UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

18 OCAHO no. 1513d

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER

TRAVIS DARNELL AUSTIN,

Complainant,

v.

SPECIALIZED STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Respondent.

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8 U.S.C. § 1324b Proceeding

OCAHO Case No. 2023B00009

Appearances: Travis Darnell Austin, pro se Complainant

Leah Toro, Esq., and Courtney Tedrowe, Esq., for Respondent

AMENDED 1 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DECISION

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises under the antidiscrimination provisions of the Immigration and Nationality

Act (INA), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. On November 21, 2022, Complainant Travis Austin

filed a Complaint against Respondent Specialized Staffing Solutions, Inc. (SSSI). Complainant

alleges that SSSI discriminated against him on account of his citizenship status and national origin,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1); retaliated against him for engaging in § 1324b protected

activity, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5); and engaged in unfair documentary practices, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6). On January 3, 2023, Respondent filed its Answer and

Affirmative Defenses.

A. Complainant’s Adverse Inference Sanctions Related to Discovery Violations

On May 30, 2023, Respondent filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, seeking the production

of ten Requests for Production of Documents and either to compel Complainant’s response to or

deem one Request for Admission to have been admitted. Mot. Compel 4.

The Court issued an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision on April 30, 2025. This Order

amends the April 30, 2025 Order only to correct typographical errors.

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On October 31, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Respondent’s Motion to

Compel Discovery, directing Complainant to provide responses by November 17, 2023. Austin

v. Specialized Staffing Solutions, Inc., 18 OCAHO no. 1513, 10 (2023). 2

Complainant did not respond to the order, and subsequently Respondent moved for

sanctions related to violations of the Court’s order. Respondent sought sanctions of an adverse

inference on the requests for production of documents not produced, and for several admissions.

Mot. Sanctions 2-3.

Complainant did not respond to this motion either, and on July 31, 2024, the Court issued

an Order on Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions. Austin v. Specialized Staffing, 18 OCAHO no.

1513b (2024). The Court also gave Respondent an opportunity to amend its original Motion for

Summary Decision. Id. at 10.

B. Summary Decision

On September 1, 2023, Respondent filed its initial Motion for Summary Decision and Brief

in Support of Motion for Summary Decision. On August 30, 2024, following the Court’s Order

on Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions, Respondent filed its Amended Motion for Summary

Decision.

Complainant opposed the motion, filing its opposition on September 9, 2024. 3

II.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Following OCAHO precedent, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986) and its subsequent case law, the Court construes the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Monty v. USA2Go Quick Stores, 16

Citations to OCAHO precedents reprinted in bound Volumes 1 through 8 reflect the volume number and the case

number of the particular decision, followed by the specific page in that volume where the decision begins; the pinpoint

citations which follow are thus to the pages, seriatim, of the specific entire volume. Pinpoint citations to OCAHO

precedents subsequent to Volume 8, where the decision has not yet reprinted in a bound volume, are to pages within

the original issuances; the beginning page number of an unbound case will always be 1, and is accordingly omitted

from the citation. Published decisions may be accessed in the Westlaw database “FIM-OCAHO,” or in the LexisNexis

database “OCAHO,” or on the website at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-administrative-hearingofficer-decisions.

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Complainant’s opposition also included belated arguments in opposition to the motion for sanctions, and a second

belated attempt to provide discovery responses responsive to the Court’s 2023 order. As stated in the order granting

the motion for sanctions, the discovery responses were extraordinarily tardy and presented without good cause for the

delay. Complainant’s response to the motion for sanctions is similarly tardy. The General Litigation Order explained

that responses to motions must be filed within 14 days after receiving the motion. Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions

was filed on December 20, 2023. Complainant argued against sanctions in a filing submitted on September 9, 2024,

roughly one year after the motion was sent. Complainant offers no explanation for his failure to respond for nearly a

year. Accordingly, the Court will not consider these arguments in evaluating the present motion for summary decision.

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OCAHO no. 1443c, 5 n.5 (2024); United States v. Four Seasons Earthworks, Inc., 10 OCAHO no.

1150, 3 9201) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).

A. Facts

Respondent is a staffing agency based in Illinois; it employs more than 15 employees.

Compl. 6, Answer ¶¶ 5, 13, Brief Mot. Summ. Dec. 2. Respondent provides temporary

employment to skilled and unskilled laborers in the Chicagoland area. Answer ¶ 13.

Printing Arts 4 is a client of Respondent. Brief Mot. Summ. Dec., Declaration of Samantha

Kruger ¶ 2.

Complainant was born in America and is consequently a United States citizen. Compl. 4.

He asserts that he was a citizen of the “U.S.A. Republic” at the time of the alleged discrimination.5

Id.

Respondent hired Complainant on February 1, 2022. IER Charge 2; Answer ¶ 14; Brief

Mot. Summ. Dec. 2.

As part of Complainant’s onboarding process, Respondent requested that he fill out an I-9

form indicating his eligibility to work in the United States. Answer ¶ 14. The form requires

Complainant to produce a select category of documents confirming his identity, and to attest to his

eligibility to work. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1), (b)(2). The form also requires Respondent to attest

to having seen the identification and to assert that it does not appear to be fraudulent. 8 U.S.C. §

1324a(b)(1)(A).

Complainant submitted a driver’s license issued by the “United States of America

Republic, Province of Missouri.” Answer., Ex. A at 1. He also provided Respondent with a birth

certificate that was issued by the “United States of America Republic.” Id., Ex. A at 2.

Respondent’s Staffing Coordinator Sandra Salinas sent Complainant’s completed Form I-9 and

supporting documents to Respondent File Clerk Doreen Wenzel. Ms. Wenzel accepted the form

and supporting documents. Answer ¶¶ 14-16.

Complainant refers to the company as “Printers Arts,” Compl. 11; Respondent refers to it as “Printing Arts.” Answer

¶ 10. For the sake of clarity, the Court refers to the company as Printing Arts.

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In the IER Charge attached to his Complaint, Complainant also states that he is “a National of the United States of

America Republic” and that he is “not a United States Citizen[.]” IER Charge 3, Compl. 10. Complainant presents

no evidence that he ever undertook to renounce his United States citizenship, or that the United States government

ever acknowledged his apparent denaturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (loss of nationality by native-born or

naturalized citizens). As described in more detail below, the Court presumes that Complainant continues to be,

notwithstanding his representations, a United States citizen. A contrary inference would put an immediate end to his

claim of citizenship-based employment discrimination under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, in that Complainant offers no

argument or evidence that he meets the other definitions of a “protected individual” under the statute. 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(a)(3).

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On February 24, 2022, Respondent assigned Complainant to work at Printing Arts. Compl.

11; Answer ¶ 10, ¶ 17. There, he worked as a forklift operator on the third shift. Compl. 11;

Answer ¶ 10. He was qualified for the jobs that he assigned. Compl. 8, 10; Answer ¶ 8.

Complainant understood that he was required to work at Printing Arts for 90 days as a

temporary employee before he was eligible to be hired by Printing Arts as a permanent employee.

Compl. 11.

In April 2022, Respondent’s Compliance Officer Samantha Kruger reviewed

Complainant’s application and concluded that the documents he produced did not comply with the

Form I-9 regulations. Answer ¶¶ 19-20.

She determined that Complainant’s driver’s license and birth certificate were not lawfully

issued by a state, county, territory, or municipality of the United States as the regulation requires.

Answer ¶¶ 19-20.

Ms. Kruger contacted Complainant to advise that the documents were invalid for the

purposes of the I-9 form. She asked him to submit I-9 approved documents to continue his

employment. Answer ¶ 21, Compl. 10, 12. Ms. Kruger gave Complainant a copy of the last page

of the Form I-9, which identified the appropriate documents, for reference. Answer ¶ 21.

Complainant responded that his documents were issued “by the U.S.A.

Republic/Morocco.” Compl. 10. He thereafter submitted “a letter from the Internal Revenue

Service . . . rejecting Complainant’s request that the United States of American Republic

Corporation . . . be treated as exempt from taxation; and . . . the Articles of Incorporation of the

United States of America Republic Corporation.” Answer ¶ 22, Compl. 10.

Respondent informed Complainant that the documents were not accepted and asked him

to provide appropriate documentation. Answer ¶ 22. Complainant did not do so. Id.

Respondent fired Complainant shortly thereafter. 6 Answer ¶ 23. Complainant asserts that

he was hired at Printing Arts on or around the same time, but he was terminated after one shift.

Compl. 11.

The date of Complainant’s termination from Respondent and employment at Printing Arts has not been clearly set

out by either party. Complainant asserts that he was hired as a permanent employee at Printing Arts. Compl. 11.

Complainant asserts that he was retaliated against on April 15, 2022; he describes the nature of his retaliation as

Respondent terminating Complainant and advising Printing Arts not to release him from Respondent’s employment

to be hired by Printing Arts. Id. This statement conflicts with Complainant’s account of Respondent requiring

employees to serve at least 90 days as temporary employees before being hired by the company where the temporary

worker was assigned. Id. Complainant does not answer the part of the Complaint questionnaire asking when he was

terminated, but presuming that it was the date he identified as the date of the retaliation, April 15, 2022, it was 50 days

between the date of his assignment at Printing Arts to the date of his termination from both Respondent and Printing

Arts. Complainant asserts that he seeks backpay from Respondent beginning on May 15, 2022 — presuming that this

is the date of his termination, that is 80 days from the date of his first assignment at Printing Arts.

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III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Decision

Under OCAHO’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2024), an

“Administrative Law Judge shall enter a summary decision for either party if the pleadings,

affidavits, material obtained . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

a party is entitled to summary decision.” 28 C.F.R. § 68.38(c). 7 OCAHO’s regulation on summary

decision mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), so the Court may “look[] to federal case

law interpreting Rule 56(c) for guidance . . . .” Brown v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 14 OCAHO no.

1379a, 11 (2022) (citing Martinez v. Superior Linen, 10 OCAHO no. 1180, 5 (2023)); see also 28

C.F.R. § 68.1.

“‘An issue of material fact is genuine only if it has a real basis in the record’ and ‘[a]

genuine issue of material fact is material if, under the governing law, it might affect the outcome

of the suit.’” Sharma v. Lattice Semiconductor, 14 OCAHO no. 1362d, 8 (2023) (quoting

Sepahpour v. Unisys, Inc., 3 OCAHO no. 500, 1012, 104 (1993)). The moving party has the

“initial burden of demonstrating both the absence of a material factual issue and that the party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . .” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 11 (quoting United

States v. Four Seasons Earthworks, Inc., 10 OCAHO no. 1150, 3 (2012)). At that point, the

“nonmoving party must come forward with contravening evidence to avoid summary resolution.”

Id. However, the “party opposing the motion” for summary decision “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of” its pleadings but must instead “set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue of fact for the hearing.” 28 C.F.R. § 68.38(b); see also United States v. 3679

Com. Place, Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1296, 4 (2017). Without proof, “the Court will not assume that

the non-moving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a

at 11 (citing Crespo v. Famsa, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1337, 3 (2019)). The Court “views all facts

and inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.’” Sharma, 14 OCAHO no.

1362d at 8 (quoting United States v. Primera Enters., 4 OCAHO no. 615, 249, 261 (1994)).

B. Burdens of Proof

To prove a § 1324b discrimination case, complainants “may use direct or circumstantial

evidence . . . .” Sharma, 14 OCAHO no. 1362d, at 9 (citing United States v. Diversified Tech. &

Servs. Of Va., Inc., 9 OCAHO no. 1095, 13 (2003)). “Direct evidence is evidence that, on its face,

establishes discriminatory intent.” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 12. Complainants, however,

rarely present direct evidence. Id. (citing Nguyen v. ADT Eng’g, Inc., 3 OCAHO no. 489, 915,

922 (1993)). For cases relying on circumstantial evidence, OCAHO utilizes the burden shifting

framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, (1973), and

subsequent cases. See Reed v. Dupont Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1321a, 3 (2019).

Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, a complainant must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. Then the respondent must “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory

OCAHO Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2024). The rules are also available through OCAHO’s

webpage on the United States Department of Justice’s website. See https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chiefadministrative-hearing-officer-regulations.

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reason for the challenged employment action[.]” Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a, at 12. If the

respondent succeeds, then the complainant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

proffered reason is “false and that Respondent intentionally discriminated[.]” Sharma, 14 OCAHO

no. 1362d, at 9.

Complainant may also prove retaliation claims “through direct evidence or by

circumstantial evidence through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test.” Ndzerre v. Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 13 OCAHO no. 1306a, 8-9 (2018) (citing Breda v. Kindred Braintree

Hosp., LLC, 10 OCAHO no. 1202, 7 (2013)).

Similarly, “the facts in a[n unfair documentary practices] case must . . . be examined in the

same manner and with the same approach as is taken in any other intentional discrimination case”

so that “[w]here a case rests on circumstantial evidence . . . the employer must be afforded the

opportunity to respond to a prima facie showing by proffering a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for the employment practice complained of.” United States v. Diversified Tech. & Servs.

of Va., Inc., 9 OCAHO no. 1095, 18 (2003).

C. National Origin Discrimination

“It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate” in hiring or

discharge “because of . . . national origin . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(A). For an employer to

be covered by the national origin discrimination prohibition in 8 U.S.C. § 1324b, the employer

must have between four and fourteen employees during the relevant period. See 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(a)(2)(A) (excepting employers with three or fewer employees from coverage); 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(a)(2)(B) (excepting from coverage claims of national origin discrimination for entities

covered under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer for Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act as one that “has fifteen or more employees[.]”).

D. Citizenship Status Discrimination

It is also “an unfair immigration-related employment practice to discriminate” in hiring or

discharge “because of . . . citizenship status” for protected individuals. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(B).

A protected individual is defined as “a citizen or national of the United States,” or an alien who is

appropriately work authorized, subject to certain exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). However,

“discrimination because of citizenship status which is otherwise required in order to comply with

law, regulation, or executive order” is excepted from coverage. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C).

To show a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a complainant must demonstrate:

1) that they belong to a protected class; 2) are qualified for the position held; 3) were discharged,

and 4) were replaced by a person not in the complainant’s protected class, or, alternatively, that

others similarly situated but not belonging to the protected group were treated more favorably.

See, e.g., Brown, 14 OCAHO no. 1379a at 12; Santiglia v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 9 OCAHO no.

1110, 7 (2004); Wilson v. Waste Connections, Inc., 13 OCAHO no. 1315, 4 (2019); Sanchez

Molina v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 11 OCAHO no. 1261, 6 (2015). “To make a comparison

of the plaintiff’s treatment to that of non-minority employees, the plaintiff must show an employee

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who is similarly situated to the [complainant] in all relevant respects[.]” Beal v. Convergys Corp.,

489 Fed. Appx. 421, 423 (11th Cir. 2012).

E. Retaliation

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(5), employers are prohibited from intimidating or retaliating

“against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured under [§

1324b] or because the individual intends to file or has filed a charge or complaint, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under [§ 1324b].”

To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation, a complainant must show: 1) the complainant

engaged in protected activity under § 1324b; 2) the respondent was aware of the protected activity;

3) the complainant suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) “there was a causal link between

the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct by” the employer. Gig Partners., 14 OCAHO no.

1363c, 7 (2021); see also Shortt v. Dick Clark’s AB Theatre, LLC, 10 OCAHO no. 1130, 6 (2009).

If the Complainant establishes a prima facie case, the Respondent may produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, which the Complainant may show is pretextual. Gig

Partners, 14 OCAHO no. 1363c, at 7.

“To qualify as protected conduct in this forum, the conduct must implicate some right or

privilege specifically secured under § 1324b, or a proceeding under that section.” Paz-Martinez

v. Securitas Security Servs. USA, Inc., 11 OCAHO no. 1260, 6 (2015); see also Patel v. USCIS

Boston, 14 OCAHO no. 1353a, 3-4 (2020) (accord).

“There must be proof that the decisionmaker knew of the protected conduct at the time the

decision was made before an inference of causation may arise.” Rainwater v. Doctor’s Hospice

of Ga., Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1300, 17 (2017).

“The causal link between the protected activity and the respondent’s employment decision

or intimidating, threatening, or coercive behavior must rise to the level of ‘but for’ causation.” Gig

Partners, 14 OCAHO no. 1363c, at 8. It is strong circumstantial evidence of but for causation if

the adverse action happens soon after the protected action. See Sperandio v. United Parcel Servs.,

15 OCAHO no. 1400e, 9, 13 (2024). “The paradigmatic circumstantial evidence,” for causation

is close “temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse action[.]” Sperandio

v. United Parcel Servs., 15 OCAHO no. 1400e, 9 (2024). Crucially, a complainant must engage

in the protected activity prior to the adverse action. See id. at 13 (finding no retaliation where the

complainant filed an internal complaint with the employer following his discharge).

F. Unfair Documentary Practices

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6), is it an unfair immigration-related employment practice to

request “more or different documents than are required under [§ 1324a(b)] or [to] refus[e] to honor

documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine . . . if made for the purpose

or with intent of discriminating against an individual” on the basis of national origin or citizenship

status.

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“To establish an unfair documentary practice (document abuse) claim under 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(a)(6), the Complainant must set forth two elements: an act and an intent.” Monty v.

USA2GO Quick Stores, 16 OCAHO no. 1443c, 10 (2024) (citing United States v. Mar-Jac Poultry,

Inc., 12 OCAHO no. 1298, 25 (2017)). To satisfy the act requirement, the complainant must show

that there was “a request by the employer for the [Complainant] to produce documents to satisfy

an employer’s obligations under IRCA, or a refusal to accept valid documents related to

employment eligibility verification procedures.” Id. (citing Jarvis v. AK Steel, 7 OCAHO no. 930,

111, 117 (1997), then citing Costigan v. NYNEX, 6 OCAHO no. 918, 1151, 1161 (1999)). To

demonstrate intent, the Complainant must show that the “action[] was undertaken for the purpose

or with the intent of discriminating against the employee on account of the employee’s national

origin or citizenship status.” Mbitaze v. City of Greenbelt, 13 OCAHO no. 1345a, 9-10 (2020);

see also Monty, 16 OCAHO no. 1443c at 10. Complainant must show “only an intent to act

differently based on a protected characteristic,” rather than specifically “an intent to deny

employment[.]” Id. at 11.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. National Origin Discrimination

The parties do not dispute that Respondent employs 15 or more people, and the statute

under which Complainant has filed suit directs that national origin claims involving those types of

respondents cannot be adjudicated in this forum. See Compl. 6; Answer ¶ 5; 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(a)(2)(B).

Complainant argues that notwithstanding this representation the national origin claim

should not be dismissed, however, he offers no legal authority to support his contention. Finding

no support for these arguments, the Court must grant the Respondent’s motion.

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is GRANTED as to the national origin-based claim.

B. Citizenship Status Discrimination

As stated above, Complainant has argued that Respondent did not hire him but the facts in

this case, as adduced by both Respondent and Complainant in their pleadings, make clear that

Respondent hired Complainant and that he worked at the temp agency for roughly three months.

See, e.g. Compl. 11 (“As a temporary employee of Specialized Staffing Solution, I was sent to

work for Printers Arts”); Compl. 10 (“I was fired because of my origin and the origin of the

documents issued”); Compl. 16 (“I applied for employment with specialized staffing solutions

February of 2022. I was allowed to work approximately three months before being terminated

…”). For the purposes of this motion, the Court addresses only Respondent’s adverse employment

action of termination, as there is no evidence of a nonselection.

Complainant did not present any direct evidence of citizenship status discrimination. The

Court therefore utilizes a McDonnell-Douglas analysis.

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Addressing the first element of the prima facie case, the Court must determine whether

Complainant is within the statute’s protected class. The statute protects United States citizens,

many lawful permanent residents, asylees, and persons with certain types of visas. Complainant

has argued that he is not a United States citizen, and instead that he is a citizen of the “U.S.A.

Republic” or “U.S.A. Republic/Morocco” or an “American National,” 8 the last title again being

distinct from a national or citizen of the United States. Complainant also asserts that he was born

in America, and in his Complaint form he checked the box for being a United States Citizen or

National.

For the purposes of the motion, the Court presumes that Complainant was a United States

citizen at the time of the alleged discrimination. This conclusion adheres to the available

information which Complainant has submitted concerning his nationality — that he was born in

America — but it also reflects the Court’s obligation to presume the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party in evaluating a motion for summary decision.

A contrary assumption would immediately end Complainant’s claims of employment

discrimination under the statute. 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(1) provides that only “protected individuals”

are within the statute’s ambit. The statute defines protected individuals as: 1) citizens of the United

States, 2) lawful permanent residents, 3) aliens who are lawfully admitted for temporary residence

under 8 U.S.C. §1160(a)(concerning special agricultural workers), 4) lawfully admitted aliens

under 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(concerning the adjustment of status of aliens present in the country

around 1986), and 5) people who are granted asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1157. The statute further

limits the protections of non-U.S. Citizens to persons who applied for naturalization within 6

months of the date that it was first offered to them. 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(3)(B).

Complainant does not plead any of the other categories outside of a U.S. Citizen — he

leaves the sections of the Complaint questionnaire concerning lawful permanent residents and

naturalized persons blank, and he does not respond to the question about visas with a visa status

which provides protection under the Act. Consequently, if the Court were to take Complainant’s

arguments of being a non-U.S. Citizen at face value, he would fail to establish the first element of

the prima facie case and Respondent’s motion would be summarily granted.

The Court declines to do so, in part because of Complainant’s assertion about his place of

birth being in the United States, and also because Complainant presents no evidence of his attempts

to denaturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizens).

The Court need not address the meaning of “American Nationals” or members of the “U.S.A. Republic/Morocco”

in the context of this decision, as Complainant fails to offer evidence demonstrating that he has renounced his U.S.

citizenship, and Complainant also offers no evidence of a comparator outside his protected class. However, the Court

notes that insofar as Complainant makes a claim of being a “sovereign citizen,” similar arguments have been

summarily rejected by the courts, inclusive of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g. Bey v.

State, 847 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases); Bey v. U.S., 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 6238489, *2 (C.D. Ill. Oct.

25, 2016) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has instructed district courts to ‘summarily

reject’ the ‘worn argument that a defendant is sovereign.’”) (internal citations omitted); Lewis v. LVNV Funding,

LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. WL 4280942, *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 24, 2024) (“[S]overeign citizen legal arguments and theories

‘are not valid in the courts of the United States’ and have been overwhelmingly rejected for years as frivolous and

‘indisputably meritless.’”).

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Presuming that Complainant establishes the first element of the prima facie case, the Court

moves to the second element: that Complainant is otherwise qualified for the position he held.

Respondent stipulates to this element, and accordingly the Court determines that it is fulfilled.

Moving to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse employment action, the

parties do not dispute that Respondent fired Complainant sometime after Ms. Krueger noted that

Complainant’s I-9 documentation was not in compliance with the statute.

Addressing the fourth and final element of the prima facie case, Complainant need

demonstrate that the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. Put more concretely, Complainant should produce evidence that links his

citizenship status with the termination. Complainant attempts to do so by asserting that a

Demetrius Crawford was hired as a forklift operator, however Complainant does not state that Mr.

Crawford is either a U.S. Citizen or non-U.S. Citizen. Complainant offers no evidence as to Mr.

Crawford’s citizenship status at all; accordingly, it is impossible for this Court to infer that

Respondent terminated Complainant because of his citizenship status. Similarly, Complainant

asserts that “individuals with other nationalities were hired instead, even a person with no

recognized nationality was hired,” Compl. 10., however he fails to identify who these people are,

what are their nationalities, and whether they held sufficiently similar jobs to Complainant such

that they might be regarded as comparators.

Separately, Respondent obtained a discovery related sanction from Complainant that

Respondent never hired a Demetrius Crawford. The combination of Complainant’s failure to plead

evidence creating a causal nexus between his citizenship status and his termination, along with the

discovery related sanction, prevent Complainant from establishing this element of his prima facie

case.

Assuming arguendo that Complainant had established a prima facie case, the Respondent

would be obliged to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action, which

Complainant might rebut through an offer of pretext. The Court will explore these issues in the

following section, which also correspond to Complainant’s arguments that Respondent violated

the law in its demand for more or different identification documents for his Form I-9 than he

provided.

C. Unfair Documentary Practices

Complainant has also alleged that Respondent violated 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(6) by

demanding “more or different documents than are required” for the purposes of the Form I-9, or

by “refusing to honor documents tendered that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine[.]”

More specifically, Complainant argues that by refusing to accept his driver’s license and birth

certificate Respondent acted contrary to the law.

The flaw in this argument is that the regulations make clear that not just any driver’s license

or birth certificate will meet the requirements of the Form I-9, but instead only a “driver’s license

. . . issued by a state . . . or an outlying possession of the United States” is acceptable. 8 C.F.R. §

274a.2(b)(1). Similarly, only birth certificates which are the “original or certified copy of a birth

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certificate issued by a State, county, municipal authority or outlying possession of the United

States bearing an official seal” may be used for the Form I-9. Id.

Complainant’s driver’s license was issued by the “United States of America Republic,

Province of Missouri,” which (unlike the state of Missouri) is not a state of the United States.

Answer, Exhibit A at 1. 9 Similarly, complainant’s birth certificate, which was issued by the

“United States Republic” is deficient because that entity is also not a state, county, municipality,

or outlying possession of the United States. Compl. 15; Answer, Exhibit A at 2.

Respondent’s demand for a document which meets the statutory and regulatory

requirements of the 8 U.S.C. § 1324a regime is not a violation of the statute. Complainant

unambiguously failed to produce the necessary documents, despite multiple requests. This is both

not a violation of 8 U.S.C. §1324b(a)(6), and it is the Respondent’s legitimate non-discriminatory

reason for the challenged action — it fired Complainant after he failed to comply with its

instructions, which were predicated on what the statute and regulation require.

To this, Complainant makes no offer of pretext.

In that there is no issue of material fact, Respondent’s motion for summary decision is

GRANTED as to both its documentary practices claim and the citizenship-based discrimination

claims.

D. Retaliation

Complainant appears to raise a two-part retaliation claim. First, he alleges that Respondent

engaged in retaliatory discharge, and second, he alleges that Respondent retaliated by refusing to

allow Respondent’s client, Printing Arts, to hire Complainant. Compl. 11. Complainant has not

offered direct evidence of retaliation in either situation, so the Court engages in a McDonnellDouglas analysis.

1. Retaliatory Discharge

The Court presumes for the purposes of the motion that Complainant establishes the

elements of the prima facie case with regard to the adverse employment action of firing

Complainant. Complainant can show that he engaged in protected activity through his complaints

of discrimination, that his employer knew about his complaints, and that he was subject to adverse

employment actions in that he was terminated. Finally, one can infer a causal nexus in that the

adverse employment actions occurred shortly after his complaints.

Complainant encounters difficulties in the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the

challenged actions and the offer of pretext. They are the same as with the claim of discrimination.

Respondent alleges that it terminated Complainant because he failed to produce identification

compliant with the Forms I-9. To this, Complainant has no response, except to argue that the

Complainant attaches to his Complaint a copy of a driver’s license issued by “Province Illinois,” which is also not

a state.

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documents he produced — which were not issued by a state, municipality, or territory of the United

States — should be accepted notwithstanding the statute and regulation’s specific directive that

they not be. As with the prior analysis, Complainant’s arguments do not carry the day, and his

claim on this matter must be dismissed.

2. Retaliation Concerning Printing Arts

Concerning the claim that Respondent failed to release Complainant from his contract to

retaliate against him for his complaints of discrimination, the Court similarly presumes that

Complainant has established a prima facie case. Complainant complained about discrimination,

his employer knew before it fired him, and the temporal proximity between the complaint and

termination creates a causal nexus. Finally, an employer who interferes with an employee’s

attempts to find subsequent employment may create a cognizable adverse employment action. See

Szymanski v. County of Cook, 468 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is well established that

a former employee … can assert a claim that she was given negative references in retaliation for

engaging in protected activity”) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)).

However, as with the prior retaliation claim, Complainant’s claims of retaliation founder

at the legitimate non-retaliatory reasons and offers of pretext. More specifically, Respondent

offers several reasons for the challenged action, and Complainant presents nothing in the way of

pretext to rebut them.

Respondent asserts that it could not have prevented Complainant from taking the job at

Printing Arts because he was fired from SSSI, and so the 90-day trial period which might normally

occur with SSSI employees working at Printing Arts did not apply. Brief Mot. Summ. Dec., Decl.

Kruger ¶ 4. Respondent argues that there was no obligation which prevented Printing Arts from

hiring Complainant at any time. Id. Decl. Kruger ¶ 5. Complainant offers no evidence or argument

reflecting pretext to this claim. 10

In addition to this, the Court notes that Complainant’s 90-day trial period with Respondent

had not elapsed at the time that he was offered the job at Printing Arts, so absent some variation

from this policy he would not normally be released. To the extent that Complainant believes that

Respondent permits its employees to be released from their employment contract with Respondent

The Court notes that both arguments could be true — Respondent could have terminated Complainant, releasing

him to be hired at Printing Arts, and yet nonetheless have told Printing Arts not to hire Complainant for any number

of reasons, inclusive of one with a retaliatory motive. However, the courts are clear that once Respondent has offered

a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the challenged action, the burden of production is on the Complainant to offer

evidence or argument suggesting pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (“The

burden therefore shifted to respondent ‘to produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was

preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’ This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve

no credibility assessment.’”) (internal citations omitted); Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389,

394 (7th Cir. 1998) (“the burden first shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging

the plaintiff and then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual”).

Complainant had two opportunities to make an argument of pretext — at the original date for the opposition to the

motion for summary decision, and at the deadline for any supplements to the original briefing. He did not do so on

either occasion.

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early in order to take a position at their client companies, he offers no argument or evidence to

support this claim.

Respondent also repeats its contention that it fired Complainant for the legitimate nonretaliatory reason of his failure to produce identification documents complying with the Form I-9,

and so even if it told Printing Arts not to hire Complainant it was based on a lawful reason, rather

than a retaliatory motive. Again, Complainant offers nothing in the way of a response to this claim.

Consequently, the Court finds that Respondent has met its burden of showing that there is

no material question of fact with regard to the retaliation claims, and it GRANTS Respondent’s

motion with regard to these claims.

V.

ORDERS

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision is GRANTED as to all claims. The case is

therefore DISMISSED.

This is a Final Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated and entered on May 13, 2025.

__________________________________

Honorable John A. Henderson

Administrative Law Judge

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Appeal Information

This order shall become the final agency order unless modified, vacated, or remanded by the

Attorney General. Provisions governing the Attorney General’s review of this order are set forth

at 28 C.F.R. pt. 68. Within sixty days of the entry of an Administrative Law Judge’s final order,

the Attorney General may direct the CAHO to refer any final order to the Attorney General for

review, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 68.55.

Any person aggrieved by the final order has sixty days from the date of entry of the final order to

petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation is

alleged to have occurred or in which the employer resides or transacts business. See 8 U.S.C. §

1324b(i)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 68.57. A petition for review must conform to the requirements of Rule

15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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