Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 816 (BIA 2026)

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 816 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4229

Matter of I-U-V, Respondent

Decided by Board June 1, 2026 1

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) Harm or injury suffered while a respondent is a minor does not necessarily constitute

persecution, but instead it is necessary to consider the respondent’s age and the

cumulative nature of the harm, including the severity, frequency, context, and

circumstances.

(2) A withholding of removal claim based on an assertion that there is a pattern or practice

of persecution against a protected group still requires an objective showing of a clear

probability of persecution and does not have a subjective component.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kieone H. Cochran, Assistant

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges;

PICOS, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed the

Immigration Judge’s decision dated April 25, 2025, that granted the

respondent’s application for withholding of removal under section

241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2024). 2 The appeal will be sustained, and the record

remanded for further proceedings.

1

Pursuant to Order No. 7080-2026, dated July 29, 2026, the Acting Attorney General

designated the Board’s decision in Matter of I-U-V- (BIA June 1, 2026), as precedent in all

proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2026).

Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a

precedent.

Neither party has appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision denying the respondent’s

application for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)

(2024). Accordingly, this issue is waived on appeal. See Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec.

330, 336 n.5 (BIA 2021) (stating that issues not meaningfully developed on appeal may be

deemed waived).

2

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Interim Decision #4229

The Immigration Judge granted the respondent withholding of removal

under the INA, finding that the respondent credibly and sufficiently

established that the harm he experienced in Russia, although not severe, rose

to the level of persecution when viewed “from the lens of a minor.” The

Immigration Judge further found that the presumption of a clear probability

of future persecution has not been rebutted by DHS.

We acknowledge the premise, recognized by several circuit courts, that

an applicant’s young age is a factor to be considered in determining whether

the applicant’s alleged experience in the country of removal rose to the level

of persecution. See, e.g., Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 628–29

(4th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases from other circuits). There is, however, no

statute, regulation, or case law, that mandates deeming harm and injury

suffered while a “minor” under the age of 18 to necessarily constitute

persecution. Each case must still be carefully analyzed to determine whether

the cumulative harm experienced by the applicant—considering a myriad of

factors such as age, severity, frequency and the circumstances and context of

the harms alleged—satisfies the “extreme concept” of “persecution.” Aben

v. Garland, 113 F.4th 457, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2024), and cases cited therein.

Persecution “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as

unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Gjetani v.

Barr, 968 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2020)).

The Immigration Judge legally erred in according primary and

predominant consideration to the fact that the respondent was a “minor”

during the period of the alleged harm and using this fact as a baseline upon

which to calibrate—and abridge 3—his persecution analysis. The respondent,

however, was 17 years old at the time of the alleged encounter with the police

For instance, the Immigration Judge simply concluded that “a police officer beating a

minor is extreme conduct, and therefore, would qualify as persecution where it results in

harm to the respondent.” The Immigration Judge also found that the respondent’s decision

to leave school and to move and reside in Sochi fell “within the realm” of persecution. The

Immigration Judge provided no factual and legal support for these conclusions. The cases

the Immigration Judge cited are inapposite. Cf., e.g., Rangel v. Garland, 100 F.4th 599,

604 (5th Cir. 2024) (finding that “[e]xtreme treatment . . . is the standard for establishing

past persecution,” and requiring more than conduct that is “unfair, unjust, or even unlawful

or unconstitutional”); Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2006)

(finding that the applicant’s “well-supported testimony,” “the threats of violence and acts

of vandalism” against the applicant by members of the FARC, and evidence that other

participants of the applicant’s same mission were threatened and thereafter murdered,

“compelled” a finding of past persecution). As noted by DHS, moreover, the respondent’s

case is distinguishable from Ordonez-Quino v. Holder, 760 F.3d 80, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2014),

and Portillo Flores, cited by the Immigration Judge, as both cases involved harm of a

greater degree to younger applicants and that resulted in serious and lasting injuries.

3

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Interim Decision #4229

where he was hit on the head “two times,” a mere 3 months before he turned

18 years old. Any calibration warranted as a result of the respondent’s age

in the overall analysis, in light of the limited facts found by the Immigration

Judge, appears to be “slight.” See generally, e.g., Hernandez-Mendez v.

Garland, 86 F.4th 482, 488 (1st Cir. 2023) (finding that “[w]hatever slight

calibration’ [the applicant’s near-]age [of majority] may have warranted in

the agency’s analysis was ‘insufficient to transform [his] experiences . . .

from harassment to persecution’”) (citing Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 314

(7th Cir. 2004)).

The Immigration Judge also did not include in his decision any findings

and analysis as to whether the harm alleged by the respondent has a nexus to

a statutorily protected ground. See Vazquez-Guerra v. Garland, 7 F.4th 265,

271 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that applicants for withholding of removal under

the INA must show that a protected ground was or will be “at least one central

reason” for the applicant’s persecution); Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396,

402 (5th Cir. 2018) (reaffirming that a statutorily protected ground cannot be

“incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for

harm,” and finding that recruitment to work as a police informant, and not

political opinion, was a central reason for the harm claimed (citation

omitted)); see also Matter of E-Z-, 29 I&N Dec. 123, 125 (BIA 2025)

(affirming Immigration Judge’s determination that political opinion was not

or will not be at least one central reason for the persecution claimed or feared

where evidence showed that applicant was interrogated as part of legitimate

investigation and released even though they were aware of his political

opinion). Absent a showing of the requisite nexus, the respondent cannot

benefit from the presumption of future persecution arising from past

persecution, and the burden of proving future persecution does not shift to

DHS. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)-(2) (2026).

We are also unable to uphold the Immigration Judge’s determination, in

the alternative, that the respondent established that his life or freedom would

be threatened in Russia based on a pattern and practice of harming persons,

like the respondent, “who oppose the regime,” or the “potential danger” or

“harm” because of the respondent’s Bashkir race and receipt of a summons

and conscription notice. General “harm” or “potential danger” do not satisfy

the elements for withholding of removal under the INA, which requires the

respondent to show that he faces a “clear probability of persecution” upon

his return to Russia. Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004); see

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) (requiring that the applicant “establish that it is

more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted” on account of a

statutorily protected ground). Moreover, to the extent that the Immigration

Judge relied on the respondent’s credible but subjective belief, we note that

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withholding of removal under the INA contains “no subjective component,

but instead requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more

likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution upon [removal].”

INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987); accord Faddoul v. INS,

37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). The Immigration Judge did not otherwise

make any other findings that are supported by record evidence, or engage in

meaningful legal analysis that applied the standards for withholding of

removal under the INA, that would permit affirming his decision to grant the

respondent this relief.

In view of the foregoing, we will remand the record to the Immigration

Judge for reconsideration and reevaluation of the respondent’s application

for withholding of removal under the INA. The Immigration Judge on

remand should also determine the respondent’s eligibility for protection

under the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”), 4 which the Immigration Judge did not reach in his prior decision.

On appeal, DHS identifies various types of evidence that the respondent

could have submitted but did not. The respondent on remand should be given

another opportunity to satisfy his burden to “corroborate the material

elements of [his] claim where the evidence is reasonably obtainable.” Matter

of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 519 (BIA 2015). Both parties on remand may

supplement the record with additional arguments and evidence. The

Immigration Judge should enter a new decision on the respondent’s

applications for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT that

is supported by the requisite factual findings and legal conclusions consistent

with prevailing law.

Accordingly, the following orders will be entered.

ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained, and the Immigration Judge’s

April 25, 2025, decision granting the respondent withholding of removal

under the INA is vacated.

FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration

Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for

entry of a new decision on the applications for withholding of removal under

the INA and protection under the CAT.

4

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into

force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17 (2026); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a) (2020).

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