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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 491 (AAO 2026)

Interim Decision #4169

Matter of TEXPERTS, INC., Petitioner

Decided March 6, 2026 1

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Administrative Appeals Office

(1) While a visa petition may not be denied on the merits following a withdrawal, an

officer is permitted to make findings of fact relevant to future benefit requests, including

findings regarding fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact. Matter of

Cintron, 16 I&N Dec. 9 (BIA 1976), distinguished.

(2) The Director must provide the specific reasons, supported by evidence in the record,

to make a finding of fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact.

FOR THE PETITIONER: Nidhi Bansal, Esquire, Reston, Virginia

The Petitioner, an information technology staffing company, seeks to

temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a database administrator under the

H-1B nonimmigrant classification for specialty occupations. See section

101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2024).

Congress set a cap of 65,000 initial H-1B visas or initial grants of H-1B

status per fiscal year. 2 INA § 214(g)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A) (2024).

To administer the cap in a fair and orderly manner, United States Citizenship

and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) requires prospective petitioners to

register for a cap selection process, commonly referred to as a lottery. See

Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking to File H-1B Petitions on

Behalf of Cap-Subject Aliens, 84 Fed. Reg. 888 (Jan. 31, 2019).

This decision was originally entered on September 16, 2025. The matter has been

reopened sua sponte for the limited purpose of making revisions for designation of this

decision as precedent.

1

Up to 6,800 visas are set aside from the cap for the H-1B1 visa program based on free

trade agreements. See INA §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b1), 214(g)(8), 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b1), 1184(g)(8) (2024). Congress also provided for certain

exemptions from the cap. See, e.g., INA § 214(g)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(5)(C)

(providing an exemption for 20,000 initial H-1B visas, or grants of initial H-1B status, each

fiscal year for aliens who have earned a master’s or higher degree from a United States

institution of higher education).

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Each prospective petitioner is prohibited from submitting multiple

registrations for the same beneficiary in the same fiscal year’s H-1B lottery.

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(iii)(A)(2) (2025). The employer must also complete

an attestation, under penalty of perjury, that it “has not worked with, or

agreed to work with, another registrant, petitioner, agent, or other individual

or entity to submit a registration to unfairly increase chances of selection for

the beneficiary.” USCIS, H-1B Electronic Registration Process (Mar. 31,

2025),

https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporaryworkers/h-1b-specialty-occupations/h-1b-electronic-registration-process. 3

A petitioner may not file an H-1B cap-subject petition unless it is based on a

valid registration selection and properly filed within the filing period stated

on the registration selection notice. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(iii)(A)(1).

Subsequent to the selection of the Petitioner’s registration in the lottery

and filing of the instant petition, the Director issued a notice of intent to deny

stating that the record indicated the Petitioner worked with another company,

ConquerTech Innovations, LLC, to submit multiple registrations to unfairly

increase the chances of selecting the Beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)

(2025). The notice listed the derogatory information present in the record

and expressed an intent to deny the petition based on a finding of fraud or

material misrepresentation. 4 The notice afforded the Petitioner an

opportunity to either submit rebuttal documentation or withdraw its petition.

See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(11).

In response, the Petitioner withdrew the petition while simultaneously

attempting to rebut the Director’s proposed findings. The Director issued a

notice acknowledging the withdrawal. The notice also stated that the

Petitioner misrepresented that it had not “worked with, or agreed to work

3

In 2024, USCIS published a final rule to implement a “beneficiary-centric” lottery

process where each alien beneficiary will be counted as one entry, regardless of the number

of employers who properly submit a registration for the individual. See Improving the

H-1B Registration Selection Process and Program Integrity, 89 Fed. Reg. 7456 (Feb. 2,

2024). While employers are still prohibited from working together to increase the odds of

selection, the submission of multiple registrations for the same individual by related entities

should not increase the chances of selection. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(8)(iii)(A)(1), (4).

The Director identified significant derogatory information. Among other facts, the

Director found: the registrations were submitted from the same Internet Protocol (“IP”)

address, indicating they were both submitted from the same computer; IRS Forms 1120S

for the two companies show common ownership and management; both companies used

the same Human Resources (“HR”) manager to submit the registrations; both companies

used the same contingent job offer letter, with common language, and both were created

by the HR manager on same day; and the Beneficiary signed both contingent employment

offers on the same day.

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Interim Decision #4169

with, another registrant, petitioner, agent, or other individual or entity to

submit a registration to unfairly increase chances of selection for the

beneficiary, despite [its] attestation to the contrary” and concluded that the

Petitioner thereby perpetrated a fraud. The Petitioner appealed the Director’s

finding of fraud.

As a threshold issue, we have jurisdiction to decide the appeal. While the

regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(15) provides that “[t]he USCIS

acknowledgement of a withdrawal may not be appealed,” the Director’s

finding of fraud is an adverse action that rests on its materiality to the visa

petition, which generally falls under our jurisdiction. See DHS Delegation

Number 0150.1 (effective Mar. 1, 2003); see also Kungys v. United States,

485 U.S. 759, 772 (1988) (“[T]he ultimate finding of materiality turns on an

interpretation of substantive law.” (citation omitted)). The question for us on

appeal is whether, after acknowledging the withdrawal, the Director properly

issued a separate finding of fraud.

The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a

preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369,

375–76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter de novo.

Matter of Christo’s, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de

novo review, we will withdraw the Director’s finding of fraud and remand

for further proceedings.

I. NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL WITH FACTFINDING

We take notice that an applicant or petitioner “may withdraw a benefit

request at any time until a decision is issued.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(6).

Generally, a request for withdrawal precludes USCIS from entering a

decision on the merits of the benefit request. See Matter of Cintron, 16 I&N

Dec. 9 (BIA 1976). In Matter of Cintron, the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“Board”) concluded that a district director erred in ordering a petition denied

after having received a withdrawal letter. Id. However, we must read this in

conjunction with the regulation that states the facts and circumstances

bearing on the merits of a benefit request will remain material to future

benefit requests, even after a withdrawal. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(15).

To preserve the facts and circumstances surrounding a withdrawn benefit

request, USCIS would typically make written findings for the record. See

USV Pharm. Corp. v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 466 F.2d 455, 462

(D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[F]indings of fact are not mere procedural niceties; they

are essential to the effective review of administrative decisions.”).

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Findings of fact are critical when a case involves fraud or willful

misrepresentation of material fact. Such facts may have a direct bearing on

eligibility for future temporary and permanent immigration benefits,

eligibility for discretionary relief, and admissibility. See, e.g., INA

§§ 204(b), 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 214(g)(3), 237(a)(1)(A), 245(a), 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1154(b), 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), 1184(g)(3), 1227(a)(1)(A), 1255(a) (2024).

The INA and the United States Code also provide for criminal penalties. See

INA § 275(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(d) (2024); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1546 (2024);

see also United States v. Patnaik, 125 F.4th 1223 (9th Cir. 2025) (reinstating

a criminal indictment for defendants who were alleged to have willfully and

materially misrepresented the nature of the position in the course of filing

85 H-1B visa petitions).

Especially important in the adjudication of a visa petition, a finding of

fact will further clarify whether the consequences fall on either the petitioner

or the alien beneficiary. See, e.g., Manney v. U.S. DHS, 735 F. Supp. 3d 590,

600 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (comparing references to fraud and misrepresentation in

the INA before concluding that “Congress recognized a distinction between

situations where an employee is culpable and where the employee is

blameless”). For this reason alone, a finding of fact can be essential to the

conclusion of a withdrawn benefit request.

The best interpretation of the regulations should allow USCIS to

recognize a withdrawal while making further findings of fact relevant to

future benefit requests, including fraud or willful misrepresentation of

material fact. Considering the statute and DHS regulations as a whole, it

would severely undermine the integrity of United States immigration laws to

permit a party to evade the immigration consequences of fraud or willful

misrepresentations of material fact by simply withdrawing the benefit request

once those consequences were imminent. 5 A request for withdrawal should

not serve to improve a petitioner, applicant, or beneficiary’s posture when

seeking future immigration benefits after an initial fraudulent attempt or after

The Petitioner’s withdrawal request did not constitute a voluntary and timely retraction.

See Matter of Namio¸ 14 I&N Dec. 412, 414 (BIA 1973) (explaining that the Board has

“consistently held that the recantation must be voluntary and without delay”). A retraction

that is made in response to the actual or imminent exposure of the fraud or

misrepresentation is not timely. See id.

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Interim Decision #4169

a willful misrepresentation of a material fact was made in furtherance of

receiving past immigration benefits. 6

Accordingly, we conclude the Director was not precluded by regulation

or Matter of Cintron, 16 I&N Dec. at 9, from making a finding of fact related

to the Petitioner’s attempt to procure a visa or grant of status by fraud or

willful misrepresentation of a material fact following the withdrawal of the

petition.

II. ANALYZING FRAUD AND MATERIAL

MISREPRESENTATION

On appeal, among other issues, the Petitioner asserts the Director

“misapplied the legal standard in the determination of the elements of fraud.”

Given the serious consequences inherent to fraud and misrepresentation, we

are expected to “closely scrutinize the factual basis for any possible finding.”

Matter of Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794, 796 (BIA 1994).

Despite frequent and recurring use in immigration law, the terms “fraud”

and “misrepresentation” are not defined in the INA. Instead, the Board, the

Administrative Appeals Office, and immigration officers have long applied

the terms as understood in the “commonly accepted legal sense.” Matter of

G-G-, 7 I&N Dec. 161, 164 (BIA 1956).

Applying that common understanding here, we expect a finding of fraud

or willful material misrepresentation to satisfy the same legal standards that

apply to inadmissibility determinations under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the

INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), if that finding is to preserve an incident for

consideration in future proceedings. 7 If a finding withstands scrutiny for

purposes of inadmissibility, it should satisfy any additional consequences

that stem from the statute based on fraud or misrepresentation. See Sorenson

v. Sec’y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) (“The normal rule of

statutory construction assumes that identical words used in different parts of

the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” (citation modified)).

If adverse findings of fact and conclusions of law are relied upon by USCIS in a

subsequent adjudication, the benefit requestor would have an opportunity to rebut such

adverse findings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i).

6

We recognize that the legal standard in the admissibility context focuses on

representations made by the alien, whereas the focus in the petition context is on

representations made by the petitioner. The legal standard to be applied to find fraud or

willful misrepresentation in the petition context, however, is otherwise the same.

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Section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), provides

two separate bases for inadmissibility: “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully

misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or

has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission to the United States

or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.” (Emphasis added.)

In practice, the distinction between fraud and willful misrepresentation is

not greatly significant because either is sufficient to establish inadmissibility.

Both may be committed through the presentation of an oral or written

statement to an official of the United States Government. See Matter of Y-G-,

20 I&N Dec. at 796. Both must be willfully made. See Matter of A.J. Valdez

and Z. Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496, 498 (BIA 2018); Matter of G-G-, 7 I&N

Dec. at 164. And both must be material to the alien’s eligibility for the

requested immigration benefit. See Matter of Mensah, 28 I&N Dec. 288,

293–94 (BIA 2021) (citing Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771, and Matter of D-R-,

27 I&N Dec. 105, 113 (BIA 2017)).

Fraud, however, requires the establishment of additional elements that do

not apply to a willful misrepresentation of material fact. To be considered

fraud, a misrepresentation of material fact must be made with the “intent to

deceive the other party.” Matter of G-G-, 7 I&N Dec. at 164. Additionally,

“[t]he representation must be believed and acted upon by the party deceived

to his disadvantage.” Id.; see also Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

714 F.3d 1353, 1356–57 (11th Cir. 2013); Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457,

463 (6th Cir. 2009) (“While fraud requires an intent to deceive, willful

misrepresentation of a material fact does not.”).

Upon de novo review, we conclude the Director did not provide an

adequate analysis. When the Director acknowledged the Petitioner’s

withdrawal of the petition, the Director specifically found that the Petitioner

“misrepresented information that has been submitted as evidence” when it

“worked with, or agreed to work with, another registrant, petitioner, agent,

or other individual or entity to submit a registration to unfairly increase

chances of selection for the beneficiary, despite [its] attestation to the

contrary.” The Director concluded that the Petitioner thereby perpetrated a

fraud. While the Director included a detailed recitation of the facts, which

do warrant serious concern, the notice did not discuss the specific elements

of fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact.

Because the factfinding within a withdrawal notice may lead to adverse

decisions in future proceedings, the finding should contain sufficient

specificity to demonstrate a rational connection between the evidence and

the elements of fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact.

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Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(i) (2025) (“[T]he officer shall explain in writing

the specific reasons for denial.”). See generally 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr. &

Richard Murphy, Administrative Law and Practice § 5:64(1) (3d ed. 2025)

(“The findings of fact must evidence a ‘rational connection’ between the

evidence and the agency’s conclusions.” (quoting Earth Island Inst. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2006))).

To make such a finding here, the Director would need to explain the

reasons for the finding so that we may identify which of the two alternatives

apply and then confirm that the elements have been satisfied. 8 The terms

“fraud” and “misrepresentation” are not synonyms and should always be

employed with specificity. If the Director intended to reach the question of

fraud, the decision should have included a discussion of the additional

elements, including the Petitioner’s intent to deceive. The lack of clarity

deprives the AAO an opportunity to meaningfully review the finding on

appeal. See, e.g., Matter of Air India “Flight No. 101,” 21 I&N Dec. 890,

892 (BIA 1997) (remanding a fine proceeding when the officer did not state

specific reasons for the determination).

We will withdraw the Director’s finding of fraud and remand the matter

for further proceedings. On remand, there is no need for the Director to reach

the higher, more demanding standard for fraud unless the record supports the

finding.

In these proceedings, it is sufficient to find a willful

misrepresentation of material fact for immigration consequences to attach.

See, e.g., INA § 214(g)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(3) (discussing restoration of

H-1B cap numbers after revocation when status acquired by “fraud or

willfully misrepresenting a material fact”); see also Matter of Mensah,

28 I&N Dec. at 288 (concluding an Immigration Judge may rely on a USCIS

finding of willful misrepresentation of a material fact).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that a remand is necessary. We

conclude the Director may make a finding of fraud or willful

misrepresentation after receiving a withdrawal from the petitioner.

Recognizing that USCIS may become aware of collusion at any stage of the visa petition

process—from cap registration to long after the approval or withdrawal of related

cases—the finding may be based on significant similarities found in different proceedings,

provided the Director follows notice procedures to preserve the fairness of the proceedings.

See Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015); see also Manney, 735 F. Supp. 3d

at 594 (discussing the revocation of multiple H-1B petitions filed by “related entities” after

USCIS issued notices pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11)(iii)(A)(2)).

8

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Accordingly, on remand, the Director may reissue an acknowledgment of

withdrawal with findings of fact, in line with our analysis above, regarding

the Petitioner’s fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact. As

jurisdiction passes to the Director on remand, the Director may also consider

any additional matters deemed appropriate under the INA and regulations.

See Matter of Patel, 16 I&N Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978). However, the

petition itself shall remain withdrawn. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(15).

ORDER: The Director’s finding of fraud is withdrawn. The matter is

remanded for further proceedings and for the entry of a new acknowledgment

of withdrawal and a new articulation of the finding of fraud or willful

misrepresentation consistent with the foregoing opinion.

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