Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 146 / Tuesday, July 31, 2007 / Notices

41744

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 146 / Tuesday, July 31, 2007 / Notices

Note: all times are local.

[FR Doc. E7–14742 Filed 7–30–07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission

[Docket No. PL07–2–000]

Composition of Proxy Groups for

Determining Gas and Oil Pipeline

Return on Equity

July 19, 2007.

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission.

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ACTION: Proposed Policy Statement.

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission is proposing to

modify its current policy regarding the

composition of proxy groups used to

determine return on equity for natural

gas and oil pipelines under the

Discounted Cash Flow Methodology.

Under the proposed policy statement,

the Commission would permit Master

Limited Partnerships (MLPs) to be

included in the proxy group, subject to

certain conditions. The Commission

proposes to leave to individual cases the

determination of the specific MLPs to be

included in the proxy group used to

determine return on equity in that case.

DATES: Initial comments are due August

30, 2007. Reply comments are due

August 30, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,

identified in Docket No. PL07–2–000, by

any of the following methods:

1. Agency Web Site: http://

www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts

most standard word processing formats

and commentors may attach additional

filed with supporting information in

certain other file formats. Commentors

filing electronically do not need to make

a paper filing.

2. Mail/Hand Delivery: Commentors

unable to file comments electronically

must mail or hand-deliver an original

and 14 copies of their comments to:

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

Office of the Secretary, 888 First Street,

NE., Washington, DC 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John

M. Robinson, Office of the General

Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,

Washington, DC 20426, 202–502–6808,

John.Robinson@ferc.gov.

Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher,

Chairman; Suedeen G. Kelly, Marc Spitzer,

Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.

1. In this proposed Policy Statement,

the Commission is proposing to update

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its standards concerning the

composition of the proxy groups used to

decide the return on equity (ROE) of

natural gas and oil pipelines. Firms

engaged in the pipeline business are

increasingly organized as master limited

partnerships (MLPs). Therefore, the

Commission proposes to modify its

current policy regarding the

composition of proxy groups to allow

MLPs to be included in the proxy group.

This proposed Policy Statement

explains the standards that the

Commission would require to be met in

order for an MLP to be included in the

proxy group. The Commission proposes

to apply its final Policy Statement to all

gas and oil pipeline rate cases that have

not completed the hearing phase as of

the date the Commission issues its final

Policy Statement. The Commission

intends to decide on a case-by-case basis

whether to apply the final Policy

Statement in cases that have completed

the hearing phase. Finally, the

Commission is requesting comments on

this proposed Policy Statement. Initial

comments are due 30 days after

publication of this order in the Federal

Register, with reply comments due 50

days after publication in the Federal

Register.

I. Background

2. Since the 1980s, the Commission

has used a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)

model to develop a range of returns

earned on investments in companies

with corresponding risks for

determining the ROE for natural gas and

oil pipelines. The DCF model was

originally developed as a method for

investors to estimate the value of

securities, including common stocks. It

is based on ‘‘the premise that a stock is

worth the present value of its future

cash flows, discounted at a market rate

commensurate with the stock’s risk.’’ 1

Unlike investors, the Commission uses

the DCF model to determine the ROE to

be included in the pipeline’s rates,

rather than to estimate a stock’s value.

Therefore, the Commission solves the

DCF formula for the discount rate,

which represents the rate of return that

an investor requires in order to invest in

a firm. Under the resulting DCF formula,

ROE equals current dividend yield

(dividends divided by share price) plus

the projected future growth rate of

dividends.

3. The Commission uses a two-step

procedure for determining the constant

growth of dividends: averaging short1 Ozark Gas Transmission System, 68 FERC ¶

61,032 at 61,104, n. 16 (1994).

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term and long-term growth estimates.2

Security analysts’ five-year forecasts for

each company in the proxy group, as

published by Institutional Brokers

Estimate System (IBES), are used for

determining growth for the short term;

long-term growth is based on forecasts

of long-term growth of the economy as

a whole, as reflected in the Gross

Domestic Product. The short-term

forecast receives a 2⁄3 weighting and the

long-term forecast receives a 1⁄3

weighting in calculating the growth rate

in the DCF model.3

4. Most gas pipelines are whollyowned subsidiaries and their common

stock is not publicly traded, and this is

also true for some jurisdictional oil

pipelines. Therefore, the Commission

uses a proxy group of firms with

corresponding risks to set a range of

reasonable returns for both natural gas

and oil pipelines. The Commission then

assigns the pipeline a rate within that

range or zone, to reflect specific risks of

that pipeline as compared to the proxy

group companies.4

5. The Commission historically

required that each company included in

the proxy group satisfy the following

three standards.5 First, the company’s

stock must be publicly traded. Second,

the company must be recognized as a

natural gas or oil pipeline company and

its stock must be recognized and tracked

by an investment information service

such as Value Line. Third, pipeline

operations must constitute a high

proportion of the company’s business.

Until the Commission’s 2003 decision

in Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline

Co.,6 the third standard could only be

satisfied if a company’s pipeline

business accounted for, on average, at

least 50 percent of a company’s assets or

operating income over the most recent

three-year period.

2 Northwest Pipeline Co., 71 FERC ¶ 61,309 at

61,989–92 (1995) (Opinion No. 396), 76 FERC ¶

61,068 (1996) (Opinion No. 396–A), 79 FERC ¶

61,309 (1997) (Opinion No. 396–B), reh’g denied, 81

FERC ¶ 61,036 (1997) (Opinion No. 396–C);

Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co., 79 FERC ¶

61,311, order on reh’g, 81 FERC ¶ 61,033 (1997),

aff’d in relevant part, Williston Basin Interstate

Pipeline Co., 165 F.3d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williston

Basin).

3 The Commission presumes that existing

pipelines fall within a broad range of average risk,

and thus generally sets pipelines’ return at the

median of the range. Transcontinental Gas Pipe

Line Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,084 at 61,423–4 (1998)

Opinion No. 414–A, reh’g, 85 FERC ¶ 61,323 (1998)

(Opinion No. 414–B), aff’d North Carolina Utilities

Commission v. FERC, 340 U.S. App. D.C. 183 (D.C.

Cir) (unpublished opinion).

4 Williston Basin at 57 (citation omitted).

5 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 90 FERC

¶ 61,279 at 61,933 (2000).

6 Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company,

104 FERC ¶ 61,036 at P 35, n. 46 (2003).

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6. As a result of mergers, acquisitions,

and other changes in the natural gas

industry, fewer and fewer interstate

natural gas companies have satisfied the

third requirement. Thus, in Williston,

the Commission relaxed this

requirement for the natural gas proxy

group. Instead, the Commission

approved a pipeline’s proposal to use a

proxy group based on the corporations

listed in the Value Line Investment

Survey’s list of diversified natural gas

firms that own Commission-regulated

natural gas pipelines, without regard to

what portion of the company’s business

comprises pipeline operations.

7. In HIOS 7 and Kern River, the only

fully litigated section 4 rate cases

decided since Williston, the

Commission again drew the proxy group

companies from the same Value Line

list. When those cases were litigated,

there were six such companies: Kinder

Morgan Inc., the Williams Companies

(Williams), El Paso Natural Gas

Company (El Paso), Equitable

Resources, Inc., Questar Corporation,

and National Fuel Gas Corporation. The

Commission excluded Williams and El

Paso on the ground that their financial

difficulties had lowered their ROEs to a

level only slightly above the level of

public utility debt, and the Commission

stated that investors cannot be expected

to purchase stock if lower risk debt has

essentially the same return. This left a

four-company proxy group, three of

whose members derived more revenue

from the distribution business, rather

than the pipeline business. In Kern

River, the Commission adjusted the

pipeline’s return on equity 50 basis

points above the median in order to

account for the generally higher risk

profile of natural gas pipeline

operations as compared to distribution

operations.

8. In both Kern River and HIOS, the

Commission rejected pipeline proposals

to include MLPs in the proxy group.

The pipelines contended that MLPs

have a much higher percentage of their

business devoted to pipeline operations,

than most of the corporations that the

Commission currently includes in the

proxy group.

9. Unlike corporations, MLPs

generally distribute most available cash

flow to the general and limited partners

in the form of quarterly distributions.

Most MLP agreements define ‘‘available

cash flow’’ as (1) Net income (gross

revenues minus operating expenses)

plus (2) depreciation and amortization,

minus (3) capital investments the

7 High Island Offshore System, L.L.C., 110 FERC

¶ 61,043, reh’g denied, 112 FERC ¶ 61,050 (2005),

appeal pending.

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partnership must make to maintain its

current asset base and cash flow

stream.8 Depreciation and amortization

may be considered a part of ‘‘available

cash flow,’’ because depreciation is an

accounting charge against current

income, rather than an actual cash

expense. As a result, the MLP’s cash

distributions normally include not only

the net income component of ‘‘available

cash flow,’’ but also the depreciation

component. This means that, in contrast

to a corporation’s dividends, an MLP’s

cash distributions generally exceed the

MLP’s reported earnings. Moreover,

because of their high cash distributions,

MLPs usually finance capital

investments required to significantly

expand operations or to make

acquisitions through debt or by issuing

additional units rather than through

retained cash, although the general

partner has the discretion to do so.

10. In rejecting the pipelines’

proposals in HIOS and Kern River to

include MLPs in the proxy group, the

Commission made clear that it was not

making a generic finding that MLPs

cannot be considered for inclusion in

the proxy group if a proper evidentiary

showing is made.9 However, the

Commission pointed out that data

concerning dividends paid by the proxy

group members is a key component in

any DCF analysis, and expressed

concern that an MLP’s cash

distributions to its unit holders may not

be comparable to the corporate

dividends the Commission uses in its

DCF analysis. In Kern River, the

Commission explained its concern as

follows:

Corporations pay dividends in order

to distribute a share of their earnings to

stockholders. As such, dividends do not

include any return of invested capital to

the stockholders. Rather, dividends

represent solely a return on invested

capital. Put another way, dividends

represent profit that the stockholder is

making on its investment. Moreover,

corporations typically reinvest some

earnings to provide for future growth of

earnings and thus dividends. Since the

return on equity which the Commission

awards in a rate case is intended to

permit the pipeline’s investors to earn a

profit on their investment and provides

funds to finance future growth, the use

of dividends in the DCF analysis is

entirely consistent with the purpose for

which the Commission uses that

8 The definition of available cash may also net out

short term working capital borrowings, the

repayment of capital expenditures, and other

internal items.

9 Kern River Gas Transmission Company, 117

FERC ¶ 61,077 (2006) (Opinion No. 486) at P 147,

reh’g pending.

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analysis. By contrast, as Kern River

concedes, the cash distributions of the

MLPs it seeks to add to the proxy group

in this case include a return of invested

capital through an allocation of the

partnership’s net income. While the

level of an MLP’s cash distributions may

be a significant factor in the unit

holder’s decision to invest in the MLP,

the Commission uses the DCF analysis

solely to determine the pipeline’s return

on equity. The Commission provides for

the return of invested capital through a

separate depreciation allowance. For

this reason, to the extent an MLP’s

distributions include a significant return

of invested capital, a DCF analysis based

on those distributions, without any

adjustment, will tend to overstate the

estimated return on equity, because the

‘dividend’ would be inflated by cash

flow representing return of equity,

thereby overstating the earnings the

dividend stream purports to reflect.10

11. The Commission stated that it

could nevertheless consider including

MLPs in the proxy group in a future

case, if the pipeline presented evidence

addressing these concerns. The order

suggested that such evidence might

include some method of adjusting the

MLPs’ distributions to make them

comparable to dividends, a showing that

the higher ‘‘dividend’’ yield of the MLP

was offset by a lower long-term growth

projection, or some other explanation

why distributions in excess of earnings

do not distort the DCF results for the

MLP in question. However, the

Commission concluded that Kern River

had not presented sufficient evidence to

address these issues, and that the record

in that case did not support including

MLPs in the proxy group.

12. In addition, Kern River pointed

out that the traditional DCF model only

incorporates growth resulting from the

reinvestment of earnings, not growth

arising from external sources of

capital.11 Therefore, the Commission

stated that if growth forecasted for an

MLP comes from external capital, it is

necessary either (1) to explain why the

external sources of capital do not distort

the DCF results for that MLP or (2)

propose an adjustment to the DCF

analysis to eliminate any distortion. The

Commission’s orders in HIOS reached

the same conclusions.

13. In some oil pipeline rate cases

decided before HIOS and Kern River, the

Commission included MLPs in the

proxy group used to determine oil

pipeline return on equity on the ground

that there were no corporations

available for use in the oil proxy

10 Id. at P 149–50.

11 Id. at P 152.

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group.12 In those cases, no party raised

any issue concerning the comparability

of an MLP’s cash distribution to a

corporation’s dividend. However, that

issue did arise in the first oil pipeline

case decided after HIOS and Kern River,

involving SFPP’s Sepulveda Line.13 The

Commission approved inclusion of

MLPs in the proxy group in that case on

the grounds that the MLPs in question

had not made distributions in excess of

earnings. The Sepulveda Line order

therefore analyzed the five MLPs that

have been used to determine SFPP’s

ROE: Buckeye Partners, L.P., Enbridge

Energy Partners, L.P., Enron Gas Liquids

(Enron),14 TEPPCO Partners, L.P., and

Kaneb Partners, L.P. (later Valero

Partners), now NuStar Energy, L.P. The

order reviewed each entity for the year

1996 and the previous four years, and

held that four of the firms had had

income (earnings) in excess of

distributions and that their incomes

(earnings) were stable over that period

with minor exceptions. The order found

these facts sufficient to address the

concerns expressed in HIOS and Kern

River. The fifth firm, Enron, had

distributions in excess of income

(earnings) in four of the five years.

While the Commission did not preclude

use of such MLPs, Enron did not meet

the HIOS test and was excluded as

unrepresentative.

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II. Discussion

14. As discussed below, the

Commission proposes to permit

inclusion of MLPs in a proxy group.

However, the Commission proposes to

cap the ‘‘dividend’’ used in the DCF

analysis at the pipeline’s reported

earnings, thus adjusting the amount of

the distribution to be included in the

DCF model. The Commission would

leave to individual cases the

determination of which MLPs and

corporations should actually be

included in the natural gas or oil proxy

group. However, participants in these

cases should include as much

information as possible regarding the

business profile of the firms they

propose to include in the proxy group,

for example, based on gross income, net

income, or assets.

15. The Supreme Court has stated that

‘‘the return to the equity owner should

be commensurate with the return on

investments in other enterprises having

corresponding risks. That return,

moreover, should be sufficient to assure

12 SFPP, L .P., 86 FERC ¶ 61,022 at 61,099 (1999).

13 SFPP, L.P., 117 FERC ¶ 61,285 (2006) (SFPP

Sepulveda order), rehearing pending.

14 Enron Gas Liquids was not affiliated with

Enron, Inc. at that time, but was a former affiliate

that was spun off in the early 1990’s.

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confidence in the financial integrity of

the enterprise, so as to maintain its

credit and to attract capital.’’ 15 The

Commission is concerned that its

current approach to determining the

composition of the proxy group for

determining gas and oil pipeline return

on equity is, or will, require the use of

firms which are less and less

representative of either natural gas or oil

pipeline business risk.

16. As has been discussed, there are

fewer and fewer publicly traded

diversified natural gas corporations that

have interstate gas pipelines as their

predominant business line, whether this

is measured on a revenue, income, or

asset basis. As such, there are fewer

diversified natural gas companies

available for inclusion in a natural gas

pipeline proxy group which may

reasonably be considered representative

of the risk profile of a natural gas

pipeline firm. Moreover, at this point

the only publicly traded oil pipeline

firms are controlled by MLPs, which

makes the issue of a representative

proxy group more acute.

17. Cost of service ratemaking

requires that the firms in the proxy

group be of comparable risk to the firm

whose equity cost of capital is at issue

in a particular rate proceeding. If the

proxy group is less than clearly

representative, this may require the

Commission to adjust for the difference

in risk by adjusting the equity cost-ofcapital, a difficult undertaking requiring

detailed support from the contending

parties and detailed case-by-case

analysis by the Commission. Expanding

a proxy group to include MLPs whose

business is more narrowly focused on

pipeline activities would help

ameliorate this problem. Thus,

including MLP natural gas pipelines in

the equity proxy group should reduce

the need to make adjustments since the

proxy group is more likely to contain

firms that are representative of the

regulated firm whose rates are at issue.

Including MLPs will also recognize the

trend to greater use of MLPs in the

natural gas pipeline industry and

address the reality of the oil pipeline

industry structure.

18. The Commission’s primary

concern about including MLPs in the

proxy group has arisen from the

interaction between use of the DCF

analysis to determine return on capital

while relying on a depreciation

allowance for return of capital. The

Commission permits a pipeline to

recover through its rates both a return

15 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591

(1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co.

v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).

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on equity and a return of invested

capital. The Commission uses the DCF

analysis solely to determine the return

on equity component of the cost-ofservice. The Commission provides for

the return of invested capital through a

separate depreciation allowance. Given

the purpose for which the Commission

uses the DCF analysis, the cash flows

included in that analysis must be

limited to cash flows which may

reasonably be considered to reflect a

return on equity. Such cash flows

include that portion of an MLP’s cash

distribution derived from net income, or

earnings.

19. To the extent an MLP makes

distributions in excess of earnings, it is

able to do so because partnership

agreements define ‘‘cash available for

distribution’’ to include depreciation.

This enables the MLP to make cash

distributions that include return of

equity, in addition to return on equity.

However, because the Commission

includes a separate depreciation

allowance in the pipeline’s cost-ofservice, a DCF analysis including cash

flows attributable to depreciation would

permit the pipeline to double recover its

depreciation expense, once through the

depreciation allowance and once

through an inflated ROE. Adjusting an

MLP’s cash distribution to exclude that

portion of the distribution in excess of

earnings addresses this problem.

20. The Commission recognizes that it

raised several concerns in Kern River as

to whether adjusting the MLP’s cash

distribution down to the level of its

earnings would be sufficient to

eliminate the distorting effects of

including MLPs in the proxy group. The

Commission pointed out that

corporations generally do not pay out all

of their earnings in dividends, but retain

some earnings in order to generate

future growth. The Commission also

suggested that the DCF model is

premised on growth in dividends

deriving from reinvestment of current

earnings, and does not incorporate

growth from external sources, such as

issuing debt or additional stock.

21. The Commission believes that

these concerns should not render

unreliable a DCF analysis using the

adjusted MLP results. The market data

for the MLPs used in the DCF analysis

should itself correct for any distortions

remaining after the adjustment to the

cash distribution described above. For

example, the IBES growth projections

represent an average of the growth

projections by professionals whose

business is to advise investors.16 The

level of an MLP’s cash distributions as

16 Opinion No. 414–B, 85 FERC at 62,268–70.

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compared to its earnings is a matter of

public record and thus known to the

security analysts making the growth

forecasts used by IBES. Therefore, the

security analysts must be presumed to

take those distributions into account in

making their growth forecasts for the

MLP. To the extent an MLP’s relatively

high cash distributions reduce its

growth prospects that should be

reflected in a lower growth forecast,

which would offset the MLP’s higher

‘‘dividend’’ yield.

22. In order to test the validity of this

assumption, the Commission reviewed

the most recent IBES growth forecasts

for five diversified energy companies

and six MLPs in the natural gas

business. The average IBES forecast for

the corporations is 9 percent, while the

average IBES forecast for the MLPs is

6.17 percent, or nearly 300 basis points

lower.17 Thus, the security analysts do

project lower growth rates for the MLPs

than for the corporations.

23. In addition, the fact MLPs may

rely upon external borrowings and/or

equity issuances to generate growth is

not a reason to exclude them from the

proxy group. Most pipelines organized

as corporations also use external

borrowings and to some extent equity

issuances. To the extent that gas or oil

pipelines are controlled by diversified

energy companies with unregulated

assets (either federal or state), the

financial practices may be the same,

although perhaps not as highly

leveraged, and the results are likewise

reflected in the IBES projections. A

prudent investor deciding whether to

invest in a security will reasonably

consider all factors relevant to assessing

the value of that security. The potential

effect of future borrowings or equity

issuances on share values of either

MLPs or corporations is one such factor.

Since a DCF analysis is a method for

investors to estimate the value of

securities, it follows that such an

analysis may reasonably take into

account potential growth from external

capital.

24. The Commission does, however,

recognize that an MLP’s lack of retained

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17 The IBES forecasts were prepared as of May 31,

2007 applying the current DCF model for the

corporate sample and using distributions capped at

earnings for the MLPs. Thus the short term growth

rates for the five diversified gas corporations were:

(1) National Fuel Gas Corporation, 5 percent; (2)

Questar Corporation, 9 percent; (3) Oneok, Inc., 9

percent; (4) Equitable Resources Inc., 10 percent;

and (5) Williams Companies, 12 percent. The short

term growth rates for the six gas MLPs were: (1)

Oneok Partners, L.P., 5 percent; (2) TEPPCO

Partners, L.P., 5 percent; (3) TC Pipelines, L.P., 5

percent; (4) Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, L.P., 7

percent, (5) Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 7

percent, and (6) Enterprise Products Partners, L.P.,

8 percent.

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earnings may render cash distributions

at their current level unsustainable, and

thus still unsuitable for inclusion in the

DCF analysis. Therefore, the

Commission intends to require

participants proposing to include MLPs

in the proxy group to provide a multiyear analysis of past earnings. An

analysis showing that the MLP does

have stable earnings would support a

finding that the cash to be included in

the DCF calculation is likely to be

available for distribution, thus

replicating the requirement of the

corporate model of a stable dividend.

III. Procedure for Comments

25. The Commission invites interested

persons to submit written comments on

its proposed policy to permit the

inclusion of MLPs in the proxy group to

be used to determine the equity cost of

capital of natural gas and oil pipelines.

The comments may include alternative

proposals for determining a

representative proxy group given that

(1) Few natural gas companies meet the

Commission’s traditional standards for

inclusion in the proxy group, and (2) the

only publicly traded oil pipeline firms

available for inclusion in the proxy

group are controlled by MLPs.

Comments may also address the

analysis advanced in this proposed

policy statement, alternative methods

for adjusting the amount of the MLP’s

distribution to be included the DCF

analysis, and the relevance of the

stability of MLP earnings.

26. Comments are due 30 days from

the date of publication in the Federal

Register and reply comments are due 50

days from the date of publication in the

Federal Register. Comments must refer

to Docket No. PL07–2–000, and must

include the commentor’s name, the

organization it represents, if applicable,

and its address. To facilitate the

Commission’s review of the comments,

commentors are requested to provide an

executive summary of their position.

Additional issues the commentors wish

to raise should be identified separately.

The commentors should double space

their comments.

27. Comments may be filed on paper

or electronically via the eFiling link on

the Commission’s Web site at: http://

www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts

most standard word processing formats

and commentors may attach additional

files with supporting information in

certain other file formats. Commentors

filing electronically do not need to make

a paper filing. Commentors that are not

able to file comments electronically

must send an original and 14 copies of

their comments to: Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, Office of the

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41747

Secretary, 888 First Street, NE.,

Washington DC 20426.

28. All comments will be placed in

the Commission’s public files and may

be viewed, printed, or downloaded

remotely as described in the Document

Availability section below. Commentors

are not required to serve copies of their

comments on other commentors.

IV. Document Availability

29. In addition to publishing the full

text of this document in the Federal

Register, the Commission provides all

interested persons an opportunity to

view and/or print the contents of this

document via the Internet through the

Commission’s Home Page (http://

www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s

Public Reference Room during normal

business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Eastern time) at 888 First Street, NE.,

Room 2A, Washington, DC 20426.

30. From the Commission’s Home

Page on the Internet, this information is

available in the Commission’s document

management system, e-Library. The full

text of this document is available on

eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word

format for viewing, printing, and/or

downloading. To access this document

in eLibrary, type the docket number

(excluding the last three digits) in the

docket number field.

31. User assistance is available for

eLibrary and the Commission’s website

during normal business hours. For

assistance, please contact the

Commission’s Online Support at 1–866–

208–3676 (toll free) or 202–502–6652 (email at: FERCOnlineSupport@ferc.gov or

the Public Reference Room at 202–502–

8371, TTY 202–502–8659 (e-mail at:

public.referenceroom@ferc.gov).

By the Commission.

Kimberly D. Bose,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. E7–14708 Filed 7–30–07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717–01–P

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY

[EPA–HQ–OAR–2007–0176; FRL–8448–2]

Agency Information Collection

Activities; Proposed Collection;

Comment Request; EPA ICR No.

1591.24, OMB Control No. 2060–0277

AGENCY: Environmental Protection

Agency.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: In compliance with the

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44

U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), this document

announces that EPA is planning to

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