Assistant Attorney General (2001)
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2001
Fourth Report)
Timothy J. Muris
Charles A. James
Assistant Attorney General
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal year 2001 marked both the 25th anniversary of passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 19761 (“the HSR Act” or “the Act”) and the enactment and the
implementation of the most extensive HSR reform legislation since passage of the Act in 1976.2
Largely as a result of the statutory changes, most notably the increase in the reporting thresholds, the
number of reportable transactions decreased dramatically. (See Figure 1 below.) Although fewer
transactions are now subject to the HSR Act requirements, the agencies continue to review the
largest mergers in history. In fiscal year 2001, 2,376 HSR transactions were reported, representing
about a 52 percent decrease from the record high number of transactions reported in fiscal year
2000, but yet a nearly 50 percent increase from the 1,589 transactions reported in fiscal year 1992.3
HSR MERGER TRANSACTIONS REPORTED
FISCAL YEARS 1992 -2001
6,000
NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS
4,926
4,728
5,000
4,642
4,000
3,702
3,087
2,816
3,000
2,305
2,000
2,376
1,846
1,589
1,000
FISCAL YEARS
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Figure 1
1
15 U.S.C. § 18a.
2
Section 630 of the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762. The legislation raised the size-of-transaction
threshold from $15 million to $50 million and made other changes to the filing and waiting period requirements.
See infra at p. 7.
3
See Appendix A.
The HSR Act, together with Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
Section 15 of the Clayton Act, gives the Federal Trade Commission (the “Commission”) and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (the “Antitrust Division” or “Division”) the opportunity
to obtain effective preliminary relief against anticompetitive mergers and to prevent interim harm to
competition and consumers. The premerger notification program was instrumental in detecting
transactions that were the subject of the numerous enforcement actions brought in fiscal year 2001 to
protect consumers -- individuals, businesses, and government -- against anticompetitive mergers.
During the year, the Commission challenged 23 transactions, leading to 18 consent orders, 4
abandoned transactions, and 1 preliminary injunction proceeding that was filed in district court. Most
notably, the Commission challenged the proposed merger of Philip Morris Companies and Nabisco
Holdings Corporation, 4 which would have created the world’s largest food company and would have
further reduced competition in five highly concentrated markets. The Commission also challenged
the proposed merger of two of the world’s largest integrated oil companies, Chevron Corporation
and Texaco Inc.,5 which would have eliminated direct competition in numerous relevant markets and
increased gasoline and fuel prices for consumers. The Antitrust Division challenged 32 merger
transactions resulting in 8 consent decrees, including The Thomson Corporation’s acquisition of
certain Harcourt General, Inc. assets that would have reduced competition for textbooks in 38
college courses,6 and 24 transactions that were either restructured or abandoned after the Division
informed the parties that it intended to sue, such as United Airlines’ proposed acquisition of US
Airways, which the Division concluded would have reduced competition, raised fares, and harmed
consumers on airline routes throughout the United States.7
Not only did the number of merger filings decrease under implementation of the HSR Reform
legislation four months after the beginning of the fiscal year, the number of transactions resulting in
requests for additional information from merging parties (“second requests”) declined. However, the
percentage of such transactions increased while the percentage and number of early termination
requests granted declined.8
In fiscal year 2001, the Commission’s Premerger Notification Office (“PNO”) continued to
respond to thousands of telephone calls seeking information concerning the reportability of
transactions under the HSR Act and the details involved in completing and filing the Notification and
4
See infra p. 21.
5
See infra p. 27.
6
See infra p. 17.
7
See www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8701.htm.
8
See Appendix A.
2
Report Form (“the filing form”). The HSR website9 continued to provide improved access to
information necessary to the notification process. The website includes such information as the
premerger notification filing form and instructions, the historic HSR Statement of Basis and Purpose,
the PNO Sourcebook, the premerger notification rules, formal interpretations of the rules, grants of
early termination, filing fee instructions, HSR events, procedures for submitting post-consummation
filings, tips for completing the filing form, frequently asked questions regarding the HSR filing
requirements, and other useful information. In fiscal year 2001, the website was the paramount
source of information for HSR practitioners seeking information on the significant changes that took
place during the fiscal year concerning HSR reform, adoption of the North American Industry
Classification System (“NAICS”), and revisions to the filing form and rules.
BACKGROUND OF THE HSR ACT
Section 201 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, amended the Clayton Act by adding a new Section 7A, 15 U.S.C. §18a. Subsection (j) of
Section 7A provides:
Beginning not later than January 1, 1978, the Federal Trade Commission, with the
concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, shall annually report to Congress on
the operation of this section. Such report shall include an assessment of the effects of
this section, of the effects, purpose, and the need for any rule promulgated pursuant
thereto, and any recommendations for revisions of this section.
This is the twenty-fourth annual report to Congress pursuant to this provision. It covers fiscal
year 2001 -- October 1, 2000 through September 30, 2001.
In general, the Act requires that certain proposed acquisitions of voting securities or assets
must be reported to the Commission and the Antitrust Division prior to consummation. The parties
must then wait a specified period, usually 30 days (15 days in the case of a cash tender offer or a
bankruptcy sale), before they may complete the transaction. Whether a particular acquisition is
subject to these requirements depends upon the value of the acquisition and, in certain acquisitions,
the size of the parties as measured by their sales and assets. Small acquisitions, acquisitions involving
small parties, and other classes of acquisitions that are less likely to raise antitrust concerns are
excluded from the Act’s coverage.
The primary purpose of the statutory scheme, as the legislative history makes clear, is to
provide the antitrust enforcement agencies with the opportunity to review mergers and acquisitions
before they occur. The premerger notification program, with its filing and waiting period
9
See www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/
3
requirements, provides the agencies with both the time and the information necessary to conduct this
antitrust review. Much of the information for a preliminary antitrust evaluation is included in the
notification filed with the agencies by the parties to the proposed transactions and is immediately
available for review during the waiting period.
However, if either agency determines during the waiting period that further inquiry is
necessary, it is authorized by Section 7A(e) of the Clayton Act to issue a second request. The
second request extends the waiting period for a specified period10 after all parties have complied with
the request (or, in the case of a tender offer or a bankruptcy sale, after the acquiring person
complies). This additional time provides the reviewing agency with the opportunity to analyze the
information and to take appropriate action before the transaction is consummated. If the reviewing
agency believes that a proposed transaction may substantially lessen competition, it may seek an
injunction in federal district court to prohibit consummation of the transaction.
The Commission with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General promulgated final
rules implementing the premerger notification program on July 31, 1978. At that time, a
comprehensive Statement of Basis and Purpose was also published containing a section-by-section
analysis of the rules and an item-by-item analysis of the filing form. The program became effective on
September 5, 1978. During the almost 24 years that the rules have been in effect, the Commission,
with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, has amended the rules and the filing form on
several occasions to improve the program's effectiveness and to lessen the burden of complying with
the rules.11
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The appendices to this report provide a statistical summary of the operation of the premerger
notification program. Appendix A shows, for a ten-year period, the number of transactions
reported,12 the number of filings received, the number of merger investigations in which second
10
Under the statutory changes cited in footnote 2, this waiting period extension was increased to 30
days for most transactions. The 10-day waiting period extension for cash tender offers and bankruptcies remains
the same.
11
43 Fed. Reg. 3443 (August 4, 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 36053 (August 15, 1978); 44 Fed. Reg. (November 21,
1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 14205 (March 5, 1980); 48 Fed. Reg. 34427 (July 29, 1983); 50 Fed. Reg. 46633 (November 12,
1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 10368 (March 26, 1986); 52 Fed. Reg. 7066 (March 6, 1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 20058 (May 29, 1987);
54 Fed. Reg. 214251 (May 18, 1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 31371 (August 2, 1990); 60 Fed. Reg. 40704 (August 9, 1995); 61
Fed. Reg. 13666 (March 28, 1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 34592 (June 25, 1998); 66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (February 1, 2001); 66 Fed.
Reg. 8723 (February 1, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 16241 (March 23, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 23561 (May 9, 2001); 66 Fed. Reg.
35531 (July 6, 2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 11898 (March 18, 2002).
12
The term “transaction,” as used in Appendices A and B, and Exhibit A to this report, does not refer
only to separate mergers or acquisitions. A particular merger, joint venture or acquisition may be structured such
that it involves more than one transaction. For example, cash tender offers, options to acquire voting securities
4
requests were issued, and the number of transactions in which requests for early termination of the
waiting period were received, granted, and not granted. Appendix A also shows for fiscal years
1992 through 2001 the number of transactions in which second requests could have been issued, as
well as the percentage of transactions in which second requests were issued. Appendix B provides a
month-by-month comparison of the number of transactions reported and the number of filings
received for fiscal years 1992 through 2001.
The statistics set out in these appendices show that the number of transactions reported in
fiscal year 2001 decreased approximately 52 percent from the number of transactions reported in
fiscal year 2000. In fiscal year 2001, 2,376 transactions were reported, while 4,926 were reported
in fiscal year 2000. The statistics in Appendix A show that the number of merger investigations in
which second requests were issued in fiscal year 2001 decreased approximately 28.6 percent from
the number of merger investigations in which second request were issued in fiscal year 2000.
Second requests were issued in 70 merger investigations in fiscal year 2001, while second requests
were issued in 98 merger investigations in fiscal year 2000. (See figure 2 below regarding 10-year
trend in issuance of Second Requests.)
PERCENTAGE OF TRANSACTIONS RESULTING
IN SECOND REQUEST
4.5%
4.1%
3.8%
4.0%
3.5%
3.5%
3.2%
3.0%
2.6%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
2.7%
3.5%
3.0%
2.1%
3.5%
0.5%
0.0%
FISCAL YEARS
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Figure 2
from the issuer, or options to acquire voting securities from someone other than the issuer, may result in multiple
acquiring or acquired persons that necessitate separate HSR transaction numbers to track the filing parties and
waiting periods.
5
The statistics in Appendix A also show that in recent years, early termination was requested
in the majority of transactions. In fiscal year 2001, early termination was requested in 86.8 percent
(2,063) of the transactions reported while in fiscal year 2000 it was requested in 87.8 (4,324)
percent of the transactions reported. The percentage of requests granted out of the total requested
decreased from 81.3 percent in fiscal year 2000 to 77.7 percent in fiscal year 2001.
Statistical tables (Tables I through XI) in Exhibit A contain information about the agencies’
enforcement interest in transactions reported in fiscal year 2001. The tables provide, for various
statistical breakdowns, the number and percentage of transactions in which clearances to investigate
were granted by one antitrust agency to the other and the number of merger investigations in which
second requests were issued. Table III of Exhibit A shows that, in fiscal year 2001, clearance was
granted to one or the other of the agencies for the purpose of conducting an initial investigation in
11.4 percent of the total number of transactions in which a second request could have been issued.
The tables also provide the number of transactions based on the dollar value of transactions
reported and the reporting threshold indicated in the notification report. The total dollar value of
reported transactions rose dramatically from fiscal years 1992 to 2000 from about $222 million to
about $3 trillion. During fiscal year 2001, however, the dollar value of reported transactions fell to
about $1 trillion.
Tables X and XI provide the number of transactions in each industry group in which the
acquiring person or the acquired entity derived revenue. For the sake of clarity, the industry groups
are listed by both the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification code (“SIC”) and the corresponding 3
digit-NAICS code.13 Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of reportable transactions within industry
groups for FY 2001 based on the acquired entity’s operations.
13
See infra p. 12.
6
PERCENTAGE OF TRANSACTIONS BY
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITY
FISCAL YEAR 2001
Other
7.0%
Health Services
4.2%
Manufacturing
33.5%
Banking/
Insurance
12.8%
Chemicals and
Pharmaceuticals
4.9%
Consumer Goods
22.1%
Transportation
2.6%
Information/
Technology
9.8%
Energy &
Natural Resources
3.1%
Figure 3
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE PREMERGER PROGRAM
1. HSR Reform Legislation
On December 21, 2000, the President signed into law certain amendments to the HSR Act
that became effective February 1, 2001.14 The principal statutory changes include an increase in the
size-of-transaction threshold, the elimination of a size-of-person test for larger transactions, the
implementation of a new tiered fee structure, and certain changes with regard to waiting periods.
These changes are summarized below.
The size-of-transaction threshold was increased from greater than $15 million to greater than
$50 million, and the 15 percent size-of-transaction threshold was eliminated, thus making $50 million
an absolute floor. No transaction resulting in an acquiring person holding $50 million or less of assets
14
See supra note 2.
7
or voting securities of an acquired person is reportable. Adjustment to the size-of-transaction
threshold will be made each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal year 2005, to reflect the percentage
change in the gross national product (“GNP”) for the previous year.
Transactions valued in excess of $200 million are now reportable without regard to the size
of the acquiring and acquired persons. The size-of-person test was not otherwise changed and
remains in place for transactions greater than $50 million and less than $200 million.
A new three-tiered fee structure was implemented, replacing the uniform $45,000 filing fee.
The fee is now based on the aggregate total value of the voting securities and assets held as a result
of the acquisition. Acquiring persons are required to pay $45,000 for transactions valued at less than
$100 million, $125,000 for transactions valued at $100 million but less than $500 million, and
$280,000 for transactions valued at $500 million or more. The filing fee tiers will be adjusted
annually, beginning in fiscal year 2005, to reflect the percentage change in the GNP for the previous
fiscal year. (The filing fees are not adjusted).
The waiting period that follows compliance with a request for additional information or
documentary material was extended from 20 days to 30 days for most transactions. The 10-day
post-compliance period for cash tender offers and bankruptcy transactions is unchanged. The end of
any waiting period that falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal public holiday now expires on the next
regular business day.
Additionally, the legislation required the Commission and the Antitrust Division to designate a
senior official, who does not have direct responsibility for the review of any enforcement
recommendation concerning the transaction at issue, to resolve any disputes related to requests for
additional information. The Agencies were to “conduct an internal review and implement reforms of
the merger review process in order to eliminate unnecessary burden, remove costly duplication, and
eliminate undue delay, in order to achieve a more effective and more efficient merger review
process,” and report to Congress on its findings and any implemented reforms. These reforms are
discussed further in Section 4 below.
2.
Amendments to the Rules as a Result of HSR Reform
In order to incorporate these statutory changes into the Premerger Notification Program, the
Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, implemented a
number of significant changes to its premerger notification rules. The Commission also took this
opportunity to make several relatively minor, but welcomed, improvements to the rules and the filing
form. All of these changes were published as Interim Rules in the Federal Register on February 1,
8
2001,15 with a solicitation for public comments. The principal Interim rules changes are summarized
below.
Notification Thresholds
Section 801.1(h), as originally promulgated in 1978,16 contained four notification thresholds,
which were greater than $15 million, 15 percent of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer, 25
percent, and 50 percent. Enactment of the HSR reform legislation required making amendments to
these thresholds. In particular, the elimination of the 15 percent size-of-transaction test, the increase
in the monetary size-of-transaction test to greater than $50 million, and the introduction of a threetiered filing fee structure all affected this provision. The lowest notification threshold was raised, and
the intermediate notification thresholds were amended to mirror the fee thresholds Congress created,
while retaining two percentage thresholds that are important for the notification of acquisitions of
voting securities. The thresholds are now: greater than $50 million, $100 million, $500 million, 25
percent of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer if valued in excess of $1 billion, and 50 percent
of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer, if valued in excess of $50 million. These thresholds
have not been made final.
Filing Fee
An entirely new section of the rules was written to provide for the appropriate payment of
filing fees under the new-tiered-fee structure. The new rule, Section 803.9, is followed by a number
of examples designed to illustrate how to apply the new graduated fee schedule to various types of
transactions. The rule also contains two new exemptions from the filing fee requirement, intended to
prevent certain limited types of acquisitions from triggering double filing fees. These types of
transactions are consolidations and acquisitions in which the acquiring entity is controlled by two
ultimate parent entities with no significant business activities outside of the jointly controlled entity.
Previously under the rules, these types of acquisitions required a fee from each acquiring person
involved (here, two); the Commission, recognizing that in reality only one transaction is taking place
in these cases, took the opportunity to ease the burden on filing persons by eliminating the anomalous
second fee for these types of transactions.
Other Changes
Numerous other rules changes were necessitated by the passage of the HSR reform
legislation. These include the elimination of Section 802.20 (which applied to acquisitions of 15
15
66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (February 1, 2001).
16
43 Fed Reg. 33450 (July 31, 1978).
9
percent but valued at $15 million or less), the amendment of Section 802.2117 (which addresses
acquisitions of voting securities up to the next notification threshold), and changes to the filing form. In
conjunction with updating the filing form to accommodate the statutory changes to the program, the
Commission made changes to aid in the processing and identification of transactions and also updated
the filing form to make it more user-friendly by reorganizing it, eliminating unnecessary items and
clarifying the instructions.
3.
Further Amendments to the Premerger Rules
On February 1, 2001, the Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney
General, published an additional Federal Register notice setting forth certain proposed HSR
amendments for public comment.18 These additional amendments were not necessary to implement
the HSR amendments, but consisted instead of updates, corrections and other improvements to the
rules, which the Commission determined were timely and appropriate. These changes, with slight
modifications in response to public comments, became effective April 17, 2002.19 The amendments
adopted are summarized below.
Foreign Transactions
The most noteworthy changes were those amending the foreign exemptions in Sections
802.50 and 802.51 of the rules. These rules were restructured to make them easier to follow, and
were also changed in a number of substantive ways. First, the nexus with the United States that
triggers a filing obligation where foreign assets or voting securities are being acquired was raised to
$50 million, essentially to mirror the new threshold for reporting of domestic acquisitions. Second,
the measure of the value of U.S. assets, establishing the link to U.S. commerce, was changed from
book value to fair market value, as fair market value is a more accurate reflection of an asset’s
potential impact on U.S. commerce. Third, the rules were amended to reflect the longstanding
position of the PNO that sales or assets of multiple foreign issuers are to be aggregated where
controlling interests in these issuers are being acquired. The fourth change is the extension of
reportability to acquisitions of foreign assets by foreign persons. Formerly exempt across the board,
these acquisitions are now subject to the same $50 million nexus-with-the-United States test as
acquisitions of foreign voting securities. Finally, the exemption for acquisitions by foreign persons
who do not meet the $110 million aggregate sales and assets test was altered to apply only where
such acquisition is not valued over $200 million (to correspond with the elimination in the HSR Act of
a size-of-person test for acquisitions valued at over $200 million).
17
This amendment became effective on March 18, 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 11904 (March 18, 2002).
18
66 Fed. Red. 8723 (February 1, 2001).
19
67 Fed. Reg. 11898 (March 18, 2002).
10
Other Changes
Other changes included an amendment to Section 802.2(g), which removed associated
agricultural assets from the agricultural property exemption. The rule had defined associated
agricultural assets as those assets that are integral to the agricultural business activities conducted on
the property, such as inventory (e.g., livestock, poultry, crops, fruit, vegetables, milk, and eggs),
structures that house livestock raised on the real property, and fertilizer and animal feed. These
assets were removed from the exemption primarily because the general increase in the filing
threshold to $50 million already excludes acquisitions involving agricultural assets that are likely to
be of little or no competitive consequence. This change also refocuses the rule on agricultural real
property, which was the initial intent of the exemption when promulgated.
Section 802.6 was amended to remove the reference to the now-defunct Civil Aeronautics
Board and to state a general rule regarding the reportability of mixed transactions as compared to
those that are industry-specific. The amended rule defines a mixed transaction as one in which
some portion that is exempt pursuant to subsection (c)(6), (c)(7), or (c)(8) of the HSR Act because
that portion requires regulatory agency premerger competitive review and approval, while another
portion does not require such review. While realizing that the prior version of Section 802.6 would
no longer directly apply to any transactions, the agencies recognized there is value in leaving this
concept in the rules because of its application to other regulated industries.
4.
Premerger Review Process Improvements
When it published the Interim Rules, the Commission also amended its Rules of Practice20 to
reflect the HSR Act’s requirement that, upon a petition from the recipient, a senior agency official,
who does not have direct responsibility for the review of any enforcement recommendation
concerning the transaction at issue, review a request for additional information to determine whether
it is unreasonably cumulative, unduly burdensome, or duplicative or whether the petitioner has
substantially complied with the request for additional information. To avoid undue delay of the
merger review process, the procedures include reasonable deadlines for expedited review of these
petitions, after reasonable negotiations with investigative staff. The Antitrust Division similarly revised
its review process to comply with the HSR Act and has posted those procedures on its website.
The changes to the Act also required, within 90 days after the date of enactment, the
Commission and the Antitrust Division to conduct an internal review of the merger process and
implement reforms to eliminate unnecessary burden, remove costly duplication and eliminate undue
delay. Within 120 days, the agencies were required to issue or amend their industry guidance,
20
66 Fed. Reg. 8721 (February 1, 2001) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 2.20).
11
regulations, operating manuals and relevant policy documents, to the extent appropriate, to
implement each reform, and within 180 days, to report to Congress on the reforms adopted and the
steps taken to implement the reforms. Both agencies have conducted their internal review of the
merger review process, implemented reforms as detailed in each of their reports to Congress, and
amended the necessary internal and external guidance, including amending the Commission’s Rules of
Practice and the Division’s Manual.
5.
Adoption of the North American Industrial Classification System (“NAICS”)
On July 1, 2001, the Commission updated the requirements of the filing form21 by requiring
information in Items 5, 7 and 8 to be reported using the NAICS rather than the SIC system. The
changeover also updates the base year from 1992 to 199722 and requires that the parties report their
insurance activities in the body of the filing form rather than in a separate insurance appendix.
This change follows the April 1997 Office of Management and Budget decision to require all
Federal statistical agencies that collect or publish data by industry to adopt the NAICS as the
industrial classification system for the United States. Subsequently, beginning with its 1997
Economic Census, the Department of Commerce began using NAICS codes to classify U.S.
economic activities.23 Although not directly required to do so, the Commission determined that
requiring filing persons to report revenue data using the NAICS will further the policy of objectives of
the HSR notification program.
The NAICS has several characteristics that will contribute to a more meaningful antitrust
analysis. First, the NAICS was designed to describe the U.S. economy more accurately than the
SIC system. With nine new service industry sectors and 358 new industries, the NAICS should
provide more precise information in making a preliminary identification of competitive overlaps.
Second, the Commission has traditionally relied upon the most current economic data to analyze the
potential anticompetitive effects of proposed transactions.24 The 1997 Economic Census and the
1997 Numerical List of Manufactured Products published by the Bureau of Census contain such
data and use the NAICS. Third, the NAICS is erected on a production-oriented, or supply-based,
conceptual framework to ensure the internal consistency of its industry classifications. This
21
66 Fed. Reg. 23561(Interim Notice, May 9, 2001); and 66 FR 35541 (Final Notice, July 6, 2001).
22
The change in the base year will continue to occur every five years.
23
62 Fed. Reg. 17287 (April 9, 1997).
24
Periodically, the Commission has adjusted the base year when the Bureau of Census published a new
“Economic Census.” See 45 Fed. Reg. 14205 (March 5, 1980); 51 Fed. Reg. 10368 (March 26, 1986); 55 Fed. Reg.
31371 (August 2, 1990); and 60 Fed. Reg. 40704 (August 9, 1995).
12
organizational concept will be useful to the Commission and the Assistant Attorney General when
they evaluate entry and industry overlap issues as part of the antitrust analysis of proposed
transactions. Incorporating the NAICS into the filing form and the instructions will ensure that filing
persons provide revenues in a format that can be compared to the most recent and complete
economic data published by the Bureau of the Census.25
6.
Compliance
The Commission and the Department of Justice continued to monitor compliance with the
premerger notification program’s filing and waiting period requirements and initiated a number of
compliance investigations in fiscal year 2001. The agencies monitor compliance through a variety of
methods, including the review of newspapers and industry publications for announcements of
transactions that may not have been reported in accordance with the requirements of the Act. In
addition, industry sources, such as competitors, customers and suppliers, as well as interested
members of the public, provide the agencies with information about transactions and possible
violations of the Act’s requirements. Under Section 7A(g)(1) of the Act, any person that fails to
comply with the Act’s notification and waiting requirements is liable for a civil penalty of up to
$11,000 for each day the violation continues.26
In United States v. Computer Associates International, Inc. and Platinum Technology
International, Inc.,27 the complaint alleged that Computer Associates obtained premature
operational control of Platinum and agreed with Platinum to limit the price discounts and other terms
it offered its customers during the mandatory premerger waiting period, thus violating the waiting
period requirements of the Act as well as Section 1 of the Sherman Act.28 On April 23, 2002, the
Antitrust Division filed a proposed consent decree to settle the suit. The consent decree, which is
awaiting entry by the Court, requires the payment of $638,000 in civil penalties and prevents
Computer Associates from agreeing on prices, approving or rejecting proposed customer contracts,
and exchanging prospective bid information with all future merger partners. The decree allows
25
A review of NAICS industry codes is slated to occur for every five years and is expected to keep
NAICS current as economic sectors evolve.
26
Effective November 20, 1996, dollar amounts specified in civil monetary penalty provisions within the
Commission’s jurisdiction were adjusted for inflation in accordance with the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (April 26, 1996). The adjustments included, in part, an increase from $10,000 to $11,000
for each day during which a person is in violation under Section 7A(g)(1). 61 Fed. Reg. 54548 (October 21, 1996),
corrected at 61 Fed. Reg. 55840 (October 29, 1996).
27
United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. and Platinum Tech. Int’l, Inc., Civil No. 01-02062 (D.D.C.
complaint filed September 28, 2001).
28
15 U.S.C. § 1.
13
Computer Associates to conduct ordinary due diligence, which may include, under narrow and
restricted circumstances, obtaining access to pending bids that are material to Computer Associates’
understanding of the future earnings and prospects of the acquisition candidate. In no circumstances,
however, may employees who are directly involved in the sale of a competing product obtain access
to such information.
MERGER ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY29
1.
The Department of Justice
During fiscal 2001, the Antitrust Division challenged 32 merger transactions that it concluded
could lessen competition if allowed to proceed as proposed. In 8 of these transactions the Antitrust
Division filed a complaint in U.S. District Court, of which all were settled by consent decree. In the
remaining 24 challenges in fiscal year 2001, the Antitrust Division informed the parties to a proposed
transaction that it would file a suit challenging the transaction unless the parties restructured the
proposal to avoid competitive problems or abandoned the proposal altogether.30 In 20 of these
29
All cases in this report were not necessarily reportable under the premerger notification program.
Because of provisions regarding the confidentiality of the information obtained pursuant to the Act, it would be
inappropriate to identify which cases were initiated under the program.
30
In these instances, the Department of Justice issued press releases: October 18, 2000 -- Wells Fargo &
Company merger with Brenton Banks Inc. -- Des Moines, Iowa area banks (business banking services); November
7, 2001 -- Varian Medical Systems Inc. proposed acquisition of IMPAC Medical Systems (radiation oncology
management systems software and medical devices); January 25, 2001 -- Fleet Boston Financial Corporation's
proposed acquisition of Summit Bancorp -- New Jersey area banks (business banking services); February 5, 2001 - Firstar Corporation and U.S. Bancorp merger -- Minnesota and Iowa banks (business banking services);
February 6, 2001 -- Eastman Kodak Company's proposed acquisition of Bell & Howell Company (scanner
business); February 6, 2001 -- JDS Uniphase's proposed acquisition of SDL Inc. (980 nanometer pump laser chip
business); February 23, 2001 -- Lesaffre et Cie's proposed acquisition through Sensient Technologies Corporation
of Universal Foods Corporation Red Star Yeast Division (yeast manufacturing); March 8, 2001 -- Fifth Third
Bancorp and Old Kent Financial Corporation merger -- Michigan banks (business banking services); May 2, 2001 - General Electric Company's proposed acquisition of Honeywell International, Inc. (helicopter engines,
maintenance, repair and overhaul, and auxiliary power units); June 19, 2001 -- BB&T Corporation's proposed
acquisition of Wachovia Corporation -- Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia banks (business
banking services); June 29, 2001 -- Electronic Data Systems acquisition of Sabre, Inc. (full-featured airline
reservation systems); July 26, 2001 -- First Union's proposed acquisition of Wachovia Bank -- Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia banks (business banking services); July 27, 2001 -- United Airlines'
proposed acquisition of US Airways (airlines); July 30, 2001 -- George Weston Ltd.'s proposed acquisition of
Bestfoods Baking from Unilever plc/nv (fresh bread products).
In the remaining 10 challenges, the Division informed the parties of its antitrust concerns but did not
issue a press release: Orica Limited's proposed acquisition of LaRoche Industries Inc. ammonium Nitrate assets
(industrial organic chemicals); BAE Systems plc proposed acquisition of Sanders Electronics Division of
Lockheed Martin's Aerospace Electronics system (infrared electronic warfare products); State National
Bancshare's proposed acquisition of Ruidoso Bank Corporation -- New Mexico banks (business banking
14
proposed transactions, the parties restructured the transactions, and in 4 of these proposed
transactions the parties abandoned the transactions entirely.
In United States v. WorldCom, Inc. and Intermedia Communications, Inc.,31 the
Division sued to block WorldCom's proposed acquisition of Intermedia's business operations and
assets. The complaint alleged that, by adding to WorldCom's leading position in the Internet
backbone market, the $6 billion acquisition, as originally proposed, would have resulted in higher
prices and lower quality of services in the Internet backbone market. Internet backbone networks
provide Internet service providers and other Internet users with connectivity to Internet sites
throughout the United States and the world. WorldCom owned and operated the largest Internet
backbone network in the world and carried more than twice the Internet traffic as its nearest rival.
Intermedia also operated a nationwide Internet backbone network, and it provided integrated local
and long distance voice and data telecommunications services in numerous metropolitan areas
throughout the country. The Division filed a proposed consent decree simultaneously with the
complaint, settling the suit. The decree required WorldCom to sell the business operations and
assets of Intermedia to a qualified third-party purchaser, while allowing WorldCom to retain
Intermedia's controlling stock interest in Digex Inc, a provider of managed Internet web hosting
services. The Court entered the consent decree on June 27, 2001.
In United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Fort James Corp.,32 the Division
challenged Georgia-Pacific Corporation's $11 billion acquisition of Fort James Corporation, alleging
that the acquisition, as originally proposed, would have substantially lessened competition in the
production and sale of commercial tissue products by reducing the number of major competitors
from three to two. Fort James and Georgia-Pacific were, respectively, the largest and second largest
producers of commercial tissue products in the United States. Commercial tissue, also referred to as
away-from-home tissue, includes paper towels, paper napkins, and bath tissue sold for use in public
settings such as restaurants, office buildings, factories, hospitals, schools, and airports. The Division
services); F&M's proposed acquisition of Atlantic Financial Corporation -- Virginia banks (business banking
services); Eure Communication's proposed acquisition of WCHV-AM and WKAV-AM from Charlottesville
Broadcasting Corporation (Virginia radio stations); Comcast's proposed acquisition of Home Team Sports and
Midwest Sports Channel (sports networks); joint venture between Thomson Financial Corporation and the
Depository Trust Clearing Corporation (post-trade, pre-settlement electronic services for securities transactions);
Xcel Energy's subsidiary NRG Energy, Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Duke Energy (Audrain electric plant); CRH
plc's proposed acquisition of F.W. Whitcomb Company (aggregates); Xcel Energy's proposed acquisition of
Wisvest (Connecticut electrical generation assets).
31
United States v. WorldCom, Inc. and Intermedia Communications, Inc., C.V.No.1:00CV02789 (D.D.C.
filed November 17, 2000).
32
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Fort James Corp., C.V.No.1:00CV02824 (D.D.C. filed
November 21, 2000).
15
filed a proposed consent decree simultaneously with the complaint, settling the suit. Under the terms
of the decree, Georgia-Pacific was required to sell its commercial tissue business. The Court entered
the consent decree on May 9, 2001.
In United States v. Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., Renault
S.A., Renault V.I. S.A., and Mack Trucks, Inc.,33 the Division challenged Aktiebolaget Volvo's
$1.8 billion acquisition of Renault V.I. The complaint alleged that the acquisition, as originally
proposed, would have reduced competition in the development, production and sale of heavy-duty
low cab over engine (“LCOE”) trucks in the United States, by giving Volvo the power to unilaterally
increase the price and decrease the quality, level of service, and amount of product improvement of
these trucks. LCOE trucks are made with the cab placed over or in front of the engine, providing
superior visibility and maneuverability. Heavy-duty LCOE trucks are capable of carrying the
heaviest payload capacities or gross vehicle weights and are the truck of choice for various heavy
hauling applications such as trash collection, home heating oil delivery, concrete pumping, and aircraft
refueling. Renault, through its Mack Trucks subsidiary, and Volvo were major producers of heavy
duty trucks in the U.S., including heavy-duty LCOE trucks, and accounted for approximately 86
percent of LCOE truck sales in the U.S. The Division filed a proposed consent decree
simultaneously with the complaint, settling the suit. Under the terms of the decree, Volvo was
required to divest its line of heavy-duty LCOE trucks to a suitable purchaser. The Court entered the
consent decree on April 30, 2001.
In United States v. The News Corp. Ltd., Fox Television Holdings, Inc. and ChrisCraft Indus., Inc.,34 the companies agreed to sell a television station located in Salt Lake City, Utah,
in order to resolve antitrust concerns about the companies' $5.3 billion proposed merger. The
complaint alleged that the acquisition, as originally structured, would have lessened competition
substantially by combining News Corporation's KSTU-TV, a FOX affiliate, with Chris-Craft's
KTVX-TV, an ABC affiliate, two stations that competed head-to-head in the Salt Lake City market,
resulting in higher prices for local or spot television advertising. News Corp. would have owned two
of the top four broadcast television stations in the Salt Lake City market with approximately 40% of
the broadcast television spot advertising revenue. The Division filed a proposed consent decree
simultaneously with the complaint, settling the suit. The decree required Chris-Craft Industries to
divest KTVX-TV. The consent decree was entered by the Court on August 18, 2001.
In United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp.,35 the Division filed suit June 6,
33
United States v. Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., Renault S.A., Renault V.I. S.A.
and Mack Trucks, Inc., C.V. No. 1:00CV03006 (D.D.C. filed December 18, 2000).
34
United States v. The News Corp. Ltd., Fox Television Holdings, Inc. and Chris -Craft Indus., Inc., C.V.
No. 1:01CV00771 (D.D.C. filed April 11, 2001).
35
United States v. 3D Systems Corp. and DTM Corp., C.V. No. 1:01CV01237 (D.D.C. filed June 6, 2001).
16
2001, to block 3D Systems Corporation's proposed $45 million acquisition of DTM Corporation,
alleging that the transaction, as originally structured, would have resulted in higher prices and less
innovation for industrial rapid prototyping systems in the United States. Rapid prototyping (“RP”) is
a process by which a machine transforms a computer design into three-dimensional objects, speeding
the design process for everything from cellular phones to medical equipment. The complaint alleged
that 3D and DTM offered the most sophisticated systems in the industry and competed directly
against each other in the development, manufacture, and sale of industrial rapid prototyping systems
and materials. The acquisition would have combined the two largest manufacturers of RP systems in
the United States, reduced the number of competitors in the U.S. industrial RP systems market from
three to two, and resulted in the combined company having a U.S. market share, by revenue, of 80
percent. On August 16, 2001, the Division filed a proposed consent decree to settle the suit. The
consent decree will permit new entry by requiring 3D and DTM to license their RP-related patents to
a firm that will compete in the U.S. market. The consent decree is awaiting entry by the Court.
In United States v. Signature Flight Support Corp., Ranger Aerospace Corp. and
Aircraft Service Int’l Group, Inc.,36 the Division challenged Signature Flight Support Corporation's
acquisition of Ranger Aerospace Corporation. Aircraft Service International Group, Inc. (“ASIG”),
a wholly owned subsidiary of Ranger, conducted fixed base operations at the Orlando International
Airport. Signature and ASIG were the only fixed base operators at the airport, competing head-tohead to provide flight support services. The complaint alleged that the acquisition, as originally
proposed, would have resulted in a monopoly in the market for fixed base flight support operations
at Orlando International Airport and that the loss of competition likely would have resulted in higher
prices and decreased quality of service to charter, private and corporate aircraft operators who used
fixed base operations. The Division filed a proposed consent decree simultaneously with the
complaint, settling the suit. The decree required Signature to divest a flight support services business,
including fueling and ramp/hangar rentals, at Orlando International Airport. The Court entered the
consent decree on October 11, 2001.
In United States v. The Thomson Corp., Harcourt General, Inc., and Reed Elsevier,
Inc.,37 the Division challenged Thomson’s $2 billion acquisition of certain Harcourt assets from Reed
Elsevier. Thomson and Harcourt were two of the world's largest textbook publishing companies and
owned two of the largest providers of computer-based testing services -- Prometric Inc. and
Assessment Systems, Inc. (“ASI”), respectively. Reed Elsevier, a large international publisher, had
agreed to purchase Harcourt for approximately $4.6 billion and then sell Harcourt's Higher
Education and Corporate and Professional Services Groups to Thomson for approximately $2.06
36
United States v. Signature Flight Support Corp., Ranger Aerospace Corp. and Aircraft Service Int’l
Group, Inc., C.V. No. 1:01CV01365 (D.D.C. filed June 20, 2001).
37
United States v. The Thomson Corp., Harcourt General, Inc., and Reed Elsevier Inc., C.V. No.
1:01CV01419 (D.D.C. filed June 27, 2001).
17
billion. The complaint alleged that the deal, as originally proposed, would have been anticompetitive,
resulting in higher prices and lower quality for textbooks, substantially lessening competition for
textbooks in 38 college courses, covering subjects such as chemistry, communications, education,
finance, foreign language, mathematics, music, philosophy and psychology. The complaint further
alleged that, had the transaction gone forward as originally proposed, it would have resulted in higher
prices and lower quality for computer-based testing services, substantially lessening competition in
the market for the delivery and administration of high stakes computer-based tests in the United
States. The Division filed a proposed consent decree simultaneously with the complaint, settling the
suit. Under the terms of the decree, the parties were required to divest property rights to textbooks
used in the 38 college courses in which the complaint alleged competitive problems. The decree also
required divestiture of the national testing business of ASI or, if determined that such divestiture
would not fully restore the competition eliminated by Thomson's acquisition of ASI, all of ASI,
including its contracts to provide state computer-based testing for purposes of licensing and
certification. The Court entered the consent decree on October 30, 2001.
In United States v. Premdor Inc., Premdor U.S. Holdings, Inc., Int’l Paper Co. and
Masonite Corp.,38 the Division challenged Premdor’s acquisition of Masonite Corporation and
related businesses from International Paper Company. The complaint alleged that the $527 million
acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the interior molded doorskin and interior molded
door markets by restructuring the industry in a way that would have facilitated coordination among
the dominant firms. A doorskin is the component that makes up the front and back of an interior
molded door. Premdor was one of two major manufacturers of molded doors, selling over 40
percent of all interior molded doors purchased in the United States in 2000. It was also Masonite's
largest customer and a small, but significant, competitor of Masonite in the molded doorskin market.
The acquisition, as proposed, would have removed Premdor as a competitor in the interior molded
doorskin market and resulted in the markets for interior molded doorskins and interior molded doors
being dominated by two similarly sized vertically integrated firms. The Division filed a proposed
consent decree simultaneously with the complaint, settling the suit. The decree requires the
divestiture of one of Masonite's two U.S. interior molded doorskin manufacturing plants to maintain
an independent molded doorskin manufacturer. The Court entered the consent decree on April 5,
2002.
During fiscal year 2001, the Division investigated eight bank merger transactions for which
divestiture was required prior to or concurrently with the acquisition and three others in which
conditions were imposed. A “not significantly adverse” letter conditioned upon a letter agreement
between the parties and the Division was sent to the appropriate bank regulatory agency in all
38
United States v. Premdor Inc., Premdor U.S. Holdings, Inc., Int’l Paper Co. and Masonite Corp., C.V.
No. 1:01CV01696 (D.D.C. filed August 3, 2001).
18
instances.39
Also during fiscal year 2001, consent decrees were entered in four merger cases previously
filed by the Division.40
2.
The Federal Trade Commission
The Commission challenged 23 transactions that it concluded would lessen competition if
allowed to proceed as proposed during fiscal year 2001, leading to 18 consent agreements for public
comment, and 4 withdrawn filings. Out of the 18 consent agreements issued, 17 became final in fiscal
year 2001 and 1 became final in fiscal year 2002. In one matter the Commission authorized staff to
seek injunctive relief, which was filed in district court.
In The Hearst Trust,41 the Commission filed for a permanent injunction alleging that Hearst
39
The 11 letters were: October 18, 2000 letter to the Board of Governors regarding the application by
Wells Fargo & Company, San Francisco, CA to acquire Brenton Banks, Des Moines, IO; December 20, 2000 letter
to the Board of Governors and the Comptroller of the Currency regarding the application for State National
Bancshares, Inc., Lubbock, TX, to acquire Ruidoso Bank Corporation, Ruidoso, NM; December 21, 2000 letter to
the Comptroller of the Currency regarding the application by Wells Fargo Bank, Texas, N.A., San Antonio, TX, to
acquire three branches of Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, NY, and to merge with Midland Interim Trust
Company, N.A., Midland, TX; January 8, 2001 letter sent to the Board of Governors regarding the application by
F&M National Corporation, Winchester, VA to acquire Atlantic Financial Corporation, Newport News, VA;
January 25, 2001 letter to the Board of Governors regarding the application by Fleet Boston Financial Corporation,
Boston, MA to acquire Summit Bancorp, Princeton, NJ and a letter to the Comptroller of the Currency regarding
the application by Fleet National Bank, Providence, RI, to acquire Summit Bank, Bethlehem, PA; February 5, 2001
letter to the Board of Governors regarding the application by Firstar Corporation, Milwaukee, WI to acquire U.S.
Bancorp, Minneapolis, MN; March 8, 2001 letter to the Board of Governors regarding the application by Fifth
Third Bancorp, Cincinnati, OH to acquire Old Kent Financial Corporation, Grand Rapids, MI; March 19, 2001 letter
to the Comptroller of the Currency regarding the application by CNB National Bank, Lake City, FL to purchase two
branches of Republic Bank, St. Petersburg, FL; March 22, 2001 letter to the Comptroller of the Currency regarding
the application by First Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Columbia, Columbia, TN to acquire Peoples and
Union Bank, Lewisburg, TN; June 19, 2001 letter to the Board of Governors regarding the application by BB&T
Corporation, Winston-Salem, NC to acquire F&M National Corporation, Winchester, VA; July 26, 2001 letter to
the Board of Governors regarding the application by First Union Corporation, Charlotte, NC, to acquire Wachovia
Corporation, Winston-Salem, NC.
40
On July 10, 2001, the District Court entered the consent decree in United States v. Alcoa Inc. and
Reynolds Metals Company (D.D.C. filed May 3, 2000); on April 30, 2001, the consent decree was entered in United
States v. Allied Waste Industries, Inc. and Republic Services, Inc. (D.D.C. filed June 21, 2000); on November 27,
2000, the consent decree was entered in United States v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., L'Oreal S.A. and Carson, Inc. (D.D.C.
filed July 31, 2000); and on September 6, 2001, the consent decree was entered in United States v. Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. and AMFM Inc. (D.D.C. filed August 29, 2000). See the FY 2000 Annual Report for a
description of these cases.
41
Federal Trade Commission v. Hearst Trust, Civ. No. 1:01CV00734 (D.D.C.), filed April 5, 2001.
19
and its wholly owned subsidiary, First DataBank Inc., illegally acquired a monopoly in the market for
electronic integratable drug information databases, also known as integratable drug data files.
According to the complaint, Hearst’s 1998 acquisition of Medi-Span, Inc., its main competitor in
that market, allowed First DataBank to institute substantial price increases to its customers for use of
the electronic databases which contain clinical, pricing and other information on prescription and nonprescription drugs. Pharmacists, physicians, hospital staff, and health plans use these databases to
help them provide high-quality, cost-effective patient care. Most notably, integratable drug data files
are needed for pharmacists to get quick, automatic warnings of any dangerous interactions between
newly prescribed drugs and other drugs their patients are already taking. The complaint also charged
that Hearst illegally withheld certain corporate documents about the Medi-Span acquisition that were
required for premerger notification review under the HSR Act. On December 14, 2001, the
Commission voted to approve a proposed settlement that required Hearst to divest the former MediSpan business and pay $19 million as disgorgement of unlawful profits. The settlement marks the
first time the Commission has sought either divestiture or disgorgement of profits in a federal court
action for a consummated merger. The funds will be distributed to injured customers as part of the
settlement of a private class action suit alleging unlawful overcharges by Hearst. The district court
approved the final order and stipulated permanent injunction on December 18, 2001.42
In Manheim Auctions, Inc./ADT Automotive Holdings, Inc.,43 the complaint alleged that
the proposed merger of Manheim and ADT would reduce competition in the provision of major
wholesale auction services in six geographic markets: the greater metropolitan area of Kansas City,
Missouri; the Colorado Front Range, which includes the greater metropolitan areas of Denver and
Colorado Springs, Colorado; the greater metropolitan area of Atlanta, Georgia; the greater
metropolitan area of San Francisco, California; the greater metropolitan area of Seattle, Washington;
and the I-4 Corridor of Florida, which includes the greater metropolitan areas of Tampa, Orlando,
and Daytona Beach, Florida. In these markets the proposed acquisition would have given Manheim
a monopoly over major wholesale auction services and created a substantial risk of reduced service
levels or higher prices. The complaint also alleged that Manheim acquired a monopoly of major
auctions in Phoenix, Arizona in 1996 when it acquired from JM Family Enterprises, Inc., a controlling
interest in its only major auction competitor there. Under the terms of the order, Manheim and ADT
were required to divest eight ADT auctions, along with one of Manheim’s major auctions in Phoenix.
42
The Commission also asked the Department of Justice to file a separate complaint in U.S. District
Court seeking civil penalties for Hearst’s failure to comply with premerger notification filing requirements by
failing to supply key documents. The Division sought civil penalties in a suit filed on October 11, 2001 (C.V. No.
1:01CV02119), and under the terms of the final judgment, Hearst agreed to pay $4 million in civil penalties to settle
the charges.
43
Manheim Auctions, Inc./ADT Automotive Holdings, Inc., Docket No. C-3982 (issued November 13,
2000).
20
In Tyco Int’l, Ltd./Mallinckrodt, Inc.,44 the complaint alleged that the proposed $4.2 billion
acquisition by Tyco of Mallinckrodt would lessen competition and could create a monopoly in the
U.S. market for endotracheal tubes – the principal means by which anesthesia and oxygen are
administered to patients in operating and emergency room settings. According to the complaint, both
Tyco and Mallinckrodt are leading suppliers of disposable medical supplies and are head-to-head
competitors in the highly concentrated U.S. market for endotracheal tubes. The proposed
acquisition would have provided Tyco with over 86 percent of the market share. In addition, new
entry into the U.S. endotracheal tube market requires the development of a full line of products in a
number of sizes and configurations, procurement of manufacturing equipment, and the establishment
of production practices in conformity with U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations, as well as
development of a track record and customer base. Because of the high costs and significant risks
associated with accomplishing these tasks, new entry into the U.S. endotracheal tube market would
have been unlikely to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects that would have resulted from
the proposed merger. Under the order, Tyco was required to divest its endotracheal tube business
to Hudson RCI, a company with significant presence in other respiratory care markets.
In Novartis AG/AstraZeneca PLC,45 the complaint alleged that the proposed merger
between Novartis and AstraZeneca would lessen competition in the already highly concentrated
markets for corn herbicides for pre-emergent control of grasses and foliar fungicides for use on
cereals, peanuts, potatoes, rice, turf and vegetables. The proposed merger would have also
significantly increased the level of concentration in the relevant markets, increased the barriers to
entry in these markets, allowed the merged firm to unilaterally raise prices and increased the
likelihood of coordinated interaction between the remaining competitors. According to the
complaint, Novartis is the leading developer, producer, manufacturer and seller of corn herbicides for
pre-emergent control of grasses in the United States, with about 50 percent of the market, followed
by AstraZeneca. Similarly, Novartis and AstraZeneca are leading sellers of foliar fungicides for use
on cereals, peanuts, potatoes, rice, turf and vegetables in the United States, and account for about
40 percent of all fungicides sales. To remedy the potential anticompetitive effects of the proposed
merger, the parties were required to divest AstraZeneca’s worldwide acetochlor corn herbicide
business to Dow Agro, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dow Chemical, and Novartis’ worldwide
strobilurin fungicide business to Bayer AG.
In Philip Morris Cos./Nabisco Holdings Corp.,46 the complaint alleged the proposed
$19.4 billion merger of Philip Morris and Nabisco would create the world’s largest food company
44
Tyco Int’l, Ltd./Mallinckrodt, Inc., Docket No. C-3985 (issued December 5, 2000).
45
Novartis AG/AstraZeneca PLC, Docket No. C-3979 (issued December 19, 2000).
46
Philip Morris Cos., Inc./Nabisco Holdings Corp., Docket No. C-3987 (issued February 27, 2001).
21
and would lessen competition in five already highly concentrated food product markets: 1) dry-mix
gelatin desserts, 2) dry-mix pudding, 3) no-bake desserts, 4) baking powder, and 5) intense mints.
According to the complaint, Philip Morris and Nabisco are the only two significant sellers of branded
dry-mix gelatin desserts, branded dry-mix pudding, and no-bake desserts in the United States, and
two of only three significant sellers of baking powder and intense mints in the United States. Philip
Morris, through its Kraft Foods Inc. subsidiary, produces and sells Jell-O brand dry-mix gelatin
desserts, dry-mix pudding, and no-bake desserts, the Calumet brand of baking powder, and the
Altoids brand of intense mints. Nabisco sells Royal and My-T-Fine brands of dry-mix gelatin
desserts, dry-mix pudding, and the Royal brand of no-bake desserts. Nabisco also sells the Davis
and Fleischmann’s brands of baking powder and the Ice Breakers and Cool Blast brands of intense
mints. Under the order, Nabisco was required to divest all of its dry-mix gelatin, dry-mix pudding,
no-baking dessert, and baking powder assets to The Jel Sert Company, and to sell Nabisco’s
intense mints assets to Hershey Foods Corporation.
In AOL Online, Inc./Time Warner Inc.,47 the complaint alleged that the proposed merger
between AOL and Time Warner would lessen competition in broadband Internet access service,
broadband Internet transport service, and the provision of Interactive TV (“ITV”) service in the
United States. According to the complaint, AOL is the nation’s largest Internet service provider
(“ISP”) and Time Warner is a media conglomerate comprising cable television system servicing
about 20 percent of U.S. cable households, and various cable-programming networks, publishing
and records interests and film libraries. The order required that the merged company, AOL Time
Warner, open its cable system to competitor ISPs and prohibited the company from interfering with
content passed along the bandwidth contracted for by non-affiliated ISPs, or from discriminating on
the basis of affiliation in the transmission of content that AOL Time Warner has contracted to deliver
to subscribers over their cable system, including the transmission of interactive triggers or other
content in conjunction with ITV services. The order also required AOL Time Warner to market and
offer AOL’s digital subscriber line (“DSL”) services to subscribers in Time Warner cable areas
where affiliated cable broadband service is available in the same manner and at the same retail pricing
as they do in those areas where affiliated cable broadband ISP service is not available.
In SmithKline plc/Glaxo Wellcome plc,48 the complaint alleged that the proposed $182
billion merger of SmithKline and Glaxo would lessen competition in the markets for the research,
development, manufacture, and sale of: 1) 5HT-3 antiemetic drugs, which are administered to
cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy and radiation treatments; 2) ceftazidime, an antibiotic used
to treat hospitalized patients who are at risk of contracting strains of potentially life-threatening
pseudomona infections; 3) oral and intravenous antiviral drugs to treat herpes, chicken pox, and
47
AOL Online, Inc./Time Warner Inc., Docket No. C-3989 (issued April 18, 2001).
48
SmithKline plc/Glaxo Wellcome plc, Docket No. C-3990 (issued January 26, 2001).
22
shingles; 4) topical antiviral herpes drugs for the treatment of cold sores (herpes); 5) prophylactic
genital herpes vaccines; 6) over-the-counter H-2 blocker acid relief products; 7) topoisomerase I
inhibitor drugs, which are used to treat solid-tumor cancers; 8) migraine treatment drugs; and 9)
irritable bowel syndrome drugs. According to the complaint, Glaxo and SmithKline are the two
leading suppliers in several of these markets, and, in some instances, the only two suppliers. In
several of these markets the proposed merger would have reduced the number of competitors to
two, created a monopoly, and eliminated any research and development efforts underway. Under
the order, the companies were required to divest: all of SmithKline’s worldwide rights relating to its
antiemetic drug Kytril; SmithKline’s U.S. rights to manufacture and market ceftazidime; SmithKline’s
worldwide rights relating to its antiviral drugs Famvir and Denavir; and Glaxo Wellcome’s U.S. and
Canadian Zantac trademark rights. The companies’ were also required to assign all of Glaxo
Wellcome’s relevant intellectual property rights and relinquish its reversionary rights to the
topoisomerase I inhibitor being developed by Gilead Sciences, Inc., return to Cantab
Pharmaceuticals all rights to use Cantab’s DISC technology to develop a prophylactic herpes
vaccine, and assign all of SmithKline’s relevant intellectual property rights and relinquish all options to
the irritable bowel syndrome drug renzapride to Alizyme plc.
In Valspar Corp./Lilly Indus., Inc.,49 the complaint alleged that Valspar’s proposed merger
with Lilly would lessen competition in the market for the research, development, manufacture and
sale of silver, tin, and copper solutions (“mirror solutions”) and mirror backing paint. According to
the complaint, Valspar and Lilly are the two leading suppliers of mirror solutions and are two of the
suppliers of mirror backing paint in the United States. As a result, they are frequent competitors to
win contracts with mirror manufacturers. The proposed merger would have created a firm
controlling more than 90 percent in each of the mirror solutions markets and more than 60 percent of
the mirror backing paint market. As significant impediments to new entry exist in these markets, a
new entrant would need to undertake the difficult, expensive and time-consuming process of
developing a competitive product, establishing reliable U.S. distribution and technical support, and
developing a reputation among mirror manufacturers for consistently producing a high quality
product. Under the terms of the order, Valspar was required to divest its mirror coatings business to
Spraylat Corporation.
In Computer Sciences Corp./Mynd Corp.,50 the complaint alleged that CSC’s proposed
acquisition of Mynd would lessen competition in the U.S. market for claims assessment systems.
Comprised of computer software and other intellectual property, claims assessment systems are used
by insurance companies and others to evaluate appropriate payments for claims of bodily injury and
to evaluate return-to-work plans in workers compensation matters. According to the complaint, the
49
Valspar Corp./Lilly Indus., Inc., Docket No. C-3995 (issued January 26, 2001).
50
Computer Sciences Corp./Mynd Corp., Docket No. C-3991 (issued January 26, 2001).
23
market for claims assessment systems in the United States is highly concentrated and CSC and
Mynd are the only significant competitors for the provision of such services. Under the order, CSC
was required to divest Mynd’s claims assessments system, known as Claims Outcome Advisor
(“COA”), to Insurance Services Office, Inc.
In El Paso Energy Corp./PG&E Gas Transmission Teco, Inc. and PG&E Gas
Transmission Texas Corp.,51 the complaint alleged that the proposed acquisition by El Paso of
PG&E Gas Transmission Teco and PG&E Gas Transmission Texas would lessen competition in
three natural gas transportation markets: 1) the prolific gas supply area of western Texas and
southeastern New Mexico (“the Permian Basin”); 2) the natural gas consuming areas of the San
Antonio-Austin area (“Central Texas”); and 3) the Matagorda Island offshore production area.
According to the Complaint, the Permian Basin is among the largest natural gas producing areas in
the United States. If the merger were to proceed as proposed, El Paso would have owned more
natural gas transportation capacity out of the Permian Basin than any other company and would have
been the owner of almost all of the natural gas transportation capacity from the Permian Basin to
Central Texas. The proposed merger would therefore have resulted in highly concentrated markets
and would have allowed El Paso to raise prices unilaterally. To remedy the effects of the proposed
merger, the parties were required to divest all of El Paso’s interest in the Oasis Pine Line Company,
all of PG&E’s share in the “Teco Pipeline” and all of PG&E’s pipeline assets in Matagorda.
In Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc./Jitney Jungle Stores of America, Inc.,52 the complaint alleged
that the proposed acquisition by Winn-Dixie of Jitney-Jungle would lessen supermarket competition
in Florida and Mississippi, resulting in higher prices and reduced services for consumers. According
to the complaint each of the post-merger markets would be highly concentrated, with the two firms
controlling market shares between 34 and 100 percent in the relevant geographic area. Under the
order, Winn-Dixie was allowed to acquire 68 supermarkets and other assets as opposed to the
originally proposed 72 supermarkets from the bankrupt Jitney-Jungle.
In El Paso Energy Corp./The Coastal Corp.,53 the complaint alleged that the $16 billion
proposed merger of El Paso and Coastal would lessen competition in the transportation of natural
gas via pipeline and in the provision of tailored services, which allow users of natural gas to balance
their changes in natural gas demand with their supply of natural gas and transportation. According to
the complaint, the proposed merger would have eliminated actual and direct competition between the
51
El Paso Energy Corp./PG&E Gas Transmission Teco, Inc. and PG&E Gas Transmission Texas Corp.,
Docket No. C-3997 (issued January 30, 2001).
52
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc./Jitney Jungle Stores of America, Inc., Docket No. C-4001 (issued February 16,
53
El Paso Energy Corp./The Coastal Corp., Docket No. C-3996 (issued March 23, 2001).
2001).
24
two companies in the following markets: 1) Central Florida; 2) the metropolitan areas of Buffalo,
Rochester, Syracuse and Albany, New York; 3) the metropolitan area of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 4)
the metropolitan area of Evansville, Indiana; and 5) 13 areas in the Gulf of Mexico. The market for
natural gas and natural gas transportation in these areas is highly concentrated and the proposed
transaction would have substantially increased that concentration. In some instances, El Paso and
Coastal were the only two options available to customers, and in other instances, they represented
two of three options. The proposed merger not only would have eliminated existing competition
between El Paso and Coastal, but also would have threatened to forestall potential new competition
as well as lead to increased transportation prices and a decrease in overall output, thereby increasing
the cost of electricity and natural gas. Under the terms of the order, El Paso and Coastal were
required to divest their interests in 11 natural gas pipelines systems totaling more than 2,500 miles of
pipe.
In Koch Indus., Inc./Entergy Corp./Entergy-Koch, L.P. (“EKLP”),54 the complaint
alleged that the proposed acquisition by EKLP, a limited partnership owned equally by Entergy and
Koch, of a 50 percent interest in the Gulf South Pipeline Company, L.P. (“Gulf South”), a major
natural gas pipeline serving Entergy’s regulated utilities in Louisiana and Mississippi, from Koch
would lessen competition in two markets: 1) the sale of electricity to consumers in areas of Louisiana
and Mississippi where Entergy subsidiaries are the regulated electric utilities; and 2) the distribution of
natural gas to consumers in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, where Entergy subsidiaries are the
regulated natural gas distribution utilities. According to the complaint, after the proposed acquisition,
Entergy would have benefited from paying Gulf South an inflated price for gas supplies because it
would have retained half of the profit and, if undetected, passed the increased costs to ratepayers.
Entergy’s added incentive to accept inflated costs would have made it more difficult for regulators to
review and challenge an imprudent purchase of natural gas transportation by Entergy. Under the
order, Entergy was required to implement an open, transparent process to buy natural gas and
natural gas transportation that will assist state regulators in determining whether Entergy purchased
gas supplies from EKLP at inflated prices.
In The Dow Chemical Co./Union Carbide Corp.,55 the complaint alleged that the
proposed merger would lessen competition in the worldwide markets for linear low density
polyethylene (“LLDPE”) and related technology, ethyleneamines, ethanolamines, and branded
methyldiethanolamine (“MDEA”) in the United States. According to the complaint, Dow and
Carbide are the leading producers of LLDPE, a key ingredient in premium plastic products such as
trash bags, stretch film and sealable food pouches, throughout the world and are among the few
LLDPE producers that have succeeded in developing specialty, high-performance polymers
54
Koch Indus., Inc./Entergy Corp., Docket No.C-3998 (issued January 31, 2001)
55
The Dow Chem. Co./Union Carbide Corp., Docket No. C-3999 (issued March 16, 2001).
25
demanded by significant users of LLDPE. The companies are also the leading developers of
polyethylene reactor process technology, of which Carbide’s reactor technology, Unipol, is the
world’s most widely licensed polyethylene process technology. Carbide and Dow are the only
producers of ethyleneamines and are the largest and third largest producers, respectively, of
ethanolamines in the United States and Canada. These chemicals are used in a broad variety of
applications, including lubricating oil additives, chelating agents, wet-strength resins, surfactants,
personal care products, pulp and paper products, fungicides, herbicides, oil and gas refining
applications, pharmaceuticals and fabric softeners. Dow and Carbide are the two largest sellers of
MDEA-based gas treating products in the United States and Canada, and as a result of the
proposed merger, the combined company would have had 60 percent of the relevant market. Under
the order, Dow was required to divest and license intellectual property that is critical to the
production of LLDPE to BP Amoco plc, its former partner in developing the technology. Dow was
also required to divest its ethyleneamines, ethanolamines and MDEA-based gas treating products
businesses.
In DTE Energy Co./MCN Energy Group, Inc.,56 the complaint alleged that the proposed
$4.6 billion merger of DTE and MCN would lessen competition in the local distribution of electricity
and the local distribution of natural gas in the Overlap Area, consisting of the city of Detroit and all or
parts of Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, Washtenaw, and Wayne Counties in Michigan. According to
the complaint, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company (“MichCon”), a subsidiary of MCN, is the only
distributor of natural gas within the Overlap Area. Similarly, except for the cities of Detroit and
Wyandotte, which operate their own municipal electric utilities, the Detroit Edison Company
(“Edison”), a subsidiary of DTE, is the only distributor of electricity in the Overlap Area. Entry into
the distribution of electricity and the distribution of natural gas within the Overlap Area is effectively
blocked by regulatory constraints, and would not be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent
anticompetitive effects that would have resulted from the proposed merger. Under the terms of the
order, DTE/MCN was required to divest certain assets to Exelon Company, one of the largest
suppliers of electricity and natural gas in the nation.
In Siemens AG/Atecs Mannesmann/Vodafone Group PLC,57 the complaint alleged that
the proposed $9 billion acquisition by Siemens of Atecs from Vodafone would lessen competition in
the research, development, manufacture, integration, sale and service of postal automation systems.
According to the complaint, Siemens and Vodafone, through its Atecs Dematic subsidiary, are the
two leading suppliers of postal automation systems in the world and the proposed acquisition would
have allowed Siemens, the largest supplier of these systems, to purchase its closest competitor.
Under the order, Siemens and Vodafone were required to divest Vodafone’s Mannesmann Dematic
56
DTE Energy Co./MCN Energy Group, Inc., Docket No. C-4008 (issued May 18, 2001.
57
Siemens AG/Atecs Mannesmann, Docket No. C-4011 (issued May 18, 2001).
26
postal automation business to Northrop Grunman Corporation.
In Lafarge S.A/Blue Circle Indus. PLC,58 the complaint alleged that the proposed merger
of Lafarge and Blue Circle would lessen competition in the manufacturing, marketing and selling of
cement and lime in the United States. According to the complaint, the markets for cement in the
Great Lakes Region and Syracuse Region, as well as the market for lime in the Southeast Region,
are highly concentrated, and the proposed merger would have substantially increased this
concentration. Under the order, the companies were required to divest Blue Circle’s cement
business serving the Great Lakes Region and the Syracuse, New York area, and Blue Circle’s lime
business in the southeast United States.
In Chevron Corp./Texaco Inc.,59 the complaint alleged that the proposed $45 billion
merger of Chevron and Texaco would lessen competition in each of the following markets: 1)
gasoline marketing in the western United States, the southern United States, Alaska, Hawaii and
several smaller localities; 2) the marketing of California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) gasoline in
California; 3) the refining and bulk supply of CARB gasoline for sale in California; 4) the refining and
bulk supply of gasoline and jet fuel in the Pacific Northwest; 5) the bulk supply of Phase II
Reformulated Gasoline (“RFG II”) in metropolitan St. Louis, Missouri; 6) the terminaling of gasoline
and other light petroleum products in Arizona, California, Mississippi, Texas, and Hawaii; 7) the
pipeline transportation of crude oil from California’s San Joaquin Valley; 8) the pipeline
transportation of crude oil to shore from portions of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico; 9) the pipeline
transportation of offshore natural gas to shore from locations in the Central Gulf of Mexico; 10) the
fractionation of raw mix into natural gas liquids products at Mont Belvieu, Texas; and 11) the
marketing and distribution of aviation fuel to customers in the western and southeastern United
States. According to the complaint, Chevron and Texaco are two of the world’s largest integrated
oil companies and if the proposed merger were allowed to proceed either unilateral behavior by the
combined Chevron/Texaco, or coordinated behavior among Chevron/Texaco and other remaining
competitors, would have lead to higher consumer prices in the relevant markets. Under the terms of
the order, the combined company was required to divest all of Texaco’s interests in two joint
ventures, Equilon Enterprises, LLC, which is owned by Texaco and Shell Oil Company, and Motiva
Enterprises, LLC, which is owned by Shell, Texaco, and Saudi Refining, Inc. Texaco also was
required to divest its interest in the Discovery natural gas pipeline system in the Gulf of Mexico, its
interests in the Enterprise fractionating plant in Mont Belvieu, Texas, and its general aviation
businesses in fourteen states.
58
Lafarge S.A./Blue Circle Indus. PLC, Docket No. C-4014 (issued August 10, 2001).
59
Chevron Corp./Texaco Inc., Docket No. C-4023 (September 7, 2001).
27
In Metso Oyi/Svedala Industri AB,60 the complaint alleged that the proposed $1.6 billion
acquisition by Metso of Svedala would lessen competition globally in the research, development,
manufacture, and sale of four separate rock processing equipment markets: cone crushers, jaw
crushers, primary gyratory crushers and grinding mills. According to the complaint, Metso and
Svedala are the two largest suppliers of rock processing equipment in the world. Under the order,
Metso was required to divest its global primary gyratory crusher and grinding mill businesses and
Svedala was required to divest its global jaw crusher and cone crusher businesses.
ONGOING REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM
The Commission continually reviews the impact of the premerger notification program on the
business community and antitrust enforcement. Although a complete assessment is not possible in
this limited report, a few observations can be made.
As indicated in past annual reports, the HSR program ensures that virtually all significant
mergers or acquisitions that affect American consumers in the United States will be reviewed by the
antitrust agencies prior to consummation. The agencies generally have the opportunity to challenge
unlawful transactions before they occur, thus avoiding the problem of constructing effective postacquisition relief. As a result, the HSR Act is doing what Congress intended, giving the government
the opportunity to investigate and challenge mergers that are likely to harm consumers before injury
can arise. Prior to the premerger notification program, businesses could, and frequently did,
consummate transactions that raised significant antitrust concerns before the antitrust agencies had the
opportunity to adequately consider their competitive effects. The enforcement agencies were forced
to pursue lengthy post-acquisition litigation, during the course of which harm from the consummated
transaction continued (and afterwards as well, where achievement of effective post-acquisition relief
was not practicable). Because the premerger notification program requires reporting before
consummation, this problem has been significantly reduced.
Although highly effective, the HSR program historically prompted expressions of concern
from the business and legal communities that the program may be overreaching, that the reporting
thresholds (which had not been adjusted since enactment of the HSR Act in 1976) may be too low,
and that the process may cause delay. The enactment and the implementation of HSR Reform
legislation during fiscal year 2001 has significantly lessened the burden on business by increasing the
reporting thresholds substantially.
In addition, the enforcement agencies continue to seek ways to speed up the review process
and reduce burdens for companies. This year, the agencies continued to implement new procedures
and initiatives to improve the handling of second requests. The agencies are continuing their ongoing
60
Metso Oyi/Svedala Industri AB, Docket No. C-4024 (issued October 23, 2001).
28
review of the HSR program in order to make it as minimally burdensome as possible without
compromising the agencies’ ability to investigate and interdict proposed transactions that may
substantially lessen competition.
29
List of Appendices
Appendix A -
Summary of Transactions, Fiscal Years 1992 - 2001
Appendix B -
Number of Transactions Reported and Filings Received by Month for
Fiscal Years 1992 - 2001.
List of Exhibits
Exhibit A -
Statistical Tables for Fiscal Year 2001, Presenting Data Profiling HartScott-Rodino Premerger Notification Filings and Enforcement Interest
Appendix A
Summary of Transactions
Fiscal Years 1992 - 2001
Appendix A
Summary of Transaction by Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
1,589
3,030
1,846
3,559
2,305
4,403
2,816
5,439
3,087
6,001
3,702
7,199
4,728
9,264
4,642
4,926
9,151
9,941
2,376
4,800
Adjusted Transactions In
Which A Second Request
Could Have Been Issued2
1,451
1,745
2,128
2,612
2,864
3,438
4,575
4,340
4,749
2,237
Investigations in Which
Second Requests Were Issued
44
71
73
101
99
122
125
111
98
70
FTC3
26
40
46
58
36
45
46
45
43
27
1.8%
2.3%
2.2%
2.2%
1.3%
1.3%
1.0%
1.0%
0.9%
1.2%
18
31
27
43
63
77
79
68
55
43
1.2%
1.8%
1.3%
1.6%
2.2%
2.2%
1.7%
1.6%
1.2%
1.9%
1,403
1,689
2,081
2,471
2,861
3,363
4,323
4,110
4,324
2,063
1,020
1,201
1,508
1,869
2,044
2,513
3,234
3,103
3,515
1,603
383
448
573
602
817
850
1,089
1,007
809
460
Transactions Reported
Filings Received
Percent
4
Percent
4
1
3
DOJ
Transactions Involving a Request
For Early Termination5
Granted5
Not Granted
5
1 Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person when a transaction is reported. Only one application is received when an acquiring
party files for an exemption under sections 7A(c)(6) or (c)(8) of the Clayton Act.
2 These figures omit from the total number of transactions reported all transactions for which the agencies were not authorized to request additional information. These include (1)
incomplete transactions (only one party filed a complete notification); (2) transactions reported pursuant to the exemption provisions of sections 7A(c) (6) and 7A(c)(8) of the Act; and
(3) transactions which were found to be non-reportable. In addition, where a party filed more than one notification in the same year to acquire voting securities of the same corporation,
e.g., filing for one threshold and later filing for the 25 % threshold, only a single consolidated transaction has been counted because, a practical matter, the agencies do not issue more
than one Second Request in such a case. These statistics also omit from the total number of transactions reported secondary acquisitions filed pursuant to 801.4 of the premerger
notification rules. Secondary acquisitions have been deducted in order to be consistent with the statistics presented in most of the prior annual reports.
3 These statistics are based on the date the request was issued and not the date the investigation was opened.
4 Second Requests investigations are a percentage of the total number of adjusted transactions.
5 These statistics are based on the date of the H-S-R filing and not the date action was taken on request.
Appendix B
Number of Transactions Reported
And
Filings Received by Month
for
Fiscal Years 1992 – 2001
Appendix B
Table 1. Number of Transactions Reported by Months for the Fiscal Years 1992 - 2001
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
TOTAL
1992
140
180
155
97
87
135
129
142
116
154
124
130
1,589
1993
163
184
160
100
110
149
131
155
151
172
204
167
1,846
1994
184
221
222
156
149
167
167
220
182
208
226
203
2,305
1995
273
309
216
180
170
229
177
281
252
225
237
267
2,816
1996
238
273
249
238
231
277
252
304
253
265
264
243
3,087
1997
296
332
267
263
250
315
302
328
319
389
318
323
3,702
1998
424
387
426
306
336
392
384
401
442
435
427
368
4,728
1999
333
359
394
282
330
427
364
438
445
444
434
392
4,642
2000
376
428
468
335
440
455
343
398
494
351
446
392
4,926
2001
360
451
345
245
66
120
94
153
190
94
163
95
2,376
Appendix B
Table 2. Number of Filings Received1 by Month for Fiscal Years 1992 - 2001
October
November
December
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
TOTAL
1
1992
253
326
316
194
165
255
244
268
233
286
227
263
3,030
1993
297
341
325
188
239
263
251
301
311
327
393
323
3,559
1994
332
428
427
293
295
326
321
421
362
380
431
387
4,403
1995
505
614
419
360
326
432
350
534
496
439
455
509
5,439
1996
450
520
474
445
480
528
498
584
502
515
515
490
6,001
1997
561
636
521
514
483
614
599
640
620
759
617
635
7,199
1998
818
749
836
614
650
766
763
787
862
851
844
724
9,264
1999
662
686
785
548
658
828
719
851
884
887
885
758
9,151
2000
777
839
922
677
867
959
695
859
1,004
718
886
738
9,941
2001
751
920
686
499
144
243
188
296
378
182
332
181
4,800
Usually, two filings are received, one from the acquiring person and one from the acquired person when the transaction is reported, unless notification for a joint venture where more
than one acquiring person is required to submit a filing. Only one filing is received when an acquiring person files for a transaction that is exempt under Sections 7(A)(c)(6) and (c)(8) of
the Clayton Act.
Exhibit A
Statistical Tables
for
Fiscal Year 2001
Data Profiling Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger
Notification Filings and Enforcement Interest
TABLE I
FISCAL YEAR 20011
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION (BY SIZE RANGE)2
TRANSACTION RANGE HSR TRANSACTIONS
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER4 PERCENT5
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENT6
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
NUMBER
PERCENT
Less Than 15
15 UP to 25
25 UP to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
29
223
270
607
257
135
170
193
157
196
1.3%
10.0%
12.1%
27.1%
11.5%
6.0%
7.6%
8.6%
7.0%
8.8%
FTC
1
4
15
32
13
9
15
12
14
16
DOJ
0
4
2
19
8
10
13
13
16
38
FTC
3.4%
1.8%
5.6%
5.3%
5.1%
6.7%
8.8%
6.2%
8.9%
8.2%
DOJ
0.0%
1.8%
0.7%
3.1%
3.1%
7.4%
7.6%
6.7%
10.2%
19.4%
TOTAL
3.4%
3.6%
6.3%
8.4%
8.2%
14.1%
16.4%
12.9%
19.1%
27.6%
FTC
0
1
1
5
2
2
5
2
2
7
DOJ
0
0
0
3
3
5
4
5
6
17
FTC
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
0.8%
0.8%
1.5%
2.9%
1.0%
1.3%
3.6%
DOJ
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%
1.2%
3.7%
2.4%
2.6%
3.8%
8.7%
TOTAL
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
1.3%
2.0%
5.2%
5.3%
3.6%
5.1%
12.3%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
100.0%
131
123
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
27
43
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
TABLE II
FISCAL YEAR 20011
ACQUISITIONS BY SIZE OF TRANSACTION2 (CUMULATIVE)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
NUMBER
LESS THAN 15
LESS THAN 25
LESS THAN 50
LESS THAN 100
LESS THAN 150
LESS THAN 200
LESS THAN 300
LESS THAN 500
LESS THAN 1000
29
252
522
1,129
1,386
1,521
1,691
1,884
2,041
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
4
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
5
PERCENT
1.3%
11.3%
23.3%
50.5%
62.0%
68.0%
75.6%
84.2%
91.2%
NUMBER
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES GRANTED
NUMBER
PERCENT
FTC
1
4
20
52
65
74
89
101
115
DOJ
0
4
6
25
33
43
56
69
85
FTC
0.3%
1.2%
5.9%
15.3%
19.2%
21.8%
26.3%
29.8%
33.9%
DOJ
0.0%
1.2%
1.8%
7.4%
9.7%
12.7%
16.5%
20.4%
25.1%
TOTAL
0.3%
2.4%
7.7%
22.7%
28.9%
34.5%
42.8%
50.1%
59.0%
FTC
0
1
2
7
9
11
16
18
20
DOJ
0
0
0
3
6
11
15
20
26
FTC
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
7.1%
9.2%
11.2%
16.3%
18.4%
20.4%
DOJ
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
3.1%
6.1%
11.2%
15.3%
20.4%
26.5%
TOTAL
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
10.2%
15.3%
22.4%
31.6%
38.8%
46.9%
131
123
51.6%
48.4%
100.0%
27
43
38.6%
61.4%
100.0%
TABLE III
FISCAL YEAR 20011
TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING THE GRANTING OF CLEARANCE BY AGENCY
CLEARANCE GRANTED AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO
AGENCY
TOTAL NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS
TOTAL NUMBER
OF CLEARANCES
PER AGENCY
TOTAL NUMBER OF
CLEARANCES GRANTED
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
FTC
1
4
15
32
13
9
15
12
14
16
DOJ
0
4
2
19
8
10
13
13
16
38
TOTAL
1
8
17
51
21
19
28
25
30
54
FTC
0.1%
0.2%
0.7%
1.4%
0.6%
0.4%
0.7%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
DOJ
0.0%
0.4%
0.8%
2.3%
0.9%
0.8%
1.3%
1.1%
1.3%
2.4%
TOTAL
0.1%
0.6%
1.5%
3.7%
1.5%
1.3%
1.9%
1.7%
2.0%
3.1%
FTC
0.8%
3.1%
11.5%
24.4%
9.9%
6.9%
11.5%
9.2%
10.7%
12.2%
DOJ
0.0%
3.3%
1.6%
15.4%
6.5%
8.1%
10.6%
10.6%
13.0%
30.9%
FTC
0.4%
1.6%
5.9%
12.6%
5.1%
3.5%
5.9%
4.7%
5.5%
6.3%
DOJ
0.0%
1.6%
0.8%
7.5%
3.1%
3.9%
5.1%
5.1%
6.3%
15.0%
TOTAL
0.4%
3.2%
6.7%
20.1%
8.2%
7.4%
11.0%
9.8%
11.8%
21.3%
ALL CLEARANCES
131
123
254
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
100.0%
100.0%
51.6%
48.4%
100.0%
TABLE IV
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INVESTIGATIONS IN WHICH SECOND REQUESTS WERE ISSUED
SECOND REQUESTS ISSUED AS A PERCENTAGE OF:
TRANSACTION RANGE
($MILLIONS)
INVESTIGATIONS IN WHICH
SECOND REQUEST
WERE ISSUED3
TOTAL NUMBER OF
TRANSACTIONS
TRANSACTIONS IN
EACH TRANSACTION
RANGE GROUP
TOTAL NUMBER OF
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
0
1
1
5
2
2
5
2
2
7
0
0
0
3
3
5
4
5
6
17
0
1
1
8
5
7
9
7
8
24
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.1%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.3%
0.4%
1.1%
0.0%
0.4%
0.2%
3.9%
0.1%
0.1%
7.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2.4%
0.2%
7.1%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.8%
0.0%
0.4%
0.2%
6.3%
0.4%
7.3%
7.4%
0.4%
0.4%
1.2%
0.0%
1.4%
1.4%
7.1%
2.9%
2.9%
7.1%
2.9%
2.9%
10.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
4.3%
4.3%
7.1%
5.7%
7.1%
8.6%
24.3%
0.0%
1.4%
1.4%
11.4%
7.2%
10.0%
12.8%
10.0%
11.5%
34.3%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
27
43
70
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
38.6%
61.4%
100.0%
TABLE V
FISCAL YEAR 20011
ACQUISITIONS BY REPORTING THRESHOLD
NUMBER
PERCENT
$15 MILLION
15%
25%
50%
ASSETS ONLY
32
178
111
470
526
1.4%
8.0%
5.0%
21.0%
23.5%
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
PERCENTAGE OF
NUMBER
THRESHOLD GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
7
7
21.9%
21.9%
43.8%
29
18
16.3%
10.1%
26.4%
2
4
1.8%
3.6%
5.4%
26
24
5.5%
5.1%
10.6%
27
15
5.1%
2.9%
8.0%
$50M
$100M
$500M
25%
50%
ASSETS ONLY
84
77
21
3
410
325
3.8%
3.4%
0.9%
0.1%
18.3%
14.5%
2
5
2
0
10
21
4
1
3
0
25
22
2.4%
6.5%
9.5%
0.0%
2.4%
6.5%
4.8%
1.3%
14.3%
0.0%
6.1%
6.8%
7.2%
7.8%
23.8%
0.0%
8.5%
13.3%
3
3
1
0
6
3
2
0
1
0
12
7
3.6%
3.9%
4.8%
0.0%
1.5%
0.9%
2.4%
0.0%
4.8%
0.0%
2.9%
2.2%
6.0%
3.9%
9.6%
0.0%
4.4%
3.1%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
100.0%
131
123
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
27
43
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
THRESHOLD7
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS
PERCENTAGE OF
NUMBER
THRESHOLD GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
1
2
3.1%
6.3%
9.4%
4
7
2.2%
3.9%
6.1%
0
1
0.0%
0.9%
0.9%
2
6
0.4%
1.3%
1.7%
4
5
0.8%
1.0%
1.8%
TABLE VI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
TRANSACTIONS BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRING PERSON
HSR TRANSACTIONS
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
ASSET RANGE
($ MILLIONS)
NUMBER
PERCENT
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
98
24
44
79
101
45
88
168
222
1368
4.4%
1.1%
2.0%
3.5%
4.5%
2.0%
3.9%
7.5%
9.9%
61.2%
FTC
2
1
3
3
3
2
4
8
19
86
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
100.0%
131
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS
DOJ
1
0
4
1
1
3
3
9
10
91
PERCENTAGE OF
ASSET RANGE GROUP
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
2.0%
1.0%
3.0%
4.2%
0.0%
4.2%
6.8%
9.1%
15.9%
3.8%
1.3%
5.1%
3.0%
1.0%
4.0%
4.4%
6.7%
11.1%
4.5%
3.4%
7.9%
4.8%
5.4%
10.2%
8.6%
4.5%
13.1%
6.3%
6.7%
13.0%
FTC
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
4
0
21
DOJ
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
4
33
PERCENTAGE OF
ASSET RANGE GROUP
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
1.0%
1.0%
2.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
2.2%
1.1%
2.3%
3.4%
2.4%
1.2%
3.6%
0.0%
1.8%
1.8%
1.5%
2.4%
3.9%
123
5.9%
27
43
1.2%
NUMBER
5.5%
11.4%
NUMBER
1.9%
3.1%
TABLE VII
FISCAL YEAR 20011
TRANSACTIONS BY SALES OF ACQUIRING PERSON
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
SALES RANGE
($ MILLIONS)
HSR TRANSACTIONS
NUMBER
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS 3
PERCENTAGE OF
SALES RANGE GROUP
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
PERCENTAGE OF
SALES RANGE GROUP
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
NUMBER
FTC
DOJ
9.7%
1.6%
3.1%
4.0%
3.7%
2.4%
4.8%
6.1%
9.0%
55.7%
4
2
3
3
7
2
1
9
12
88
5
0
4
5
2
1
5
4
13
84
1.9%
5.6%
4.3%
3.4%
8.5%
3.7%
0.9%
6.6%
6.0%
7.1%
2.3%
0.0%
5.7%
5.6%
2.4%
1.9%
4.7%
2.9%
6.5%
6.7%
4.2%
5.6%
10.0%
9.0%
10.9%
5.6%
5.6%
9.5%
12.5%
13.8%
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
3
0
20
3
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
3
33
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
1.1%
3.7%
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
0.0%
1.6%
1.4%
0.0%
1.4%
1.1%
1.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.7%
1.5%
2.7%
1.4%
0.0%
1.4%
2.2%
4.9%
0.0%
0.0%
2.9%
1.5%
4.3%
100.0%
131
123
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
27
43
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
NUMBER
PERCENT
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
216
36
70
89
82
54
107
137
201
1245
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
TABLE VIII
FISCAL YEAR 2001
TRANSACTIONS BY ASSETS OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES 8
HSR TRANSACTIONS
ASSET RANGE
($ MILLIONS)
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
NUMBER
PERCENT
PERCENTAGE OF
ASSET RANGE GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS
NUMBER
PERCENTAGE OF
ASSET RANGE GROUP
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
ASSETS
UNAVAILABLE9
342
209
274
355
145
96
107
130
120
309
15.3%
9.3%
12.2%
15.9%
6.5%
4.3%
4.8%
5.8%
5.4%
13.8%
27
9
9
21
8
7
10
14
8
16
27
5
4
9
5
8
9
12
7
37
7.9%
4.3%
3.3%
5.9%
5.5%
7.3%
9.3%
10.8%
6.7%
5.2%
7.9%
2.4%
1.5%
2.5%
3.4%
8.3%
8.4%
9.2%
5.8%
12.0%
15.8%
6.7%
4.8%
8.4%
8.9%
15.6%
17.7%
20.0%
12.5%
17.2%
7
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
1
5
12
0
2
2
2
1
2
3
3
16
2.0%
0.5%
0.7%
0.6%
0.7%
3.1%
0.9%
1.5%
0.8%
1.6%
3.5%
0.0%
0.7%
0.6%
1.4%
1.0%
1.9%
2.3%
2.5%
5.2%
5.5%
0.5%
1.4%
1.2%
2.1%
4.1%
2.8%
3.8%
3.3%
6.8%
150
6.7%
2
0
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%
2
0
1.3%
0.0%
1.3%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
100.0%
131
123
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
27
43
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
TABLE IX
FISCAL YEAR 2001
TRANSACTIONS BY SALES OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES 10
HSR TRANSACTIONS
SALES RANGE
($ MILLIONS)
CLEARANCE GRANTED TO FTC OR DOJ
NUMBER
PERCENTAGE OF
SALES RANGE GROUP
SECOND REQUEST INVESTIGATIONS
NUMBER
PERCENTAGE OF
SALES RANGE GROUP
NUMBER
PERCENT
LESS THAN 15
15 UP to 25
25 to 50
50 UP to 100
100 UP to 150
150 UP to 200
200 UP to 300
300 UP to 500
500 UP to 1000
1000 AND UP
SALES NOT
AVAILABLE11
398
149
326
337
170
119
153
147
160
243
17.7%
6.7%
14.6%
15.1%
7.6%
5.3%
6.8%
6.6%
7.2%
10.9%
FTC
8
9
16
22
8
10
14
8
10
26
DOJ
8
2
3
13
12
9
8
6
21
39
FTC
2.0%
6.0%
4.9%
6.5%
4.7%
8.4%
9.2%
5.4%
6.3%
10.7%
DOJ
2.0%
1.3%
0.9%
3.9%
7.1%
7.6%
5.2%
4.1%
13.1%
16.0%
TOTAL
4.0%
7.3%
5.8%
10.4%
11.8%
16.0%
14.4%
9.5%
19.4%
26.7%
FTC
6
0
3
5
0
2
3
1
2
5
DOJ
8
0
1
1
4
2
4
3
7
13
FTC
1.5%
0.0%
0.9%
1.5%
0.0%
1.7%
2.0%
0.7%
1.3%
2.1%
DOJ
2.0%
0.0%
0.3%
0.3%
2.4%
1.7%
2.6%
2.0%
4.4%
5.3%
TOTAL
3.5%
0.0%
1.2%
1.8%
2.4%
3.4%
4.6%
2.7%
5.7%
7.4%
35
1.6%
0
2
0.0%
5.7%
5.7%
0
0
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
ALL TRANSACTIONS
2,237
100.0%
131
123
5.9%
5.5%
11.4%
27
43
1.2%
1.9%
3.1%
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
111
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
FTC
08
113
Agricultural Production - Crops
Agricultural Production - Livestock
and Animal Specialties
Forestry
09
114
10
12
01
112
CLEARANCE
PERCENT
OF
CHANGE
FROM
GRANTED
TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER4
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
0
0.0%
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.2%
5
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping
0
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
212
Metal Mining
Coal Mining
3
0.1%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
211
Oil and Gas Extraction
1
1
2
0
1
1
454
Heating Oil Dealers and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
23
1.0%
0.2%
14
212
Mining and Quarrying of
Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels
3
0.1%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
233
Building Construction – General
Contractors and Operative Builders
6
0.3%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
234
13
0.6%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
235
11
0.5%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
311
Heavy Construction Other Than
Building Construction - Contractors
Construction - Special Grade
Contractors
Food and Kindred Products
65
2.9%
0.9%
3
9
12
3
5
8
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
21
312
22
313
23
315
24
113
25
337
322
453
26
27
511
28
325
29
324
30
326
31
316
32
327
33
324
34
332
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
CLEARANCE
PERCENT
OF
CHANGE
FROM
GRANTED
TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER4
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
FTC
Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and
Carbonated Drinks; and Cigarette
Manufacturing
Textile Mill Products
Apparel and Other Finished
Products Made From Fabrics and
Similar Materials
Lumber and Wood Products, Except
Furniture
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Stationery and Office Supplies
Printing, Publishing and Allied
Industries
Chemicals and Allied Products
Petroleum Refining and Related
Industries
Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products
Leather and Leather Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and Concrete
Products
Primary Metal Industries
Fabricated Metal Products, Except
Machinery and Transportation
Equipment
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
2
0.1%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0.3%
-0.4%
2
0
2
0
0
0
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0.1%
-0.1%
0
1
1
0
1
1
8
0.4%
-0.1%
15
0.7%
0.5%
1
1
0
0
3
0
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
54
2.4%
0.6%
1
2
3
1
1
2
109
4.9%
1.3%
23
5
28
5
1
6
7
0.3%
NC
2
0
2
2
0
2
23
1.0%
-0.4%
4
0
4
0
0
0
4
0.2%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0.4%
-0.4%
3
0
3
2
0
2
13
0.6%
-0.5%
0
1
1
1
0
1
31
1.4%
0.3%
5
1
6
0
0
0
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
35
333
36
335
37
336
38
334
39
339
40
482
41
485
42
484
44
483
45
46
47
48
481
486
561
513
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
CLEARANCE
PERCENT OF CHANGE FROM GRANTED TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
4
FTC
Industrial and Commercial
Machinery and Computer Equipment
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
70
3.1%
0.3%
7
9
16
0
2
2
118
5.3%
1.0%
2
12
14
0
2
2
45
2.0%
0.6%
4
5
9
0
2
2
96
4.3%
2.7%
18
12
30
3
2
5
11
0.5%
NC
3
0
3
1
0
1
0
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0.6%
-0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
Water Transportation
14
0.6%
0.1%
1
0
1
0
2
2
Transportation by Air
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas
Transportation Services
Communications
8
67
22
149
0.4%
3.0%
1.0%
6.7%
NC
2.8%
0.2%
-2.7%
0
14
1
1
4
9
0
6
4
23
1
7
0
0
0
1
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
3
Electronic and Other Electrical
Equipment and Components, Except
Computer Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Measuring, Analyzing and
Controlling Instruments;
Photographic, Medical and Optical
Goods; Watches and Clocks
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries
Railroad Transportation
Local and Suburban Transit and
Interurban Highway Passenger
Transportation
Motor Freight Transportation and
Warehousing
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
49
221
50
421
51
422
52
444
53
54
452
447
55
441
56
448
57
337
58
59
60
722
446
521
61
522
62
523
63
524
64
525
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
CLEARANCE
PERCENT OF CHANGE FROM GRANTED TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
4
FTC
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
11
0.5%
-2.8%
0
1
1
0
1
1
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable
Goods
89
4.0%
-0.5%
2
1
3
0
0
0
74
3.3%
NC
2
1
3
0
0
0
7
0.3%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
15
0.3%
0.7%
0.1%
0.2%
0
7
0
0
0
7
0
2
0
0
0
2
29
1.3%
0.3%
1
0
1
1
0
1
3
0.1%
-0.2%
1
0
1
0
0
0
9
0.4%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
15
34
0.7%
0.7%
1.5%
-0.2%
-0.8%
-0.4%
0
1
0
1
0
3
1
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
34
1.5%
0.3%
0
0
0
0
0
0
74
3.3%
0.8%
1
1
2
1
1
2
44
2.0%
0.2%
1
2
3
0
1
1
15
0.7%
NC
0
1
1
0
1
1
Building Materials, Hardware,
Garden Supply, and Mobile Home
Dealers
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline
Service Stations
Apparel and Accessory Stores
Home Furniture, Furnishings and
Equipment Stores
Eating and Drinking Places
Miscellaneous Retail
Depository Institutions
Nondepository Credit Institutions
Security and Commodity Brokers,
Dealers, Exchanges and Services
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents, Brokers and
Service
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
65
711
67
551
70
721
72
73
812
541
75
532
76
443
78
512
79
713
80
621
622
81
82
83
86
541
611
624
813
87
541
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
CLEARANCE
PERCENT OF CHANGE FROM GRANTED TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
4
FTC
Real Estate
Holding and Other Investment
Offices
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps,
and Other Lodg ing Places
Personal Services
Business Services
Automotive Repair, Services and
Parking
Miscellaneous Repair Services
Motion Pictures
Amusement and Recreation
Services
Health Services
General Medical and Surgical;
Psychiatric and Substance Abuse
Hospitals
Legal Services
Educational Services
Social Services
Membership Organizations
Engineering, Accounting, Research,
Management and Related Services
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
12
0.5%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
107
4.8%
3.5%
1
0
1
0
0
0
6
0.3%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
76
0.1%
3.4%
NC
-10.0%
0
6
0
10
0
16
0
1
0
3
0
4
10
0.4%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0.1%
NC
0
2
2
0
0
0
9
0.4%
-0.1%
0
1
1
0
0
0
79
3.5%
2.7%
1
0
1
1
0
1
14
0.6%
-1.8%
2
1
3
0
0
0
17
227
0
2
0.8%
10.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.8%
10.0%
NC
NC
1
5
0
0
1
9
0
0
2
14
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
3
0
0
2
3
0
0
55
2.5%
0.2%
1
1
2
1
1
2
TABLE X
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRING PERSONS
2-DIGIT
SIC
CODE12
3-DIGIT
NAICS
CODE 13
89
711
94
923
95
924
99
999
00
000
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
CLEARANCE
PERCENT OF CHANGE FROM GRANTED TO FTC OR SECOND REQUEST
NUMBER
TOTAL
FY 200014
DOJ
INVESTIGATIONS 3
4
FTC
DOJ TOTAL FTC DOJ TOTAL
Miscellaneous Services
Administration of Human Resource
Programs
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0.1%
0.1%
0
2
2
0
0
0
Administration of Environmental
Quality and Housing Programs
1
0.0%
NC
0
1
1
0
0
0
Nonclassificable Establishments
Not Available15
1
0.0%
NC
0
1
1
0
1
1
109
4.9%
0.4%
0
3
3
0
4
4
2,237
100.0%
131
123
254
27
43
70
ALL TRANSACTIONS
TABLE XI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
2-DIGIT 3-DIGIT
SIC
NAICS
12
CODE
CODE13
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION NUMBER4
PERCENT CHANGE CLEARANCE GRANTED
FROM FY
OF
TO FTC OR DOJ
14
TOTAL
2000
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS3
NUMBER OF 3 DIGIT
INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS13
(the data series for this column was
revised in April, 2008)
01
111
02
112
07
08
115
24
09
113
114
10
12
Agricultural Production Crops
Agricultural Production –
Livestock and Animal
Specialties
Agricultural Services
Forestry
Lumber and Wood Products,
Except Furniture
Fishing, Hunting & Trapping
Metal Mining
15
233
16
234
17
235
20
21
311
312
Coal Mining
Mining and Quarrying of
Nonmetallic Minerals, Except
Fuels
Building Construction General Contractors and
Operative Builders
Heavy Construction other than
Building Construction Contractors
Construction - Special Grade
Contractors
Food and Kindred Products
Tobacco Products
22
313
Textile Mill Products
212
14
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
0
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0.1%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
5
0.0%
0.2%
-0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
14
0.6%
NC
0
1
1
0
1
1
11
0
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
11
0.5%
0.3%
2
1
3
0
0
0
5
0.2%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
13
0.6%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
9
0.4%
0.7%
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
59
4
2.7%
0.2%
0.4%
0.1%
3
0
10
0
13
0
2
0
8
0
10
0
58
2
8
0.4%
0.1%
2
0
2
0
0
0
4
TABLE XI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
2-DIGIT 3-DIGIT
SIC
NAICS
12
CODE
CODE13
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION NUMBER4
PERCENT CHANGE CLEARANCE GRANTED
FROM FY
OF
TO FTC OR DOJ
14
TOTAL
2000
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS3
NUMBER OF 3 DIGIT
INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS13
(the data series for this column was
revised in April, 2008)
23
315
25
337
26
322
27
511
28
325
29
324
33
30
326
31
316
32
327
34
332
35
333
36
335
37
336
Apparel and Other Finished
Products Made from Fabrics
and Similar Materials
Furniture and Fixtures
Paper and Allied Products
Printing, Publishing and Allied
Industries
Chemicals and Allied Products
Petroleum Refining and
Related Industries
Primary Metal Industries
Rubber and Misc. Plastics
Products
Leather and Leather Products
Stone, Clay, Glass and
Concrete Products
Fabricated Metal Products,
Except Machinery and
Transportation Equipment
Industrial and Commercial
Machinery and Computer
Equipment
Electronic and Other Electrical
Equipment and Components,
Except Computer Equipment
Transportation Equipment
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
3
0.1%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0.1%
-0.3%
1
0
1
0
0
0
3
20
0.9%
-0.3%
1
4
5
0
1
1
19
62
2.8%
NC
1
3
4
0
1
1
50
96
4.3%
-0.1%
20
3
23
5
1
6
65
8
0.4%
-0.2%
2
0
2
1
0
1
5
42
1.9%
1.0%
5
1
6
0
0
0
31
29
1.3%
-0.3%
6
0
6
0
0
0
19
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0.4%
-0.6%
2
0
2
2
0
2
6
42
1.9%
NC
5
1
6
0
0
0
28
68
3.1%
-0.2%
7
9
16
0
2
2
43
108
4.9%
-0.1%
4
11
15
0
2
2
74
37
1.7%
-0.1%
3
5
8
0
2
2
29
TABLE XI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
2-DIGIT 3-DIGIT
SIC
NAICS
12
CODE
CODE13
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION NUMBER4
PERCENT CHANGE CLEARANCE GRANTED
FROM FY
OF
TO FTC OR DOJ
14
TOTAL
2000
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS3
NUMBER OF 3 DIGIT
INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS13
(the data series for this column was
revised in April, 2008)
Measuring, Analyzing and
Controlling Instruments;
Photographic, Medical and
Optical Goods; Watches and
Clocks
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Industries
Railroad Transportation
Local and Suburban Transit
and Interurban Highway
Passenger Transportation
Motor Freight Transportation
and Warehousing
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
97
4.4%
2.6%
21
12
33
5
2
7
71
13
0.6%
0.1%
2
0
2
1
0
1
4
3
0.1%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
0.5%
-0.2%
2
0
2
0
0
0
6
Water Transportation
15
0.7%
0.5%
1
0
1
0
0
0
11
481
486
561
513
Transportation by Air
Pipelines, Except Natural Gas
Transportation Services
Communications
7
8
22
170
0.3%
0.4%
1.0%
7.7%
0.1%
0.3%
0.3%
-2.7%
0
1
1
1
4
0
0
6
4
1
1
7
0
1
1
1
2
0
2
4
2
1
3
5
6
6
16
122
49
221
82
3.7%
0.7%
0
7
7
0
4
4
72
50
421
Electric, Gas and Sanitary
Goods
Wholesale Trade-Durable
Goods
97
4.4%
-0.3%
3
4
7
0
0
0
66
51
422
62
2.8%
-0.1%
5
2
7
1
0
1
56
52
444
1
0.0%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
53
54
452
447
4
14
0.2%
0.6%
-0.1%
-0.1%
0
8
0
0
0
8
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
11
38
334
39
339
40
482
41
485
42
484
44
483
45
46
47
48
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable
Goods
Building Materials, Hardware,
Garden Supply, and Mobile
Home Dealers
General Merchandise Stores
Food Stores
TABLE XI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
2-DIGIT 3-DIGIT
SIC
NAICS
12
CODE
CODE13
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION NUMBER4
PERCENT CHANGE CLEARANCE GRANTED
FROM FY
OF
TO FTC OR DOJ
14
TOTAL
2000
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS3
NUMBER OF 3 DIGIT
INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS13
(the data series for this column was
revised in April, 2008)
Automotive Dealers and
Gasoline Service Stations
Apparel and Accessory Stores
Home Furniture, Furnishings
and Equipment Stores
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
34
1.5%
-0.2%
1
0
1
1
0
1
27
4
0.2%
-0.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
11
0.5%
0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
Eating and Drinking Places
21
0.9%
0.2%
0
1
1
0
0
0
14
446
Miscellaneous Retail
18
0.8%
-1.1%
1
0
1
0
0
0
10
60
61
521
522
29
37
1.3%
1.7%
-0.7%
0.5%
0
0
3
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
14
62
523
Depository Institutions
Nondepository Credit
Security and Commondity
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges
Insurance Carriers
Insurance Agents, Brokers and
Service
Real Estate
Administration of Human
Resource Programs
Holding and Other Investment
Offices
Hotels, Rooming Houses,
Camps, and Other Lodging
73
3.3%
1.7%
0
3
3
0
2
2
56
51
2.3%
0.5%
2
2
4
0
1
1
37
22
1.0%
0.3%
0
2
2
0
1
1
22
5
0.2%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0.0%
NC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27
1.2%
0.6%
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
5
0.2%
-0.1%
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
2
285
28
26
0.1%
12.8%
1.3%
1.2%
NC
-3.2%
1.1%
1.1%
0
4
1
1
0
11
1
1
0
15
2
2
0
1
1
1
0
3
1
1
0
4
2
2
2
10
0.5%
0.2%
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
2
10
0.1%
0.5%
NC
NC
0
0
2
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
55
441
56
448
57
337
58
722
59
63
64
524
65
94
711
67
551
70
721
72
73
82
89
812
Personal Services
Business Services
541
75
532
76
78
443
512
Educational Services
Miscellaneous Services
Automotive Repair, Services
and Parking
Miscellaneous Repair Services
Motion Pictures
196
TABLE XI
FISCAL YEAR 20011
INDUSTRY GROUP OF ACQUIRED ENTITIES
2-DIGIT 3-DIGIT
SIC
NAICS
12
CODE
CODE13
INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION NUMBER4
PERCENT CHANGE CLEARANCE GRANTED
FROM FY
OF
TO FTC OR DOJ
14
TOTAL
2000
SECOND REQUEST
INVESTIGATIONS3
NUMBER OF 3 DIGIT
INTRA-INDUSTRY
TRANSACTIONS13
(the data series for this column was
revised in April, 2008)
79
713
80
83
86
621
611
624
87
813
99
00
923
924
Amusement and Recreation
Services
Health Services
Social Services
Membership Organizations
Research, Management and
Related Services
Nonclassificable Establishments
Not Available
ALL TRANSACTIONS
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
FTC
DOJ
TOTAL
14
0.6%
-0.3%
1
0
1
1
0
1
10
52
4
2
2.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
2
0
0
3
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
42
2
1
57
2.6%
-0.3%
4
0
4
0
0
0
25
1
120
2,219
0.0%
5.4%
100.00%
NC
-2.0%
--
0
3
130
0
6
120
0
9
250
0
0
27
0
0
42
0
0
69
0
9
1,450
1
Fiscal Year 2001 figures include transactions reported between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001.
The size of transaction is based on the aggregate total amount of voting securities and assets to be held by the acquiring person as a result of the transaction and is taken from the
response to Item 3(b)(ii) and 3(c) of the notification form.
3
These statistics are based on the date that the second request was issued.
4
During fiscal year 2001, 2376 transactions were reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification program. The smaller number 2,237 reflects adjustments to eliminate the
following types of transactions: (1) transactions reported under Section (c)(6) and Section (c)(8), (transactions involving certain regulated industries and financial businesses); (2)
transactions found to be non-reportable; (3) incomplete transactions (only one party in each transaction filed a compliant notification); and (4) transactions withdrawn before the waiting
period began. The table does not, however, exclude competing offers or multiple party transactions (transactions involving two or more acquiring persons).
5
Percentage of total transactions
6
Percentage of transaction range group.
7
Pursuant to HSR reform, on February 1, 2001, the size-of-transaction threshold was increased from $15 million to $50 million, and the 15 percent size-of-transaction threshold was
eliminated.
8
The assets of the acquired entity were taken from response to Item 3(b)(i) (Assets to be acquired) or from Items 4(a) or (b) (SEC documents and annual reports required by the
premerger notification and report form.
9
The assets were not available primarily because the acquired entity’s financial data was consolidated within its ultimate parent.
10
The sales of the acquired entity were taken from Items 4(a) and (b) (SEC documents and annual reports) or responses to Item 5 (dollar revenues) of the premerger notification and
report form.
11
Transactions in this category include acquisitions of newly formed corporations or corporate joint ventures from which no sales were generated, and acquisitions of assets, which had
produced no sales or revenues during the prior year to filing the notification and report form.
12
The 2-digit SIC codes are part of the system of Standard Industrial Classification established by the United States Government Standard Classification Manual, 1987, Executive Office
of the President – Office of Management and Budget. The SIC groupings used in this table were determined from responses submitted by filing parties to Item 5 of the premerger
notification and report form.
13
The 3-digit NAICS codes are part of the North American Industrial Classification System established by the United States Government North American Industrial Classification
System 1997, Executive Office of the President – Office of Management and Budget. The NAICS groups used in this table were determined from responses submitted by the parties to
Item 5 of the premerger notification and report form effective July 1, 2001.
14
This number represents a deviate in percentage from the FY 2000 percentage.
15
This category includes transactions by newly formed entities.
16
The intra-industry transaction column identifies the number of acquisitions in which both the acquiring and acquired persons derived revenues in the same industry.
2
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.