USCA4 Appeal: 23-1742

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No. 23-1742

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

MARC-PHILLIP FERZAN,

Receiver-Appellee,

ANDRIS PUKKE; PETER BAKER;

and JOHN USHER,

Defendants-Appellants.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland

No. 18-cv-3309 (Hon. Peter J. Messitte)

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

PAGE-PROOF BRIEF OF

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

ANISHA S. DASGUPTA

General Counsel

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN J. THEISMAN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20580

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

BENJAMIN F. AIKEN

Attorneys

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20580

(202) 326-2151

baiken@ftc.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................iii

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

JURISDICTION ......................................................................................... 3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED....................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................... 3

A. Pukke’s History of Fraudulent Activity ....................................... 3

B. The Sanctuary Belize Scam ......................................................... 5

C. Initial District Court Proceedings................................................ 8

D. This Court’s Decision On Appeal ............................................... 11

E. Proceedings on Remand ............................................................. 13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................. 16

STANDARD OF REVIEW........................................................................ 18

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 18

Appellants Lack Standing To Bring This Appeal. .................... 18

A. Appellants Lack Standing To Challenge the

Receiver’s Control Over Corporate Assets.......................... 20

B. Appellants Have Not Shown That They Possess

Any Assets That Are Subject to the Asset

Freeze. .................................................................................. 24

II. Appellants’ Arguments Are Barred By the Law of

the Case Doctrine and the Mandate Rule. ................................ 25

III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By

Maintaining the Receivership or the Asset Freeze. .................. 29

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A. The Contempt Sanction Is a Valid Basis for the

Asset Freeze and Receivership............................................ 29

B. The District Court Did Not Refuse To Allow

Appellants To Pay The Contempt Sanction. ...................... 33

C. The District Court Properly Held That

Appellants Cannot Be Trusted To Sell the

Sanctuary Belize Assets Given Their History of

Deceptive Conduct. .............................................................. 37

D. Appellants’ Attacks on the Receiver Lack Merit. ............... 39

IV. Appellants’ Request for an “Accounting” Is Forfeited

and Meritless. ............................................................................. 41

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 41

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC,

141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021) .......................................................................... 12

Doe v. Chao,

511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 26

FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc.,

373 F. Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md. 2005) ......................................................... 4

FTC v. On Point Capital Partners, LLC,

17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................................. 30, 31, 32

FTC v. Pukke,

53 F.4th 80 (4th Cir. 2022) ........................................................... passim

FTC v. Ross,

743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2014) ................................................................... 8

Fusaro v. Howard,

19 F.4th 357 (4th Cir. 2021) ........................................................... 26, 28

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 693 (2013) ............................................................................... 18

In re Sanctuary Belize Litigation,

482 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.Md. 2020) ........................................ 9, 10, 21, 29

McNulta v. Lochridge,

141 U.S. 327 (1891) ............................................................................... 37

Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc.,

811 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................... 21

Nat’l Enterprises, Inc. v. Barnes,

201 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) ................................................................. 35

Padilla v. Troxell,

850 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2017) ................................................................. 41

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Shenzhen Stone

Network Info. Ltd.,

58 F.4th 785 (4th Cir. 2023) ................................................................. 24

iii

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Pukke v. FTC,

No. 22-958, 2023 WL 6377807 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023) .............................. 13

SEC v. Hickey,

322 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................... 22

Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procurement

Rev. Panel,

20 F.3d 1311 (4th Cir. 1994) ................................................................. 23

Solis v. Malkani,

638 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 2011) ................................................................. 18

United States v. Yalincak,

30 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2022) ................................................................... 20

Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,

139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) ..................................................................... 18, 19

STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 45(a) ......................................................................................... 8

15 U.S.C. § 53(b) ......................................................................................... 8

28 U.S.C. § 1291.......................................................................................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1331.......................................................................................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) ..................................................................................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1345.......................................................................................... 3

REGULATIONS

Telemarketing Sales Rule

16 C.F.R. Part 310 ................................................................................... 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

15A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller,

Fed. Prac. & Proc. (3d ed. 2023) ........................................................... 21

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INTRODUCTION

Appellants Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher operated

a real estate scam that this Court previously described as “dishonest to

the core.” FTC v. Pukke, 53 F.4th 80, 105 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Pukke I”).

They induced more than a thousand consumers to purchase lots in a

purported luxury real estate development in Belize by lying about the

project’s viability, its finances, and its supposed safety as an

investment. They also covered up Pukke’s prior conviction for a crime of

dishonesty by using pseudonyms to conceal his involvement in the

project. Following a multiweek trial, the district court found Appellants

liable for deceptive practices in violation of the Federal Trade

Commission Act (“FTC Act”) and held them in contempt for violating a

prior injunction stemming from Pukke’s operation of an earlier scam.

The court ordered Appellants to pay $120.2 million in consumer redress

and appointed a receiver to manage the corporate entities involved in

the scam and liquidate their assets, including the Belizean property.

In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed the liability findings and

held that the $120.2 million judgment was proper as a contempt

sanction. It also affirmed the receivership and a freeze on certain of

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Appellant’s assets. On remand, the district court entered a new order

that reaffirmed these provisions. That is the order at issue in this

appeal. Stripped to its essence, Appellants’ argument is that the district

court should have terminated the receivership and transferred the

receivership assets—principally the 14,000-acre Belizean property—to

Appellants for Appellants to sell. They claim that the Court should

trust them to use the resulting proceeds to pay the contempt judgment.

Appellants’ arguments must be rejected for multiple reasons.

First, they lack standing to pursue this appeal because they have no

direct ownership interest in the Belizean property or the other assets in

the Receiver’s possession, and they have not shown that they possess

any personal assets subject to the freeze. Second, their arguments are

barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine because this Court has already

affirmed the receivership and the asset freeze. Finally, their arguments

fail on the merits. Given Appellants’ well-documented history of fraud

and asset concealment, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

maintaining the receivership and asset freeze, which are critical to

ensuring that Appellants’ victims receive the monetary redress they

deserve.

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JURISDICTION

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the

Commission’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345. The

district court orders under review (DE 1446 and 1447 (JA __ and __))

were entered on June 15, 2023. Appellants timely appealed on July 12,

2023. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but

as discussed below, Appellants lack Article III standing to bring this

appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Do Appellants have Article III standing to bring this appeal?

Are Appellants’ claims barred by the law of the case doctrine

and the mandate rule given this Court’s decision in Pukke I?

Did the district court act within the scope of its discretion by

maintaining the asset freeze and receivership provisions that this Court

affirmed in Pukke I?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pukke’s History of Fraudulent Activity

Pukke is a serial fraudster whose history of misdeeds dates back

at least to 1996, when he pleaded guilty to mail fraud stemming from

his operation of a loan scam. See United States v. Pukke, No. 2:96-cr-137

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(W.D. Pa.). Pukke was sentenced to three years probation, fined $5,000,

and ordered to pay $38,078 in restitution. See id. ECF No. 11. He also

entered into a consent judgment in a parallel civil case. See United

States v. Pukke, 2:96-cv-1172 (W.D. Pa.).

Shortly afterwards, Pukke formed a company called AmeriDebt,

which ran a credit counseling scam. The FTC sued Pukke over

AmeriDebt in 2003. See FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558,

561 (D. Md. 2005). Pukke eventually resolved that lawsuit by agreeing

to a consent judgment, which required him to pay $172 million in

consumer redress, with all but $35 million suspended on the condition

that Pukke cooperate fully with the FTC. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 100. The

consent order also permanently enjoined Pukke from making false

representations in connection with the telemarketing of any goods or

services. Id. The AmeriDebt judgment further directed Pukke and

Baker—“who was also involved with AmeriDebt,” id.—to turn assets

over to a receiver, but instead of cooperating they conspired to hide

Pukke’s assets, leading to a contempt finding and six weeks of

incarceration. Id.

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Meanwhile, in 2011, Pukke pleaded guilty to obstructing justice

based on the false statements he made about his assets in the

AmeriDebt case and a separate bankruptcy. Id. at 98; see United States

v. Pukke, No. 8:10-cr-734 (D. Md.). He was sentenced to 18 months in

prison plus another three years of supervised release. 1

The Sanctuary Belize Scam

While the AmeriDebt litigation and Pukke’s obstruction-of-justice

prosecution were ongoing, Pukke was also engaged in the Sanctuary

Belize real estate scam with Baker and Usher. The basic facts

underlying that scam are set forth in this Court’s decision in Pukke I. In

2003, Pukke and Baker began developing land in Belize; in 2005, with

Usher’s help, they began selling lots with the purported “intent to

convert this tropical area into a luxury resort for American

vacationers.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 97. They called this project Sanctuary

Belize, and the district court referred to the various individuals and

corporate entities that developed and sold the real estate lots as the

Sanctuary Belize Enterprise (“SBE”). Id.

Pukke is also currently under indictment for alleged wire fraud and

unlawful monetary transactions in connection with the Sanctuary

Belize scam. United States v. Pukke, No. 1:23-cr-168 (S.D.N.Y.).

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Pukke was effectively the CEO of the project and led its sales and

marketing efforts. Id. Beginning in 2009, he launched “an aggressive

advertising campaign” on television, websites, and other media to

persuade consumers to buy lots in Sanctuary Belize. Id. Consumers who

provided contact information would then be called by telemarketers,

who were “coached to create a sense of urgency and a fear of loss on the

part of prospective purchasers, techniques somewhat reminiscent of

those used by Jordan Belfort, aka the ‘Wolf of Wall Street.’” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

SBE’s sales pitch relied on a mountain of lies. Telemarketers told

prospective purchasers the development was not risky because it had

“no debt” and that “every dollar” from the sale of lot purchases would go

“right into the progress of the development.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 98. In

fact, SBE carried “not insignificant amounts of debt,” was a risky

investment, and spent “only 14% of sales revenue for development”;

Pukke diverted about 12.8% of sales revenue—some $18 million—“for

his own benefit and that of his friends and family.” Id. at 98-99. SBE

also promised that the project would boast luxury amenities, most of

which “either d[id] not exist, d[id] not exist as promised or ha[d] never

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been seriously contemplated to exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Consumers were told that the development would be done in

two to five years, even though SBE lacked sufficient funds and had no

realistic prospect of finishing the project in that time. Id. Additionally,

salespersons falsely told prospective purchasers there was a “strong

resale market” for Sanctuary Belize lots, even as they were actively

working to undermine and impede resales by preventing owners from

reselling lots before SBE sold all the lots. Id.

Finally, as part of an “overarching falsehood,” SBE’s salespersons

represented to consumers that Pukke had no meaningful involvement

in the development. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 99. They knew that disclosure

of his felony convictions for deception of trusting consumers would

“scare away purchasers.” Id. To keep consumers in the dark, they

disguised Pukke’s identity behind various aliases. Id. at 98.

All told, Appellants sold more than 1,000 Sanctuary Belize lots—

some of them more than once—swindling consumers out of $120.2

million. Id. at 98-99.

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Initial District Court Proceedings

The FTC sued Pukke, Baker, Usher, and various SBE entities in

2018, seeking to shut down the Sanctuary Belize scam and secure

redress for its victims. The FTC’s complaint alleged violations of the

FTC Act’s prohibition on deceptive acts or practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a),

and the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”), 16 C.F.R. Part 310.

The FTC brought its claim under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act,

15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which authorizes the FTC to sue in district court for a

permanent injunction against violations of the laws under its purview.

At the time, courts of appeals had unanimously held that Section 13(b)

authorized the FTC to obtain both equitable monetary relief to redress

consumer harm and prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., FTC v. Ross,

743 F.3d 886, 890-92 (4th Cir. 2014).

In addition to filing the complaint, the FTC filed several motions

to hold Pukke, Baker, and Usher in civil contempt for violating previous

court orders. Most relevant here, the FTC alleged that Pukke, Baker,

and Usher’s operation of the Sanctuary Belize scam violated the

AmeriDebt consent order’s prohibition on deceptive telemarketing

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practices. 2 The district court consolidated the existing AmeriDebt case

with the new Sanctuary Belize case. DE 261 at 1 (JA __). Though they

were properly served, Usher and several SBE-affiliated corporations

never appeared, and the district court entered default judgments

against them. DE 1112 (JA __).

The district court entered a temporary restraining order, which

was later superseded by two preliminary injunction orders. See In re

Sanctuary Belize Litigation, 482 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.Md. 2020)

(“Sanctuary Belize”); see also DE 615 (JA __). Among other things, those

orders appointed a receiver to take control of the corporate defendants’

related business entities—including Sittee River Wildlife Reserve

(“SRWR”), a corporation that owned SBE’s property in Belize. DE 615

at 7, 9, 25-31 (JA __, __, __-__). Pukke, Baker, and Usher were ordered

to turn assets over to the Receiver. DE 615 at 31-33 (JA __-__). The

orders also froze any assets the defendants had as of the date the TRO

was entered (November 5, 2018) and assets obtained afterwards derived

from the Sanctuary Belize scam. DE 615 at 12-14 (JA __-__).

Although Usher was not a party in AmeriDebt, the consent order also

bound Pukke’s business associates. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 100.

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Following a lengthy bench trial, the district court issued a detailed

opinion finding that Pukke, Baker, Usher, and the various SBE entities

violated the FTC Act and TSR. See Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at

429-59. It also held Pukke, Baker, and Usher in contempt for violating

the AmeriDebt injunction. Id. at 476-77. The district court found that

the scam caused $120.2 million of consumer harm. Id. at 475.

The district court issued three remedial orders: the “De Novo

Order” (DE 1194), the “Default Order” (DE 1112), and the “Contempt

Order” (DE 1113). The relevant provisions of the De Novo and Default

Orders are similar. In addition to permanent injunctive relief, the

orders imposed a $120.2 million equitable monetary judgment against

the defendants, to be paid to the FTC and used for consumer redress.

DE 1194 at 8, 11-12 (JA __, __-__); DE 1112 at 9, 14 (JA __, __). The

orders also required Pukke, Baker, and Usher to transfer assets in

excess of a nominal amount to either the FTC or the Receiver and

stripped them of any rights in assets previously transferred to the

Receiver. DE 1194 at 8-10 (JA __-__); DE 1112 at 9-12 (JA __-__). The

orders modified the asset freeze to permit these transfers and provided

that the freeze would be dissolved upon full satisfaction of the monetary

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judgment. DE 1194 at 12 (JA __); DE 1112 at 15 (JA __). Finally, the

orders restated the Receiver’s authority to control, manage, and

liquidate the receivership assets. DE 1194 at 13-16 (JA __-__); DE 1112

at 16-19 (JA __-__).

As relevant here, the Contempt Order required Pukke, Baker, and

Usher to pay the FTC the same $120.2 million imposed in the other

orders: an amount representing the total amount of consumer loss. DE

1113 at 3 (JA __). 3 Appellants were ordered to transfer assets sufficient

to pay the judgment to the FTC within 30 days. Id.

This Court’s Decision On Appeal

Pukke, Baker, Usher, and some of the corporations appealed to

this Court, which substantially affirmed the district court’s judgment.

The Court affirmed the contempt finding as “supported by an

abundance of evidence and show[ing] no hint of an abuse of discretion.”

Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 101-02. The Court also found it “clear that Pukke

and SBE violated the FTC Act and TSR” through their brazen lies,

concluding that “Pukke’s Belizean business venture was dishonest to

3 The district court also ordered Pukke to pay the full $172 million

judgment in AmeriDebt. DE 1113 at 2-3 (JA __-__).

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the core” and that “this sort of deception lies at the heart of what the

FTC is empowered to seek out and stop.” Id. at 105.

The Court vacated the monetary judgment against Pukke and

Baker to the extent it relied on Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which the

Supreme Court had recently concluded did not authorize monetary

relief. 4 Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 105; AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141

S. Ct. 1341 (2021). But that did not “change the bottom line” because

Pukke, Baker, and Usher were still liable for the same $120.2 million as

a contempt sanction for violating the AmeriDebt consent order. Id. at

105-06. The Court held that AMG did not affect the validity of the

district court’s injunctive relief or invalidate the appointment of the

Receiver. Id. at 106-08. It also rejected Pukke’s challenge to the asset

freeze, finding the freeze “an appropriate use of the court’s discretion,

especially given the risk of Pukke diverting funds to his personal

accounts.” Id. at 109.

The parties have disputed whether the Court also vacated the

Section 13(b) monetary judgment against Usher, who defaulted, see

Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 106-07, but that does not matter for present

purposes because Usher is plainly subject to the monetary contempt

sanction.

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Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated

and remanded for further proceedings in part. 5

Proceedings on Remand

On remand, the FTC filed a motion to reform and reaffirm the

district court’s prior relief orders in accordance with this Court’s

mandate. DE 1404 (JA __). Pukke, Baker, and Usher, joined by several

of the corporate defendants, opposed (DE 1405 (JA __)), and filed a

separate motion for return of property (DE 1435 (JA __)). They argued

that the district court should lift the asset freeze and order the return of

the assets held by the Receiver, contending there was no longer any

basis for the receivership in light of AMG and this Court’s vacatur of

the Section 13(b) monetary relief. DE 1405 at 8 (JA __); DE 1435-1, at 12 (JA __-__).

The district court largely granted the FTC’s motion and denied the

motion for return of property. DE 1441; DE 1447 (JA __, __). The court

explained that “[t]he Contempt Order stands in full force and effect”

because “[t]he Fourth Circuit clearly upheld the $120.2 million

The Supreme Court denied Appellants’ petition for a writ of

certiorari on October 2, 2023. See Pukke v. FTC, No. 22-958, 2023 WL

6377807 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023).

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judgment against Baker, Pukke, and Usher as set forth in the

Contempt Order and separately confirmed the validity of the

Receivership and the injunctive relief ordered pursuant to Section

13(b).” DE 1441 at 2 (JA __). That relief, the court explained, “plainly

include[d] freezing Defendants[’] assets and requiring that they be

turned over to the Receiver.” Id.

The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that they

were entitled to a return of the assets held by the Receiver. DE 1441 at

5 (JA __). It noted that “[i]n the course of these proceedings many of

these assets were in fact long hidden by Defendants” and that they

should not now be “rewarded.” Id. It further noted that this Court had

“loudly and clearly” affirmed the Receiver’s authority to “manage and

liquidate these assets,” and that the turnover of assets was appropriate

given the “overall conspiratorial scam.” Id.

The accompanying order—the “Reaffirmation Order” from which

Appellants now appeal—confirmed that “[t]he Contempt Order …

stands in full force and effect and requires that the Defendants’ assets

be frozen and otherwise turned over to the Receiver.” DE 1447 at 2 (JA

__). The Reaffirmation Order also explained that the contempt

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judgment “supports all the monetary relief and related provisions

directed at or related to the Individual Defendants” in the De Novo and

Default Orders. DE 1447 at 3 (JA __-__). The Reaffirmation Order

further confirmed that “[t]he injunctive relief and receivership

provisions of the De Novo Order … and the Default Order … stand in

full force and effect.” Id. at 2 (JA __). The court reiterated that Pukke,

Baker, Usher, and the defaulting corporate defendants remained

“obligated to relinquish, transfer, and turn over all assets that they

directly or indirectly own or control … until the judgments against them

are satisfied in full.” 6 Id. at 4 (JA __).

Pukke, Baker, and Usher now appeal from the Reaffirmation

Order. The corporate defendants who joined the briefing on remand in

the district court have not joined the appeal. Although the Receiver has

taken possession of the corporate defendants and their assets (including

the Sanctuary Belize property), Pukke, Baker, and Usher have never

The district court also issued a separate order implementing the next

phase of a consumer redress plan. DE 1446 (JA __). Although

Appellants reference this order in their Brief’s Statement of the Case

(Br. 12, 13), they do not discuss it in the argument section of their brief

and it is not relevant to the issues they raise on appeal.

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paid a penny of the judgment against them or turned over any

individual assets to the Receiver. See DE 1217-2 at 4, 9 (JA __, __).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For starters, Appellants lack standing to bring this appeal. Article

III’s standing requirements—injury, traceability, and redressability—

must be met by anyone seeking appellate review, just as they must be

met by anyone filing a complaint. Here, Appellants are complaining

about the maintenance of the receivership and asset freeze. But

Appellants are not injured by the maintenance of the receivership

because they do not directly own the Sanctuary Belize property or any

of the other underlying assets they seek to have “returned.” Those

assets belong to various corporate entities that did not join this appeal.

Appellants’ status as shareholders or as principals who control (or

formerly controlled) those corporate entities does not give them

standing to assert injuries on the corporate entities’ behalf. To the

extent that Appellants are challenging the freeze on their personal

assets, they have not shown that they currently possess or control any

assets that are subject to the freeze. Accordingly, the appeal should be

dismissed.

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If the appeal is not dismissed for lack of standing, the Court

should affirm because Appellants’ arguments are barred by law of the

case. This Court already upheld both the asset freeze and the

receivership in the prior appeal. This Court also upheld the contempt

judgment and explained that the district court’s previous “bottom line”

had not changed because the contempt judgment justified both the asset

freeze and receivership. Appellants offer no explanation for why this

Court’s decision does not dictate the outcome of the present appeal; they

simply ignore it.

Even if the Court had not already resolved these issues,

Appellants’ arguments would fail on the merits. As the district court

explained, the receivership and asset freeze remain necessary to secure

consumer redress for the harm associated with Appellants’ violation of

the AmeriDebt injunction. That determination was not an abuse of

discretion. Nor was any other aspect of the district court’s decision. The

court did not prevent Appellants from paying their contempt judgment;

its factual findings provide a thorough explanation for the necessity of

the receivership; Appellants cannot be trusted to sell the receivership

assets themselves; and there is no merit to Appellants’ attacks on the

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trustworthiness and qualifications of the Receiver. Appellants forfeited

any request for an accounting by failing to make such a request until

now, but regardless the district court did not abuse its discretion by

failing to order an accounting on top of the regular reports the Receiver

already files.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court’s decision to award equitable

relief, such as an asset freeze or an accounting, for abuse of discretion.

Solis v. Malkani, 638 F.3d 269, 274 (4th Cir. 2011).

ARGUMENT

APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL.

This appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing because

Appellants have not shown that they suffered any injury from the

portions of the Reaffirmation Order they are challenging.

Article III of the Constitution requires that “any person invoking

the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so.”

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013). The standing

requirement “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as

it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Va.

House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951 (2019)

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(internal quotation omitted). To establish standing, the party invoking

the appellate court’s jurisdiction must “do more than simply allege a

nonobvious harm”; it must “explain how the elements essential to

standing are met.” Id. Those elements are “(1) a concrete and

particularized injury, that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged

conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at

1950. “As the part[ies] invoking this Court’s jurisdiction,” Appellants

“bear[] the burden” of establishing these elements. Id. at 1955.

Appellants have not met this burden. All of their arguments are

directed toward what Appellants describe as an “asset freeze and

seizure” order. 7 Br. 15, 16, 19-22, 24, 26. As relief, they request that the

Sanctuary Belize property and other assets currently under the

Receiver’s control should be “returned” to them. Br. 13, 14, 20, 24-26.

But Appellants have not established that they directly own any of the

assets in the Receiver’s control, and they fail to identify any personal

assets they are seeking to have unfrozen. Accordingly, Appellants have

The Reaffirmation Order maintains an asset freeze, but the district

court never issued any “seizure order.” That label appears to refer to the

portion of the Reaffirmation Order that keeps the receivership “in full

force and effect.” DE 1447 at 2 (JA __).

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not demonstrated standing to challenge the receivership or the asset

freeze.

A. Appellants Lack Standing To Challenge the

Receiver’s Control Over Corporate Assets.

Appellants lack standing to challenge the portion of the

Reaffirmation Order that maintains the receivership because

Appellants do not own the Sanctuary Belize property or any other

assets that they seek to have “returned.” Those assets are owned by

corporate entities that are legally distinct from Appellants and that did

not join this appeal. Appellants themselves have never turned over any

personal assets to the Receiver. And because they do not own the assets

in the receivership, Appellants are not directly injured by the Receiver’s

continued control over those assets. Moreover, those assets cannot be

“returned” to Appellants because Appellants did not own them in the

first place.

It is well settled that a party lacks standing to appeal portions of a

district court’s orders that relate solely to another party. See United

States v. Yalincak, 30 F.4th 115, 132 (2d Cir. 2022) (dismissing appeal

challenging codefendant’s restitution order because the outcome of the

appeal would have “no effect” on appellant’s restitution obligations and

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he had therefore “suffered no cognizable injury as a result of” the

challenged order); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d

1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (“It is hornbook law that a party may only

appeal to protect its own interests, and not those of a coparty.” (internal

quotation omitted)). Just as there is a “general standing doctrine that a

litigant may not advance the rights of others,” there is a corollary “that

a party may not appeal to protect the rights of others.” 15A Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3902 (3d ed. 2023).

That rule forecloses any argument from Appellants about the assets in

the receivership estate.

None of the Appellants have any direct ownership interest in any

assets in the receivership estate. The most significant of those assets—

and the focus of Appellants’ brief—is the Sanctuary Belize property.

See, e.g., Br. 20. None of the Appellants have any direct ownership

interest in that land. A company called Sittee River Wildlife Reserve

(“SRWR”) “became the sole owner of the entire Sanctuary Belize

development” in 2007. Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 390.

Although SRWR was a party to the proceedings on remand below and

expressly named in the Reaffirmation Order, see DE 1447 at 1 & n.1 (JA

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__ & n.1), neither SRWR nor any other corporate defendant appealed.

The only parties to this appeal are the individual Appellants, who have

never contributed any assets to the receivership. See DE 1217-2 at 4, 9

(JA __, __) (declaration from Receiver discussing source of the assets in

the receivership).

A recent claim by SRWR and several other corporate defendants

likewise indicates that the individual Appellants have no

constitutionally cognizable interest in the receivership assets. Following

the Reaffirmation Order, those companies sued in the United States

Court of Federal Claims seeking redress for the “millions of dollars of

assets and properties” they claim were “wrongfully seized” in this

action—i.e., the receivership assets. 8 Complaint at 1, Buy Belize et al. v.

United States of America, No. 1:23-cv-1025 (U.S. Ct. Claims July 3,

2023), ECF No. 1. Their theory is that the “seized assets and property”

constitute “an illegal exaction” because those belonged to the

corporations, who “are separate from Pukke, Baker, and Usher.” Id. at

2. Each of the entities—represented by the same counsel who represent

Appellants here—emphasizes that “[i]t is a separate legal entity from

The estate of Pukke’s father is also a party to that action.

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its stockholders and members.” Id. at 3. The corporate entities thus

view themselves as both legally distinct from Appellants and as the

direct owners of the receivership assets.

To be sure, Appellants did have practical control over the

Sanctuary Belize property and other receivership assets through their

ownership or control of the various corporate entities that are now

managed by the Receiver. That is why those entities and their assets

are properly part of the receivership estate. See, e.g., SEC v. Hickey, 322

F.3d 1123, 1125, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court’s “broad

equitable powers” authorized it to freeze assets of corporate entity that

was “dominated and controlled” by contemnor). 9 But neither ownership

nor control over the corporate entities confers Article III standing to

assert those entities’ property rights in litigation. “It is considered a

fundamental rule that a shareholder—even the sole shareholder—does

not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the corporation.”

Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311,

Appellants have not disputed, either here or below (see DE 1405 (JA

__)), that they controlled the corporate entities and that this control

requires that those entities and the entities’ assets be used to satisfy

the contempt judgment. See DE 1408 at 2 (JA __) (summarizing

evidence of Appellants’ control of the corporate entities).

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1317 (4th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). Similarly, “[c]orporate officers …

generally lack standing to defend their corporation’s property interests.”

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Shenzhen Stone Network Info. Ltd., 58

F.4th 785, 792 (4th Cir. 2023). That Pukke, Baker, and Usher may be

shareholders or principals of the corporate defendants or otherwise

exercised control over them is thus insufficient to confer standing.

Since Pukke, Baker, and Usher have no direct ownership interest

in the assets owned by the corporate entities, they suffer no Article III

injury from the Receiver’s continued control over those assets. And

since Appellants have never turned over any personal assets to the

Receiver, an order requiring the “return” of the receivership assets

would not directly benefit them. Appellants thus lack standing to

challenge the maintenance of the receivership.

B. Appellants Have Not Shown That They Possess

Any Assets That Are Subject to the Asset Freeze.

To the extent that Appellants are challenging the portion of the

Reaffirmation Order that freezes their personal assets, they have not

met their burden to demonstrate standing because they have not

identified any assets they possess that are subject to the freeze. The

freeze applies only to “assets that predate the filing of this case [on

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November 6, 2018] or are derived from actions or assets that predate

the filing of this case,” DE 1447 at 2-3 (JA __-__)”); see also DE 615 at

12-14 (JA __-__). It does not apply to assets acquired later on, such as

money that Appellants may earn through employment or other

legitimate activity.

Appellants’ brief focuses on “the Sanctuary Belize assets,” i.e., the

assets in the receivership. E.g. Br. 19, 20. As discussed above, these

assets do not belong to Appellants, and the assets under the Receiver’s

control are not subject to the freeze. Appellants do not identify any

assets that they personally own that are still in their possession or

control and hence subject to the freeze. Absent such a showing,

Appellants have failed to demonstrate that any of them has standing to

challenge the asset freeze.

II.

APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS ARE BARRED BY THE LAW OF THE

CASE DOCTRINE AND THE MANDATE RULE.

Even if Appellants have standing, their arguments are barred by

the law of the case doctrine and the mandate rule. Appellants argue

that in light of AMG and this Court’s vacatur of the Section 13(b)

monetary judgment, the district court was also required to lift the asset

freeze and “seizure order”—i.e., the receivership provisions of the prior

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orders—and transfer the receivership assets to them. Br. 15, 19. But

this Court specifically affirmed both the receivership and the asset

freeze in its prior decision. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 107-09. Under the

mandate rule, the district court had no authority to reconsider those

issues, and under the more general law of the case doctrine, this Court

is bound by its rulings in the prior appeal.

Under the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a

rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in

subsequent stages in the same case,” including “a subsequent appeal in

the same litigation.” Fusaro v. Howard, 19 F.4th 357, 367 (4th Cir.

2021) (internal quotation omitted). The mandate rule is a “more

powerful version of the law of the case doctrine” that “prohibits lower

courts, with limited exceptions, from considering questions that the

mandate of a higher court has laid to rest.” Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461,

465 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Under this rule, “any

issue conclusively decided by this court on the first appeal is not

remanded,” and a district court has no authority to reconsider it. Id.

Here, Pukke argued in a prior appeal that AMG required

nullification of the receivership as well as the Section 13(b) monetary

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award. This Court squarely rejected that claim, holding that “AMG does

nothing of the sort.” Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 107. The Court explained that

“the appointment of a receiver has long been considered an ancillary

power that a court can deploy to effectuate its injunctive relief” and that

a receivership was appropriate here to “ensur[e] further FTC Act and

TSR violations would not occur and that Pukke would not continue to

profit from these deceptions.” Id. at 107-08. The Court likewise rejected

Pukke’s challenge to the asset freeze, holding that the freeze was “an

appropriate use of the court’s discretion” to secure payment of a civil

contempt sanction, “especially given the risk of Pukke diverting funds

to his personal accounts.” Id. at 109. This Court thus held that the asset

freeze was appropriate even though AMG rendered monetary relief

under Section 13(b) unavailable.

Because this Court affirmed the receivership and the asset freeze

provisions of the district court’s prior orders, the mandate rule barred

the district court from reconsidering those provisions on remand.

Indeed, the Court’s order constituted only a partial remand. See Pukke

I, 53 F.4th at 110 (“The judgment is affirmed in part and vacated and

remanded in part for such further proceedings as are consistent with

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this decision.”). Thus, the district court plainly did not err by

reaffirming the receivership and asset freeze; it had no authority to do

anything else.

Similarly, the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from

revisiting its prior decision affirming the receivership and the asset

freeze. There are only three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine:

“(1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence,

(2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law

applicable to the issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous

and would work manifest injustice.” Fusaro 19 F.4th at 367. The first

two exceptions plainly do not apply. For the third exception to apply,

the prior decision “cannot be just maybe or probably wrong; it must

strike [the Court] as wrong with the force of a five-week-old,

unrefrigerated dead fish.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, Appellants have not

even alleged that the prior decision was wrong, much less shown the

kind of extraordinary circumstances that would allow this Court to

reconsider it.

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III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By

Maintaining the Receivership or the Asset Freeze.

Even if the district court had discretion to revisit the receivership

and asset freeze provisions this Court had previously affirmed, it did

not abuse its discretion by maintaining those provisions in the

Reaffirmation Order. The district court made extensive findings about

Appellants’ history of fraud, diversion of assets for personal and familial

gain, failure to follow court orders, and concealment of assets.

Sanctuary Belize, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 393-96, 409-10. 10 It cited some of

this history in the Reaffirmation Order. DE 1441 at 5 (JA __). These

findings, which this Court affirmed, are more than sufficient to support

the continuation of both the asset freeze and the receivership. None of

Appellants’ arguments to the contrary holds water.

A. The Contempt Sanction Is a Valid Basis for the

Asset Freeze and Receivership.

There is no merit to Appellants’ argument that the asset freeze

should be lifted because there is “no longer any nexus” between the

relief the FTC sought and the assets (if any) subject to the freeze. Br.

For this reason, there is no merit to Appellants’ suggestion that “the

district court made no … fact findings” that would support an asset

freeze and receivership. Br. 21-22.

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16. As this Court held in an earlier appeal, vacating the Section 13(b)

award “does not in fact change the bottom line” because Appellants are

liable for the same amount as a contempt sanction. Pukke I, 53 F.4th at

106. Put another way, “the harm from Defendants’ contumacious

conduct is … the same as the harm caused by their FTC Act violations.”

DE 1109 at 1 (JA __). Thus, Appellants are still subject to a contempt

sanction in the amount of $120.2 million: the “consumer loss caused by

their violation of the [AmeriDebt] Telemarketing Order.” See DE 1113

at 3 (JA __). And because that contempt sanction addresses the same

harm as the FTC Act violations, the court properly maintained both the

receivership and the freeze on Appellants’ personal assets.

Appellants misplace their reliance (Br. 16-19) on FTC v. On Point

Capital Partners, LLC, 17 F.4th 1066 (11th Cir. 2021). On Point does

not help Appellants because, unlike this case, it did not involve a

Section 13(b) case and contempt proceeding consolidated into a single

proceeding with a single docket number and caption. See DE 261 at 1

(JA ___); see also Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 104 (AmeriDebt contempt motions

consolidated with the Sanctuary Belize case). In On Point, the district

court had entered an asset freeze and receivership order in place to

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secure a monetary judgment under Section 13(b). 17 F.4th at 1075-76.

Separately, the defendants there were subject to a contempt sanction—

and associated asset freeze and receivership order—for their violation of

a consent decree in an earlier case (Acquinity). Id. at 1076. Following

AMG, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the On Point order asset freeze and

receivership, reasoning that with monetary relief off the table, “there is

no need to preserve resources for a future judgment” in On Point. Id. at

1078.

Appellants’ suggestion that they should be entitled to the same

relief now that the Section 13(b) monetary award against them has

been vacated (Br. 18-19) misunderstands the Eleventh Circuit’s

analysis. Here, the Contempt Order, De Novo Order, and Default Order

were all entered on the same docket and are part of the same case.

Thus, even though there is no longer any basis for monetary relief

under Section 13(b), the Contempt Order remains as a basis for the

asset freeze and receivership. Nothing in On Point undermines that

conclusion. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized in On Point that

“nothing in this opinion should be construed as commenting on or

having a legal effect on the separate asset freeze in Acquinity,” id. at

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1078, which was entered to facilitate the payment of the contempt

sanction there.

Appellants also miss the mark in suggesting that the asset freeze

and receivership should be deemed invalid because those provisions

were set forth in orders other than the Contempt Order and not

expressly incorporated in the Contempt Order. See Br. 6-7, 18-19. As

discussed above (at 25-28), this Court specifically affirmed the

receivership as an appropriate component of the relief ordered by the

district court under Section 13(b). Pukke I, 53 F.4th at 109. Regardless,

Appellants cite no authority requiring that a receivership and asset

freeze appear in the same order as the judgment they protect—and the

FTC is aware of none. The relevant question is whether there is a legal

basis for a receivership and asset freeze, and here there plainly is. As

the district court explained, the Contempt Order “stands in full force

and effect” and the contempt relief affirmed by this Court “plainly

includes freezing Defendants[’] assets and requiring that they be turned

over to the Receiver.” DE 1441 at 2 (JA __); see also DE 1447 at 2 (JA

__) (same). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

maintaining the asset freeze and receivership on remand.

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B. The District Court Did Not Refuse To Allow

Appellants To Pay The Contempt Sanction.

Appellants misstate the facts in arguing that the district court

“abused its discretion by refusing to permit … Appellants to pay the

$120.2 million contempt sanction.” Br. 19. Nothing prevents Appellants

from paying the contempt sanction with any assets that they own or

control. Indeed, the district court’s orders obligate them to turn over

such assets to the FTC or the Receiver to satisfy the contempt sanction.

See, e.g., DE 1447 at 2-3 (JA __-__). Furthermore, nothing in the district

court’s order forbids Appellants from seeking employment or otherwise

earning money through legitimate means and using their earnings to

pay down the judgment.

Appellants’ core complaint is that the district court declined to

transfer the receivership assets to them so that they could sell the

Belizean property and pay off the judgment. But as the district court

explained, “many of these assets were in fact long hidden by

Defendants,” such that the turnover of assets was necessary to address

Appellants’ “overall conspiratorial scam.” DE 1441 at 5 (JA __). Given

Appellants’ long and well-documented history of fraud and concealment

of assets, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

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that Appellants could not be trusted to manage and sell the receivership

assets.

The declaration submitted by Appellant Baker in the remand

proceeding does not undermine this conclusion. 11 Baker’s declaration

asserts, without any supporting evidence, that the assets in the

receivership estate are more than sufficient to pay the $120.2 million

consent judgment in this case. 12 DE 1405-1 (JA __). In particular, he

asserts his “belie[f]” that “the funds generated by a sale of the

Sanctuary Belize property would far exceed the $120.2 million needed

to transfer to the FTC under the Contempt Order.” DE 1405-1 at 3. (JA

__). The district court considered the Baker declaration, DE 1441 at 4

(JA __), but concluded that Appellants “are not entitled to any return of

assets.” Id. at 5 (JA __).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit

the Baker declaration. First of all, Baker’s assertions are pure hearsay

laced with a dollop of speculation. Baker hedges nearly all his claims by

Some of the figures that Appellants cite in their brief (Br. 20) do not

actually appear in Baker’s declaration.

Baker ignores that Pukke is liable for an additional $172 million

under the AmeriDebt injunction. See DE 1113 at 2-3 (JA __-__).

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stating they are what he “believes” or “understands” based on

unspecified “reports filed by the Receiver and other information.” DE

1405-1 at 2 (JA __). Yet he does not include the Receiver’s reports or the

“other information” he claims to rely upon. Id. Similarly, Baker claims

that a “conservative estimate” of the value of the Belize property is $104

million, but he does not provide any actual data to support that claim;

instead, he asserts that the property was previously appraised at $87

million at some unspecified time and he arbitrarily increases that figure

by 20%. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to

accept these unsupported claims. See, e.g., Nat’l Enterprises, Inc. v.

Barnes, 201 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (appellant’s “self-serving

affidavit describing the content of” certain agreements could not defeat

summary judgment, especially because appellant failed to produce the

agreements in question).

In fact, there is no reliable evidence that the seized assets exceed

the value of the contempt judgment. The value of the Belizean property

will not be known until the Receiver actually sells the still undeveloped

land. If the value of the assets ends up exceeding Appellants’

obligations—including both the $120.2 million contempt sanction and

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the $172 million plus interest that Pukke owes from AmeriDebt—then

Appellants will be entitled to receive the excess, “as would be the case

in any collections matter.” DE 1441 at 4 n.2 (JA __). None of that means

that the assets should be turned over to Appellants to sell. Given

Appellants’ history of deceptive conduct, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by assigning that task to the Receiver.

Some of Baker’s other claims are, in the district court’s words,

“pure blather.” DE 1441 at 4 (JA __). For example, he claims that

Sanctuary Belize consumers have been credited with “$50 million in

monthly payments due and owing by them but not collected” and counts

as receivership assets another $157 million in “current receivables from

lot purchasers at Sanctuary Belize.” DE 1405-1 at 1, 2 (JA __, __). In

other words, Baker is counting as a receivership asset money that

consumers would be required to pay under the terms of their purchase

contracts if those contracts were valid. But in fact, consumers do not

owe any of this money because the purchase contracts were induced by

Appellants’ fraud and are void. The $120.2 million represents money

that Appellants actually took from consumers. If consumers had paid

more, Appellants would owe more.

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Nor were Appellants entitled to “credits” for the roughly $21

million the Receiver has spent “managing Sanctuary Belize during the

five years of this litigation.” Br. 21. A receiver “stands in place of the

corporation.” McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 331 (1891). The

owners of Sanctuary Belize would have incurred the same costs these

last five years to maintain the property that the Receiver has incurred.

None of that has contributed to making Appellants’ victims whole.

On top of these shortcomings of proof, there is also Baker’s lack of

credibility. Given Baker’s active participation in a scam that swindled

consumers out of $120.2 million and his prior actions to conceal assets

in AmeriDebt, the district court was not required to credit his selfserving testimony.

C. The District Court Properly Held That Appellants

Cannot Be Trusted To Sell the Sanctuary Belize

Assets Given Their History of Deceptive Conduct.

Appellants miss the point in arguing that their “histories of

deceptive conduct” cannot serve as a legitimate reason for maintaining

the asset freeze and receivership because they “have already been

punished for this ‘deceptive conduct’—to the tune of 120.2 million

dollars.” Br. 23. Asset freezes and receiverships exist to secure the

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payment of judgments. As of today, Appellants have not paid a cent of

the $120.2 million they owe to their victims, and their history of

deceptive conduct shows that they cannot be trusted to manage the

Sanctuary Belize assets or repay injured consumers. The district court

did not abuse its discretion by leaving the asset freeze and receivership

in place to secure consumer redress.

Appellants’ argument that they are in a better position than the

Receiver to obtain “top dollar” for the Sanctuary Belize property (Br. 23)

is wrong for at least two reasons. First, as the district court pointed out,

Appellants “remain subject to a full ban on real estate activity and,

more specifically, bans preventing any further involvement with, or

presence in, Sanctuary Belize.” DE 1441 at 3 (JA __); see also DE 1194

at 6 (JA __); DE 1112 at 7 (JA __). The terms of that injunction were

affirmed on appeal. In light of this prohibition, Appellants cannot

legally sell the Sanctuary Belize property.

Second, Appellants’ claim that “the only thing they could do (and

would do) with the Sanctuary Belize assets is sell” those assets and pay

the judgment, Br. 22, carries no weight given their extensive history of

engaging in consumer scams, enriching themselves and associates, and

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hiding assets. Appellants insist they would certainly sell the assets

because they “remain subject to the district court’s pervasive injunctive

decrees,” Br. 22, but as this Court noted, “Pukke has repeatedly harmed

and deceived people despite direct injunctions forbidding these very

acts. Had Pukke obeyed the injunctions, he never would have swindled

Sanctuary Belize consumers out of millions of dollars.” Pukke I, 53

F.4th at 103. Given this history, it is vital that Appellants have no

further involvement with the Sanctuary Belize assets. The district court

did not abuse its discretion by appointing a neutral third-party receiver

to manage and dispose of those assets.

D. Appellants’ Attacks on the Receiver Lack Merit.

Appellants’ attacks on the Receiver’s expertise are unwarranted.

They say that their superior knowledge of the Belize market makes

them a better option to sell the property than the Receiver, who “has no

familiarity with that market,” Br. 23. But the Receiver will not

personally sell the property. Instead, the district court charged the

Receiver with “engag[ing] a reputable international real estate

brokerage firm, at commercially reasonable rates and terms” to handle

the process. DE 1446 at 3 (JA __). The Receiver fulfilled that obligation

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by “select[ing] CBRE, Inc.—one of the largest commercial real estate

services and investment firms in the world, with clients in more than

100 countries” following a thorough vetting process. DE 1455 at 17-18

(JA __-__). CBRE will now “serve as the broker for the Belize real estate

assets for an initial period of 18 months and help support any and all

Court-approved sale(s).” Id.

Nor is there any reason to doubt the Receiver’s competence to

oversee the sale of the Sanctuary Belize assets. Appellants suggest

otherwise by quoting, out-of-context, FTC filings focused on a narrow

dispute between the Receiver and the FTC concerning “consumer

survey materials.” DE 1463 at 3 (JA __); see Br. 23. Specifically, the

FTC was arguing that it should have oversight of these materials, and

that the process for surveying consumers should move forward

expeditiously to minimize the Receiver’s costs and preserve money for

consumers. DE 1463 at 3-4 (JA __-__). That has nothing to do with the

Receiver’s qualifications or capability to sell the Sanctuary Belize

property. The FTC remains confident in the Receiver’s ability to

complete that task and is satisfied with the Receiver’s selection of

CBRE to handle the process.

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IV.

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APPELLANTS’ REQUEST FOR AN “ACCOUNTING” IS

FORFEITED AND MERITLESS.

Appellants forfeited their alternative request for an “accounting,”

Br. 24, by failing to make that argument in the district court. See

Padilla v. Troxell, 850 F.3d 168, 178 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Petitioner did not

raise this argument below, and we similarly consider it forfeited on

appeal.”). None of their filings below use the word “accounting” or

propose that it would be an appropriate alternative remedy. See DE

1405, 1417, 1435.

The argument is also meritless. The Receiver in this case files

regular reports with the district court, and those reports include

“accounting and financial statements.” DE 1455 at 20 (JA ___) (title

case removed). The district court did not abuse its discretion by

declining to order an accounting on top of these reports.

CONCLUSION

The Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of standing, or in the

alternative, affirm the district court’s judgment.

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Respectfully submitted,

ANISHA S. DASGUPTA

General Counsel

MATTHEW M. HOFFMAN

Attorney

November 17, 2023

/s/ Benjamin F. Aiken

BENJAMIN F. AIKEN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20580

(202) 326-2151

baiken@ftc.gov

Of Counsel:

BENJAMIN J. THEISMAN

Attorney

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Washington, DC 20580

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1742

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the foregoing brief complies with the volume

limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 8278

words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B)(iii), and that it complies with the typeface requirements

of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed.

R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it was prepared using Microsoft Word

for Microsoft 365 MSO in 14-point Century Schoolbook type.

November 17, 2023

/s/ Benjamin F. Aiken

Benjamin F. Aiken

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.