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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of

)

∗

Eusabio Juarez-Ruffino,

)

Appellant.

)

__________________________________________)

Docket No. 9444

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND MOTION TO STAY

This case arises from sanctions imposed against Eusebio Juarez-Rufino

(“Mr. Juarez”), a trainer, after an Arbitrator held him liable for possession of

diisopropylamine (‘‘dipa”) in violation of rules adopted to implement the

Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020 (“HISA”). 1 Mr. Juarez has filed an

Amended Petition for Appellate Review and Combined Motion to Stay Suspension

Order (the “Review Pet.”). 2 The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the

“Authority”) timely filed individual responses to Mr. Juarez’s Petition (respectively,

the Authority’s “Review Resp.” and “Stay Resp.”).

This Order resolves both matters.

I am spelling Appellant’s name as it appears in the Amended Petition for Review and Combined

Motion to Stay, which the Office of the Secretary of the Commission used in assigning the matter a

docket number. However, Appellant’s racing trainer license, and the Appeal Book generally, spell his

name “Eusebio Juarez-Rufino.” See, e.g., Appeal Book at 160. Where necessary, I use the Appeal

Book spelling throughout the body of this Order.

∗

See 15 U.S.C. § 3051 et seq. Capitalized terms used, but not defined, in this Order, are from HISA

Rule 1020 of the General Provisions and the Protocol. References to a “Rule” are to those

promulgated under HISA, unless otherwise identified.

2 15 U.S.C. § 3058; 16 C.F.R. § 1.146 (the “FTC Rules”).

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Neither party included, in its papers, the Arbitrator’s decision—a core paper

that should rarely be omitted from these initial filings. The Authority, however, has

filed its Appeal Book (“AB”), which includes the Arbitrator’s Corrected Final

Decision, among other materials. 3 I have, therefore, drawn on the Corrected Final

Decision and other parts of the Appeal Book for facts bearing on Mr. Juarez’s

petition and stay motion.

Summary of the Case and the Arbitrator’s Decision

The Authority has adopted, and the FTC has approved, various rules to

implement HISA, including those comprising the Anti-Doping and Medication

Control (“ADMC”) Program. The Horseracing Integrity & Welfare Unit (“HIWU”)

enforces these rules on behalf of the Authority. 4 Violations of various Rules

implementing the ADMC Program provide for sanctions, which can include a period

of Ineligibility to participate in HISA-governed thoroughbred racing, a fine, and

payment of adjudication and legal costs. 5 During the period relevant to this case,

Mr. Juarez was employed as an “exercise rider” for another Trainer. 6 There is no

dispute, however, that he is subject to the prohibitions in the ADMC Program. 7

3 AB 640 (Corrected Final Decision).

4 Rule 3010(e)(1).

5 See, e.g., Rule 3212. HISA Rule 1020 defines “the penalties resulting from the occurrence of one or

more [Rule] violations” as “Consequences,” which parties often refer to as “sanctions,” a term also

used, but not defined, in the Rules. For simplicity, I use the term “sanctions.”

6 AB 99-100 (EAD Notice), 163 (Ruddick Interview Memo), 572-73 (Juarez Pre-hearing Brief).

7 AB 648, at ¶ 4.4, 649, at ¶ 5.2 (Corrected Final Decision).

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The Violation Charged

Rule 3214(a) of the ADMC Program prohibits “Possession of a Banned

Substance . . . unless there is compelling justification for such Possession.” HISA

Rule 1020 defines “Possession,” providing in pertinent part:

Possession means actual, physical possession, or constructive possession

(which shall be found only if the Covered Person has exclusive control or

intends to exercise exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance . . . or the

premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists).

The Rule imposes strict liability, regardless of knowledge or intent, except where

“constructive Possession” is charged:

If the Covered Person does not have exclusive control over the Prohibited

Substance . . . or the premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . , or the

premises in which a Prohibited Substance . . . exists, constructive Possession

shall only be found if the Covered Person knew about the presence of the

Prohibited Substance . . . and intended to exercise control over it. 8

HIWU, however, maintained that Mr. Juarez had “exclusive control” over his SUV,

thereby precluding any need to resort to the knowledge and intent elements of

“constructive” Possession. 9

8 Rule 1020 (definition). See Matter of Shell, FTC No. 9439, 2025 WL 1784696, at *11, n.16 (ALJ

Mar. 6, 2025): HIWU v. Poole, JAMS Case 1501000576, at ¶¶ 7.7-.8 (Aug. 8, 2023), aff’d, FTC No.

9417, 2023 WL 8435860 (ALJ Nov. 13, 2023)

9 AB 086, at ¶¶ 43-46 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief), 15, at ≈4:31:00-4:33:16 (Hearing Video).

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Both equine sporting association codes and those in sports generally include

analogous provisions. 10 Violation of the Rule carries a mandatory 24-month

Ineligibility period for a first offender, plus potential monetary sanctions. 11

In addition to the “compelling justification” defense embedded in the Rule

3214(a), the Rules provide for two other defenses: (1) No Fault or Negligence (“NF”);

and (2) No Significant Fault or Negligence (“NSF”). If the person charged can prove

there was NF on their part, then Rule 3224 eliminates sanctions entirely. If NSF is

proven, sanctions may be reduced, albeit not eliminated, under Rule 3225.

The Underlying Facts

On January 29, 2025, HIWU investigators searched Mr. Juarez’s SUV, then

parked at Oaklawn Park Racetrack in Hot Springs, Arkansas. In the SUV’s frontseat center console, they discovered two hypodermic syringes, which were filled with

a substance later determined, upon laboratory analysis, to be dipa. 12 Dipa is “a

vasodilator, causing smooth muscle relaxation and widening of blood vessels.” 13 It

“can improve blood flow and increased oxygen delivery to various parts of the body,”

See e.g., Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI) Equine Anti-Doping and Controlled Medication

Regulations, Article 2.6 (4th ed. 2025); World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Code, Article 2.6 (2021);

USADA v. Drummond, Case No. AAA 01-14-000-6146, at 19 (Dec. 17, 2014) (“The Panel rejects

Drummond’s contention that actual possession requires his specific intent to have under his custody

and control a particular banned substance whose characteristics were fully known to him.”); Eder v.

International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS 2007/A/1286, 1288 & 1289, at ¶¶ 42, 52 (Jan. 4, 2008)

(possession does not require proving “subjective intent,” or “intent to use”); Diethart v. IOC, CAS

2007/A/1290, at ¶ 40 (Jan. 4, 2008) (possession “constitutes in itself an antidoping rules violation”).

11 Rule 3223(b).

12 AB 641-42, at ¶¶ 2.9-.10, 2.16.

13 AB 178, at ¶ 5 (Healy Witness Statement).

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which can potentially “lead to performance enhancing effects in racehorses.” 14 Dipa,

which lacks FDA approval, has “no reported efficacy or safety data in any species.” 15

Therefore, under the Rules, dipa is a Banned Substance, the use of which “is

prohibited at all times.” 16

Upon HIWU discovering the filled syringes during its search, Mr. Juarez said

“he had no idea how [they] got into his vehicle,” and that he did not “know[] what

substances the two syringes contained.” 17 He further said “he [had] recently

received the vehicle back from the repair shop and suggested they could have come

from there.” 18

Subsequently, HIWU served Mr. Juarez with an EAD Notice, stating that he

had been found in Possession of a Banned Substance, a possible Anti-Doping Rule

Violation (“ADRV”) that could lead to sanctions. 19 In response, Mr. Juarez’s counsel

provided to HIWU written factual narrative, which HIWU has summarized thusly:

Mr. Juarez “did not ‘own’ or intend to possess the substance,” explaining that

the “substance [dipa] was intended for administration to some injured

roosters” owned by Mr. Luis Terrazas, who Trainer Juarez claimed is his

auto-mechanic. 20

14 AB 179, at ¶¶ 5-6 (Healy Witness Statement).

15 AB 179, at ¶ 9 (Healy Witness Statement).

See 88 Fed. Reg. 5124 (Jan. 26, 2023) (Appendix 1 to Rule 4000 Series); AB 179, at ¶¶

7-9 (Healy Witness Statement).

16 Rule 4111.

17 AB 642, at ¶ 2.11 (Corrected Final Decision).

18 AB 642, at ¶ 2.11 (Corrected Final Decision).

19 AB 642, at ¶ 2.17.

See AB 97 (EAD Notice).

20 AB 79-80, at ¶ 20 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief) (footnote omitted), quoting AB 167-68, at ¶¶ 2-3, 7

(unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice).

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The writing further stated that before entering Oaklawn Park on the day of the

search, “Mr. Juarez did not inventory the contents of his vehicle” and thus “was

unaware of the prohibited substance being present.” 21

Mr. Juarez’s counsel elaborated on the facts in an “unsigned, unnotarized,

draft affidavit,” purportedly by Mr. Terrazas, which counsel also provided to

HIWU. 22 He further submitted an alleged receipt for Mr. Terrazas’ work. 23 The

following paragraph summarizes the contents of this document, bearing in mind

that, when offered to HIWU in response to the EAD Notice, Mr. Terrazas had not

signed it.

Mr. Terrazas serviced Mr. Juarez’s SUV during the period January 13-28,

2025. 24 Mr. Juarez brought his SUV to Mr. Terrazas because it “had been

repeatedly overheating.” 25 In order to re-create and then repair the condition,

Mr. Terrazas “drove the SUV several times over the course of about one week.” 26

During that time, he “put the two syringes” into the console of Mr. Juarez’s SUV. 27

Mr. Terrazas had obtained the two filled syringes “from a friend” in order “to

administer the substance in both syringes to several farm animals at [his] home

21 AB 167, at ¶ 1 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice).

22 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief).

23 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief) & 175 (repair shop receipt).

24 AB 171, at ¶¶ 2, 4 (unsigned affidavit).

25 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit).

26 AB 171, at ¶ 2 (unsigned affidavit).

27 AB 171, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit).

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later that day. These animals had been gravely injured by a predator.” 28 The

syringes, however, were not used, as Mr. Terrazas’s wife suggested an alternative

treatment, which was successful. 29 Mr. Terrazas never removed the two syringes

from Mr. Juarez’s SUV and “never told [Mr. Juarez he] had put the syringes in the

SUV console[.]” 30

HIWU determined that Mr. Juarez’s explanation “lacked credibility,” and

thus charged Mr. Juarez with “a Possession ADRV . . . .” 31

HIWU’s Possession charge here was not Mr. Juarez’s first encounter with

dipa, however. In April 2024, HIWU discovered a single syringe, filled with dipa,

during a search of the vehicle Mr. Juarez’s wife had driven to Oaklawn Park. Mrs.

Juarez allegedly obtained the dipa to treat chickens that the couple raise. HIWU

did not charge Mr. Juarez with any ADRV. 32

Besides HIWU charging Possession of dipa in this case, the Oaklawn Park

stewards charged Mr. Juarez with a violation of Racetrack Safety Program Rule

2230(e), which prohibits any person from “possess[ing] a . . . syringe capable of

accepting a needle or injectable of any kind” on the racetracks. 33 Hearings were

conducted before the stewards, who ruled against Mr. Juarez, and, for reasons not

28 AB 172, at ¶ 7 (unsigned affidavit).

29 AB 172, at ¶¶ 8-9 (unsigned affidavit).

30 AB 172, at ¶¶ 11-12 (unsigned affidavit).

31 AB 643, at ¶ 2.21 (Corrected Final Decision).

See also AB 80-81, at ¶ 25 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief).

32 AB 15, at ≈0:36:12-0:37:30, ≈1:14:39-1:14:59 (Bennett) & ≈2:57:38-3:02:00, ≈3:24:43-3:34:35

(Juarez) (Hearing Video).

33 AB 643, at ¶ 2.27.

See also AB 646, at ¶¶ 3.18-.20.

51 AB 654, at ¶ 7.1 & 656-57, at ¶¶ 7.6-.8 (Corrected Final Decision).

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He further testified that the volume of diisopropylamine was inconsistent with the

volume that could possibly be administered to roosters or other fowl.” 52

Mr. Juarez himself was the only defense witness. He maintained that, from

his experience treating chickens, a large hypodermic needle could be used. 53 He also

was permitted to testify regarding matters relating to Mr. Terrazas. 54 The repair

shop receipt, excluded by the Arbitrator’s pre-hearing ruling, was “ultimately

admitted into evidence.” 55

Mr. Juarez testified that, once HIWU’s search ended, “the first thing” he did

was “finish my job and call Luis.” 56 The two knew each other. Both raise chickens. 57

However, exactly what Mr. Terrazas told Mr. Juarez during their call is unclear. At

one point, Mr. Juarez testified that he learned Mr. Terrazas obtained the filled

syringes from a fellow chicken farmer to treat his injured fowl. 58 But on crossexamination, Mr. Juarez said he first learned of the attack on Mr. Terrazas’s

chickens “a week, a week and a half” after the search. 59 According to Mr. Juarez,

52 AB 659, at ¶ 7.18.b (Corrected Final Decision).

53 AB 15, at 2:53:22-53:52 (Juarez) (Hearing Video).

54 AB 647, at ¶ 3.25 (Corrected Final Decision).

55 AB 647, at ¶ 3.28 (Corrected Final Decision).

56 AB 15, at ≈2:50:55-2:51:02 (Juarez) (Hearing Video).

57 AB 15, at ≈2:51:33-2:51:41 (Juarez) (Hearing Video). See AB 167, at ¶ 4 (unnumbered) (The two

were “previously acquainted.”) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice).

58 AB 15, at ≈2:52:14-2:53:22 (Juarez) (Hearing Video).

59 AB 15, at ≈3:34:44-3:35:13 (Juarez) (Hearing Video).

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Mr. Terrazas knew only that he’d been given medicine, but not what was in the two

syringes. 60

After the hearing, the Arbitrator found Mr. Juarez in violation of Rule

3214(a)’s Possession prohibition. Discussing the evidence proving Possession in

greater detail, the Arbitrator held that Mr. Juarez “had exclusive control” over his

SUV, where the dipa was found. 61 And although Mr. Juarez argued “he was not

conscious of the Diisopropylamine being in his vehicle because his vehicle had been

in the shop and his mechanic must have placed the Diisopropylamine filled syringes

inside his center console,” that was “of no legal moment under the definition of

Possession.” 62

That left for determination whether Mr. Juarez had proven either NF or NSF

as a defense. Analyzing the facts, the Arbitrator determined that Mr. Juarez’s

“objective” and “subjective” fault were considerable.” 63 Therefore, Mr. Juarez

“should suffer a period of Ineligibility at the highest end of the range, 24 months,

commencing with the HIWU notification of Final Sanctions.” 64

60 AB 15, at ≈2:52:36-2:53:19 (Juarez) (Hearing Video),168, at 2 [¶ 2] (unnumbered page) (counsel’s

response to EAD Notice).

61 AB 657, at ¶ 7.10 (Corrected Final Decision).

62 AB 657, at ¶¶ 7.8, 7.9 (Corrected Final Decision).

. See generally AB 658, at ¶¶ 7.15-.17 (discussing the NSF analysis

derived from Cilic v. International Tennis Federation, CAS 2013/A/3327 (Apr. 11, 2024), which is

commonly used in HISA cases).

63 AB 659, at ¶¶ 7.19 & 7.20

64 AB 659, at ¶ 7.22 (Corrected Final Decision).

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Since Mr. Juarez’s fault was “considerable,” it necessarily followed he could

not eliminate sanctions entirely under a NF analysis. Thus, the Arbitrator did not

discuss NF further.

Accordingly, the Arbitrator awarded the following sanctions against

Mr. Juarez:

1. A 24-month period of Ineligibility.

2. A fine of $10,000, reduced from $25,000 maximum, inasmuch as there was

no evidence Mr. Juarez intended wrongdoing or gained any benefit from

Possession of the dipa.

3. A contribution of $8,000 toward HIWU’s share of the arbitration costs. 65

The Arbitrator further directed HIWU to publish his decision in accordance with

applicable Rules. 66

Mr. Juarez’s Review Petition

Mr. Juarez seeks review of the Corrected Final Decision and resulting

sanction on the basis of the Arbitrator’s exclusion of “a necessary defense witness

despite Trainer’s prior timely identification of that witness.” 67 Although identified

only as “Witness A,” the individual is described “as a person with firsthand

knowledge concerning how the contraband [two syringes with dipa] came to be

located in the center console of Trainer’s vehicle.” 68 From the Appeal Book material

65 AB 659-60, at ¶¶ 7.23-.29 (Corrected Final Decision).

sanctions).

See Rule 3223 (prescribing the applicable

66 AB 660, at ¶¶ 7.30 (Corrected Final Decision) (citing Rules 3231 and 3630).

67 Review Pet. at 2.

Id. at 3.

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filed, that can only be Mr. Terrazas. His exclusion, Mr. Juarez argues, violated: (1)

“the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; (2) “Rule 3220(a)” and

“Rule 3219(e)”; (3) “HIWU Arbitration Procedure § 10(d)”; and (4) “[d]ouble

jeopardy,” based apparently on the fact that Mr. Juarez was sanctioned for both

possession of the syringes and for the dipa they contained. 69

Rule “3219(e),” “3220(a),” and “§ 10(d)” do not exist. And regardless of

whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies here, HISA and the Rules themselves

provide for due process and therefore provide a basis to review the decision to

exclude Mr. Terrazas. 70 For reasons discussed below, I refrain from substantively

addressing Mr. Juarez’s “double jeopardy” argument, as it is superfluous for present

purposes.

Finally, Mr. Juarez requests an evidentiary hearing “to present evidence

excluded below over valid objection.” 71 Again, I take this to refer to testimony by

Mr. Terrazas.

The Authority’s Response

The Authority contends that the Arbitrator had multiple grounds on which to

exclude Mr. Terrazas. In summary, Mr. Juarez “acknowledged that he failed to

comply with Procedural Order #1, including the requirement to provide a pre-

Id. at 2-5.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3057(c)(3), 3058(b)(2)(B) (importing Administrative Procedure Act requirements

in 5 U.S.C. § 556); Rule 3122(e); FTC Rule 1.146(c)(1)(ii).

71 Review Pet. at 1 (boldface omitted).

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hearing submission or evidence.” 72 Mr. Juarez, the Authority maintains, “cannot

flout the Rules and then cry foul when the Rules are nonetheless applied.” 73

The Authority further notes that the Arbitrator heard “substantial hearsay

testimony [from Mr. Juarez] regarding [Mr. Terrazas’s] alleged intended use of the

[dipa] found in [Mr. Juarez’s] possession.” 74 Hence, the Arbitrator’s exclusion ruling

was “harmless because it would not have changed the Arbitrator’s determination

that the Appellant’s failure to mitigate his fault put him in the uppermost range of

fault.” 75

The Authority urges resolution of this review on the briefs. However, if an

evidentiary hearing is directed, it “requests that the witnesses presented on behalf

of HIWU below be permitted to testify.” 76 The Authority offers no elaboration on

why it would be appropriate to receive additional testimony from witnesses who

already testified for HIWU at the arbitration, however.

Besides seeking review and an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Juarez also seeks a

stay of the sanctions imposed. I will consider the stay motion first. After that, I

address the review petition and the course of further proceedings in this case.

72 Review Resp. at 3 (footnote omitted), quoting AB 645, at ¶ 3.9 (Corrected Final Decision).

73 Review Resp. at 4.

74 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 3 (Since Mr. Juarez had the “opportunity to crossexamine witnesses and make an argument in his defense at a hearing,” he received due process.).

Id. at 5.

Id. at 6.

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II.

Mr. Juarez’s Motion for a Stay

Under FTC Rule 1.148(c) & (d), an application for a stay of the sanctions imposed

“must provide the reasons a stay is . . . warranted by addressing the [following] factors . . .

and the facts relied upon”:

(1) The likelihood of the applicant’s success on review;

(2) Whether the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted;

(3) The degree of injury to other parties or third parties if a stay is granted; and

(4) Whether the stay is in the public interest. 77

Moreover, “[a] stay pending appeal is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of

administration and judicial review, so this extraordinary relief is never granted as a matter

of right.” 78

Summary of the Parties’ Positions

Mr. Juarez maintains that “[g]ood cause exists very simply because the

suspension order [that is, the Ineligibility sanction] rests on proceedings that

violated due process.” 79 Mr. Juarez argues that he will suffer irreparable injury: “he

will unavoidably suffer reputational damage that cannot be undone even if the

appeal succeeds; and he will be deprived of income and racing opportunities critical

to livelihood.” 80 In his view, “[t]he absence of a stay would effectively destroy appeal

77 87 Fed. Reg. 60083.

factors).

See generally Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (adopting comparable

78 Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins, No. 25-2089, 2025 WL 3135862, at *5 (1st Cir.

Nov. 9, 2025) (cleaned up), admin. stay extended, No. 25A539, 2025 WL 3145875 (U.S. Nov. 11, 2025)

(mem.). See also Media Matters for America v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966, at *3 (D.C. Cir.

Oct. 23, 2025) (A stay “pending appeal is an extraordinary form of relief.”) (cleaned up).

79 Review Pet. at 7.

Id. at 8.

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rights” and “merely compound[] the deprivation [of due process], rather than curing

it.” 81 The balance of equities and public interest are said to “favor[] ensuring [that]

disciplinary actions are administered in a manner consistent with constitutional

and statutory fairness.” 82

Opposing stay relief, the Authority argues that because Mr. Juarez “fail[ed]

to take advantage of procedural safeguards available to him,” his due process and

related objections have a “low” likelihood of success. 83 The Authority further

cautions that overturning the Arbitrator’s enforcement of his Orders and the

procedural Rules “would generally erode the validity of the Arbitration

Procedures.” 84 As for irreparable injury, the Authority argues that Mr. Juarez’s

“conclusory assertions” of reputational harm and loss of business prospects lack

factual support. 85

The Authority also contends a stay would harm other parties—“Responsible

Persons,” referring to rival Trainers and other industry participants, as well as “the

betting public,” who are the beneficiaries of the ADMC Program’s “mission to

protect horse welfare” and “the integrity of horseracing.” 86 Comparable

considerations similarly inform the public interest, which is served by “individual

Id.

Id. at 9.

83 Stay Resp. at 3.

Id. at 5.

Id.

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compliance with the rules and regulations validly promulgated by [administrative]

agencies.” 87

Likelihood of Success

On a stay motion, “[t]he first two factors of the traditional standard are the most

critical.” 88 Moreover, likely success on the merits must be “better than negligible.” 89 Here,

specifically, there is no dispute that in January 2025, HIWU found two syringes, filled with

dipa, a Banned Substance, in Mr. Juarez’s SUV, while it was located at Oaklawn Park

racetrack. Mr. Juarez, however, denies knowing the two syringes were there and maintains

that—unbeknownst to him—the syringes were put there by Mr. Terrazas, the auto

mechanic who serviced his SUV in the days immediately preceding HIWU’s search.

Mr. Juarez sought to call Mr. Terrazas as an arbitration witness, offering as support

a purported signed affidavit by Mr. Terrazas. In that document, Mr. Terrazas recounts his

obtaining the two dipa-filled syringes to treat injured fowl he owned and his putting them

in the SUV during the time he had the vehicle for servicing. However, he forgot to remove

the syringes upon returning the SUV to Mr. Juarez, or to tell Mr. Juarez about them.

This exculpatory evidence was not simply a tile in the mosaic of Mr. Juarez’s defense

to HIWU’s Possession charge. It was the mosaic itself. Mr. Juarez had no other explanation

for what HIWU found. Two years of his professional life was at risk.

The Arbitrator excluded Mr. Juarez’s proposed evidence, when formally offered less

than 48 hours before the scheduled start of the arbitration hearing. His submission was

Id.

Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

89 Id. See also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1019 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (“Crossroads’ appeal shows little prospect of success—an arguably fatal flaw for a stay

application.”).

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untimely under Procedural Order No. 1, to be sure. But—contrary to HIWU’s assertion in

moving to preclude—testimony from Mr. Terrazas would not have been “ambush

evidence.” 90 Mr. Juarez had alerted HIWU to Mr. Terrazas as a source for the dipa-filled

syringes during the very search itself and had provided more detailed information months

before the September 2025 proceedings.

•

January 29, 2025: Mr. Juarez “claimed to have no idea how the two syringes got into

his lower center console or what substances the two syringes contained,” and said

that “he recently received the vehicle back from a repair shop and alluded the

syringes were left behind by the repair technician.” 91

•

January 29, 2025: Mr. Juarez told his trainer-employer, Ingrid Mason, that “he had

no idea where the needles and syringes came from or how they got in his SUV. He

told her maybe the mechanics at the repair shop from where he had just picked his

SUV up had put them in it. . . . MASON said she believed JUAREZ was telling her

the truth.” 92

•

April 25, 2025: In response to HIWU’s EAD Notice, Mr. Juarez’s counsel: (a) advised

HIWU that “the ‘substance was ‘intended for administration to some injured

roosters’ owned by Mr. Luis Terrazas, who Trainer Juarez claimed is his automechanic.” 93; and (b) also provided a “typed, unsigned, unnotarized, draft affidavit

90 AB 610 (HIWU motion to preclude or, in the alternative, for continuance).

91 AB 141 (HIWU Interview/Intelligence Report of January 29, 2025).

See

also AB 139, at ¶ 33 (Bennett Witness Statement, confirming that AB 163 “is accurate.”). But see AB

92 AB 163 (HIWU Interview/Intelligence Report of January 29, 2025) (capitalization in original).

15, at ≈0:53:03-0:53:10 (Bennett) (Hearing Video) (when interviewed, Mason “parroted” Juarez’s

explanation, suggesting the two had talked).

93 AB 79-80 (footnote omitted) quoting AB 168, at ¶ 7 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD

Notice).

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allegedly from Mr. Terrazas,” as well as “an alleged handwritten receipt for the auto

repair.” 94

•

July 30, 2025: Mr. Juarez “watched [the HIWU investigator] recover the syringes

from the lower center console; [Juarez] suggested they may have been left there by

his auto-mechanic.” 95

•

August 1, 2025: Mr. Juarez “claimed he had no idea how the two syringes got into

his lower-center console and denied knowing what substance the two syringes

contained,” and “claimed he recently received the vehicle back from the repair shop

and suggested they could have come from there.” 96

The purported Terrazas affidavit and repair shop receipt, which Mr. Juarez

offered less than 48 hours before the hearing, were identical to that which his

counsel had provided to HIWU more than four months earlier. So, HIWU was not

blind-sided in September.

When Mr. Juarez filed his belated pre-hearing papers, it is fair to infer that

both the Arbitrator and HIWU were frustrated by his failure (or probably more

likely, that of his counsel) to comply with the service deadlines and other

requirements that had been ordered. Nevertheless, the evidence from Mr. Terrazas

was the centerpiece to the entire case. If Mr. Terrazas testified along the lines in

the purported affidavit, and after cross-examination proved to be credible, analysis

of HIWU’s Possession charge could change markedly. Regardless of the niceties that

94 AB 80, at ¶ 21 (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief), referring to AB 171 (unsigned affidavit) & AB 175

(repair shop receipt).

95 AB 137, at ¶ 20 (Bennett Witness Statement).

96 AB 77, at ¶ 17(b) (footnotes omitted) (HIWU Pre-hearing Brief).

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define “actual, physical, and constructive” “Possession” under Rule 1020,

Mr. Terrazas’ testimony, if believed, could move the needle on Mr. Juarez’s NF and

NSF defenses, potentially reducing the otherwise mandatory two-year Ineligibility

period.

In granting HIWU’s motion to preclude, the Arbitration cited Rule 7170(e),

which provides in pertinent part that “[i]f a party should have submitted evidence

in the party’s pre-hearing submission but did not submit such evidence, the

arbitrator(s) shall not admit such evidence absent a showing of good cause.” 97

Mr. Juarez had previously provided HIWU with details regarding Mr. Terrazas

comparable to those required for a pre-hearing witness statement, however. And as

an alternative to preclusion, HIWU itself was willing to accept Mr. Juarez’s

proposed evidence if granted a continuance and possible costs. 98

In the circumstances here, there was a colorable showing of “good cause” to

relieve Mr. Juarez of his failure to make a timely pre-hearing submission.

In Wilkerson v. Turner, 99 the defendant, charged with burglary, obtained an

affidavit from another individual, “exonerating the defendant.” 100 The Court denied

the defendant a continuance of his burglary trial, which could have allowed the noncharged, confessing individual to be produced as a witness, and the defendant was

See AB 646, at ¶ 3.19 (emphasis added). See id. 064, at ¶ 10.a (Procedural Order No. 1).

98 AB 609-10 (HIWU motion to preclude or, alternative, for continuance).

99 693 F.2d 121 (11th Cir. 1982).

100

Id. at 122.

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convicted. The Court of Appeals held that there was a due process violation and

granted habeas corpus relief that effectively required a new trial. 101

Again, putting constitutional applicability aside, HISA itself directs that the

Rules implementing the statute “shall provide for adequate due process, including

impartial hearing officers or tribunals commensurate with the seriousness of the

alleged safety, performance, or anti-doping and medication control rule violation

and the possible civil sanctions for such violation.” 102 In approving the ADMC

Program Rules, the FTC, too, was mindful that due process needed to be assured. 103

Here, evidence from Mr. Terrazas was so potentially exculpatory that its

exclusion impairs the due process protection applicable in HIWU cases. Although

the Arbitrator received hearsay testimony from Mr. Juarez, barring Mr. Terrazas

himself was not, as the Authority contends, “harmless” as a matter of law on the

facts here. 104 Courts have long-described testimonial hearsay as “exceedingly

infirm, unsatisfactory[,] and intrinsically weak in its very nature and character.” 105

Thus, its persuasive force will rarely equal that of testimony by a witness with first-

See also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (exclusion of evidence on “a critical issue” and

that bore indicia of reliability—whether or not the defendant was present when another committed

the criminal acts—denied due process); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (limitations on

defendant’s ability to cross examine a witness who had confessed to the crime with which the

defendant was charged denied due process).

101

102 15 U.S.C. § 3057(c)(3).

103

See generally 87 Fed. Reg. 60077-78 (Oct. 4, 2022).

104

Review Resp. at 5.

105

Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. 412, 436 (1836).

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hand knowledge of the facts. That, after all, is part of the reason that hearsay is

often excluded as evidence. 106

I cannot prejudge whether Mr. Terrazas’s testimony will be credible, of

course. But the stay factor of success on the merits favors Mr. Juarez.

Irreparable Injury

HIWU argues that “harm to . . . professional reputation and loss of business

prospects” often are insufficient to establish irreparable injury, particularly where

there is a remedy at law. 107 But as the Authority’s citation to Janvey v. Alguire itself

recognizes, there are exceptions. 108 Depending on the facts, denial of the opportunity

to practice one’s livelihood pending review of disciplinary action can constitute

irreparable injury.

For example, in Walker v. Memorial Health System of East Texas, 109 the

plaintiff, a physician, received a negative review of his professional competence,

which his hospital reported to the National Practitioners Data Bank. That report

“almost certainly proves detrimental to a practitioner’s livelihood . . . .” 110 The

physician pursued an internal review process and simultaneously filed suit in court

for injunctive relief. Granting a preliminary injunction, the Court wrote: “The

See, e.g., United States v. Dollison, No. 3:09-cr-00106-SLG-DMS, 2017 WL 3873698, at *7 (D.

Alaska Sept. 4, 2017) (“the testimony of witnesses with direct knowledge is generally more

persuasive than hearsay witnesses”); Valdez v. Williams Energy Servs., No. Civ. 99-1334 BB/WWD,

2001 WL 37125329, at *2 (D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2001) (“hearsay testimony must be disregarded in favor of

the direct testimony”).

106

107

See Stay Resp. at 5.

108 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011), cited in

id. at 5 n.15.

109 231 F. Supp. 3d 210 (E.D. Tex. 2017).

110

Id. at 214.

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injunctive relief that Dr. Walker seeks is very time sensitive, and the dissemination

of this report throughout the relevant medical community is a bell that cannot

otherwise be unrung.” 111

Similarly, in Berryhill v. Gibson, 112 the three-judge court held that the risk of

revocation of a professional license, and attendant publicity, arising from

proceedings before a panel whose members practiced the same profession

threatened a due process violation that “would cause irreparable damage . . . .” 113

The Court wrote: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due

process.” 114

There is no claim here that the Arbitrator lacked impartiality. However, his

ruling barring Mr. Terrazas as a witness, instead of granting a continuance of the

hearing, meant that HIWU’s charge would be resolved without the admission of

significant, potentially exculpatory, evidence. The Arbitrator thereafter ruled in

favor of HIWU, awarding sanctions, which currently prevent Mr. Juarez from

working at Covered Racetracks for the next two years.

On a stay motion, a “sliding scale” analysis often is warranted: “injury held

insufficient to justify a stay in one case may well be sufficient to justify it in

another, where the applicant has demonstrated a higher probability of success on

Id. at 217. See also Rosario v. Weirton Med. Ctr., No. 17-cv-0085, 2018 WL 1960952 (W.D. Pa.

Apr. 26, 2018) (finding irreparable injury on similar facts).

111

112 331 F. Supp. 122 (M.D. Ala. 1971),

aff’d in relevant part, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).

113 331 F. Supp. at 126.

114

Id. at 125.

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the merits.” 115 The facts here sufficiently call into question the fairness of the

arbitration hearing and meet the irreparable injury requirement for stay relief.

Accordingly, this factor also favors Mr. Juarez.

Injury to Others and the Public Interest

The Authority contends, in substance, that a stay would harm other industry

participants—presumably those who follow the Rules—and the betting public.

Likewise, a stay, it maintains, would disserve thoroughbred racing integrity and

safety.

But there is no evidence that Mr. Juarez doped any horse, or secured dipafilled syringes for the purpose of doing so. Instead, this is a case involving

Possession. And if Mr. Terrazas’s testimony were to be believed, the most that could

be said is that Mr. Juarez should have searched his SUV more carefully when it

came back after servicing. Mr. Terrazas is an auto mechanic whose interests are

said not to relate to horses. 116 He would not seem to be a likely supplier of dipa to

Mr. Juarez. Moreover, HIWU offered no evidence that he committed prior

violations. So, there is no basis for inferring his unwillingness to comply with the

Rules.

Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Roland

Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing authorities);

Brady v. NFL, 640 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011).

115

116 AB 167, at ¶ 3 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice).

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Under these circumstances, no meaningful harm to others is apparent. Nor

would the public interest mandate denial of a stay. The final factors favor

Mr. Juarez.

Mr. Terrazas’s testimony has significant exculpatory potential. The contents

of his purported, signed affidavit, offered in the arbitration, show that he has firsthand knowledge of facts probative of HIWU’s Possession charge. 117 He swears,

among other things, that:

I had possession of the SUV from January 13, 2025, until January 28, 2025.

The truck was returned to Eusebio on January 28, 2025; . . . . I put the two

syringes . . . into the front seat center console compartment of the SUV. . . . I

was the only person having access [to] the truck during the week it was at my

shop was me [sic]. I was the only person who drove the truck during that

time[.] 118

The date on the purported affidavit—February 1, 2025—suggests that the facts

were memorialized in writing and adopted by him at a time when they were fresh in

his mind, and those facts do not appear to be ones about which Mr. Terrazas might

reasonably be mistaken. 119

When Mr. Juarez sought, belatedly, to call Mr. Terrazas as a witness at the

arbitration hearing, a fair and impartial resolution of the case would have been

better assured not by excluding him, but instead by directing the alternative relief

HIWU requested—continuance of the hearing and a possible application for costs.

117 AB 583 (purported affidavit).

118 AB 583-84, at ¶¶ 4,7, 10 (purported affidavit).

119 AB 585-86 (purported affidavit).

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Therefore, to the extent provided below, I will direct an evidentiary hearing at

which Mr. Terrazas may testify.

III.

Petition for Review

FTC Rule 1.146(c)(2) provides that:

In reviewing the final civil sanction and decision of the Authority, the

Administrative Law Judge may rely in full or in part on the factual record

developed before the Authority through the disciplinary process under 15

U.S.C. 3057(c) and disciplinary hearings under Authority Rule Series 8300.

The record may be supplemented by an evidentiary hearing conducted by the

Administrative Law Judge to ensure each party receives a fair and impartial

hearing. Within 20 days of the filing of an application for review, based on

the application submitted by the aggrieved party or by the Commission and

on any response by the Authority, the Administrative Law Judge will assess

whether:

(i) The parties do not request to supplement or contest the facts found

by the Authority;

(ii) The parties do not seek to contest any facts found by the Authority,

but at least one party requests to supplement the factual record;

(iii) At least one party seeks to contest any facts found by the

Authority;

(iv) The Commission, if it filed the application for review, seeks

supplementation of the record; or

(v) In the Administrative Law Judge’s view, the factual record is

insufficient to adjudicate the merits of the review proceeding. 120

120 In a review proceeding such as this, arising from violation of an ADMC Program Rule, the

references in Rule 1.146 to “facts found by the Authority” are sensibly understood to refer to those

found by the “Arbitral Body,” which is the fact finder and which may, as here, consist of a single

arbitrator. See Rules 3261, 7020, 7060; Order on Application for Review and Application for Stay,

Matter of Overly, FTC No. 9443, slip op. at 7, n.23 (ALJ Nov. 20, 2025). By contrast, the Authority

can have a role as a fact finder in cases arising from rules implementing the Racetrack Safety

Program. See, e.g., Rules 8200(b) & (d), 8320, 8340 8350, 8370.

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Mr. Juarez has requested an evidentiary hearing to offer Mr. Terrazas’s

testimony. 121 And if a hearing is directed, the Authority requests that HIWU’s

witnesses “below be permitted to testify.” 122 As the preceding discussion reflects, I

have determined that the record should “be supplemented by an evidentiary

hearing . . . to ensure each party receives a fair and impartial hearing.” 123

The review that I conduct here is de novo. 124 Thus, if testimony from

Mr. Terrazas at an evidentiary hearing were deemed credible, it could, conceivably,

benefit Mr. Juarez’s NF or NSF arguments and, thus, affect the sanctions imposed.

However, full exoneration would be less likely under Rule 3124(a)’s strict liability

regime. On the other hand, if Mr. Terrazas’ testimony were lacking in credibility,

there could be adverse consequences. Testimony before this Court is, of course,

given under oath.

Mr. Terrazas does not appear to be a “Covered Person” under Rule 1020 or

otherwise subject to HISA and the Rules. 125 Mr. Juarez may be able to secure his

appearance and testimony on a voluntary basis. But that alone is not enough. The

evidentiary hearing must assure that “each” party’s interests are protected. Thus,

the Authority (or HIWU) must be permitted to conduct effective cross-examination,

121

Review Pet. at 1.

122 Review Resp. at 6.

123

FTC Rule 1.146(c)(2).

124

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b)(1); FTC Rule 1.146(b)(2) & (3).

See AB 167, at ¶ 3 (unnumbered) (counsel’s response to EAD Notice) (“Mr. Terrazas is not in the

horse business and never has been. He is generally unfamiliar with horses.”).

125

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which may include an opportunity to secure appropriate documents. 126 To

accomplish this, I will direct an evidentiary hearing on the condition that

Mr. Juarez obtain Mr. Terrazas’s consent to be subject to this Court’s authority. I

have, therefore, attached to this Order a draft “Witness Agreement,” which, as

explained further below, I propose to finalize and require to be signed.

Also, at the arbitration hearing, Mr. Juarez’s counsel argued at length that

the Oaklawn Park stewards’ hearing and eventual resolution regarding Possession

of the two syringes should operate as some sort of defense to HIWU’s charge of

Possession of the dipa itself. Apart from alluding generally to the criminal law

doctrine of “double jeopardy,” he offered no authority for his position. 127 His review

petition suggests, however, that he proposes to raise the matter in this

proceeding. 128 To avoid any misunderstanding, I address this position.

FTC Rule 1.146(a)(1) provides that, “[e]xcept for good cause shown, no

assignment of error by the aggrieved party may rely on any question of fact or law

not presented to the [Arbitrator].” 129 Mr. Juarez had an opportunity to introduce

facts relating to the Oaklawn Park stewards’ hearing at the Arbitration. Insofar as

he failed to do so, he has not set forth grounds sufficient to show good cause

entitling him to offer more factual matter. Therefore, I will not permit him to

126

See, e.g., Matter of Lynch, FTC No. 9423, 2024 WL 2045679 (ALJ May 1, 2024) (granting issuance

of a subpoena duces tecum).

127

AB 15, at ≈0:17:31-0:23:59, ≈0:26:26-0:30:06, ≈4:58:58-5:01:20, ≈5:02:02-5:07:30, ≈5:10:56-5:14:15

(Hearing Video).

128 Review Pet. at 3, 8-9.

129

See supra n.120.

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introduce any additional evidence here related to the Oaklawn Park stewards’

hearing. At an appropriate time, I will provide the parties an opportunity to brief

Mr. Juarez’s professed “defense.” However, I will not entertain any oral argument

on this matter by Mr. Juarez’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing or any other

proceeding on this review. The Arbitration hearing record includes his argument

there. Any further oral presentation would be needlessly cumulative.

Steps Relating to the Evidentiary Hearing

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. An evidentiary hearing will take place on a date, time, and place to be

determined upon the conditions and completion of the matters set forth below.

Mr. Juarez will be permitted to call Luis Terrazas as a witness at the hearing.

2. Counsel for the parties must CONFER regarding the attached draft

Witness Agreement and NOTIFY me by no later than December 11, 2025, either

that:

(a) it is acceptable; or

(b) they have proposed changes, shown by attaching the draft with redlined

edits.

If the form of Witness Agreement is acceptable to counsel, or if the proposed edited

version is acceptable to the Court, I will issue an Order regarding further

procedures leading to an evidentiary hearing (“Hearing Order No. 1”). On the other

hand, if changes are proposed that I believe warrant discussion, I will schedule a

telephonic or Zoom conference of counsel for the parties.

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3. Once the form of the Witness Agreement is finalized, Mr. Juarez’s counsel

must provide it to him for signature, after which it must be filed in this case.

4. If Mr. Terrazas declines to sign the finalized Witness Agreement and

alternative arrangements, acceptable to the Court, are not otherwise agreed to, no

evidentiary hearing will be held.

5. If Mr. Terrazas intends to be represented by counsel at the hearing,

counsel must file a notice of appearance or appropriate motion under § 4.1 of the

FTC’s Rules of Practice.

6. In issuing Hearing Order No. 1, I will include steps that will enable the

Authority to determine whether to renew its request to also call one or more

witnesses to testify. If the request is renewed, I will rule on it.

Additional Required Review Material

As noted earlier, although the Authority has filed an Appeal Book, it does not

include a transcript of the arbitration hearing. Therefore, I hereby ORDER that:

By no later than December 9, 2025, the Authority must file a written

transcript of the arbitration hearing, to be denominated “Appeal Book 2” (“AB2”).

Each page of AB2 shall bear a sequential number using at least a 20-point font size.

The Authority’s attention is further directed to the Matter of Michael Hewitt,

FTC No. 9438, 2024 WL 5078323, at*4 (ALJ Nov. 1, 2024):

This is the second proceeding in recent months in which HIWU’s Appeal Book

has omitted a written transcript of the proceedings sought to be reviewed. The

Authority and HIWU are hereby NOTIFIED that:

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1. Henceforth, whenever HIWU is required to file an Appeal Book in an FTC

ALJ review proceeding, written transcripts of any proceedings relevant to

the review sought must be included in the Appeal Book when filed, and

not afterward.

2. The transcript may be prepared from a stenographic record created

contemporaneous with the proceeding subject to review, or from an

audio/video recording of the proceeding created afterwards, or from such

other method as the parties may agree to, and must include a certification

or party stipulation of accuracy.

Unless otherwise ordered, all filing and service dates in this case must be

made by 5 p.m. EST on the date specificized. As a reminder, courtesy copies of all

papers required to be filed in this case must also be sent to OALJ@ftc.gov.

I offer this additional cautionary observation. Procedural Order No. 1 in the

arbitration instructed that “[a]ll deadlines and requirements stated herein will be

strictly enforced.” 130 Mr. Juarez’s counsel’s attention to, and compliance with, the

Arbitrator’s instruction left much to be desired, to put it charitably. I will not

tolerate any similar disregard. The deadlines in this case will be strictly enforced as

to all parties.

130 AB 645, at ¶ 3.4 (Corrected Final Decision).

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I have considered all the matters raised in Mr. Juarez’s Amended Petition for

Appellate Review and Combined Motion to Stay Suspension Order and find them

unpersuasive except to the extent set forth above.

ORDERED:

Jay L. Himes

Administrative Law Judge

Date: December 2, 2025

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Exhibit A

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

__________________________________________

)

In the Matter of

)

Eusebio Juarez-Rufino,

)

Appellant.

)

__________________________________________)

Docket No. 9444

WITNESS AGREEMENT [DRAFT]

I, Luis Terrazas, state as follows:

1. I understand that Eusebio Juarez-Rufino, the Appellant in this case, seeks

to call me to give sworn testimony as a witness on his behalf at an evidentiary

hearing that will be scheduled in the case. I further understand that if I appear as a

witness and testify, I will be subject to cross-examination by counsel for the

Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (“the Authority”) and may also be

questioned by the Court.

2. I agree to appear at the evidentiary hearing and to testify.

3. For the purposes of this case only, I voluntarily consent to the authority of

this Court, including that conferred by 5 U.S.C. § 556, 15 U.S.C. § 3058(b), and FTC

Rule 1.146(c).

4. I understand that the evidentiary hearing is expected to be conducted via

Zoom or another comparable video/audio application. If it is, I consent to my

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Exhibit A

testimony at the hearing being deemed given in New York, New York, just as if I

testified in person there.

5. I also understand that if satisfactory arrangements for a remote

evidentiary hearing cannot be reached, then the hearing will be conducted in person

in either New York, New York or Washington, D.C. I will be apprised of the location

at least 14 calendar days in advance of the hearing date.

6. I understand that, if I wish to do so, I may speak to an attorney concerning

this matter before signing this Agreement. I also understand that I may be

represented by an attorney when I testify at the evidentiary hearing.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at ______________, Arkansas, on December______, 2025.

______________________________

Luis Terrazas

AGREED:

Date:_______________________, 2025

____________________________

John Mac Hayes, OBA#15512

1601 S. Victor Ave.

Tulsa, OK 74104

(405) 918 888 0630

JohnMacHayesLaw@aol.com

Attorney for Appellant Eusebio Juarez-Rufino

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Exhibit A

___________________

Bryan Beauman

Rebecca Price

333 W. Vine Street, Suite 1500

Lexington, Kentucky 40507

Telephone: (859) 255-8581

bbeauman@sturgillturner.com

rprice@sturgillturner.com

HISA ENFORCEMENT COUNSEL

_______________________

Michelle C. Pujals

Allison J. Farrell

4801 Main Street, Suite 350

Kansas City, MO 64112

Telephone: (816) 291-1864

mpujals@hiwu.org

afarrell@hiwu.org

HORSERACING INTEGRITY & WELFARE UNIT,

A DIVISION OF DRUG FREE SPORT LLC

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.