UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS:

Andrew N. Ferguson, Chairman

Mark R. Meador

In the Matter of

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND TO

GLOBAL DISINFORMATION INDEX

DATED MAY 20, 2025

)

) File No. 251-0061

) PUBLIC

)

ORDER DENYING PETITION TO QUASH

CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND

By FERGUSON, Chairman:

The Global Disinformation Index (GDI) petitions the Commission to quash in its entirety

a Civil Investigative Demand (CID) issued on May 20, 2025, in connection with the

Commission’s investigation into whether any natural persons, partnerships, corporations,

associations, or other legal entities have engaged in unfair methods of competition, including

boycotts or other forms of collusion or coordination, with respect to withholding, degrading,

increasing the cost of, or otherwise diminishing the quantity of advertising placed on news

outlets, media platforms, or other publishers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1, or Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.

GDI requests that the Commission quash the CID because (1) the Commission lacks the

authority under the FTC Act to enforce the antitrust laws against nonprofits like GDI; and (2) the

CID infringes upon GDI’s First Amendment rights. 1 Petition, at 6. For the reasons set forth

below, we deny GDI’s petition.

BACKGROUND

GDI describes itself as a nonprofit organization that “was guided by its charitable

GDI sporadically argues that the CID is both unduly burdensome and vague and ambiguous, but does not expressly

identify these arguments as an independent basis to quash the CID. Petition, at 4, 12–14. GDI does not substantiate

its burden claims by affidavit or other documentation, and its failure to do so is sufficient reason to deny them. See

16 C.F.R. § 2.10(a)(1); In re Civil Investigative Demand to Media Matters for Am. Dated May 20, 2025, No. 2510061, 2025 WL 2355463, at *10 (July 25, 2025). Likewise, “[t]he party objecting to discovery as vague or

ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity,” Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 238 F.R.D.

648, 655 (D. Kan. 2006), and GDI’s passing reference to vagueness and ambiguity does not establish a basis to

quash the CID.

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purpose of educating the public about the risk of disinformation in online news.” 2 Petition, at 2.

GDI conducted risk assessments of news websites based on its self-selected criteria (such as

ownership and editorial independence). Id. at 2–3. GDI’s work focused on three primary areas.

Id. at 10. First, GDI created its flagship risk assessment report, the “Dynamic Exclusion List”

(DEL), a domain-level list of publishers with the highest risk of containing disinformation. Id. 3

GDI licensed the DEL (presumably for a fee) to “[a]d tech companies and platforms . . . [to help

them] make more informed choices about their online ad purchases.” 4 GDI provided the DEL to

its “subscribers and clients who were free to do whatever they wanted with it via their own

independent decision-making.” Id. at 2. Second, GDI hosted an open-source intelligence hub that

tracked “disinformation and extremism” across various platforms. Id. at 10. Third, GDI

presented the findings of its disinformation research to government and regulatory bodies. Id. 5

As of the date of this order, GDI “no longer provide[s] risk rating or exclusion lists,” but

focuses on “systemic solutions that reduce the promotion of adversarial content.” 6

On May 20, 2025, under the authority of a Commission resolution authorizing the use of

compulsory process, the Commission issued a CID to GDI pursuant to Section 20 of the FTC

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1. The GDI CID was one of seventeen still-outstanding CIDs issued as part

of the Commission’s investigation into whether entities have conspired to withhold, degrade,

increase the cost of, or otherwise diminish the quantity of advertising placed on news outlets,

media platforms, or other publishers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5

of the FTC Act, under the guise of promoting “brand suitability” and “brand safety” against

“misinformation.” Specifically, the Commission is investigating whether online advertisers

and/or advertising agencies have unlawfully agreed to use certain lists promulgated by other

industry participants that categorize or rate content publishers as not “brand suitable” or not

“brand safe,” to coordinate the placement of ads. As such, CID recipients to date include

multiple advertising agencies as well as entities that the Commission has reason to believe

possess information relating to the use of such lists to coordinate ad placement. These entities

include several advertising trade associations, several brand safety/suitability rating

organizations, and several policy/advocacy groups such as GDI.

The CID to GDI seeks information pertaining to GDI’s organizational structure;

documents relating to GDI’s ratings of media or similar products that help consumers distinguish

between sources of information; communications with other entities related to the subject of the

investigation; the methodology by which GDI evaluates or categorizes content publisher entities;

For reasons it does not explain, GDI refers to itself in the past tense throughout its petition.

See also GDI, What We Do,

http://web.archive.org/web/20250824145937/https://www.disinformationindex.org/product/ (captured Aug. 24,

2025).

GDI, What We Do, https://www.disinformationindex.org/product/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).

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lists GDI has provided to third parties that evaluate or categorize content publisher entities;

identification of GDI’s customers; and GDI’s financial information, among other subjects. See

generally Petition Ex. 4 Attach., at 1–6. The relevant time period for GDI’s responses is from

January 1, 2018 to the present. Id. at 9.

The CID attached the Resolution Directing Use of Compulsory Process in Nonpublic

Investigations of Collusive Practices (Omnibus Resolution) issued by the Commission on July 1,

2022. The Omnibus Resolution authorized the issuance of CIDs:

To investigate whether any persons, partnerships, corporations, or others have

engaged or are engaging in inviting, initiating, participating in, or facilitating

collusion or coordination in any way with any other market participant, whether

through private communications, public statements, sharing information, or

other actions, in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,

15 U.S.C. § 45, as amended, or any other statutes or rules enforced by the

Commission; and to determine the appropriate action or remedy, including

whether injunctive and monetary relief would be in the public interest.

On July 18, 2025, the Commission sent GDI a letter modifying the May 20 CID to

include an additional description of the scope and nature of the investigation. The modification

letter described the subject of the investigation as:

To determine whether any natural persons, partnerships, corporations, associations, or

other legal entities have engaged in or are engaging in unfair, anticompetitive, collusive,

or exclusionary acts or practices – including inviting, participating in, or facilitating

boycotts or other collusion or coordination – to withhold, degrade, increase the cost of, or

otherwise diminish the quantity of advertising placed on news outlets, media platforms,

or other publishers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or

Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, as amended, or any other statutes or rules

enforced by the Commission, and to determine the appropriate action or remedy. See also

the attached resolution.

Petition Ex. 4. The letter was signed by the Assistant Director of the Anticompetitive Practices I

Division of the Bureau of Competition and was issued pursuant to Rule 2.7(l) of the

Commission’s Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §2.7(l). The letter attached a modified copy of the

CID that included the above subject of the investigation, but was identical to the May 20 CID in

all other respects.

GDI appears to have had four substantive meet-and-confer sessions with Commission

staff, on June 6, July 14, September 12, and September 15, 2025. See Petition Ex. 1, at 1–6

(Statement of Counsel Pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 2.10(a)(2)). 7 During those meet-and-confers, GDI

raised objections to the CID based on the Commission’s statutory authority and the First

Amendment, but does not appear to have offered any proposals to modify the CID’s

specifications in a manner that would address its concerns while providing the Commission the

GDI claims that it conferred with staff on sixteen separate occasions “to discuss the scope, burden, and

unconstitutionality of the CID,” Petition, at 5, but based on its Statement of Counsel, many of these appear to be

scheduling emails or other non-substantive communications.

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information it needs. See id.

The return date of the modified CID was August 20, 2025. Commission staff granted two

extensions to the return date, to September 3, 2025 and then September 17, 2025. Petition Ex. 1,

at 4–5. GDI timely filed the instant petition on September 17, 2025. 8

II.

ANALYSIS

The Commission Has Authority to Serve a CID on Any Legal Entity.

GDI first argues that, because it is a nonprofit, the FTC lacks authority to enforce the

antitrust laws against it under Sections 4 and 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 44–45. Petition, at

7–8. Section 5 provides, in relevant part, that the FTC has authority to prevent “persons,

partnerships, or corporations” from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting

commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). Under Section 4, a “corporation” includes any company,

“incorporated or unincorporated, which is organized to carry on business for its own profit or

that of its members.” Id. § 44. GDI attaches documents purporting to show its nonprofit status

and argues that “the Commission’s lack of jurisdiction to enforce antitrust laws against GDI

necessarily limits its ability to issue a CID for which [GDI] is a target.” Petition, at 8 & Ex. 3.

The question of whether the Commission has enforcement authority over GDI is

irrelevant because this argument confuses the Commission’s enforcement authority with its

broader investigatory authority. 9 The plain language of the FTC Act makes clear that the

Commission has the authority to issue this CID as part of its investigation. Section 20 authorizes

the Commission to serve a CID on any “person.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1). 10 “Person” for

purposes of Section 20 is defined as “any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, including any person acting under color or authority of State law.” Id. § 57b1(a)(6) (emphasis added). Prior Commission decisions have recognized that Section 20

authorizes the Commission to obtain information from any “legal entity,” irrespective of whether

the entity falls within the definition of “corporation” in Section 4 of the FTC Act. See In re Civil

Investigative Demand to Media Matters for Am. Dated May 20, 2025, No. 251-0061, 2025 WL

2355463, at *8 (July 25, 2025); In re Aug. 11, 2022 Civil Investigative Demand Issued to

Childhood Leukemia Found., Inc., No. 222-3073, 2023 WL 8112947, at *2 (Nov. 17, 2023)

(“[T]he plain language of Section 20 permits the Commission to serve a CID on any legal entity,

regardless of whether it is a ‘corporation’ within the meaning of Section 4[.]”); In re Mar. 19,

Commission staff granted several extensions to the deadline for GDI to file a petition to limit or quash the CID, the

latest of which was September 17, 2025. Under Commission Rule 2.10(c), 16 C.F.R. § 2.10(c), the Commission had

40 days, or until October 27, 2025, to issue an order ruling on GDI’s petition. Due to the lapse in federal government

appropriations from October 1 through November 12, 2025, this date has been extended until December 10, 2025.

The Commission does not concede that it lacks enforcement authority over GDI.

Section 20(c)(1) provides: “Whenever the Commission has reason to believe that any person may be in

possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or tangible things, or may have any information,

relevant to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of

this title), or to antitrust violations, the Commission may, before the institution of any proceedings under this

subchapter, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such

person to produce such documentary material for inspection and copying or reproduction, to submit such tangible

things, to file written reports or answers to questions, to give oral testimony concerning documentary material or

other information, or to furnish any combination of such material, answers, or testimony.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1(c)(1).

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2014 Civil Investigative Demand Issued to Police Protective Fund, Inc., No. 132-3239, 2014

FTC LEXIS 130, at *5 (May 22, 2014) (petitioner’s objections “confuse the Commission’s

investigatory authority (under Section 20 of the FTC Act) with its enforcement authority (under

Section 5)”); In re Feature Films for Families, Inc., No. 102-3023, 2010 FTC LEXIS 134, at *8

(Sept. 23, 2010) (Commission “can require production of material from an entity that is not

subject to the Commission’s enforcement authority if that material furthers the investigation of

possibly illegal conduct by entities that are subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, such as for-profit

telefunders making calls on [the CID recipient’s] behalf”). GDI does not dispute that it is a “legal

entity” that is subject to Section 20’s definition of “person.” Therefore, regardless of whether the

Commission may enforce the antitrust laws against GDI, it is subject to the Commission’s

investigatory jurisdiction and may properly be issued a CID.

Complying With the CID Would Not Violate GDI’s First Amendment

Rights.

GDI argues that forcing it to comply with the CID would violate its First Amendment

rights. Petition, at 6–7. More specifically, it contends that compliance with all but Specifications

1–3 of the CID (which it has already produced) would “compel disclosure of its sources,

methods, and internal research—core elements protected by the First Amendment—that GDI

used in its DEL, open-source intelligence hub, and research reports.” Petition, at 10–11. We are

unpersuaded for two reasons: the public interest in effective law enforcement outweighs GDI’s

qualified First Amendment privilege in withholding information (assuming such a privilege

exists), and GDI has not met its burden of showing that the information sought by the CID falls

within that privilege. 11

Some courts have held that the First Amendment “provides journalists with a qualified

privilege against compelled disclosure of information obtained through their news gathering

activities.” Hutira v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2002); see also

Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712–14 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In those courts that have recognized the

privilege, the reporter invoking the privilege bears the burden of demonstrating its applicability.

See Hutira, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 119 nn.4–5. “[T]he critical question for deciding whether a person

may invoke the journalist’s privilege is whether she is gathering news for dissemination to the

public.” Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). In other words, assuming the

GDI claims that “[s]imilar specifications in the Media Matters CID . . . have already been found to

unconstitutionally seek a reporter’s resource materials,” referring to the preliminary injunction entered by the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia against enforcement of a CID issued to Media Matters for America in this

investigation. Petition, at 6 (citing Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 2378009, at *1–4

(D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2025)). The Commission respectfully disagrees with the district court’s order and is appealing the

preliminary injunction. Moreover, GDI’s claim misunderstands the district court’s decision. The court expressly

based the preliminary injunction on its finding “that Media Matters is likely to succeed on its First Amendment

retaliation claim, which is all it needs at this stage.” Media Matters, 2025 WL 2378009, at *2. In other words, the

court addressed whether the CID’s issuance constituted a retaliatory action, not whether individual CID

specifications violated a First Amendment privilege. Here, GDI does not advance a retaliation theory of harm, aside

from a passing and unsupported assertion that the purpose of the Commission’s investigation is “to punish GDI’s

exercise of free speech.” Petition, at 12. The district court’s preliminary injunction order is therefore inapplicable to

GDI’s petition.

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existence of the privilege, 12 the person seeking to invoke the privilege “must demonstrate,

through competent evidence, the intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to

disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the

newsgathering process.” von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987).

The Public Interest

The Supreme Court has held that only in limited circumstances will the First Amendment

bar the government from gathering information during a law enforcement investigation. In

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court considered whether the First Amendment

protected journalists from revealing confidential information and sources in response to a grand

jury subpoena. The Court ruled in favor of the government, noting that it could “perceive no

basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury

proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news

gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant

questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.” Id. at

690–91; see also Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711 (“The Court justified this decision by pointing to the

traditional importance of grand juries and the strong public interest in effective criminal

investigation.”).

The Commission exercises investigative law enforcement powers akin to those of a

criminal grand jury. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the Commission “has a power of

inquisition . . . . [that] is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or

controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is

being violated.” United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950); see also In re

Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Grand jury subpoenas then, when

they are brought before the federal courts for enforcement, for all practical purposes are exactly

analogous to subpoenas issued by a federal administrative agency on the authority of a statute,

without any prior judicial control.”). As such, when the Commission acts in its law enforcement

capacity, as it does here, the public interest in the ability to thoroughly gather evidence

outweighs any qualified First Amendment privilege.

GDI’s Burden

GDI also fails to meet its burden to show that the material sought by the CID qualifies for

the journalist’s privilege as recognized by some courts. First, GDI broadly claims that complying

with the CID would force it to disclose “sources, methods, and internal research” that it uses to

create the DEL and conduct other journalistic activities. Petition, at 10. But these general,

unsupported statements do not provide “competent evidence” demonstrating where GDI obtained

the information in question and whether the organization intended to disseminate the information

to the public at the time it received it. von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144. Such “blanket assertions” of

See In re Request from U.K. Pursuant to Treaty Between Gov’t of U.S. and Gov’t of U.K. on Mutual Assistance in

Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1, 17 n.23 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is a circuit split on

whether under Branzburg [v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)] there can ever be a reporter’s privilege of constitutional

or common law dimensions.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–49 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(rejecting existence of constitutional reporter’s privilege in grand jury proceedings); cf. Chen v. FBI, 153 F.4th 1289,

1295 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (declining to recognize a federal common law newsgathering privilege).

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privilege, id. at 147, are insufficient under both von Bulow and the Commission’s Rules of

Practice. To properly assert a “claim of protected status” in response to the CID, GDI needed to

“include a detailed log of the items withheld . . . of sufficient detail to enable the Commission

staff to assess the validity of the claim for each document . . . . The failure to provide information

sufficient to support a claim of protected status may result in a denial of the claim.” 16 C.F.R.

§ 2.11(a)(1). GDI submitted no such privilege log here, and its privilege claim can be denied on

that basis alone.

Second, at least as to the DEL, GDI’s argument conflates its commercial and journalistic

activities. To the extent a First Amendment newsgathering privilege exists, it applies only where

there is an intent to disseminate information to the public, which is at the heart of the “paramount

public interest in . . . an[] independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered

debate.” von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144 (cleaned up). By contrast, GDI appears to have licensed the

DEL only to “clients and subscribers” (not the public), for a fee, via terms spelled out in private

licensing agreements. See supra Part I; Petition, at 2–3. Those clients and subscribers were under

no obligation to disseminate the materials they received from GDI to the general public or

otherwise put them to public use. Indeed, GDI’s petition acknowledges that for the DEL, its

subscribers and clients “were free to do whatever they wanted with it via their own independent

decision-making.” Petition, at 2–3 (“[E]ach of GDI’s subscribers was free to use” the DEL “to

inform its independent brand safety decisions or to disregard on a case-by-case basis, as it saw

fit.”). These circumstances describe garden-variety commercial arrangements, not journalism.

Licensing a commercial product for a fee to select commercial purchasers via private contract is

not “disseminat[ing] information to the public,” von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 147, which is required

for First Amendment protection. See also Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. USB PaineWebber, Inc., No.

M8-85, 2002 WL 31833223, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2002) (denying motion to quash

subpoena to credit rating agency that performed fee-based ratings subject to private contractual

agreements, since circulating information only to private counterparties was not newsgathering

and did not qualify for First Amendment privilege).

Third, without further explanation from GDI, it is not clear that many of the CID’s

specifications demand the production of reporters’ confidential resources, sources, methods, or

notes. For example, Specification 13 requests “any list produced, licensed, sold, or otherwise

provided by You to any third party that evaluates or categorizes any news, media, sources,

outlets, platforms, websites, or other content publisher entities by credibility or any other

categorical metric maintained by GDI.” Petition Ex. 4 Attach., at 3. GDI fails to explain how

lists provided to a third party, such as the DEL, or the sources used to assemble them are

privileged. Likewise, Specification 17 requests documents “reflecting allegations that GDI’s

reliability, credibility, safety, or other similar ratings (or the criteria upon which they may be

based) are or may be unreliable, subjective, unscientific, or otherwise methodologically

unsound.” Id. We think it unlikely that GDI considers allegations about the unreliability of its

products to be a subject for dissemination to the public as news, and GDI does not indicate

otherwise. Without further detail, which GDI could have provided through the meet-and-confer

process and its affidavit, we are left to guess at how the CID’s specifications might violate any

First Amendment journalist’s privilege that GDI may hold.

Accordingly, assuming the First Amendment journalist’s privilege exists, we reject its

application to this CID.

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III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, GDI’s petition to quash is denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT GDI’s Petition to Quash the May 20, 2025, Civil

Investigative Demand be, and hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT GDI shall comply in full with the Commission’s

Civil Investigative Demand no later than January 13, 2026, or at such other date, time, and

location as the Commission staff may determine.

By the Commission, Commissioner Meador recused.

April J. Tabor

Secretary

SEAL:

ISSUED: December 10, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.