Administrative Review Board

Agency decision

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20210-0001

U.S. Department of Labor

In the Matter of:

ADMINISTRATOR, WAGE AND

HOUR DIVISION, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ARB CASE NO. 2018-0038

PROSECUTING PARTY,

DATE: December 9, 2020

ALJ CASE NO. 2017-LCA-00024

v.

DOCTOR’S HELP, INC.,

RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Prosecuting Party:

Kate S. O’Scannlain, Esq., Jennifer S. Brand, Esq., William C. Lesser,

Esq., Paul L. Frieden, Esq., Heather Maria Johnson, Esq.; U.S.

Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor; Washington, District of

Columbia

For the Respondent:

E. Lois Simmons; pro se; National Harbor, Maryland

BEFORE: James A. Haynes and Thomas H. Burrell, Administrative Appeals

Judges; Judges Haynes and Burrell concurring

2

DECISION AND ORDER

This case arises under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended

(INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2014), and implementing regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part

655, Subparts H and I (2020). On April 2, 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

issued a Decision and Order (D. & O.) affirming the Wage and Hour Division’s

(WHD’s) determination that Doctor’s Help, Inc. (Respondent) violated the INA.

Respondent petitioned the Administrative Review Board (ARB) for review. We

summarily affirm.

BACKGROUND

Respondent is a business that provides medical training, staffing, and

administrative services to the health care industry.1 In December 2008, Respondent

posted a job listing for an assistant manager.2 Kelly Silva, a Brazilian pharmacist

and chemist, applied. Respondent agreed to sponsor her and Ms. Silva paid the cost

of an attorney and the processing fees for her H-1B visa application.3 Her

application was approved.4

Prior to her start date, Respondent emailed Ms. Silva that it had lost the

contract under which Ms. Silva was meant to work. Respondent said it would try to

place her in a different job and suggested a part-time position because Respondent

anticipated more work in 2010.5 Ms. Silva arrived in the U.S. in time to start work

on October 1, 2009. In November, Ms. Silva requested payment for the part-time

hours she had worked, but she was not paid these wages and she was not

reimbursed for the cost of legal and processing fees.6 On December 5, 2009, she

returned to Brazil.7 On December 7, 2009, Respondent emailed Ms. Silva that her

employment was terminated and submitted a letter to the Department of Homeland

Security’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to confirm

1

Transcript (Tr.) at 21-22, 112; Administrator’s Exhibit (CX) 3.

2

CX 3.

3

Tr. at 23-28, 39, 46-47, 49-50; CX 6-12; CX 21.

Her application was approved to work from October 1, 2009, until September

23, 2012, in a full-time position at a wage rate of $12.30 per hour. CX 5.

4

5

Tr. at 30-32; CX 13-14; Respondent’s Exhibit (RX) 7-8, 10.

6

CX 19.

7

Tr. at 47, 52-53.

3

the end of her employment.8 The letter was received by USCIS on December 15,

2009.9

In December 2009, Ms. Silva filed a complaint with WHD seeking back wages

and reimbursement for the fees. Approximately two years later, WHD investigated

the matter.10 On August 15, 2017, WHD determined Respondent failed to pay Ms.

Silva the required wages and ordered payment and reimbursement for the fees.

Respondent requested a hearing before an ALJ. After a hearing, the ALJ issued a

D. & O. awarding back wages. The ALJ did not award pre- and post-judgment

interest.

Respondents filed a petition for review with the Board on May 1, 2018. Both

Respondent and the Administrator filed briefs.

JURISDICTION

This Board has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision and order in cases

under the H-1B provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.11

DISCUSSION

The INA permits an employer to hire nonimmigrant foreign workers in

“specialty occupations” to work in the United States for prescribed periods of time.12

These workers are commonly referred to as H-1B nonimmigrants. Specialty

occupations require specialized knowledge and a degree in the relevant specialty.13

An employer seeking to hire an H-1B worker must obtain DOL certification by filing

8

Tr. at 106-07; RX 13.

9

Tr. at 84.

The WHD investigator who testified at the hearing stated that another

investigator had been assigned to the case in 2012 and that he was assigned only in March

2017. He did not know what happened from December 2009 to 2012 or why the investigation

was not finished. Tr. at 72-74.

10

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.845; see also Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of

Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board (Secretary’s

discretionary review of ARB decisions)), 85 Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020).

11

12

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b); 20 C.F.R. § 655.700.

13

8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1).

4

a Labor Condition Application (LCA).14 The LCA sets the wage levels and working

conditions that the employer guarantees for the H-1B employee.15 After securing

the certification, and upon approval by USCIS, the Department of State issues H1B visas to these workers.16

After the H-1B petition is granted, the petitioning employer assumes

obligations when the H-1B worker enters the country or becomes “eligible to work

for the petitioning employer.”17 The employer must begin paying the H-1B worker

within the time prescribed in 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(6)(ii). Of critical importance to

this case, the H-1B petitioner must pay the required wage even if the H-1B

nonimmigrant is in “nonproductive status” (i.e., not performing work) “due to a

decision by the employer (e.g., because of the lack of assigned work) . . . .”18 The

employer may end its obligation to pay the H-1B worker through a “bona fide

termination” of the employment relationship, and it must inform DHS of the

termination.19 In certain circumstances the H-1B employer must pay for the

worker’s return to his or her home country.20

Respondent asserts there was a bona fide termination before Ms. Silva

arrived in the United States. However, the record is clear that Respondent did not

terminate Ms. Silva’s employment prior to her arrival.21 Further, there is no dispute

that Respondent did not provide the required notice of a termination to DHS/USCIS

until December 15, 2009.22 We agree with the ALJ’s finding that Respondent did not

effect a bona fide termination of Ms. Silva’s employment.

14

8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.731-33.

15

Id.

16

20 C.F.R. §§ 655.705(a), (b).

17

20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(6)(ii).

18

8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(vii)(I); 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(i).

19

8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(11); 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(ii).

20

Id.

Respondent informed Ms. Silva that the contract was cancelled. However,

Respondent also discussed a part-time position and the possibility of amending her contract.

RX 8. Further, although Respondent argues that it warned Ms. Silva not to come to the

United States, Respondent emailed Ms. Silva, “Call me when you arrive in DC.” CX 14.

21

22

Tr. at 84.

5

Respondent next contends that Ms. Silva never worked. However, the record

demonstrates that Ms. Silva worked at least some hours.23 Moreover, Ms. Silva

made herself available to work from October 1, 2009, until she returned to Brazil on

December 5, 2009. 24 That she did not work as planned was due to a lack of assigned

work, which placed her in a non-productive status. Thus, we also agree with the

ALJ’s finding that Ms. Silva is entitled to compensation.

Respondent also raises issues that were either not raised before the ALJ or

were stipulated to at the hearing. First, Respondent contends the investigation

constitutes harassment by WHD. However, because Respondent did not raise this

issue before the ALJ, it is waived.25 Next, Respondent argues it should not be

required to reimburse a portion of the fees Ms. Silva’s husband paid on her behalf.

However, at the hearing, Respondent stipulated to the repayment of all legal and

processing fees.26

The Administrator contends that the ALJ erred by failing to award pre- and

post-judgment interest in her response brief. However, the Administrator did not

file a cross-petition to request a revision to the ALJ’s D&O. As such, we deny her

request.27

CONCLUSION

Specifically, Respondent’s email to Ms. Silva in mid-November 2009 discussed

previous hours Ms. Silva worked and confirmed her schedule. RX 12-13.

23

24

Tr. at 30, 32-33, 47, 52-53; RX 11; CX 15-17.

Adm’r, Wage & Hour Div. USDOL v. Am. Truss, ARB No. 2005-0032, ALJ No.

2004-LCA-00012 (ARB Feb. 28, 2007); ALJ Exhibit (ALJX) 4 at 1-5. However, even if

Respondent did not waive this issue, the Administrator has the authority to investigate and

determine whether an H-1B employer has failed to pay wages. 20 C.F.R. § 655.805(a)(2).

Respondent has not presented any evidence that WHD abused its authority.

25

Tr. at 11, 98-100. Even if Respondent had not agreed to this payment, an H1B employer is prohibited by law from receiving and the employee is prohibited from paying,

the filing fee for an H-1B visa. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(ii). Further, payment for business

expenses, including attorney fees, are required to be paid by the employer. 20 C.F.R. §

655.731(c)(9)(ii).

26

Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1987); Batyrbekov v.

Barclays Capital (Barclays Group US Inc.), ARB No. 2013-0013, ALJ No. 2011-LCA-00025

(ARB July 16, 2014) (“We adhere to the principle that ‘[a] party who neglects to file a crossappeal may not use his opponent’s appeal as a vehicle for attacking a final judgment in an

effort to diminish the appealing party’s rights thereunder.’”).

27

6

For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s Decision and order is summarily

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

James A. Haynes, Administrative Appeals Judge, concurring:

I concur with the result reached and with the analysis of the facts and the

law in this case. But I write separately regarding the standard of review. I conclude

that the ARB should explicitly adopt de novo review for ALJ conclusions of law and

substantial evidence review for findings of fact in cases where the applicable

statutes or regulations fail to provide a standard of review.

The ARB has not adopted any consistent standard of review for ALJ findings

of fact in H-1B and H-2B cases.28 The variety of language and standards is a source

of confusion and inconsistency for the appellate courts which review ARB decisions.

Likewise, litigants before the ARB confront an array of possible standards which

See, e.g., Adm’r, Wage and Hour Div. v. Integrated Geophysics, Corp.,

ARB No. 2019-0001, ALJ No. 2017-LCA-00018, slip op. at 2 (ARB May 13,

2020) (“The Board has plenary authority to review an ALJ’s legal conclusions

de novo.”); Adm’r, Wage and Hour Div. v. Fernandez Farms, Inc., ARB No.

2016-0097, ALJ No. 2014-TAE-00008, slip op at 2 (ARB Sept. 16, 2019) (“The

Board will affirm the ALJ’s factual findings if supported by substantial

evidence but reviews all conclusions of law de novo.”); Vyasabattu v.

eSemantiks, ARB No. 2010-0117, ALJ No. 2008-LCA-00022, slip op. at 5-6

(ARB Feb. 11, 2015) (“Where the statute and regulations provide no expressed

standard of review, as in H-1B appeals, we choose to defer to the ALJ’s fact

findings if they are reasonable, and we make reasonable inferences permitted

by the ALJ’s findings and/or the undisputed record.”); Batyrbekov v. Barclays

Capital , ARB No. 2013-0013, ALJ No. 2011-LCA-00025, slip op. at 6 (ARB

July 16, 2014) (“[W]e also follow well-accepted appellate principles that permit

appellate bodies to affirm on alternate grounds.”); Adm’r v. American Truss,

ARB No. 2005-0032, ALJ No. 2004-LCA-00012, slip op. at 2(ARB Feb. 28, 2007)

(“We have jurisdiction under 20 C.F.R. § 655.845, and our review is de novo.”).

28

7

complicate their briefing and advocacy. I believe it to be incorrect to assert that

there is any established ARB precedent for the standard of review in H-1B or H-2B

visa cases.

This array of standards of review has no basis in any substantive difference

in the way ALJs perform their duties. The general process and procedure by which

ALJs conduct hearings and deliberate does not differ from statute to statute. It is

no different in the case before us, which involves an employer’s obligations to an

employee under the H-1B visa program, than it is in cases arising under the Service

Contract Act29 or under the whistleblower provisions of numerous other Federal

statutes.30 Logic suggests that where possible, the ARB should treat ALJ decisions

similarly where they are the product of a similar process. The ARB’s adoption of

varying standards of review when considering appeals of ALJ decisions cannot be

explained based on any difference in how the ALJ performs his or her work.

A substantial portion of matters which come before the ARB involve witness

testimony offered at hearing. The presiding ALJ is uniquely positioned to evaluate

the demeanor of witnesses offering live testimony. In addition, where documentary

or other non-testimonial evidence is received into the record, the ALJ is in the best

position to question the proponent of that evidence to clarify its probative value. It

is certainly possible that other appellate administrative tribunals must evaluate

records consisting of exclusively of non-testimonial evidence where both the initial

finder of fact and the appellate reviewer are equally able to evaluate the factual

record. That is not the role of the ARB.

There is authority for the standard of review suggested in this opinion. In

Secretary’s Order 01-2020, the Secretary of Labor “delegated authority and

assigned responsibility to act for the Secretary of Labor in review or on appeal of”

matters arising under more than seventy statutes and regulations. In cases arising

under some of those laws, the ARB is required or has explicit authority to review

41 U.S.C. § 6701 et seq. (2011); see, e.g., MLB Transp., Inc. v. Adm’r, Wage and

Hour Div., ARB No. 2016-0078, (Feb. 13, 2020).

29

See, e.g., cases arising under the employee protection provisions of the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1980); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)

(1994); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010); or Surface Transportation Assistance

Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a) (2007).

30

8

findings of fact de novo.31 But the Board should not choose, at its discretion, to

develop facts without regard to the ALJ’s findings. That is the unforced error of

ignoring the credibility judgments of the person best able to make those judgments.

This devalues the Department’s entire system of ALJ fact finding followed by an

appellate review by the Secretary or the Secretary’s designees.

It is also clear that, even where a solid standard of review is consistently

included in ARB decisions, our predecessors and colleagues have disagreed over how

to resolve questions of fact. For example, in a case arising under the Surface

Transportation Assistance Act, one member explained in a concurrence why the

ARB should exercise caution when attempting to resolve factual disputes:

Key is that we simply do not know whether Pattenaude’s

story is correct, and, as an appellate body, we should not be

resolving the dispute. Indeed, we have no way of knowing

based on the reading of a dry transcript, since the dispute

involves the resolution of direct conflicts in testimony by

witnesses at a hearing.

Pattenaude’s story is not

implausible—indeed, if an ALJ were to believe that story,

Pattenaude’s testimony would be sufficient evidence for

Pattenaude to prevail in this case—but we do a real

disservice to the Department’s entire system of

adjudication by usurping the ALJ’s role and resolving

factual disputes of this kind. As the majority points out,

perhaps the ALJ failed to consider the mismatch in access

to evidence between employees and employers, and he

should have. But then we should remand so that the ALJ

can consider the mismatch in access to evidence, rather

than decide that the ALJ believed the wrong witnesses.

Determining whom to believe is the paradigmatic decision

See, e.g., OFCCP v. Bank of America , ARB No. 2013-0099, ALJ No. 1997-OFC00016, slip op. at 8-9 (ARB Apr. 21, 2016) (under Executive Order 11246, Section 503 of the

Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 793), and Section 402 of the Vietnam Era Veterans’

Readjustment Assistance Act (38 U.S.C. § 4212))(“ Because no standard of review exists in

EO 11246, the implementing regulations, or Secretary’s delegation of authority, we rely on

the Administrative Procedure Act.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, we have

previously determined that our review is de novo and that the standard of proof in

administrative adjudications ‘is the traditional preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.’”).

31

9

on which to defer, and here, that is exactly what we should

have done.32

The Secretary’s Order imposes on ARB the responsibility to decide cases

promptly and fairly. To meet that obligation, the Board should adopt a uniform

standard of review wherever possible. The Order grants the Board the power to

adopt standards of review where none is provided within the statute or regulation

governing the appeal brought before the Board. In the vast majority of its cases the

ARB uses a de novo standard of review for legal conclusions but has deferred to ALJ

findings of fact where they are supported by substantial evidence. This distinction

between fact and law is the most honest method for the ARB to resolve the cases

that come before it.

The argument in favor of consistency rests heavily on obvious practical

benefits. The ARB will forward the goal of access to justice by making its own

deliberative process less confusing and opaque. Litigants before ARB would

certainly have a clearer idea of the standard of proof they must reach, and those

parties will be better able to calculate their legal positions with a broadly

understood “substantial evidence” standard than with several less widely applied

standards. A consistent ARB standard of review for ALJ decisions is also a benefit

to the Article III Courts which hear appeals of final Department of Labor decisions

and apply their own consistent standards of review in cases before them.33 And it is

reasonable to assume that the department’s goals of prompt, fully adequate agency

decisions will be furthered by a simpler process.

The ARB would benefit in its deliberations by adopting a consistent standard

of review allowing de novo review of legal holdings and substantial evidence review

of ALJ findings of fact. The Secretary’s Order grants the ARB the power to adopt

such standards where the statutes in question are silent. I can see no disadvantage

to consistency and urge my colleagues to adopt a single standard of review which

distinguishes questions of fact and law wherever the governing statutes allow it. I

Pattenaude v. Tri-Am Transp., LLC, ARB No. 2015-0007, ALJ No. 2013-STA00037, slip op. at 33 (ARB Jan. 12, 2017) (Desai, J., concurring).

32

See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-58 ("We first consider whether

the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard when reviewing the District Court’s

determination that the Secretary’s position was not substantially justified. For purposes of

standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories,

denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear

error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for “abuse of discretion”).

33

10

can see no advantage in substituting a novel and heretofore unrecognized reading of

the Administrative Procedure Act to ARB factual determinations.

Thomas H. Burrell, Administrative Appeals Judge, concurring:

I join the majority opinion above affirming the ALJ’s decision. With respect to

my colleague’s opinion, I would state our JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW as

the following (which follows the framework established by the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 557(b) and long-standing ARB precedent):

This Board has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision

and order in cases arising under the H-1B provisions of the

INA.34 The APA provides, at 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), that “[o]n

appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has

all the powers which it would have in making the initial

decision . . . .” Thus, the Board is permitted to review the

ALJ’s findings of fact and legal conclusions de novo,35

although on the record that was before the ALJ.36

Title 5 U.S.C. 557(b) provides the following (which I will refer to as the “APA

Default):”

(b) . . .When the presiding employee makes an initial

decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the

agency without further proceedings unless there is an

appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time

provided by rule. On appeal from or review of the initial

decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have

See 20 C.F.R. § 655.845; see also Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of

Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board (Secretary’s

discretionary review of ARB decisions)), 85 Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020).

34

5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 557; see also Adm’r, Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v.

ZL Rest. Corp., ARB No. 2016-0070, ALJ No. 2013-FLS-00004, slip op. at 4 (ARB Jan. 31,

2018).

35

36

4.

See 29 C.F.R. § 580.15; see also ZL Rest. Corp., ARB No. 2016-0070, slip op. at

11

in making the initial decision except as it may limit the

issues on notice or by rule. . . .37

Although the Department of Labor has modified the applicable regulations

implementing INA’s H-1B program numerous times over the years, the Department

has not adopted regulations limiting the agency’s standard of review in H-1B

cases.38

To the contrary, the Department has adopted regulations limiting the

agency’s review to “substantial evidence” in its whistleblower regulations.39 In my

opinion, the ARB, as a delegatee of the Secretary, does not have the authority to

self-impose a rule limiting agency review where the implementing regulations are

silent on the issue. I would leave that policy decision with the Department’s

regulatory authorities. As a result, I would continue to rely upon the APA Default in

our JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW as we have done in the past for cases

under numerous statutes.

Plenary authority for agency review identified in the APA Default does not

mandate exercise of that authority for every case. If, in a particular case arising

under a statute without a promulgated regulation limiting agency review, the ARB

decides to defer to and affirm an ALJ’s findings of facts because the findings are

reasonable or amply supported by the record, it is within the discretion of the ARB

to do so40—as we have done in numerous cases, for example, cases involving an

ALJ’s demeanor-based credibility findings.

37

5 U.S.C. § 557(b).

20 C.F.R. § 655.845. This is true of a majority of statutes under the ARB’s

jurisdiction. Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020, para. 5.

38

See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1979.110 (AIR 21) (“The Board will review the factual

determinations of the administrative law judge under the substantial evidence standard.”);

29 C.F.R. § 1980.110 (SOX); 29 C.F.R. § 1981.110 (Pipeline Safety Act).

39

Vineland Fireworks Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives, 544 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2008); Janka v. Dept. of Transp., Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd.,

925 F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1991); Chen v. Gen. Accounting Off., 821 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

40

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.