In DEPORTATION Proceedings

Agency decision

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

MArrEn OF S—

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

A-8089783

Decided by Board April 19, 1962

Recommendation against deportation—Section 241(b), 1952 act—Not effective

following resentencing for sole purpose of making recommendation — Deportation — Section 241(a)(4)—Single scheme.

(1) A new Jersey court vacated two 1960 convictions; in lieu thereof accepted a plea of non vuit to one; and, in an order dated March 30, 1961,

zentencing respondent to an iraleLetathiale term, recommended against deportation. Since sole stated purpose of court's action was to correct failure

to make timely recommendation against deportation, such recommendation

is ineffective under section 241(b) of 1952 Act.

(2) Convictions for illegal possession of one person's automobile and for stealing the automobile of another person on different dates permit the normal

Inference that different crimes committed at different times against different persons are not part of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. In the

absence of evidence to the contrary and in light of respondent's refusal to

testify such convictions establish deportability under section 241(a) (4) of

the 1952 Act.

CHARGES:

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)]—ConvIcted

of two crimes after entry, to wit: grand larceny and grand

larceny.

Lodged: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)7—Convicted

of two crimes after entry, to wit: grand larceny and grand larceny; robbery while armed and possession of (stolen) motor

vehicle.

Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)1—Convicted

of two crimes after entry, to wit: grand larceny and grand larceny; robbery while armed and possession of (stolen) motor

vehicle, and robbery.

BEFORE THE BOARD

DISCUSSION: The case comes forward on appeal by the examining officer from the decision of the special inquiry officer dated

November 13, 1961, ordering the proceedings terminated.

The record relates to a native and citizen of Poland, 21 years old,

male, single, who last entered the United States on August 24, 1951,

ex USNS Gen. 1?. M. Macleh ford and was admitted as an eligible die-

613

placed person under section 2(c) of the Displaced Persons Act. The

original order to show cause was served on the respondent on August

11, 1960, and charged him with being subject to deportation under

section 241(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in that

after entry he had been convicted in the County Court of Hudson

County of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a

single scheme of criminal misconduct, to wit, grand larceny on October 17, 1958 (Indictment 31-58), and grand larceny on April 14,

1960 (Indictment 28-59). The crimes were committed in July of

1958 and February 1959 and involved motor vehicles which were the

property of different persons. On October 13, 1960, the special inquiry officer ordered the respondent deported on the charge stated in

the order to show cause. On December 20, 1060, the special inquiry

officer granted a motion to reopen, the motion containing a copy of

an order entered by a judge of the Hudson County Court, Law Division, vacating and setting aside the plea, sentence, and thus, the

conviction of one of the two offenses which formed the basis of the

deportation proceeding.

At the reopened hearing the five convictions, all in the Hudson

County Court, Jersey City, New Jersey, which were used to support

the deportation charges had developed into the following postures:

(1) Indictment No. 31-58 charged the respondent with grand

larceny in violation of N_J_S_A. 2A_ :119 2, committed July 18, 1958,

in Bayonne, New Jersey, involving the theft of a motor vehicle of

"VV—H—. The respondent was convicted upon his plea of non vult

and on October 17, 1958, was sentenced to an indeterminate term at

the New Jersey State Reformatory, sentence suspended and respondent placed on probation for a period of 3 years.

(2) Indictment No. 30-58, charged the respondent with possession

of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:139 3, committed on July 17, 1958, involving the possession of the motor vehicle

of R—S , knowing the said motor vehicle to have been stolen. The

respondent was convicted upon his plea of non volt and on October

17, 1958,- was sentenced to an indeterminate term at the New Jersey

State Reformatory, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed

upon Indictment No. 31-58, supra, sentence suspended and respondent

placed on probation for a period of 3 years.

(3) Indictment No. 27-59 charged the respondent with robbery

while armed in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A :141-1, 2A:151-5, and

2A ;90 2, committed. February 13, 1050, involving the robbery, while,

armed, from C—G— of S500 in cash. The respondent was convicted on February 29, 1960, upon his plea of non vult solely of that

portion of the charge which related to robbery, the "while armed"

portion of the charge being dismissed, and was sentenced to the New

Jersey State Reformatory for an indeterminate term not to exceed

-

-

-

014

5 years. On November 2, 1960, the sentencing judge vacated and

set aside the respondent's plea of non vult and the sentence which

had been imposed, reinstated the charge of robbery in violation of

N.J.S.A. 2A :141-1 and di]., en1. the entrance of a plea of not guilty

to the charge. On Man -h 19G1, the judge directed the dismissal

of the indictment„

(4) Accusation No. 85-60 charged the respondent with robbery in

violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:141-1. committed February 13, 1059, in

Jersey City, New Jersey, involving the robbery from C G— of the

sum of $500. On February 20, 1961, respondent entered a plea of

non unit to the accusation, having waived indictment and trial, and

on March 30, 1961, was sentenced to an indeterminate term to the

New Jersey State. Reformatory not to exceed 5 years, respondent to

given credit for time already spent at the New Jersey State, Reformatory under Indictments No. 27-59 (eupow) and No. 28-59

(infra) and the time which he had already spent in the Hudson

County Jail. A motion made by respondent's counsel that, the court

recommend against deportation by reason of this conviction was

opposed by a representative of the United States Attorney's office

but was granted by the court. (Proceedings pursuant to Indictment

No. 27-59 and Accusation No. 85-00 have been set out in direct succession in order to demonstrate the same crime against the same

person was involved in both convictions.)

(5) Indictment No. 28-59 charged respondent with grand larceny

of a motor vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A :119-2, committed on

February 13, 1959, in Jersey City, New Jersey, involving the - theft of

a motor vehicle of J—A--. The respondent was convicted upon his

plea of non vult on April 14, 1960, was sentenced to the New Jersey

State Reformatory for an indeterminate term not to exceed 3 years,

to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on Indictment No.

27-59, ,vapra. On November 2, 1900, the sentencing judge vacated

and set aside the respondent's plea of non vult and the sentence which

had been imposed, reinstated the charge of theft, of a motor vehicle

in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:110-2, directed the entrance of a plea

of not guilty to the charge and on March 30, 1961, the some judge

directed the dismissal of the indictment.

The County Courts order of November 2, 1960, vacating the convictions under Indictments No. '27-5.9 and No. 28-59 was made pursuant to the authority contained in N.J.R.R. 3:7-10(a) which provides:

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of not conterdere or of non volt,

may he made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice, the Court, after sentence, may set

aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his

plea.

615

The examining officer in his brief has cited a number of New

Jersey court cases in which the "manifest injustice" mentioned in

N.J.R.R. 3:7-10(a) involved instances in which the defendant was

denied due process in the State court, such as appearance or entering

a plea without representation by counsel, lack of ability to comprehend the nature of the charges in the proceeding, and otherwise

involving a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. However, since such a motion is addressed to the discretion or conscious;

of the court, it cannot be said that the court lacked jurisdiction

to grant the motion to vacate as pointed out by the special inquiry

officer. 1 The difficulty arises not with the jurisdiction of the State

court to grant the motion to vacate but the attempt of the State

court to invade an area to which Congress has seen fit. to erect or

impose a federal standard in regard to recommendations against

deportation as provided in section 241(b) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act. We find that in intruding into this federal area,

the court's action was ineffective for reasons which we will now

develop.

Accusation No. 85-60 arose out of the same facts which constituted

the basis for Indictment No. 27-59; i.e., the robbery of $500 cash

from C—G— committed February 13, 1950, in the City of Jersey

City, New Jersey. Indictment No. 27-59 had resulted in the respondent's conviction on his plea of non 'twit on February 29. 1960, to the

indictment which related to robbery, the "while armed" charge being

dismissed. Subsequently, on November 2, 1960, the sentencing judge

vacated and set aside respondent's plea of non vult and the sentence

which lied been imposed, reinstated the charge of robbery in violation

of N.J.S.A. 2A:141-1, directed the entrance of a plea of not guilty

to the charge and on March 30, 1961, directed the dismissal of this

indictment. Accusation No. 85 - 60 revived the charge which consisted of the same factual allegations, minus the "while armed"

charge, to which respondent entered a plea of non 'vull on February

20, 1961, and on March 30, 1961, was given the same sentence of an

indeterminate. term at the New Jersey State Reformatory not to exceed 5 years to which he had previously been sentenced under Indictment No. 57-59; and the court, upon motion by counsel after due

notice to the United States Attorney's office, granted the motion and

recommended against deportation.

It is difficult to perceive how Accusation No. 85-60 can be divorced

from No. 27-59, both alleging the same overt act and the same violation of law and involving the same defendant and the same victim.

The "manifest injustice" referred to by Judge, Duffy of the Hudson

Con Ity Court in his order of November 2, 1960, that the defendant's

of non exult heretofore entered on February 29, 1960, in response

-- -1 itri f

of H--, 9-380; Matter of H—,

616

to Indictments Nos. 27-59 and 25-59 and the sentences imposed as a

result thereof on April 14, 1960, be vacated as if never entered was

made for the specifically-stated reason that the court was not aware

(at the time of first sentencing) that the defendant was subject to

deportation as an alien, did not consider that the. defendant was

faced with additional penalty of deportation and that it would be

manifestly unjust to subject the defendant to the additional penalty

aforesaid. This reason alone, the added penalty of deportation and

no other, is given in the order to constitute the "manifest injustice"

in the order to vacate and set aside pursuant to R.R. 3:7-10(a).

This subject was considered by the Attorney General in Matter of

P—. 9 - 293 (May 24, 1961). In that case the respondent was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of section 722(S) of the

Penal Law of New York in September 1954 and again in March

19;59, both offenses involving moral turpitude. The 1959 conviction was set aside by the New York Trial Court on a writ of error

coram nobis- and on October 2, 1959, the respondent was retried and

again convicted on his plea of guilty and at this second trial the

court recommended against deportation. The question was whether

the recommendation at this time of the court against deportation met

the requirement of section 241(b) that to be effective it must be made

"at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence." Reliance was had upon United States ex rel. Piperleoff v. Esperdy, 2 in

which the court held that the coram nobis proceeding in that case

had no effect for the purpose of section 241(b).

eral interpreted the Pip,:rkoff case to

The Attorney Gen-

mean that the test to be

applied under section 241 (b) in coram nobis cases was whether the

court's "sole basis" for granting coram nobis was to make the statutory recommendation against deportation; that the accused's motives

or purposes in seeking COMM, "ii0bi8 were immaterial, except insofar

as they threw light upon the court's basis for vacating the conviction. After examining the record which showed (1) at the time of

pleading guilty to the March 1959 conviction, the accused was not

represented by counsel; (2) that as a result of the court's refusal

of a request that the charges be translated into German, he was unable to understand the crimes against him; and (3) the conviction

could result in his deportation; and that at the hearing only the

first two grounds were urged, there being no mention made of deportation, the Attorney General found no difficulty in concluding that

the opportunity to recommend against deportation was not the court's

"sole basis" for vacating the March 1959 conviction; that it was

clear that the court granted coram nobis because of a constitutional

defect in the prior conviction.

-267 F.2d 72 (C.A. 2, 1959).

617

In the present case, instead of the similar procedure of the writ

of coram, nob is which had been abolished under New Jersey practice,

resort was had to R.R. 3:7-10(a) to correct "manifest injustice."

The "sole basis" stated on the record by the court in granting the

motion to vacate was because it was not aware that the defendant was

subject to deportation and the motion was granted to avoid the additional penalty of deportation. The fact that thereafter the respondent was proceeded against by an accusation rather than by an indictment should not make any difference 3 in concluding that the

recommendation against deportation was not made pursuant to section 241 (b) which enunciates a federal standard for the determination

of what constitutes the first entry of judgment or the passing of

sentence where it is manifest that the sole basis for the vacation and

reentry of judgment was to repair the omission to make the statutory

recommendation against deportation' The interdependency of Accusation 85-60 and Indictment No. 27-59 is shown not only by the

common factors of accused and victim, corpus dalieti, and section of

law violated but also by the reference in the record of conviction on

Indictment 85-60 to Indictments Nos. 27-59 and 28-59 to the effect

that these latter indictments were not dismissed until after the imposition of sentence on Accusation 85-60 and the making of the recommendation against deportation on March 30, 1961. It is concluded

that the recommendation against deportation is not effective under

the federal standard set forth in section 2 11(b) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act.

The conviction of robbery committed on February 13, 1959 (Accusation No. 85-60), the conviction of grand larceny of a motor

vehicle committed July 18, 1958 (Indictment No. 31-58), and the

conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle committed July 17,

1958 (Indictment No. 30-58), support the deportation charge laid

under section '241(a) (1). While under this view it is not necessary

to consider whether the latter two convictions involved a single

scheme, we believe we should discuss the finding of the special inquiry

officer in this regard.

Indictment No. 31-58 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:119-2 charged

the respondent with stealing the automobile of one W—H— in

3 Artiele 1, paragraph 5, New Jersey Constitution, provides no person shall

be held to answer for a criminal offense unless on presentment or indictment

of a grand jury except in cases now prosecuted without indictment. N.J.S.A.

2A;152-1 defines indictment to include "accusation of crime"; it includes "inquisitiOn," "presentment," "information," as well. N.J.R.R. 3:4-2(a) provides

"a criminal offense punishable by death shall be prosecuted by indictment.

Any other criminal offense shall be prosecuted by indictment, unless the defendant. after having been advised of his right to indictment, shall, in writing

signed by him waive such right, in which case he may be tried on accusation."

267 F.2d 72 (C.A. 2, 1959).

4 United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy,

R1R

Bayonne, Now Jersey, on July 18, 1958; and Indictment No 30-58

charged possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A.

2A:139-3 committed the day before, July 17, 1958, in the same city

and involving the property of one R — S — . Convictions on both

indictments occurred in the County Court of Hudson, Jersey City,

New Jersey. on October 17, 1958, and the respondent was given concurrent sentences of indeterminate terms in the New Jersey State

Reformatory, sentences Were suspended and he was placed on 3 years'

probation. The special inquiry officer has found alienage and that

the crimes involve moral turpitude. He has, however, found that the

Government has not borne the burden of establishing that the two

crimes did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.

The examining officer placed into evidence the records of conviction and attempted to question the respondent. However, the respondent declined to testify upon advice of counsel and the records

of conviction, plus the refusal of respondent to testify, constitute

the sole evidence to support the charge under section 241(a) (4) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act. 5 The special inquiry officer in

construing the records of conviction stated that they were as equally

susceptible of an inference that the respondent might have been in

the illegal business of stealing and disposing of stolen motor vehicles and thus that the two crimes under consideration were part and

parcel of one scheme or plan of illegal business, as of an inference

of two separated, unrelated and distinct crimes; and concluded that

the test of substantial evidence was not satisfied by evidence which

gives

support to inconsistent inferences.

We believe that this construction tales the imagination and is

unsupported by the record. The records of conviction establish that

the respondent had illegal possession of the stolen vehicle of one Son July 17, 1958, and that on the next day, July 18, 1958, stole the

auto of one H—. The normal inference to be drawn from different

crimes committal at different times against different. persons is that

they were separate and distinct crimes and were not part of a common scheme or plan unless there is evidence to the contrary. It is

concluded that the records of conviction establish a prima facie

showing of deportability.

The case of Chan-an Din. Khan. v. Barber 6 stated that while it is

true that many separate offenses may be committed by an individual

in furtherance of some subjective predilection amounting to a general

scheme of criminality, to hold that a mere lurking propensity to corn241(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

5 S.ection

1251(a) (4) ) provides for the deportation of an alien who has, subsequent to

entry into the United States, been convicted of at least two crimes involving

moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.

147 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal., N.D., 1957).

619

mit certain kinds of offenses manifests a "single scheme" within the

meaning of section 1251(a) (4) would be, in effect, to render nugatory

a declared public policy to deport aliens who are convicted of two

crimes involving moral turpitude; a more reasonable and rational interpretation of this language is that Congress contemplated nothing

more than those situations where an alien's conviction i5 based on a

multiple indictment charging him with separate crimes, which were

committed by the doing of a single act or a series of simultaneous or

closely related connected acts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that fraudulent returns in two different years could, or could

not, be one plan or scheme but that the case presented no facts to

prove such a single scheme; and, in the absence of all evidence to

the contrary, complete crimes committed on different dates or in different places are considered separate and different crimes and support

separate charges.'

This reasoning was quoted with approval in Wood v. floys in

which the court, however, found that there was evidence to the con

trary based upon the alien's testimony which overcame the prima

facie case established solely by the record of conviction .° The court

in Wood v. Hoy referred with approval to the case of Jeronimo v.

Murff . 1° This case involved a multi-count indictment involving sev-

eral larcenies and briberies covering a stated period; the court

laid great stress on the concluding paragraph of the indictment

which charged: "all of the acts and transactions alleged in each

of the several counts in this indictment are connected together and

constitute parts of a common scheme and plan"; and the grand jury

found that all the acts and transactions Alleged in the indictments

were connected together. The court in Jeronimo distinguished the

case from Fitzgerald ex rel. Miceli v. Landon" and Chanan Din

Khan v. Barber '-2 by pointing to the following evidentiary facto

which convincingly established a single scheme in that case: the

initial formulation of the same subsisting fundamental object and

purpose; the utilization of precisely the same methods and procedures in each of a series of successive situations to accomplish the

original objective; the continuously interacting relationship and

cnanan Din Tan v. Barber, 253 F.20 547 (C.A. 9, 1938).

266 F.2d 825 (C.A. 9, 1959).

9 The court commented ou the case of Fitzgerald ex rel. Miceli v. Landon,

238 F.2d 864 (C.A. 1, 1956), in which the court concluded it had no reason to

believe that Lilt petitivuer was eunvitAed of being lewd, wanton and lascivious

solely on the basis of the one act of indecent assault charged in the first

count; but criticized the implication in Miceli to the effect that the proviso is

to be interpreted as "crimes arising out of a single act of criminal misconduct."

.0157 F. Supp. 808 (D.C., S.D.N.Y., 1957).

11 238 F.2d 864 (C.A. 1, 1956).

12 147 F. Supp. 771.

020

activities of the same persons who originated and launched the proj

ect; the victimizing of the same person through all of the acts

which, in the aggregate, demonstrated the existence of a single

criminal enterprise, project and undertaking, and found that the

record conclusively established that the four larcenies upon which

the proposed deportation was based arose out of a single continuing

criminal enterprise. In the instant case there was no indication

in the indictment of an allegation of a

CO111111011

scheme and plan nor

were the same persons victimized, but two different vehicles were

stolen from two different persons on different dates.

In the case of Zito v. Illoutal,'3 the plaintiff was convicted on a

12-count indictment which charged conspiracy and 11 substantive

violations of the Internal Revenue Act, in which the examining

officer introduced into the evidence only a certified copy of the

indictment, judgment and conviction and the alien rested without

producing any evidence. The court followed the reasoning of

Jeronimo, supra, because the only evidence, the record of conviction,

failed to conotitute eubetantial evidence because the indictment

charged a continuing conspiracy, the offenses were of the same type,

the victim was the same and the same defendants participated in

the commission of the offenses. The court found the offenses had a

common subject matter and that the object of each crime was the

same. Again, the present case may be distinguished because the

crimes were different and the victims were different and the record

of conviction shows neither a common subject or a common objective.

in Matter of C—, 9 - 524 (Jan. 2, 1962), in which the respondent

was convicted in a single trial of filing fraudulent tax returns for

the years 1948 and 1949, the record of conviction constituting

the only evidence when the respondent refused to testify at the

deportation hearing, it was found that in the absence of probative

evidence to the contrary, the record of conviction failing to show acts

in furtherance of a common plan would suffice to establish a single

scheme did not exist, and the Board held there was no probative

evidence controverting the inference which flows from the commission

of crimes a year apart. In the instant case, the record of conviction

showing the commission of different crimes on different dates against

different persons supports the charge in the absence of evidence to

the contrary. The crimes here- do not meet the single .scheme test

of commission pursuant to the formulation of overall plan to accomplish an original objective in each of a series of successive criminal

projects. It is concluded that these two convictions do not comprise

a single scheme. Deportation will be ordered upon that portion of

the second lodged charge which is comprehended by the amended conclusion of law (2) below.

10

174 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill., 1959).

621

The findings of fact and conclusion of law made by the special

inquiry officer on November 13, 1961, are hereby adopted except that

finding of fact (9) is amended to read:

(9) That the offenses for which the respondent was convicted under Accusation #85-60 and Indictments #30-58 and #31-58 did not arise out

of a single scheme of criminal misconduct;

and the conclusion of law is amended to read:

(1) That the recommendation against deportation on March 30, 1961, was

not effective under section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality

Act;

(2) That the respondent is subject to deportation under section 241(a) (4)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act in that he at any time after

entry has been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude; robbery commIlLed February 13, 1959, grand larceny committed

July 18, 1958; and possession of a stolen motor vehicle committed July

17, 1958.

ORDER: It is ordered that the alien be deported to Poland pursuant to law on the following charge:

Section 241(a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act in that at any time

after entry he has been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude: robbery committed February 13, 1959, grand larceny committed July

18, 1958; and possession of a stolen motor vehicle committed July 17, 1958_

622

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.