Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

Matter of E-M-F-S-, et al., Respondents

Decided January 9, 2026

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

Death threats alone rarely rise to the level of persecution and only do so if they are

objectively credible and issued by a person or persons with the immediate ability to carry

them out.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ernest Bradley, Esquire, Miami, Florida

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; VOLKERT,

Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.

MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:

In a decision issued on November 27, 2024, the Immigration Judge

denied the respondents’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the regulations implementing the Convention Against

Sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the

Torture (“CAT”). 1

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),

1231(b)(3)(A) (2024). The Immigration Judge denied the applications in part

because the respondents had not demonstrated that the death threats they

received rose to the level of persecution. The respondents appealed. 2 We

will dismiss the appeal.

1

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into

force for United States on Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2025); 8 C.F.R.

1208.18(a) (2020).

2

The respondents are the lead respondent, the male respondent, and their minor children.

The lead respondent and minor children seek asylum as derivative beneficiaries of the male

respondent’s application. INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.3(a)(1) (2025). The lead respondent and minor respondents have not filed separate

applications and are not entitled to assert a derivative claim for withholding of removal and

CAT protection. See Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275, 279–80 (BIA 2007). However,

the Immigration Judge treated the lead respondent as having filed a separate application

for relief and evaluated her claims independently from the male respondent. For the

purposes of this decision, we will treat the lead respondent and male respondent as having

Page

379

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondents are natives and citizens of Peru. The lead respondent

was a news broadcaster and television host of a well-known Peruvian news

channel, and the male respondent was a producer on her television show.

After former Peruvian President, Pedro Castillo, gave an interview—that

turned hostile—with another reporter at the news station where the lead

respondent and the male respondent both worked, the respondents suffered

threats and harassment by the former president’s supporters. The respondent

was physically pushed and insulted on numerous occasions as she left the

news station. The respondents also received two anonymous written death

threats left on their doorstep, one week apart, one of which was accompanied

by three bullets. The respondents saw a young man running away from their

home after they received the second threat. After the second death threat, the

respondents reported the incident to the police and resigned from their

positions at the news channel. The respondents left Peru approximately

6 months after the second death threat.

The Immigration Judge found that the respondents had not suffered harm

rising to the level of persecution. The Immigration Judge also determined

that the respondents had not established a well-founded fear of future

persecution because although the lead respondent was threatened on account

of her imputed political opinion, their fear of persecution was not objectively

reasonable and the respondents could safely and reasonably relocate within

Peru. Additionally, the Immigration Judge denied the respondents’

application for CAT protection. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

An applicant seeking asylum bears the burden of demonstrating that he

or she is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA,

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2024). See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(A). “An applicant can establish refugee status by showing that

he or she either suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future

persecution.” Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448, 450 (BIA 2008); see also

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (2020). To establish past persecution, the applicant

must demonstrate that he or she (1) suffered harm rising to the level of

persecution, (2) on account of a statutorily protected ground, and

(3) committed by the government or by persons whom the government is

filed separate applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. All

references to the respondent in the singular refer to the lead respondent.

Page

380

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

either unable or unwilling to control. See Matter of J-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 97,

99–100 (BIA 2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). To establish a well-founded

fear of persecution, an applicant must demonstrate that his or her fear of

persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See

Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196, 198 (BIA 2007), aff’d sub nom. Shao v.

Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008).

A. Past Persecution

The Immigration Judge determined that the limited physical harm and

two anonymous threats suffered by the respondents were not sufficiently

severe to constitute persecution. 3 The respondents, however, argue that death

threats alone are per se persecution. We review de novo whether harm rises

to the level of persecution. See Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493, 497

(BIA 2008), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N

Dec. 586 (BIA 2015).

On appeal, the respondents request that we adopt the approach of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concerning death

threats, which they argue is that death threats constitute persecution per se.

See Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, 42 F.4th 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2022) (“[T]his

Court has held that ‘the threat of death alone constitutes persecution . . . .’”

(quoting Tairou v. Whitaker, 909 F.3d 702, 707–08 (4th Cir. 2018))); see also

Chicas-Machado v. Garland, 73 F.4th 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2023);

Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015);

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 126 (4th Cir. 2011). Having

reviewed the Fourth Circuit case law the respondents cite, however, we are

not persuaded that the Fourth Circuit categorically holds that all death threats

qualify as persecution.

While we recognize the Fourth Circuit has stated that death threats

alone constitute persecution, the factual circumstances of these cases

have consistently included more than death threats alone. As the

Second Circuit has noted, “many of the Fourth Circuit’s cases finding

persecution based on death threats involved aggravating circumstances.”

3

Contrary to the respondents’ assertions on appeal, the Immigration Judge did not

conclude that the lead respondent suffered past persecution. Rather, the Immigration Judge

concluded that the lead respondent’s past threats were on account of her imputed political

opinion but that the respondents had not established that they had suffered harm rising to

the level of persecution. See Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1283, 1291

(11th Cir. 2021) (“To establish asylum based on past persecution, the applicant must prove

(1) that [he] was persecuted, and (2) that the persecution was on account of a protected

ground.” (citation omitted)).

Page

381

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

KC v. Garland, 108 F.4th 130, 136 n.4 (2d Cir. 2024). For example, in

Sorto-Guzman, 42 F.4th at 446, 449–50, the Fourth Circuit found past

persecution where the respondent had been threatened with death, beaten,

nearly sexually assaulted, and robbed by gang members. Likewise, in

Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 947, 949, the Fourth Circuit found the alien

had a well-founded fear of future persecution where the cousin of her

husband had been murdered by gang members and she was twice threatened

with a gun to her head. Finally, in Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 120,

126–27, the Fourth Circuit found persecution where the alien was threatened

by gang members after gang members murdered his cousin and attempted to

murder his uncle.

Moreover, despite statements in some cases that death threats alone are

persecution, the Fourth Circuit has not found all death threats

to be persecution. In Cortez-Mendez v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 205,

209 n.* (4th Cir. 2019), for instance, the Fourth Circuit declined to conclude

that the death threat against the alien constituted persecution where it was

“communicated through two third parties, across country borders, and a

decade before [the alien] sought legal protection.” Thus, we are not

convinced by the respondents’ assertion that the Fourth Circuit takes such a

broad approach as to conclude that death threats constitute persecution per

se. Immigration Judges interpreting Fourth Circuit law should not apply it

in that categorical manner.

Even if the Fourth Circuit’s case law were interpreted to hold that death

threats constitute persecution per se, no other circuit court has concluded that

death threats categorically rise to the level of persecution. In fact, several

circuit courts have observed that death threats alone rarely rise to the level of

persecution. See, e.g., Brizuela v. Garland, 71 F.4th 1087, 1093

(8th Cir. 2023) (holding that threats rarely rise to the level of persecution and

only when they are “so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or

harm” (citation omitted)). The Second Circuit has held that ‘“unfulfilled

threats alone’ rarely constitute persecution” and that “a death threat may be

too speculative or specious—as opposed to imminent or concrete—to

constitute persecution.” KC, 108 F.4th at 135–36 (citation omitted).

Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has observed that while ‘“death threats alone can

constitute persecution,’ they constitute ‘persecution in only a small category

of cases.’” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)

(citations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit, in which jurisdiction in this case arises, has held

that “[a] credible death threat by a person who has the immediate ability to

act on it constitutes persecution regardless of whether the threat is

Page

382

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

successfully carried out.” Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1333–34

(11th Cir. 2010); cf. Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1283, 1292

(11th Cir. 2021) (affirming the Board’s determination that a threat by an

officer to make the alien “disappear” during his detention was menacing

but not persecution). This approach is similar to that of the Ninth Circuit,

which has held that for a credible death threat to rise to the level of

persecution, the group issuing the death threat must have “the will or

the ability to carry it out.” Corpeno-Romero v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570,

578 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1083

(9th Cir. 2021)).

Other circuit courts have also focused on imminence or the likelihood that

a threat will be carried out when finding that “credible” death threats

In finding a

can constitute persecution in some circumstances. 4

respondent’s death threats by the MS-13 constituted persecution, the

Fifth Circuit noted that Salvadoran authorities had deemed the threats

“credible and imminent” and numerous Salvadoran officials told

the respondent to flee the country. Argueta Hernandez v. Garland,

87 F.4th 698, 708–09 (5th Cir. 2023), abrogated on other grounds by

Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025). Likewise, in evaluating whether a

respondent’s death threats by Sri Lankan government officials constituted

persecution, the Seventh Circuit evaluated whether the actions of the officials

suggested a likelihood that the threat would be fulfilled.

See

Pathmakanthan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 618, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2010). The Third

Circuit has explained that in determining whether a threat is concrete and

menacing so as to constitutes persecution, “[t]he key is not a threat’s

imminence, but rather its likelihood, which is ‘subsumed in the inquiry as to

whether the threat is “concrete.”’” Blanco v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 967 F.3d 304,

312 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Finally, the Tenth Circuit has held that

threats “only rarely” constitute persecution and only when they are

“immediate and menacing.” Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1305

(10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210

(10th Cir. 2003)).

Any analysis of conduct rising to the level of persecution requires the

consideration of “the cumulative effect of the allegedly persecutory

A few circuit courts have stated generally that credible death threats can constitute

persecution in some circumstances but have not explained what renders a threat credible.

See Aguilar-Escoto v. Garland, 59 F.4th 510, 516 (1st Cir. 2023) (“We have long held that

‘credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if they are severe

enough’—particularly if they are death threats” (citation omitted)); Japarkulova v. Holder,

615 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that credible death threats can constitute

persecution even absent physical abuse).

4

Page

383

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

incidents.” De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1008

(11th Cir. 2008); accord Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1218–19

(9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth Circuit has held that a threat may constitute

persecution when it is “specific and menacing and . . . accompanied by

evidence of violent confrontations, near-confrontations and vandalism.” Id.

(quoting Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004)). Other

circuit courts have agreed that “past persecution may be found . . . when the

applicant demonstrates repeated threats combined with other forms of severe

mistreatment.” Martinez, 992 F.3d at 1292; accord Hernandez-Mendez v.

Garland, 86 F.4th 482, 487 (1st Cir. 2023); Herrera-Reyes v.

Att’y Gen. of U.S., 952 F.3d 101, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2020). It is necessary to

consider death threats not in isolation but as part of the totality of the

applicant’s past mistreatment. See De Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1008. In

some cases, the “severe mistreatment” apart from the death threats may be

the determining factor in establishing past persecution. Martinez, 992 F.3d

at 1292.

The Board has not adopted a specific standard for when a death threat

may constitute persecution. In Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163, 169

(BIA 2007), we stated that a threat of forced abortion may rise to persecution

“when a reasonable person would objectively view the threats as genuine,

and the threatened harm, if carried out, would meet or exceed the threshold

level of harm for past persecution.” However, a death threat that is vague,

anonymous, or used merely to intimidate, by itself, does not rise to the level

of severity required to establish persecution. See Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N

Dec. 1157, 1159 (BIA 1998) (holding that an anonymous, painted death

threat on the exterior of a respondent’s house did not rise to the level of

persecution). As noted above, death threats alone rarely rise to the level of

persecution. See KC, 108 F.4th at 135–36; Brizuela, 71 F.4th at 1093;

Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028. Consistent with the Eleventh and Ninth

Circuits, we hold that they only do so if they are objectively credible and

issued by a person or persons with the immediate ability to carry them out.

An asylum applicant bears the burden to establish that he or she suffered

harm rising to the level of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). In the

case of death threats, the applicant must produce evidence of the ability of

the persecutor to imminently carry out the threat. See Corpeno-Romero,

120 F.4th at 578. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, ‘“it is the conduct of the

persecutor’ that is relevant to evaluating whether past treatment rises to the

level of persecution—not ‘the level of harm’ or ‘subjective suffering’ the

[applicant] experienced.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1074

(9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Consequently, the appropriate inquiry is

Page

384

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

not the subjective suffering of the applicant, but the objective treatment by

the alleged persecutor. 5

We have construed the term persecution to include “either a threat to the

life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon, those who

differ in a way regarded as offensive.” See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N

Dec. 211, 222–23 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by

Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). While threats to life

and freedom can constitute persecution, an applicant seeking to prove that he

or she suffered harm rising to the level of persecution due to death threats

must show that he or she suffered more than mere harassment or

intimidation; in other words, the applicant must prove objectively that the

threat was not hollow. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231

(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that ‘“persecution’ is an ‘extreme concept,’

requiring ‘more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or

intimidation,’ and that ‘[m]ere harassment does not amount to persecution.’”

(citation omitted)); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Threats

themselves are sometimes hollow and . . . claims of threats are hard to

disprove.”). Thus, the applicant must establish that the purported persecutor

actually possessed the ability to imminently follow through on the threat.

In this case, the respondents received two anonymous written death

threats outside of their home one week apart, one of which was accompanied

by three bullets. While the respondents testified that they saw a young man

running away from their home after they received the second threat, they

have not presented any evidence concerning the individuals who sent these

threats or their ability to imminently carry them out. Cf. Diallo, 596 F.3d at

1333–34 (finding past persecution where a respondent was threatened with

death by the same soldiers who killed his brother and was able to avoid the

same fate by escaping). The respondents have also not shown that the

pushing and insults by unknown individuals outside the news station where

they worked render the threats credible, or that their cumulative harm rises

to the level of persecution. See Martinez, 992 F.3d at 1292 (holding that the

We acknowledge that several circuit courts have stated that a death threat may constitute

persecution if it is “so menacing as . . . to cause actual suffering or harm.” KC, 108 F.4th

at 135 (citation omitted); accord Corpeno-Romero, 120 F.4th at 579; Brizuela, 71 F.4th

at 1093; Blanco, 967 F.3d at 312–13; Matumona, 945 F.3d at 1305; Japarkulova, 615 F.3d

at 701. While we agree that the infliction of suffering or harm is a key component to

establishing past persecution, we caution that the applicant’s subjective harm, by itself, is

insufficient to demonstrate that an alleged persecutor’s death threat constituted

persecution. See Antonio, 58 F.4th at 1074; see also Flores Molina v. Garland,

37 F.4th 626, 636 (9th Cir. 2022) (stating that the “severity of [the respondent’s] injuries

is not dispositive to whether the threats and violence constituted persecution”).

5

Page

385

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

applicant’s cumulative mistreatment did not rise to the level of persecution

where he was threatened, detained, and released without harm); Sepulveda,

401 F.3d at 1231 (concluding that menacing phone calls and threats to the

applicant, her family members, and other members of the her group did not

rise to level of persecution). Accordingly, we agree with the Immigration

Judge that the respondents have not met their burden to establish that they

suffered harm rising to the level of persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a),

(b)(1).

Accordingly, the respondents did not suffer past persecution, and the

Immigration Judge properly determined that they are not presumed to have a

well-founded fear of future persecution. See Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec.

at 450; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). As the respondents’ past mistreatment did

not rise to the level of persecution, they “must prove that [they] have reason

to believe [they] will be treated worse, i.e., persecuted, upon return to [their]

native country.” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005).

B. Future Persecution

We affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondents

have not established a well-founded fear of future persecution in Peru. We

agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondents have not established

an objectively reasonable fear of persecution because they have not shown

that supporters of Pedro Castillo have been looking for them or would seek

to harm them upon their return. See Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. at 198.

As found by the Immigration Judge, the respondents continued to live in Peru

unharmed for 6 months following the second threat against them, and Pedro

Castillo was removed from office and jailed in Peru.

Contrary to the respondent’s appellate assertions, the Immigration Judge

considered the country conditions evidence. The Immigration Judge

permissibly found that freedom of expression was generally respected in

Peru and that although journalists reporting on antigovernment protests have

suffered some aggression, the country conditions evidence did not establish

that this aggression against journalists rises above mere harassment and

intimidation to reach the level of persecution.

See Murugan v.

U.S. Att’y Gen., 10 F.4th 1185, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2021) (finding that the

Immigration Judge properly weighed the record evidence and determined

that the applicant had not demonstrated that the mistreatment of similarly

situated persons was sufficient to establish a pattern or practice of

persecution). Moreover, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents

were not similarly situated to these journalists because they did not report on

the protests.

Page

386

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

Additionally, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents could

safely and reasonably relocate elsewhere in Peru.

See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(ii) (providing that an asylum applicant does not have a

well-founded fear of future persecution if the applicant can avoid persecution

by relocating to another part of the country of removal); see also

Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 805 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that an

applicant who has not suffered past persecution must show that internal

relocation is not reasonable), overruled in part on other grounds by

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). As the respondents do not

meaningfully contest this dispositive finding, we deem this issue waived. See

Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. 330, 336 n.5 (BIA 2021).

Thus, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the

respondents did not establish that they possess a well-founded fear of

persecution and therefore have not met their burden of proof for asylum. INA

§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Because the respondents did

not meet their burden of proof for asylum, it follows that they cannot satisfy

the more stringent standard of a clear probability for withholding of

removal. 6 See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232–33; Matter of M-D-C-V-, 28 I&N

Dec. 18, 34 (BIA 2020).

C. Eligibility for CAT Protection

For the reasons stated by the Immigration Judge, we will also affirm the

Immigration Judge’s denial of CAT protection. To qualify for protection

under the CAT, the respondents bear the burden to show that they would

more likely than not suffer torture by, at the instigation of, or with the consent

or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official

capacity upon their removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2025); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2020). We agree with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion

that the respondents did not establish that they will more likely than not be

tortured upon their removal with the consent or acquiescence of the Peruvian

government.

In this case, the respondents have not suffered past harm rising to the level

of persecution, much less torture. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i);

1208.18(a)(2). As stated above, the respondents also do not contest the

Immigration Judge’s determination that they could relocate elsewhere in

As the above grounds are dispositive of the respondents’ claims for asylum and

withholding of removal, we need not address the respondents’ remaining arguments related

to this relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

6

Page

387

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 379 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4154

Peru where they would not likely be tortured.

See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). The respondents have also not sufficiently established

that the supporters of Pedro Castillo would seek them out and attempt to

torture them upon their removal. See Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

500 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that a CAT claim may fail if

the applicants do not establish that they “would be individually and

intentionally singled out for harsh treatment”). Moreover, we agree with the

Immigration Judge that the ineffectiveness of Peruvian police in preventing

attacks against members of the media does not demonstrate that the Peruvian

government would consent or acquiesce to the respondents’ future harm. See

Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 97 F.4th 725, 744 (11th Cir. 2024) (finding that

the police’s inability to apprehend a perpetrator is not a basis for finding

government acquiescence); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Accordingly, we will

dismiss the respondents’ appeal of the Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.

ORDER: The respondents’ appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the

time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland

Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper

the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent

shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the

respondent is in violation. See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024);

8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025). Further, any respondent that has been

denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while

an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter

enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be

fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a),

8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).

Page

388