. Louis, Missouri; Kansas City,
Missouri; and Cincinnati, Ohio. Casino services include gaming services such as slots and
table games, as well as related lodging, entertainment, and food and beverage services.
According to the complaint, the proposed merger would reduce direct competition in these
markets because Penn and Pinnacle were close and vigorous competitors. The combination
would increase the likelihood that Penn could have exercised market power, leading to higher
prices and reduced quality for consumers of casino services. To remedy these concerns, the
Commission issued a consent order requiring Pinnacle to divest its Ameristar St. Charles
property in St. Louis, Pinnacle’s Ameristar Kansas City property, and both Pinnacle properties
in Cincinnati (Belterra Park and Belterra Resort). Following a public comment period, the
Commission approved the final order on February 21, 2019.
In Amneal/Impax, 44 the Commission challenged Amneal’s $1.45 billion proposed
acquisition of Impax. The complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely harm
42
In the Matter of CRH plc and Ash Grove Cement Company, FTC Dkt. C-4653 (final order issued on Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0230-c-4653/crh-plc.
43
In the Matter of Penn National Gaming, Inc.,and Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-4658 (final order issued
on Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/181-0011/penn-national-gaming-pinnacleentertainment-matter.
44
In the Matter of Amneal Holdings and Impax Laboratories, FTC Dkt. C-4650 (final order issued on June 29, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/181-0017-c-4650/amneal-holdings-impax-laboratories-matter.
17
competition for ten generic drug products. The generic drug products in question treat a
variety of conditions including depression, epilepsy, attention-deficit disorder, and
gastrointestinal issues. According to the complaint, entry into the market from new
competitors would not be timely, likely, or sufficient in magnitude to deter or counteract any
anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. To remedy these concerns, the Commission issued a
consent order requiring Amneal and Impax to divest rights and assets to these ten products to
three other companies: ANI, Perrigo, and G&W Laboratories. Following a public comment
period, the Commission approved the final order on June 29, 2018.
In Air Medical Group/AMR, 45 the Commission challenged Air Medical’s $2.4 billion
proposed acquisition of AMR. Both companies operate air ambulance services. The
complaint alleged that the proposed merger would likely harm competition for air ambulance
transportation services between medical facilities in Hawaii. According to the complaint, Air
Medical and AMR were the only two providers of these services in Hawaii. Without a
remedy, the proposed merger would have created a monopoly for inter-facility air services in
Hawaii. To remedy these concerns, the Commission issued a consent order requiring AMR to
sell its inter-facility air ambulance business to AIRMD, a company that provides these
services on the mainland but did not have operations in Hawaii. Following a public comment
period, the Commission approved the final order on April 24, 2018.
ONGOING REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The Commission and the Antitrust Division continually review the impact of the
premerger notification program on the business community and antitrust enforcement. The
premerger notification program ensures that the antitrust agencies review virtually every
relatively large merger and acquisition that affects U.S. consumers before consummation.
Prior to the HSR Act, businesses could, and often did, consummate transactions that raised
significant antitrust concerns before the agencies had an opportunity to consider adequately
their competitive effects. This practice forced the agencies to engage in lengthy postacquisition litigation, during the course of which the transaction’s anticompetitive effects
continued to harm consumers, and if effective post-acquisition relief was not practicable, the
harm continued. Because the premerger notification program requires reporting before
consummation, the agencies’ ability to obtain timely, effective relief to prevent
anticompetitive effects has vastly improved. Thus, the HSR Act is doing what Congress
intended—giving the government the opportunity to investigate and challenge those relatively
large mergers that are likely to harm consumers before injury can arise.
The Commission and the Antitrust Division also regularly examine the premerger
notification program’s effectiveness and continually seek ways to increase accessibility,
promote transparency, and improve the review process to reduce the burden on the filing
parties without compromising the agencies’ ability to investigate and challenge proposed
45
In the Matter of Air Medical Group Holdings, Inc., FTC Dkt. C-4642 (final order issued on Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0217-c-4642/air-medical-group-kkr-northamerica-amrholdco.
18
transactions that may substantially lessen competition.
19
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A:
Summary of Transactions, Fiscal Years 2009 - 2018
Appendix B: Number of Transactions Reported and Filings Received by Month for Fiscal
Years 2009 - 2018
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Exhibit A:
Statistical Tables for Fiscal Year 2018 – Data Profiling Hart-Scott- Rodino
Notification Filings and Enforcement Interests
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS
FISCAL YEARS 2009 – 2018
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
2009
2010
Transactions Reported
716
1,166 1,450 1,429 1,326 1,663 1,801 1,832 2,052 2,111
Filings Received1
1,411
2,318 2,882 2,829 2,628 3,307 3,585 3,674 4,083 4,188
684
1,128 1,414 1,400 1,286 1,618 1,754 1,772 1,992 2,028
31
42
55
49
47
51
47
54
51
45
15
20
24
20
25
30
20
25
33
26
2.2%
1.8%
1.7%
1.4%
1.9%
1.9%
1.1%
1.4%
1.7%
1.3%
16
22
31
29
22
21
27
29
18
19
2.3%
2.0%
2.2%
2.1%
1.7%
1.3%
1.5%
1.6%
0.9%
0.9%
575
953
1,157 1,094
990
1,274 1,366 1,374 1,552 1,500
Granted5
396
704
888
902
797
1,020 1,086 1,102 1,220 1,170
Not Granted5
179
249
269
192
193
254
Adjusted Transactions In Which A
Second Request Could Have Been
Issued2
Investigations in Which Second Requests
Were Issued
FTC3
Percent4
DOJ3
Percent4
Transactions Involving a Request For
Early Termination5
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
280
2016
272
2017
332
2018
330
Note: The data for FY 2010 and FY 2011 reflect corrections to some prior annual reports and the DOJ number of investigations in which second requests were issued and the percentage
of transactions in which second requests were issued by DOJ.
1
Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person when a transaction is reported. Only one application is received when an
acquiring party files for an exemption under Section 7A (c )(6) or (c )(8) of the Clayton Act.
2 These figures omit from the total number of transactions reported all transactions for which the agencies were not authorized to request additional information. These include (1)
incomplete transactions (only one party filed a complete notification); (2) transactions reported pursuant to the exemption provisions of Sections 7A (c)(6) and 7A(c)(8) of the Act;
(3) transactions which were found to be non-reportable; and (4) transactions withdrawn before the waiting period began. In addition, where a party filed more than one notification
in the same year to acquire voting securities of the same corporation, e.g., filing one threshold and later filing for a higher threshold, only a single consolidated transaction has been
counted because as a practical matter the agencies do not issue more than one Second Request in such a case. These statistics also omit from the total number the transactions
reported secondary acquisitions filed pursuant to §801.4 of the Premerger Notification rules. Secondary acquisitions have been deducted in order to be consistent with the statistics
presented in most of the prior annual reports.
3 These statistics are based on the date the Second Request was issued and not the date the investigation was opened.
4 Second Request investigations are a percentage of the total number of adjusted transactions. The total percentage reflected in Figure 2 may not equal the sum of reported
component values due to rounding.
5 These statistics are based on the date of the HSR filing and not the date action was taken on the request.
APPENDIX B
NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS REPORTED
AND
FILINGS RECEIVED BY MONTH
FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2009 - 2018
APPENDIX B
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS REPORTED BY MONTH FOR FISCAL YEARS
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
October
91
66
128
122
127
124
144
168
163
174
November
85
135
217
169
260
159
157
243
215
207
December
37
84
91
95
92
108
122
157
148
160
January
42
62
97
104
78
125
118
117
153
170
February
32
61
81
90
82
114
140
127
153
141
March
42
116
97
111
87
100
128
125
146
178
April
60
92
96
96
77
140
131
129
150
140
May
58
108
142
117
117
157
152
168
209
222
June
51
108
117
142
90
150
155
150
191
177
July
62
94
120
130
91
162
170
140
146
180
August
77
120
164
133
122
151
216
166
219
223
September
79
120
100
120
103
173
168
142
159
139
TOTAL
716
1,166
1,450
1,429
1,326
1,663
1,801
1,832
2,052
2,111
APPENDIX B
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF FILINGS RECEIVED1 BY MONTH FOR FISCAL YEARS
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
October
185
146
252
242
255
247
289
345
329
336
November
165
242
422
332
511
325
322
483
416
417
December
79
177
193
188
180
211
239
314
297
319
January
77
126
188
203
151
244
244
236
307
316
February
63
116
157
185
169
236
257
249
298
304
March
81
232
195
215
172
195
252
265
302
338
April
119
182
190
193
151
271
265
249
290
285
May
114
216
284
231
228
315
305
331
402
424
June
99
213
231
275
181
304
322
304
388
365
July
121
187
240
269
186
323
327
284
291
364
August
149
238
329
259
240
292
425
339
446
433
September
159
243
201
237
204
344
338
275
317
287
TOTAL
1,411
2,318
2,882
2,829
2,628
3,307
3,585
3,674
4,083
4,188
1
Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person, when the transaction is reported. Only one filing is received when an
acquiring person files for a transaction that is exempt under Sections 7A(c)(6) and (c)(8) of the Clayton Act.
EXHIBIT A
STATISTICAL TABLES
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2018
DATA PROFILING HART-SCOTT-RODINO PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION FILINGS AND ENFORCEMENT INTERESTS
TABLE I
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
2
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION (BY SIZE RANGE)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
4
NUMBER
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
50M - 100M 5
114
5.6%
7
5
6.1%
4.4%
10.5%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100M - 150M 5
320
15.8%
17
8
5.3%
2.5%
7.8%
1
0
0.3%
0.0%
0.3%
150M - 200M 5
284
14.0%
20
6
7.0%
2.1%
9.2%
1
1
0.4%
0.4%
0.7%
200M - 300M 5
232
11.4%
29
3
12.5%
1.3%
13.8%
3
0
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%
300M - 500M 5
274
13.5%
26
7
9.5%
2.6%
12.0%
4
1
1.5%
0.4%
1.8%
500M - 1000M5
529
26.1%
55
20
10.4%
3.8%
14.2%
6
2
1.1%
0.4%
1.5%
Over 1000M 5
275
13.6%
54
29
19.6%
10.5%
30.2%
11
15
4.0%
5.5%
9.5%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE II
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
2
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION (CUMULATIVE)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
4
NUMBER
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES
NUMBER
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF
SECOND REQUESTS
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
LESS THAN 50M 5
0
0.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
LESS THAN 100M 5
114
5.6%
7
5
2.4%
1.7%
4.2%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
LESS THAN 150M 5
434
21.4%
24
13
8.4%
4.5%
12.9%
1
0
2.2%
0.0%
2.2%
LESS THAN 200M 5
718
35.4%
44
19
15.4%
6.6%
22.0%
2
1
4.4%
2.2%
6.7%
LESS THAN 300M 5
950
46.8%
73
22
25.5%
7.7%
33.2%
5
1
11.1%
2.2%
13.3%
LESS THAN 500M 5
1,224
60.4%
99
29
34.6%
10.1%
44.8%
9
2
20.0%
4.4%
24.4%
LESS THAN 1000M 5
1,744
86.0%
151
49
52.8%
17.1%
69.9%
15
4
33.3%
8.9%
42.2%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
208
78
72.7%
27.3%
100.0%
26
19
57.8%
42.2%
100.0%
TABLE III
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE GRANTING OF CLEARANCE BY AGENCY
CLEARANCE GRANTED AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
CLEARANCES
GRANTED TO
AGENCY
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
TRANSACTIONS IN EACH
TRANSACTION RANGE
GROUP
TOTAL NUMBER
OF CLEARANCES
PER AGENCY
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES
GRANTED
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
50M - 100M 5
7
5
12
6.1%
4.4%
10.5%
3.4%
6.4%
2.4%
1.7%
4.2%
100M - 150M 5
17
8
25
5.3%
2.5%
7.8%
8.2%
10.3%
5.9%
2.8%
8.7%
150M - 200M 5
20
6
26
7.0%
2.1%
9.2%
9.6%
7.7%
7.0%
2.1%
9.1%
200M - 300M 5
29
3
32
12.5%
1.3%
13.8%
13.9%
3.8%
10.1%
1.0%
11.2%
300M - 500M 5
26
7
33
9.5%
2.6%
12.0%
12.5%
9.0%
9.1%
2.4%
11.5%
500M - 1000M5
55
20
75
10.4%
3.8%
14.2%
26.4%
25.6%
19.2%
7.0%
26.2%
Over 1000M 5
54
29
83
19.6%
10.5%
30.2%
26.0%
37.2%
18.9%
10.1%
29.0%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
208
78
286
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
100.0%
100.0%
72.7%
27.3%
100.0%
TABLE IV
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTIONS IN WHICH SECOND REQUESTS WERE ISSUED
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
INVESTIGATIONS IN
WHICH A SECOND
REQUEST WAS
ISSUED 3
SECOND REQUESTS ISSUED AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
TOTAL NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTIONS IN
EACH TRANSACTION
RANGE GROUP
TOTAL NUMBER OF
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
50M - 100M 5
0
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100M - 150M 5
1
0
1
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
0.0%
0.3%
2.2%
0.0%
2.2%
150M - 200M 5
1
1
2
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.4%
0.4%
0.7%
2.2%
2.2%
4.4%
200M - 300M 5
3
0
3
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%
6.7%
0.0%
6.7%
300M - 500M 5
4
1
5
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
1.5%
0.4%
1.8%
8.9%
2.2%
11.1%
500M - 1000M5
6
2
8
0.3%
0.1%
0.4%
1.1%
0.4%
1.5%
13.3%
4.4%
17.8%
Over 1000M 5
11
15
26
0.5%
0.7%
1.3%
4.0%
5.5%
9.5%
24.4%
33.3%
57.8%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
26
19
45
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
57.8%
42.2%
100.0%
TABLE V
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
ACQUISITIONS BY REPORTING THRESHOLD
HSR TRANSACTIONS
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
THRESHOLD 6
NUMBER
NUMBER
PERCENT
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENT OF
THRESHOLD GROUP
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
THRESHOLD GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
$50M (as adjusted)
140
6.9%
4
3
2.9%
2.1%
5.0%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
$100M (as adjusted)
226
11.1%
16
4
7.1%
1.8%
8.8%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
$500M (as adjusted)
40
2.0%
1
1
2.5%
2.5%
5.0%
0
1
0.0%
2.5%
2.5%
25%
7
0.3%
0
1
0.0%
14.3%
14.3%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
50%
897
44.2%
112
47
12.5%
5.2%
17.7%
15
15
1.7%
1.7%
3.3%
ASSETS ONLY
206
10.2%
37
4
18.0%
1.9%
19.9%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
NCI
512
25.2%
38
18
7.4%
3.5%
10.9%
11
3
2.1%
0.6%
2.7%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE VI
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTION BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRING PERSON
HSR TRANSACTIONS
ASSET RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
272
13.4%
12
5
4.4%
1.8%
6.3%
2
1
0.7%
0.4%
1.1%
50M - 100M
33
1.6%
3
1
9.1%
3.0%
12.1%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100M - 150M
46
2.3%
1
1
2.2%
2.2%
4.3%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
150M - 200M
123
6.1%
5
1
4.1%
0.8%
4.9%
0
1
0.0%
0.8%
0.8%
200M - 300M
69
3.4%
5
1
7.2%
1.4%
8.7%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
300M - 500M
107
5.3%
6
2
5.6%
1.9%
7.5%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
500M - 1000M
194
9.6%
14
4
7.2%
2.1%
9.3%
1
0
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
Over 1000M
1,184
58.4%
162
63
13.7%
5.3%
19.0%
23
17
1.9%
1.4%
3.4%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE VII
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTION BY SALES OF ACQUIRING PERSON
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SALES RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
7
224
11.0%
9
3
4.0%
1.3%
5.4%
0
1
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
50M - 100M
7
91
4.5%
2
1
2.2%
1.1%
3.3%
1
0
1.1%
0.0%
1.1%
100M - 150M
7
46
2.3%
3
1
6.5%
2.2%
8.7%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
150M - 200M
7
67
3.3%
4
1
6.0%
1.5%
7.5%
0
1
0.0%
1.5%
1.5%
200M - 300M
7
87
4.3%
10
2
11.5%
2.3%
13.8%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
300M - 500M
7
124
6.1%
4
6
3.2%
4.8%
8.1%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
500M - 1000M
7
198
9.8%
15
4
7.6%
2.0%
9.6%
3
2
1.5%
1.0%
2.5%
Over 1000M
7
986
48.6%
154
57
15.6%
5.8%
21.4%
21
15
2.1%
1.5%
3.7%
Sales Not Available 7
205
10.1%
7
3
3.4%
1.5%
4.9%
1
0
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE VIII
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTION BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES8
HSR TRANSACTIONS
ASSET RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
ASSET RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
8
304
15.0%
27
3
8.9%
1.0%
9.9%
1
0
0.3%
0.0%
0.3%
50M - 100M
8
247
12.2%
18
10
7.3%
4.0%
11.3%
1
0
0.4%
0.0%
0.4%
100M - 150M
8
167
8.2%
14
4
8.4%
2.4%
10.8%
0
1
0.0%
0.6%
0.6%
150M - 200M
8
121
6.0%
11
3
9.1%
2.5%
11.6%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
200M - 300M
8
131
6.5%
7
4
5.3%
3.1%
8.4%
1
1
0.8%
0.8%
1.5%
300M - 500M
8
160
7.9%
20
2
12.5%
1.3%
13.8%
4
0
2.5%
0.0%
2.5%
500M - 1000M
8
205
10.1%
30
8
14.6%
3.9%
18.5%
2
0
1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
Over 1000M
8
466
23.0%
50
30
10.7%
6.4%
17.2%
11
13
2.4%
2.8%
5.2%
Assets Not Available 8
227
11.2%
31
14
13.7%
6.2%
19.8%
6
4
2.6%
1.8%
4.4%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE IX
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
TRANSACTION BY SALES OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES 9
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SALES RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT OF
SALES RANGE
GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
Below 50M
10
336
16.6%
27
9
8.0%
2.7%
10.7%
4
0
1.2%
0.0%
1.2%
50M - 100M
10
304
15.0%
20
10
6.6%
3.3%
9.9%
1
1
0.3%
0.3%
0.7%
100M - 150M
10
194
9.6%
12
4
6.2%
2.1%
8.2%
1
1
0.5%
0.5%
1.0%
150M - 200M
10
130
6.4%
11
5
8.5%
3.8%
12.3%
2
0
1.5%
0.0%
1.5%
200M - 300M
10
209
10.3%
23
3
11.0%
1.4%
12.4%
1
1
0.5%
0.5%
1.0%
300M - 500M
10
184
9.1%
22
6
12.0%
3.3%
15.2%
1
0
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
500M - 1000M
10
193
9.5%
24
7
12.4%
3.6%
16.1%
1
2
0.5%
1.0%
1.6%
Over 1000M
10
405
20.0%
53
33
13.1%
8.1%
21.2%
13
14
3.2%
3.5%
6.7%
Sales not Available 10
73
3.6%
16
1
21.9%
1.4%
23.3%
2
0
2.7%
0.0%
2.7%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,028
100.0%
208
78
10.3%
3.8%
14.1%
26
19
1.3%
0.9%
2.2%
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2017 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
000 13
Not Available
239
11.8%
1.3%
7
3
10
1
0
1
111 13
Crop Production
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
211 13
Oil and Gas Extraction
20
1.0%
-0.4%
1
0
1
0
0
0
212 13
Mining (except Oil and Gas)
9
0.4%
0.1%
2
1
3
0
0
0
213 13
Support Activities for Mining
13
0.6%
-0.4%
0
0
0
0
0
0
221 13
Utilities
40
2.0%
0.4%
0
4
4
0
0
0
236 13
Construction of Buildings
4
0.2%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
237 13
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction
8
0.4%
-0.2%
1
0
1
1
0
1
238 13
Specialty Trade Contractors
14
0.7%
-0.2%
3
1
4
0
1
1
311 13
Food and Kindred Products
49
2.4%
0.6%
12
3
15
0
0
0
312 13
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
7
0.3%
-0.6%
1
0
1
0
0
0
313 13
Textile Mills
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
314 13
Textile Products
4
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
315 13
Apparel Manufacturing
1
0.0%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
321 13
Wood Product Manufacturing
7
0.3%
0.1%
2
1
3
0
0
0
322 13
Paper Manufacturing
11
0.5%
-0.4%
0
3
3
0
1
1
323 13
Printing and Related Support Actitivies
7
0.3%
0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
324 13
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
17
0.8%
-0.3%
6
0
6
2
0
2
325 13
Chemical Manufacturing
109
5.4%
-1.6%
28
0
28
6
0
6
326 13
Plastics and Rubber Manfuacturing
35
1.7%
0.6%
3
1
4
0
0
0
327 13
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
10
0.5%
-0.1%
1
1
2
0
0
0
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2017 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
331 13
Primary Metal Manufacturing
10
0.5%
-0.2%
0
1
1
0
0
0
332 13
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
23
1.1%
0.0%
3
1
4
0
1
1
333 13
Machinery Manufacturing
34
1.7%
0.2%
4
0
4
0
0
0
334 13
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
50
2.5%
-0.6%
7
2
9
2
1
3
335 13
Electrical Equipment, Applicance, and Component
Manufacturing
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
20
1.0%
0.2%
1
2
3
0
0
0
52
2.6%
-0.1%
5
6
11
1
3
4
337 13
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
7
0.3%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
339 13
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
17
0.8%
-0.4%
6
0
6
0
0
0
423 13
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods
79
3.9%
0.1%
5
1
6
0
0
0
424 13
Merchant Wholesales, Nondurable Goods
99
4.9%
0.3%
20
1
21
3
0
3
425 13
Wholesale Electric Markets and Agent and Brokers
5
0.2%
-0.2%
1
0
1
1
0
1
441 13
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers
15
0.7%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
442 13
Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores
2
0.1%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
443 13
Miscellaneous Repair Services
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
444 13
Electronics and Appliance Stores
3
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
445 13
Food and Beverage Stores
8
0.4%
0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
446 13
Health and Personal Care Stores
9
0.4%
0.0%
2
1
3
0
1
1
447 13
Gasoline Stations
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
448 13
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores
8
0.4%
0.0%
0
1
1
0
0
0
452 13
General Merchandise Stores
3
0.1%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
453 13
Miscellaneous Store Retailers
4
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
336 13
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2017 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
454 13
Nonstore Retailers
13
0.6%
0.2%
3
0
3
0
0
0
481 13
Air Transportation
1
0.0%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
483 13
Water Transportation
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
484 13
Truck Transportation
4
0.2%
-0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
486 13
Pipeline Transportation
9
0.4%
-0.4%
1
0
1
0
0
0
488 13
Support Actitivies for Transportation
8
0.4%
0.0%
0
1
1
0
0
0
493 13
Warehousing and Storage
3
0.1%
-0.1%
1
1
2
0
0
0
511 13
Publishing Industries (except Internet)
72
3.6%
0.7%
3
7
10
0
0
0
512 13
Motion Pictures and Sound Recording Industries
8
0.4%
-0.2%
0
1
1
0
0
0
515 13
Broadcasting (except Internet)
12
0.6%
-0.1%
0
5
5
0
3
3
517 13
Telecommunications
29
1.4%
-1.0%
1
4
5
0
2
2
518 13
Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data
Processing Services
Other Information Services
31
1.5%
-0.2%
2
4
6
0
0
0
19
0.9%
0.1%
0
0
0
1
0
1
522 13
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
37
1.8%
0.0%
0
3
3
0
2
2
523 13
Securitites, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial
Investments and Related Activities
Insurance Carriers and Related Actitivities
202
10.0%
0.3%
10
4
14
0
2
2
71
3.5%
0.2%
5
2
7
2
1
3
525 13
Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
95
4.7%
1.4%
0
0
0
0
0
0
531 13
Real Estate
4
0.2%
-0.6%
2
0
2
0
0
0
532 13
Rental and Leasing Services
10
0.5%
0.1%
3
0
3
1
0
1
533 13
Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except
Copyrighted Works)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
8
0.4%
-0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
133
6.6%
0.6%
8
7
15
0
0
0
519 13
524 13
541 13
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 2018 1
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSON
3 DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 11
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
PERCENT
NUMBER 4
OF TOTAL
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS 3
% POINTS
CHANGE
FROM FY
2017 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
551 13
Management Companies and Enterprises
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
561 13
Administrative and Support Services
38
1.9%
0.1%
3
4
7
0
0
0
562 13
Waste Management and Remediation Services
8
0.4%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
611 13
Educational Services
6
0.3%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
621 13
Ambulatory Health Care Services
38
1.9%
0.1%
9
0
9
2
0
2
622 13
Hospitals
30
1.5%
-0.1%
17
0
17
1
0
1
623 13
Nursing Care Facilities
4
0.2%
0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
624 13
Social Assistance
7
0.3%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
711 13
Performing Arts, Spector Sports, and Related Industries
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
713 13
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries
14
0.7%
0.5%
4
1
5
1
1
2
721 13
Accommodation
17
0.8%
0.5%
4
0
4
1
0
1
722 13
Food Services and Drinking Places
21
1.0%
-0.4%
5
0
5
0
0
0
811 13
Repairs and Maintenance
10
0.5%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
812 13
Personal and Laundry Services
1
0.0%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
813 13
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, Professional, and Similar
Organizations
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,028
100.0%
208
78
286
26
19
45
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2018
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2017 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
000 1
Not Available
79
3.9%
-1.1%
14
1
15
1
0
1
0
111 1
Crop Production
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
112 1
Animal Production
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
115 1
Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry
1
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
211 1
Oil and Gas Extraction
35
1.7%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
14
212 1
Mining (except Oil and Gas)
15
0.7%
-0.3%
1
2
3
0
0
0
6
213 1
Support Activities for Mining
12
0.6%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
221 1
Utilities
60
3.0%
0.4%
0
4
4
0
0
0
29
236 1
Construction of Buildings
2
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
237 1
Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction
16
0.8%
0.5%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
238 1
Specialty Trade Contractors
11
0.5%
-0.3%
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
311 1
Food and Kindred Products
61
3.0%
0.5%
11
3
14
0
0
0
34
312 1
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing
11
0.5%
-0.3%
3
0
3
0
0
0
4
313 1
Textile Mills
6
0.3%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
314 1
Textile Products
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
315 1
Apparel Manufacturing
1
0.0%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
316 1
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
321 1
Wood Product Manufacturing
14
0.7%
0.5%
7
1
8
0
0
0
6
322 1
Paper Manufacturing
11
0.5%
-0.2%
0
2
2
0
1
1
7
323 1
Printing and Related Support Actitivies
6
0.3%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
324 1
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
5
0.2%
-0.6%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2018
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2017 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
325 1
Chemical Manufacturing
82
4.0%
-1.9%
18
0
18
2
0
2
34
326 1
Plastics and Rubber Manfuacturing
42
2.1%
0.7%
3
1
4
0
0
0
12
327 1
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
9
0.4%
-0.2%
2
0
2
1
0
1
2
331 1
Primary Metal Manufacturing
13
0.6%
-0.4%
0
2
2
0
1
1
6
332 1
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
18
0.9%
-0.8%
1
0
1
0
0
0
3
333 1
Machinery Manufacturing
41
2.0%
0.5%
3
0
3
0
0
0
11
334 1
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
49
2.4%
-0.5%
7
3
10
1
3
4
12
335 1
Electrical Equipment, Applicance, and Component
Manufacturing
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
18
0.9%
0.1%
1
2
3
0
0
0
6
42
2.1%
-0.5%
4
3
7
1
1
2
18
337 1
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing
6
0.3%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
339 1
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
36
1.8%
-0.2%
6
0
6
0
0
0
12
423 1
Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods
112
5.5%
0.7%
12
1
13
0
0
0
27
424 1
Merchant Wholesales, Nondurable Goods
98
4.8%
1.0%
22
2
24
7
0
7
32
425 1
Wholesale Electric Markets and Agent and Brokers
4
0.2%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
441 1
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers
14
0.7%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
442 1
Furniture and Home Furnishing Stores
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
444 1
Electronics and Appliance Stores
4
0.2%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
445 1
Food and Beverage Stores
2
0.1%
-0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
446 1
Health and Personal Care Stores
15
0.7%
0.6%
3
0
3
0
0
0
2
447 1
Gasoline Stations
4
0.2%
0.0%
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
448 1
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores
5
0.2%
-0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
336 1
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2018
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2017 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
452 1
General Merchandise Stores
4
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
453 1
Miscellaneous Store Retailers
2
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
454 1
Nonstore Retailers
21
1.0%
-0.1%
3
0
3
0
0
0
2
481 1
Air Transportation
3
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
482 1
Railroad Transportation
1
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
483 1
Water Transportation
3
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
484 1
Truck Transportation
5
0.2%
-1.0%
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
485 1
Transit and Ground Transportation
3
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
486 1
Pipeline Transportation
24
1.2%
-0.3%
4
0
4
0
0
0
6
487 1
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation
1
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
488 1
Support Actitivies for Transportation
16
0.8%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
492 1
Couriers
4
0.2%
0.0%
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
493 1
Warehousing and Storage
10
0.5%
-0.1%
2
1
3
0
0
0
2
511 1
Publishing Industries (except Internet)
127
6.3%
1.9%
3
9
12
0
0
0
26
512 1
Motion Pictures and Sound Recording Industries
13
0.6%
0.0%
0
2
2
1
2
3
3
515 1
Broadcasting (except Internet)
14
0.7%
0.1%
0
6
6
0
3
3
6
517 1
Telecommunications
31
1.5%
-0.4%
0
3
3
0
2
2
7
518 1
Internet Service Providers, Web Search Portals, and Data
Processing Services
Other Information Services
68
3.4%
-1.0%
1
5
6
0
1
1
5
29
1.4%
-0.1%
3
3
6
1
0
1
3
522 1
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities
52
2.6%
0.3%
0
3
3
0
2
2
22
523 1
Securitites, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial
Investments and Related Activities
46
2.3%
0.0%
0
2
2
0
1
1
18
519 1
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2018
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2017 12
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
524 1
Insurance Carriers and Related Actitivities
71
3.5%
1.0%
2
2
4
0
1
1
28
525 1
Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
531 1
Real Estate
22
1.1%
0.5%
2
0
2
1
0
1
0
532 1
Rental and Leasing Services
15
0.7%
-0.1%
4
0
4
1
0
1
5
533 1
Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted
Works)
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
17
0.8%
0.3%
3
0
3
1
0
1
1
215
10.6%
1.3%
8
10
18
0
1
1
48
541 1
551 1
Management Companies and Enterprises
1
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
561 1
Administrative and Support Services
52
2.6%
0.0%
4
4
8
0
0
0
12
562 1
Waste Management and Remediation Services
13
0.6%
0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
5
611 1
Educational Services
17
0.8%
0.4%
0
1
1
0
0
0
2
621 1
Ambulatory Health Care Services
50
2.5%
-0.3%
13
0
13
3
0
3
14
622 1
Hospitals
33
1.6%
0.0%
18
0
18
2
0
2
24
623 1
Nursing Care Facilities
1
0.0%
-0.3%
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
624 1
Social Assistance
2
0.1%
0.0%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
711 1
Performing Arts, Spector Sports, and Related Industries
8
0.4%
0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
713 1
Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries
20
1.0%
0.4%
3
0
3
1
0
1
4
721 1
Accommodation
9
0.4%
0.1%
4
0
4
1
0
1
4
722 1
Food Services and Drinking Places
23
1.1%
-0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
10
811 1
Repairs and Maintenance
9
0.4%
0.0%
2
0
2
0
0
0
1
812 1
Personal and Laundry Services
6
0.3%
0.0%
2
0
2
1
0
1
1
TABLE XI
1
FISCAL YEAR 2018
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
3 DIGIT
NAICS
11
CODE
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
4
NUMBER
2,028
CLEARANCE
GRANTED TO FTC
OR DOJ
% POINTS
PERCENT
CHANGE
OF TOTAL
FROM FY
2017 12
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
100.0%
208
78
286
NUMBER OF
3 DIGIT
SECOND REQUEST 3
INTRAINVESTIGATIONS
INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS 14
FTC
DOJ TOTAL
26
19
45
571
1 Fiscal year 2018 figures include transactions reported between October 1, 2017 and September 30, 2018.
2 The size of transaction is based on the aggregate total amount of voting securities, non-corporate interests and/or assets held by the acquiring person as a result of the transaction
and are taken from the response to Item 2(d)(iii), 2(d)(vii), and 2(d)(ix) of the Notification and Report Form.
3 These statistics are based on the date the Second Request was issued.
4 During fiscal year 2018, 2,111 transactions were reported under the HSR Premerger Notification program. The smaller number, 2,028, reflects the adjustments to eliminate the
following types of transactions: (1) transactions reported under Section 7A(c)(6) and (c)(8) (transactions involving certain regulated industries and financial businesses); (2)
transactions deemed non-reportable; (3) incomplete transactions (only one party in each transaction filed a compliant notification); and (4) transactions withdrawn before the
waiting period began. The table does not, however, exclude competing offers or multiple HSR transactions resulting from a single business transaction (where there are multiple
acquiring persons or acquired persons).
5 The total number of filings under $50 million submitted in fiscal year 2018 reflects corrective filings.
6 In February 2001, legislation raised the size of transaction threshold for filing from $15 million to $50 million with annual adjustments beginning in February 2005.
As of fiscal
year 2017, the threshold categories include non-corporate interests (NCI), encompassing transactions in which the acquiring entity acquires 50 percent or more of the non-corporate
interests of the acquired entity.
7 The category labeled “Sales Not Available” includes newly-formed acquiring persons, foreign acquiring person with no U.S. revenues, and acquiring persons who had not derived
any revenues from their investments at the time of filing.
8 Assets of an acquired entity are not available when the acquired entity’s financial data is consolidated within its ultimate parent.
9 Sales of an acquired entity are taken from responses to Item 4(a) and (b) (SEC documents and annual reports) or item 5 (dollar revenues) of the Premerger Notification and Report
Form.
10 This category includes acquisition of newly-formed entities from which no sales were generated, and acquisitions of assets which produced no sales revenues during the prior
year to filing the Notification and Report Form.
11 The 3-digit codes are part of the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) established by the United States Government North American Industrial Classification
System 1997, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget. The NAICS groups used in this table were determined from responses submitted by the parties
to Item 5 of the Premerger Notification and Report Form.
12 This represents the deviation from the fiscal year 2016 percentage.
13 This category includes transactions by newly-formed entities.
14 The intra-industry transactions column identifies the number of acquisitions in which both the acquiring and acquired person derived revenues from the same 3-digit NAICS
code.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.