Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 519 (BIA 2026)

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 519 (BIA 2026)

Interim Decision #4174

Matter of Audencio AREVALO-VARGAS, Respondent

Decided March 16, 2026 1

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) The respondent’s children are no longer qualifying relatives for purposes of the

respondent’s application for cancellation of removal because they are now over 21 years

old and have therefore aged out.

(2) The respondent has not demonstrated that the economic detriment, diminished

educational opportunities, and emotional hardship his children may experience in the

event of the respondent’s removal from the United States would constitute exceptional

and extremely unusual hardship.

FOR THE RESPONDENT: Khanh N. Nguyen, Minneapolis, Minnesota

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kenneth R. Knapp, Assistant

Chief Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; GEMOETS

and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges.

GEMOETS, Appellate Immigration Judge:

The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appeals from the

Immigration Judge’s August 20, 2019, decision granting the respondent’s

application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents

under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2018). The respondent, a native and citizen of

Mexico, opposes the appeal. The appeal will be sustained.

The Immigration Judge determined that the respondent was statutorily

eligible for cancellation of removal. On appeal, DHS argues the Immigration

Judge erred in determining that the respondent’s qualifying United States

1

Pursuant to Order No. 6679-2026, dated March 12, 2026, the Attorney General

designated the Board’s decision in Matter of Arevalo-Vargas (BIA February 17, 2026) as

precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3)

(2026). The Board vacated the February 17, 2026, decision and, effective today, reissues

the decision based on the Attorney General’s order. Editorial changes have been made

consistent with the designation of the case as a precedent.

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Interim Decision #4174

citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in

the event of his removal and that he has the requisite good moral character.

As an initial matter, the respondent’s children are no longer qualifying

relatives for purposes of the respondent’s application for cancellation of

removal because they are now 26 and 24 years old and have therefore aged

out during the pendency of this appeal. See Matter of Isidro, 25 I&N

Dec. 829, 831 (BIA 2012) (“It is well established that an application for relief

from removal is a ‘continuing’ application.”); see also Matter of

Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793, 797 (BIA 2005) (holding that an

application for cancellation of removal is a “continuing” application).

Therefore, the respondent is not eligible for cancellation of removal because

he does not have a qualifying relative. See INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D).

However, even assuming the respondent’s children were still qualifying

relatives, and upon our de novo review, we reverse the Immigration Judge’s

determination that the respondent’s qualifying relatives would experience

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in the event of the respondent’s

removal to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026). In the aggregate,

the hardships presented by the respondent are aligned with those encountered

by families who face the removal of a relative, rather than hardship that is

“substantially beyond” the ordinary hardship that would be expected when a

close family member leaves this country. See Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N

Dec. 56, 59, 62–64 (BIA 2001) (indicating that, when viewing factors in the

aggregate, the hardship must be substantially beyond that which would

ordinarily be experienced by qualifying relatives following an applicant’s

removal from the United States); cf. Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467,

470–72 (BIA 2002) (assessing the hardship factors and concluding that the

case fell “on the outer limit of the narrow spectrum of cases in which the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard will be met”).

In this regard, the record contains no evidence that the respondent’s

children have any serious medical or academic issues. See Matter of

Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. at 63 (noting that a “strong applicant might have a

qualifying child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs

in school”). Moreover, the economic detriment, diminished educational

opportunities, and emotional hardship the respondent’s children may

experience in the event of the respondent’s removal are insufficient to

establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in the present case. See

Matter of Buri Mora, 29 I&N Dec. 186, 187–88 (BIA 2025) (concluding that

the respondent did not establish the requisite hardship based on economic

detriment and family separation where the qua1ifying relatives would remain

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Interim Decision #4174

in the United States); see also Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006,

1013 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the “sadly common hardships that can result

when an alien parent is removed and must make the heart-wrenching decision

between family unity and the children’s ability to enjoy the educational and

economic advantages of living in the United States”).

The Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s removal would result

in economic and educational hardship for his children, who would be forced

to seek part-time employment while in school in lieu of the respondent’s

financia1 support. However, economic and educational hardship of this

nature is a common feature of a parent departing the United States. See

Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002). Moreover, the

respondent did not provide any evidence or testimony reflecting that he

would be unable to obtain employment in Mexico in the event of his removal.

The respondent has not established that the possibility that his children would

have to contribute to their post-secondary education is an uncommon practice

that necessitates his continued presence such that it would permit them to

continue their education. The Immigration Judge also noted that the

respondent’s removal would result in emotional hardship and a loss of

stability for his qualifying children, with whom he has a close relationship.

However, the respondent’s wife remains present in the United States and, as

significant of a hardship as family separation is, it does not generally meet

the high standard of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See

Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. 627, 631 (BIA 1996) (recognizing that

emotional hardship from family separation is a common result of

deportation), aff’d 129 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 1997).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence of record is

insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate that the respondent’s removal

would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying

children. As this issue is dispositive of the respondent’s eligibility for relief,

we need not address the Immigration Judge’s determination, or DHS’

appellate arguments, regarding good moral character.

See INS v.

Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of

which is unnecessary to the results they reach”). Accordingly, the following

orders will be entered.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained.

FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s August 20, 2019,

decision granting the respondent’s application for cancellation of removal

under section 240A(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), is vacated.

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Interim Decision #4174

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is ordered removed from the

United States to Mexico.

NOTICE: If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and

willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the

order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the

time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any

action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to

the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary

penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. See INA

§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,

any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has

departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or

removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any

time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than

2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).

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