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U.S. Department of Labor

Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 2021 0

In the Matter of:

ARB CASE NO. 2018-0028

AZIZ AITYAHIA,

COMPLAINANT,

ALJ CASE NO. 2017-AIR-00029

DATE:

v.

SEP 1 2 2019

AVIATION ACADEMY OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:

R. Chris Pittard, Esq.; Pittard Law Firm; San Antonio, Texas

For the Respondent:

Michael V. Galo, Jr., Esq.; Galo Law Firm, P.C.; San Antonio, Texas

Before: William T. Barto, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge; James A.

Haynes and Thomas H. Burrell, Administrative Appeals Judges

FINAL DECISION AND ORDER

PER CURIAM. The Complainant, Aziz Aityahia, filed a retaliation complaint

under the employee protection provision of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation

Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21) 1 with the Department of

Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Complainant

49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000). AIR 21's implementing regulations are found at 29 C.F.R.

Part 1979 (2018).

2

alleged that his employment with Aviation Academy of America (AAA) was

terminated in retaliation against him for making safety-related complaints. OSHA

dismissed the complaint because it lacked jurisdiction, but the case was referred to

the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) at Complainant's request. The ALJ

granted Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the complaint is not

cognizable under AIR 21 and that the OALJ lacked jurisdiction to consider

complaints under Section 1 l(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29

U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970) (OSH Act). Complainant filed a petition requesting that the

Administrative Review Board (ARB or the Board) review the ALJ's order. We

granted that petition and now affirm.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Secretary of Labor has delegated to the Administrative Review Board

(ARB) the authority to issue final agency decisions in review or on appeal of matters

arising under AIR 21 and its implementing regulations at 29 C.F.R. Part 1979. 2 The

ARB will affirm the ALJ's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but

reviews all conclusions oflaw de novo. Summary decision is permitted when "there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to decision

as a matter oflaw." 29 C.F.R. § 18.72(a) (2018). On appeal from summary decision,

we review the record on the whole in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Micallefv. Harrah's Rican Casino & Resort, ARB No. 2016-0095, ALJ No.

2015-SOX-00025, slip op. at 3 (ARB July 5, 2018).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ's determination that there is no evidence that AAA is a covered

employer under the employee protection provisions of AIR 21 is correct. For the

reasons stated by the ALJ, there is no genuine issue of material fact that

Respondent AAA is itself a direct or an indirect air carrier or a contractor or

subcontractor of an air carrier. Moreover, the ALJ correctly concluded that Section

ll(c)(2) of the OSH Act does not provide an administrative appellate remedy for

complaints under that Act that are dismissed by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, we

2

Secretary's Order No. 01-2019 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of

Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 84 Fed. Reg. 13,072 (April 3, 2019); 29

C.F.R. § 1979. ll0(a).

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adopt the ALJ's well-reasoned order Ruling on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss as

the final agency decision in this matter and attach a copy hereto. 3

SO ORDERED.

While we agree with the ALJ's reasoning in finding that AAA is not a covered

employer under AIR 21, we note that the ALJ mischaracterized the relationship between

Vision Technologies Aerospace Incorporated (VT Aerospace), AAA's parent company, and

Singapore Technologies Aerospace, Ltd. (ST Aerospace). See Ruling on Respondent's Motion

to Dismiss at 2. Based upon the evidence in this matter, it appears that ST Aerospace is a

direct subsidiary of Singapore Technologies Engineering, Ltd, the primary parent company,

not VT Aerospace. This is evidence that the relationship between AAA and any company

that actually has a contract with an air carrier is even more attenuated than found by the

3

ALJ.

U.S. Department of Labor

Office of Administrative Law Judges

5100 Village Walk, Suite 200

Covington, LA 70433

(985) 809-5173

(985) 893-7351 (Fax) .

Issue Date:. 07 February 2018

Case No.: 2017-AIR-00029 •

In the Matter of

AZIZ AITYAHIA,

Complainant

v.

AVIATION ACADEMY OF AMERICA,

Respondent

RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Nature of Motion. The case arises pursuant to a complaint alleging violations under the

employee protective provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for

the 21st Century (AIR 21 or "the Act"), 49 U.S.C. § 42121 and the implementing regulations at

29 C.F.R. Part 1979. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 18.70, Respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss" for

lack of jurisdiction under the Act. Respondent specifically asserts that it is not ari organization

covered by the terms of the Ac.I and tbus Complainant was not an employee subject to the

protections of the Act.

2. Procedural History and Findings of Fact.

a) On June 10, 2017, Complainant filed a whistleblower allegation against Respondent

with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). On July 3, 2017, Complainant

was notified by letter tbat OSHA would not investigate the complaint and dismissed it because

OSHA lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Specifically, OSHA determined that Respondent was

not an air carrier or contractor or subcontractor within the meaning of AIR 21. OSHA also

determined Complainant was not an employee within the meaning of.tl,e Act. On August 8,

2017, Complainant filed an objection to tbe OSHA findings and requested an appeal and hearing

before the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ).

b) On September 13, 2017, the undersigned issued a Notice of Case Assignment and

Prehearing Order in this matter.

c) In compliance with the order, Complainant filed a pleading complaint on October 2,

2017, and Respondent filed a complaint response on October 11, 2017,

.

d) On November 27, 2017, Respondent filed the Motion to Dismiss 1 addressed by this

. ruling and order.

· . e) On December 28, 2017, Complainant filed a response to Respondent's Motion to

Dismiss.2

.

·

f) Respondent is an aviation flight school operating at two airports in Texas.

Respondent's primary·and sole business .enterprise is to provide aircraft pilot training programs.

It does not offer passenger or cargo transportation services, and it has not contracted· i¥ith any air

carrier to provide aircraft service or maintenance or perform safety-sensitive functions on

aircraft.

g) Respondent is a subsidiary company of Vision Technologies Aerospace Inc. (VT

Aerospace). As Respondent's direct parent company, VT Aerospace is, in tum, one of several

subsidiary companies operating under Vision Technologies Systems (VT Systems). VT Systems

is a primary subsidiary of Singapore Technologies Engineering, Ltd. (ST Engineering). This

corporate sttucture makes Respondent a third-tier subsidiary of ST Engineering.

h) In addition to Respondent, VT Aernspace is also the direct parent company of several.

other subsidiaries. One of those subsidiaries, Singapore Technologies Aerospace, Ltd., has a

contract with Alaska Airlines, a U.S. air carrier, to provide aircraft maintenance and repai.r

services.

i) Although Respondent is a subsidiary of VT Aerospace, it maintains and utilizes

· independent employment policies and procedures. Respondent also possesses independent

insurance policies that are separate and distinct from those of its parent companies. The one

. notable area of business interaction between Respondent and VT Aerospace involves procuring

payroll, information technology, finance, and human resources support from VT San Antonio

Aerospace, which is another subsidiary of VT Aerospace.

j) Respondent's senior executive staffinclndes Mr. Paul Woessner, the General

Manager, and Mr. Yusuke Kusajima, 3 Chief Pilot. Both are directly employed by Respondent·

and are not employees of any other ST Engineering company.

k) In his position as Respondent's General Ganagcr, Mr. Woessner makes all occupation

decisions related to Respondent's employees. 'His managerial employment authority includes the

ability to hire and promote employees, set pay rates, impose disciplinary action, and terminate ,an

employee. Mr. Woessner hired Complainant to be a flight instructor for Respondent in March

2016. Mr. Kusajima and Mr. Woessner directly supervised Complainant during his employment

with Respondent. Complainant was not supervised or managed by anyone not employed by

1

2

Respondent's motion is marked as Appellate Exhibit I (AX~l)

Complainant's response to AX-I is marked as Appellate Exhibit 2 (AX-2).

3

In AX-1~ Respondent's Chief Pilot is identified a-s Yustike Fukajima. However, in Exhibit 1, attached as supporting

evidence for AX-1, Mi-. Woes-sner names Respondent's Chief Pilot as Yusuke Kusajjma. The undersigned inte1'prets

the nameFukajima as a careless misidentification made by counsel While composing the motion.

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Respondent. Mr. Woessner ultimately decided to suspend and then later tenninate Complainant's

employment. He made this decision after consulting an executive in another subsidiary company

as well as Respondent's president.

3. Applicable Law and Analysis.

a) Motions to Dismiss. The proceedings in AIR 21 cases are conducted in accordance

with the rules of practice and procedure and the rules of evidence for administrative hearings

before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, codified at pa1t 18 of title 29 of the Code of

Federal Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1979.107(a). A party may move to dismiss part or all of the

matter for reasons recognized under controlling Jaw, such as lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or untimeliness. 29 C.F .R. § 18. 70(c).

b) Parties' Positions. Respondent asse1ts that, as a flight school, it does not qualify as

either an "air carrier" or a "contractor or subcontractor" as those terms are defined for the

purposes of applying AIR 21 jurisdiction to Complainant's claim. Respondent notes that it does

not, by any means, directly or indirectly provide air transportation. Complainant contends that

Respondent is a subsidiary of a larger company, which owns another subsidiary company that

serves as a main contractor for a U.S. air ca1Tier. As such, Complainant maintains that "air

carrier" status should be imputed upon Respondent for the purpose of determining AIR 21

jurisdiction in this matter.

c) Subject Matter Jurisdiction for an AIR 21 Claim. Section 42121 of AIR 21 provides

that "[no] air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an employee

or othe1wise discriminate against an employee" for engaging in protected activity. The Act

applies only to air carriers, or contractors or subcontractors of air carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 4212l(a).

Air carriers are defined as citizens of the United States who directly or indirectly provide air

transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2); 29. C.F.R. § 1979.101. A ''citizen ofthe United States"

includes a corporation or association organized under the laws of the United States. 49 U.S.C. §

40102 (a)(l5)(c).

In determining whether AlR 21 jurisdiction exists in this matter, the 1hreshold question

the undersigned must resolve is whether Respondent may be considered an- air carrier. In order to

be considered an air carrier, Respondent must be an entity that undertakes "by any means,

directly or indirectly, to provide air transportation."

"Air transportation- means foreign air transportation, interstate air transportation, or the

transportation of mail by aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(5). Interstate afr transportation is

defined as:

The transportation of passengers or property by aircraft as a

common carrier for compensation, or the transportation of mail by

aircraft (A) between a place in (i) a State, territ01y, or possession

of the United States and a place in the District of Columbia or

another state, territory, or possession of the United States; (ii)

Hawaii and another place in Hawaii through the airspace over a

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. place outside Hawaii; (iii) the District of Columbia and an~ther

place in the District of Columbia; or (iv) a territory or possession.

of the United States and another place in the same territory ot

possession; and (B) when any part of the transportation is by

aircraft.

49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25).

The Administrative Review Board (ARB) previously rnled that "the repeated use of

broad language in the AIR 21 statute indicates Congress's intent that the definition of' air

carrier' be expansively construed." Cobby. FedEx Corp. Servr, Inc., ARB No. 12-052, ALJ No.

2010-AIR-24 (ARB Dec. 13, 2013); see also Morales~- Trans ·world Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S.

374, 3 83-'84 °( 1992)- (expansive scope of a-statute is· apparent from broadly worded statutory

language). The Board in Cobb 'further noted that "by prohibiting 'contrac_tors and

subcontractors,' as well as air carriers, from retaliating against employees for engaging in

protected activity, Congress conveyed a cle.ar aim to promote comprehensive aviation safety."

Cobb; ARB No. 12-052, slip op. at 10-12. Additionally, the ARB has applied precedent under

which whistleblower statutes "are intende,l as remedial measures to be broadly construed." ··

Williams v. American Airlines, Inc., ARB No. 09-018, AU No. 2007-AIR-004, slip op. at 15 n.

73 (ARB Dec. 29, 2010).

.

•

In light of these authorities, the )lndersigned concludes that.an examination of

Respondent's business activitie_s for t)1_e purpose of determining whether it qualifies as an air

carrier subject to AIR 21 jurisdiction should be expansive and apply the standard set-forth by the

ARB in its Cobb holding.

However, even when applying such an expansive interpretation t_o this matter, the

undersigned concludes the record clearly fails to establish that Respondent is an air carrier. The

evidence presented by both parties on this motion indisputably establishes that Respondent

· operates a flight training schocil with the sole purpose of educating student aircraft pilots.

Nothing in the evidence proves that Respondent undertakes by any means, directly or indirectly,

to provide air transportation. Respondent does not 111 any manner operate as a common carrier

that supplies transportation of persons, cargo, or mail for compensation. As snch, Respondent

canp.ot be categorized as a "direct'' air carri~r.

Additionally, Respondent does not engage in the business of maintaining the security of

air carriers nor is it in the business of providing integral services necessary for Respondent or

another company to provide aii- transportation. DHL Corp v. C,A.B., 584 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir.

1978). In sum, Respondent fails to qualify as either a direct or indirect "air carrier" by any

. criteria established in the Cobb.decision.

In dete1mining, that Respondent is not an "indirect" air carrier, the undersigned found no·

persuasive legal authority to support Complainant's argument that AIR 21 jurisdiction should be

imputed to Respondent based on air carrier activities by other subsidiaries ofRespo:1dent's ·

parent company. Complainant argues that - because one of Respondent's sister subsidiaries,

Singapore Technologies Aerospace, Ltd., is a contractor for an air carrier - all subsidiaries under

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the control of the main parent company, ST Engineering, should be considered contractors or

subcontractors for the purposes of AIR 21 jurisdiction.

Complainant is pa1tially correct in asserting that a respondent in an AIR 21 case can be

found to engage in indirect air transpo1tation based on a relationship with a parent company or

sister subsidiary company. "The technicalities of corporate structure may not act to shield

operating 'segments' of an air carrier from the air safety obligations as an air carrier under AIR

21." Cobb, ARB No. 12-052, slip op. at 12; see, e.g., Fleszar v. US. Dept of Labor, 598 F.3d

912,. 915 (7th Cir. 20 I 0) ("ln context, 'contractor, subcontractor or agent' sounds lilce a reference

to entities that paiticipate in the [parent']s activities.").

However, as Respondent correctly notes in its motion, there are no prior district court or

ARB case decisions that hold an employer is subject to AlR 21 jurisdiction as an indirect air

carrier based solely on a subsid_iary relationship to either a parent or sister company engaged in

business with an air caiTier. As Respondent further accurately points out, the lack of such rulings

is consistent with how comts a.pply the general legal principal that "the mere existence of a

common management and ownership are not sufficient to justify treating a parent corporation

and its subsidiary as a single employer." Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Cmp., 129 F.3d. 773, 778 (5th

Cir. 1997).

The ARB in Cobb observed that "although there ai·e no statutory criteria for detennining

an indirect air carrier ... [g]enerally speaking, indirect air carriers are defined as those who

'hold out a transportation service to the public under which they utilize.the services of a direct

carrier for the actual transportation by air."' Cobb, ARB No. 12-052, slip op. at 9 (citatio11s

omitted). The Board extended this general precedent to include a subsidiary company that

provides critical support to a parent company that operates.as an air carrier engaged in air

transportation. In so doing, the Board concluded that FedEx Services, a subsidiary of FedEx

Express, indirectly provided air carrier services to FedEx Express and was therefore itself an "air

carrier" even though the FedEx Services neither owned aircraft nor offered transportation

services. Id. at 9-13.

In reaching its ruling in ~obb, the Board noted that "the operations of FedEx Services are

integral to FedEx Express's operation as an air carrier." In support of this conclusion, the Board.

noted that the information technology services, cargo trucking operations, and disaster and

security planning provided by FedEx Services were "essential, albeit indirect, components of the

integrated all-cargo air service provided by FedEx Express." Id. at 11. Accordingly, the Board

concluded that, as a subsidiary, "FedEx Services operations are essential for the air

transportation FedEx Express conducts." Id.

No similar relationship·cxists between Respondent and its parent company or sister

subsidiaries, The evidence is indisputable that Respondent operates an independent, stand-alone

flight training school. As such, it neither supports - nor relies upon - either its parent company or

a sister subsidiary for any integral business support related to air transportation. As reflected in

the findings of facts, the only direct interaction Respondent has with any other company in its

corporate structure is to utilize a sister subsidiary for its information technology support and

· administrative _services. Such services, while admittedly important to·the daily operation of the

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business, are not "integral," Hvitalt or «essential" to Respondenfs business of training student

pilots. Even assuming arguendo that such services are .critical, more importantly, they are not

-provided to Respondent to enable it to engage in air transpo1tation activities.

Based on the forgoing analysis, the undersigned concludes the uncontroverted facts in

this case clearly establish that, as a matter of law, Respondent is neither a direct or indirect air

carrier engaged in air transportation activities as defined in the Act. As a consequence, the

· employee whistle blower protections of AIR 21 do not impose subject matter jurisdiction upon

Respondent.

d) OSH Act Claim. Alternatively,

Complainant asse1ts that this matter is cognizable

.

.

before the undersigned pursuant to section ll(c) of the OSHAct, 29. U.S.C. § 660(c). This

argument also· lacks merit. ·

Section ll(c)(2) of the OSHAct states:

Any employee who believes that he has beeri discharged or

otherwise ,discriminated against by any person in violation of this

subsection,may, within 30 days after such violation occurs, file a

complaint with the Secretary alleging such discrimination. Upon

receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall cause such

· investigation to be made_ as he deems appropriatec' If upon-such ·

investigation, the Secretary determines that the provisions of this

subsection have been violated, he:shall bring an action-in any

appropriate United States district court against such person. If any

such action the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction,

for cause shown to restrain violations of paragraph (1) of thi,

subsection and order all appropriate relief including rehiring or

reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back

pay.

The section plainly does not afford ·a private remedy for actions covered by the OSH Act.

Gomez v. Wilson, 2013 WL 4099466, *3 (D. Neb., Aug. 13, 2013); see also Ellis v. Chase

Commnc'ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 473, 476-77 (6th Cir. 1995) ("OSHA does not create a private right of

action."); Jeter v. St. Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 976°77 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The only

provision in the statute which addresses itself to a private remedy clearly indicates that Congres·s

did not intend OSHA to create a new action for damages in favor of employees."). Complaints

filed under Section ll(c) of the OSH Act that have been dismissed by the Secretary of Labor are

not accorded an appellate remedy. 4 Thus, this c!ahn is not subject to OALJ jurisdiction.

4

Although Compl,ainant does not h~ve a private right of action under the OSH Act, the Act does not preempt a· state

law claim against Respondent for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See e.g., Kohrt. V.: MidAmerican

Energy Co,, 354 F.3d 894, 901-02 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding there is tio federal common law ·actlon_for •;:vrongful '

discharge in violation of public policy, but OSHA's femedial scheme does not preempt a state law claim of wrongful

discharge in violation of public _policy).

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4. Ruling and Specific Orders. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. The hearing

scheduled for April 24, 2018, in San Antonio, TX is cancelled, and this case is dismissed,

SO ORDERED this day at Covington, Louisiana.

Dil)ilally ~loned by Tracy A. Daly

ON: CN=Tracy A. D~ly,

Oll=Adm!Fll!;tralM: Law Judge, CPUS

OOL Office or Admini5lrn1ll'e Law

Judges, L~c,winglon, s-t.A, c,,u:i

Loc:z\lgo: Co<inglon I.A

TRACY A. DALY

Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS; To appeal, you must file a Petition for Review ("Petition")

with the Administrative Review Board ("Board") within ten (10) business days of the date of

issuance of the administrative law judge's decision, The Board's address is: Administrative

Review Board, U.S. Depaitment of Labor, Suite S-5220, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW,

Washington DC 20210, for traditional paper filing, Alternatively, the Board offers an Electronic

File and Service Request (EFSR) system. TheEFSR for electronic filing (eFile) permits the

submission forms and documents to the Board through the Internet instead of using postal

mail and fax, The EFSR portal allows parties to file new appeals electronically, receive

electronic service of Board issuances, file briefs and motions electronically, and check the status

of existing appeals via a web-based interface accessible 24 hours every day. No paper copies

need be filed.

of

An e-Filer must register as a user, by filing an online registration form. To register, thee-Filer

must have a valid e-mail address. The Bo.ard must validate thee-Filer before he or she may file

any e-Filed document. After the Board has accepted an e-Filing, it is handled just as it would be

had it been filed in a more traditional manner. e-Filers will also have access to electrnnic service

(eService), which is simply a way to receive documents, issued by the Board, through the

Internet instead of mailing paper notices/documents.

Information regarding registration for access to the EFSR system, as well as a step by step user

guide and FAQs can be found at: https://dol-appeals.entellitrak.com. If you have any questions or

comments, please contact: Boards-EFSR-Hclp@dol.gov

Your Petition is considered filed on the date of its postmark, facsimile transmittal, ore-filing; but

if you file it in person, by hand-delivery or other means, it is filed when the Board receives it.

See 29 C.F .R. § 1979.l l0(a). Your Petition must specifically identify the findings, conclusions

or orders to which you object. You waive any objections you do not raise specifically. See 29

C.F.R. § 1979.1 JO(a),

At the time you file the Petition with the Board, you must serve it on al] parties as well as the

Chief Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Administrative Law

Judges, 800 K Street, )'lW, Suite 400-North, Washington, DC 20001-8002, You must also serve

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the Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Associate

Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 20210.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1979.ll0(a).

If filing paper copies, you must file an original and four copies of the petition for review with the

Board, together with one copy of this decision. In addition, within 30 calendar days of filing the

petition for review you must file with the Board an original and four copies of a supporting legal

brief of points and authorities, not to exceed thirty·double-spaced typed pages, and you may file

an appendix (one·copy only) consisting of relevant excerpts of the record of the proceedings

from which the appeal is taken, upon which you rely in suppmt of your petition for review. If

you e-File your petition and opening brief, only one copy need be uploaded.

Any response in opposition to a petition for review must be filed witb the Board within 30

calendar days from the date of filing of the petitioning party's supporting legal brief of points

and authorities. The response in opposition to the petition for review must include an original

and four copies of the responding party's legal brief cif points and authorities in opposition tci the

petition, not to exceed thirty double-spaced typed pages, and may include an appendix (one copy

only) consisting ofrelevant excerpts of the record of the proceedings from which appeal has

been taken, upon which the responding party relies. If you e-File your responsive brief, only one

copy need be uploaded.

Upon receipt of a legal brief filed in opposition to a petition for review, the petitioning pai:ty may.

file a reply brief (original and four copies), not to e~ceed ten double-spaced typed pages, within ·

such time period as may be ordered by the Board. If you e-File your reply brief, only. one copy

M~~~~~

'

If no Petition is timely filed, the administrative law judge's decision becomes tbe final order of ·

the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1979.110. Even if a Petition is timely filed, the

administrative law judge's decision becomes the final order of the Secretary of Labor unless the

Board issues an order within thirty (30) days of the date the Petition is filed notifying the parties

that it has accepted the case for review. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1979.109(c) and 1979.ll0(a) and (b).

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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