U.S. Department of Labor

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Administrative Review Board

200 Constitution Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20210-0001

IN THE MATTER OF:

MICHELLE G. BARHAGHI,

COMPLAINANT,

ARB CASE NO. 2024-0061

ALJ CASE NO. 2023-TAX-00010

ALJ LAUREN C. BOUCHER

DATE: February 27, 2026

OB/GYN AFFILIATES & PROSUM,

RESPONDENT.

Appearances:

For the Complainant:

S.G. Barhaghi, PhD; Lay Representative; Aurora, Colorado

For the Respondent:

Andrew D. Ringel, Esq.; Hall & Evans, LLC; Denver, Colorado

Before JOHNSON, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, and BURRELL

and KIKO, Administrative Appeals Judges

DECISION AND ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING

This case arises from a complaint filed by Complainant Michelle G. Barhaghi

against her former employer, Respondent OB/GYN Affiliates & Prosum, alleging

retaliation in violation of the whistleblower protections of the Taxpayer First Act

(TFA).1 Complainant appeals Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lauren C. Boucher’s

July 11, 2024 Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition, which

dismissed her complaint as untimely. We reverse and remand the ALJ’s decision

due to an error of law and a genuine issue of material fact.

26 U.S.C. § 7623(d); 29 C.F.R. Part 1989 (2025).

BACKGROUND

Complainant filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) in which she alleged Respondent violated the TFA by

subjecting her to a hostile work environment and terminating her employment as a

physician in retaliation for her internal complaints about Respondent’s accounting

and tax-related practices.2 OSHA denied the complaint as untimely on April 28,

2023.3

Complainant filed objections to OSHA’s determination with the Office of

Administrative Law Judges on May 26, 2023.4 At the hearing level, Respondent

filed a Motion for Summary Disposition in which it argued Complainant’s complaint

should be dismissed as untimely.5 In her opposition to Respondent’s motion,

Complainant asserted that her complaint was timely because S.G. Barhaghi, PhD

(her office manager, father, and lay representative) (Dr. Barhaghi) called and

informed OSHA of TFA violations before the 180-day deadline to file a TFA

complaint.6

In support, Complainant submitted an affidavit from Dr. Barhaghi dated

October 31, 2023.7 Dr. Barhaghi attested that on January 4, 2023, he called

“OSHA’s 800 number and reported the IRS tax rules violations under OSHA’s

Whistleblower Protection Program” and “made repeated attempts to reach Regional

OSHA agents by leaving voicemails.”8 Dr. Barhaghi stated that on February 7,

2023, an OSHA agent by the name of Luana returned his call, and, “[f]ollowing

Amended Complaint at 1-7; Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Disposition at 2.

April 28, 2023 OSHA Determination Letter.

Complainant’s Objections and Request for Hearing Before Administrative Law

Judge.

Order for Additional Briefing Related to Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Disposition (Order for Additional Briefing) at 1.

Complainant’s Objection to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition and

Affidavit in Support at 6-7.

Affidavit of S.G. Barhaghi, PhD in Support of Complainant’s Objection to

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition (Aff. of S.G. Barhaghi).

Id. at 5, ¶¶ 18-19.

extensive discussions,” instructed him to file a complaint under the TFA.9 Also,

according to Dr. Barhaghi, “[o]n March 2, 2023, with the assistance of OSHA

agents, we formally filed an OSHA complaint.”10

1. The ALJ’s Order for Additional Briefing

In an Order for Additional Briefing Related to Respondent’s Motion for

Summary Decision, the ALJ noted that any assertion from Complainant that her

complaint “should be considered filed as of January 4, 2023, because Dr. S.G.

Barhaghi called OSHA to report IRS tax rule violations on that date” would be

“problematic.”11

To bolster this premise, the ALJ cited only Supreme Court cases outlining

that generally parties cannot assert the rights or interests of others in federal

court.12 The ALJ then ordered that if Complainant intended to argue she filed her

OSHA complaint on January 4, 2023 (via her father), she was to submit a brief

illustrating how her situation met the standard established by federal courts in

assessing third-party standing in that “(1) she has a ‘close relationship’ with Dr. S.

G. Barhaghi; and (2) she was in some way hindered from contacting OSHA herself”

to file her complaint.13 The ALJ also ordered Complainant to clarify whether she

intended to file a hostile work environment claim and to explain how her claim met

three factors for such a claim.14

Id., ¶ 20. Complainant also states the agent “registered” her complaint during the

February 7, 2023 phone call. Petition for Review (Pet. for Review) at 3; Complainant’s

Opening Brief (Comp. Br.) at 4, 5, 7, 8.

Aff. of S.G. Barhaghi at 5, ¶ 21.

Order for Additional Briefing at 3.

Id. (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-29 (2004); Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)).

The ALJ cited Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129-30, and applied it to the requirements for

the TFA complaint filed with OSHA here, stating: “Courts look to two factors to determine

if it is necessary to grant a third party standing to assert the rights of another: (1) whether

the party asserting the right has a ‘close relationship’ with the person who possesses the

right, and (2) whether there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his or her

own rights.” Order for Additional Briefing at 3-4.

Id. at 4-5.

In her brief in response to the ALJ’s order, Complainant attempted to

demonstrate her eligibility for a waiver of the general prohibition against thirdparty standing outlined in the ALJ’s order.15 Complainant described her “close

relationship” to Dr. S.G. Barhaghi and outlined various obstacles which impeded

her from filing an OSHA complaint on January 4, 2023, per the ALJ’s order. 16 She

also explained that she intended to file a hostile work environment claim and

detailed that claim.17

Respondent argued Complainant’s brief failed to show she met the criteria in

the ALJ’s order to support “utilizing the third-party standing doctrine.”18

Respondent further contended that Complainant’s complaint could not be found

timely without additional evidence “demonstrating the telephone call from S.G.

Barhaghi occurred, was considered a complaint by OSHA, and most importantly

was considered a complaint filed on behalf of Complainant . . . . [T]here is no factual

basis to conclude S.G. Barhaghi actually filed a complaint with OSHA on behalf of

Complainant.”19

2. The ALJ’s Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision

In a summary decision, the ALJ determined that the complaint was untimely

with respect to Complainant’s alleged retaliatory termination and several adverse

actions related to her hostile work environment claim.20 Applying the Supreme

Court cases previously cited in her Order for Additional Briefing21 and Sixth Circuit

cases on standing and third-party standing to bring suit in an Article III court,22 the

ALJ concluded that Complainant had “not demonstrated any legally significant

hindrance to her ability to file her own OSHA complaint that would warrant third

Complainant’s Additional Briefing at 1-3.

Id.

Id. at 3-8.

Respondent’s Response to Complainant’s Additional Briefing at 2.

Id. at 4.

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision at 4, 8, 10.

Order for Additional Briefing at 3.

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision at 4.

party standing to permit Dr. S.G. Barhaghi to file a complaint on [Complainant’s]

behalf” on January 4, 2023.23

The ALJ instead found Complainant filed her complaint online on March 2,

2023.24 The ALJ then calculated that any alleged adverse action which occurred

before September 2, 2022, 180 days prior to March 2, 2023, was untimely pled.25

The ALJ had earlier concluded that “there is no dispute that Complainant

was notified of her termination no later than August 15, 2022 (and likely before that

date)” because “[o]n August 15, 2022, Dr. S.G. Barhaghi, on behalf of Complainant,

sent a letter to Respondent acknowledging and responding to the termination

notice” [emailed to Complainant on July 27, 2022].26 The ALJ then found that

Complainant received final and unequivocal notice of her termination outside the

180-day limitations period “no later than” August 15, 2022, such that the complaint

was untimely filed in relation to her retaliatory termination claim.27

Next, the ALJ determined that several alleged adverse actions underlying

Complainant’s hostile work environment claim which occurred before September 2,

2022, were also untimely.28 The ALJ then dispensed with the remaining “facially

timely” adverse actions that took place after September 2, 2022, by deeming them

“natural consequences of the alleged discriminatory acts” and thus not

independently actionable to support a hostile work environment claim.29

As a result, the ALJ dismissed the complaint.30

Id. at 3-4.

“[Complainant] filed her OSHA complaint on March 2, 2023, the date she filed the

online complaint.” Id. at 4.

Id. at 8. A complaint under the TFA “shall be filed not later than 180 days after the

date on which the violation occurs.” 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(2)(B)(iv).

Order for Additional Briefing at 3.

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition at 4.

Id. at 4-10.

Id. at 8-10.

Id. at 10.

3. Complainant’s Arguments

Complainant contends that the ALJ erred in finding that the January 4, 2023

TFA complaint filed by Dr. Barhaghi, “including [the] claims of retaliatory

termination and a hostile work environment,”31 was untimely on the basis that her

father lacked third-party standing to file for her.32 She argues the ALJ should have

applied 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(a).33 That regulation allows any person to file a TFA

complaint on another’s behalf.34

Complainant also objects to the ALJ’s finding that the limitations period

began accruing on August 15, 2022. She contends that Dr. Barhaghi “never

discussed” Respondents’ July 27, 2022 termination letter with her35 and replied to

the letter on August 15, 2022 without her knowledge.36 Complainant avers the ALJ

erred in calculating the deadline to file her complaint of retaliatory termination

because she “first became aware on October 18, 2022, of Respondent’s intent to

terminate her employment effective November 1, 2022.”37

Complainant argues the ALJ “fail[ed] to apply the same legal standard to

comparable facts” when the ALJ determined the August 15, 2022 letter that Dr.

Barhaghi sent established that Complainant herself had received notice of

Respondent’s intent to fire her despite finding that Dr. Barhaghi lacked standing to

file the complaint for Complainant.38

Finally, Complainant avers that equitable tolling applies to extend the filing

deadline “by at least 34 days [to April 11, 2023], accounting for the time between

the initial call on January 4 and the return call on February 7, during which the

Pet. for Review at 1.

Comp. Br. at 5-6.

Id.

29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(a).

Complainant’s Reply Brief at 6.

Id. at 5.

Comp. Br. at 4.

Id. at 5.

Complainant was unable to obtain essential information related to the TFA

claim.”39

4. Respondent’s Arguments

Respondent counters that the ALJ correctly determined Complainant’s

complaint was not timely filed and that the Board should thus affirm the ALJ’s

grant of summary decision.40 It asserts “the ALJ correctly analyzed the third-party

standing doctrine and appropriately determined Complainant had failed to

demonstrate the type of permanent hindrance required for the doctrine to be

invoked and apply.”41 Respondent argues Complainant did not meet the criteria for

third-party standing and cites additional federal court decisions to support this

argument.42

Respondent concedes that “third party standing precedent does not apply in

this context . . . . [as such precedent] address[es] whether a third-party has standing

to pursue a claim on behalf of someone else.”43 Respondent does not specifically

respond to Complainant’s argument the ALJ’s determination was incorrect in

ignoring 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103’s provision allowing “any person” to file a TFA

complaint on another’s behalf.44

Respondent argues that the lack of “any actual evidence of [the complaint]

being filed on behalf of Complainant . . . . [does] not render an untimely filed

complaint filed by Complainant somehow timely.”45

Respondent also contends the ALJ’s determination Complainant received

notice of its intent to terminate Complainant’s employment no later than August

15, 2022 is “supported by the evidence in the record and is not erroneous.”46

Id. at 8.

Respondent’s Answer Brief (Resp. Br.) at 14-20.

Id. at 8.

Id. at 16.

Id.

Resp. Br. at 15-20; 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(a).

Resp. Br. at 17.

Id. at 15.

Respondent avers that “Complainant’s argument the August 15, 2022,

communication does not represent knowledge by Complainant herself is belied by

the actual communication itself.”47 Respondent notes that the July 27, 2022 email

was sent to both Complainant and Dr. Barhaghi,48 who as her office manager, “is

considered Complainant’s agent for purposes of her knowledge of the Notice of

Termination”49 and that the latter acknowledged receipt on August 15, 2022.50

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Secretary of Labor has delegated authority to the Board to hear appeals

from ALJ decisions and issue agency decisions in cases arising under the TFA.51

The Board conducts de novo review of the ALJ’s grant of summary decision,

including prehearing dismissals of claims based on untimeliness.52

DISCUSSION

1. The ALJ Erred as a Matter of Law in Applying the Third-Party Standing

Doctrine to the Analysis of the Timeliness of the Complaint

Summary decision is appropriate when the “movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to [a] decision as

a matter of law.”53 In reviewing an ALJ’s grant of summary decision, the Board

views the evidence and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party.54

Id. at 14

Id.

Id. at 15.

Id.

Secretary’s Order No. 01-2020 (Delegation of Authority and Assignment of

Responsibility to the Administrative Review Board), 85 Fed. Reg. 13186 (Mar. 6, 2020).

Jahanbin v. Boeing Co., ARB No. 2024-0035, ALJ No. 2023-AIR-00023, slip op. at 34 (ARB Mar. 13, 2025) (citations omitted).

29 C.F.R. § 18.72(a).

Jahanbin, ARB No. 2024-0035, slip op. at 4 (citation omitted).

A complaint alleging retaliation in violation of the TFA’s whistleblower

protections must be filed within 180 days after a violation occurs.55 The limitations

period begins to run from the time a complainant receives “final, definitive, and

unequivocal notice of the adverse employment action.”56 The claim accrues from the

date the employer communicates to the employee its decision to implement an

adverse employment decision, “rather than the date the consequences of the

decision are felt.”57

First, we agree with Complainant that the ALJ erred in determining that

Complainant’s father’s telephonic filing of her TFA complaint on January 4, 2023,

could not be counted as the date of the complaint’s filing by virtue of the third-party

standing doctrine. The federal cases applied by the ALJ and cited in Respondent’s

brief on the doctrine are inapposite. They entail third parties themselves

attempting to pursue causes of action which assert the rights and interests of others

26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(2)(B)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(d).

Mehrotra v. Gen. Elec. Co., ARB No. 2022-0060, ALJ No. 2022-SOX-00014, slip op. at

4-5 (ARB Sept. 21, 2023) (citations omitted); see also Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S.

250, 258 (1980) (“. . . the filing limitations periods therefore commenced—at the time the

[adverse action] decision was made and communicated . . . . ”).

Mehrotra, ARB No. 2022-0060, slip op. at 5 (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S.

6, 8 (1981) (other citations omitted)); see also Peters v. Am. Eagle Airlines, Inc. ARB No.

2008-0126, ALJ No. 2007-AIR-00014, slip op. at 5 (ARB Sept. 28, 2010) (“The time for filing

a complaint begins when the employee knew or should have known of the adverse action,

regardless of the effective date. The focus is on the time of the alleged discriminatory act,

not on the point at which ‘the consequences of the act become painful.’”) (quoting Ricks, 449

U.S. at 258).

beyond the case’s inception and throughout suit in federal courts.58 By contrast, the

inquiry here concerns Dr. Barhaghi’s initiation of Complainant’s claim with OSHA.

While he has acted as her lay representative, he has not sought to supplant

Complainant as the party in this matter.

Second, the ALJ’s determination is contrary to the TFA. The TFA provides

that “[a]n action under subparagraph (A)(i) [on filing a TFA complaint with the

Secretary of Labor] shall be governed under the rules and procedures set forth in

section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code.”59 In turn, 49 U.S.C § 42121(b) sets

forth that “[a] person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise

discriminated against by any person . . . may . . . file (or have any person file on his

or her behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging such discharge or

discrimination.”60

Third, the ALJ’s determination is inconsistent with the TFA’s implementing

regulations, which state that “[a] person who believes that they have been

discharged or otherwise retaliated against by any person in violation of [the] TFA

may file, or have filed by any person on their behalf, a complaint alleging such

The cases cited by the ALJ and Respondent involve petitioners pursuing the rights

or interests of others not participating in the suit. See Order Granting Respondent’s Motion

for Summary Decision at 3-4 (citing Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 127 (attorneys denied standing

in seeking to invoke the rights of hypothetical indigent defendants); Warth, 422 U.S. at 493

(organizations and city residents denied standing in suing municipality for exclusion of low

and moderate income residents from zoning plan); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (concluding a

criminal defendant can raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded from

jury service by the prosecution on the basis of race); Moody v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd.,

847 F.3d 399, 401-03 (6th Cir. 2017) (son denied standing in suit to redress father’s

exclusion from gaming board); Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197,

208-09 (6th Cir. 2011) (teachers denied third-party standing in portion of suit seeking

redress on behalf of students impacted by school closure)); see Resp. Br. at 16 (citing Aid for

Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1109-14 (10th Cir. 2006) (health care and social service

professionals granted third-party standing in suit challenging constitutionality of statute

on behalf of minor patients); McDonald v. Van Houtte, 160 F. App’x 673, 674-75 (10th Cir.

2005) (husband denied standing in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against police department alleging

unlawful arrest and prosecution of wife); RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045,

1054-55 (9th Cir. 2002) (business owners lacked third-party standing to pursue equal

protection challenge to city ordinances on behalf of former patrons); Flood v. NCAA, No.

1:15-CV-890, 2015 WL 5785801, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2015) (sports fan lacked thirdparty standing to sue NCAA on behalf of Penn State athletes)).

26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(2)(B)(i).

49 U.S.C § 42121(b)(1).

retaliation.”61 Moreover, “[n]o particular form of complaint is required. A complaint

may be filed orally or in writing. Oral complaints will be reduced to writing by

OSHA.”62 And, “[t]he date of the . . . telephone call . . . will be considered the date of

filing.”63

Thus, Complainant’s TFA complaint need not have been in any particular

form and the complaint could have been filed for Complainant by her father via

telephone on her behalf.64 Accordingly, the ALJ erred in failing to apply 49 U.S.C

§ 42121(b) and 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103 and summarily determining the Complainant’s

retaliatory termination and several hostile work environment claims were untimely

for lack of third-party standing.

2. Complainant Raised a Genuine Issue of Material Fact that the

Complaint was Timely Filed

While the ALJ did not determine whether there was a genuine issue of

material fact that Dr. Barhaghi filed a complaint on Complainant’s behalf on

January 4, 2023, Respondent has failed to identify evidence controverting Dr.

Barhaghi’s attestation or to demonstrate how Dr. Barhaghi’s affidavit does not

create a genuine dispute that he did so.65

29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(a) (emphasis added).

Id. § 1989.103(b) (emphasis added).

Id. § 1989.103(d) (emphasis added).

Id. § 1989.103(a)-(b), (d). We interpret “may . . . have filed by any person on their

behalf . . . . ” to mean that any individual may file the complaint for an employee, however,

such filing must occur with the employee’s consent. 29 C.F.R. § 1989.103(a). “With the

consent of the employee, complaints may be filed by any person on the employee’s behalf.”

Interim Final Rule, Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the

Taxpayer First Act (TFA), 87 Fed. Reg. 12575, 12578 (Mar. 7, 2022). The Final Rule adopted

the Interim Final Rule “as final, without change,” but for a technical change unrelated to

the procedures on filing a TFA complaint with OSHA. Final Rule, Procedures for the

Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the Taxpayer First Act (TFA), 88 Fed. Reg.

15271, 15272 (Mar. 13, 2023).

Aff. of S.G. Barhaghi at 5, ¶¶ 18-23. We infer that Dr. Barhaghi placed the call on

January 4, 2023, with Complainant’s consent given that his affidavit also states: “[o]n

March 2, 2023 . . . we formally filed an OSHA complaint”; “[s]ubsequently, we were

interviewed by OSHA’s investigators . . . . ”; and “[t]hroughout the course of the

investigation, we were consistently informed that the complaint was timely . . . . ” Id.,

¶¶ 21-23 (emphasis added).

Respondent has argued that the lack of “additional” or “actual” evidence

beyond Dr. Barhaghi’s affidavit which shows Dr. Barhaghi filed a complaint on

January 4, 2023 cannot make the complaint timely.66 Even so, an affidavit

submitted by the non-moving party, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant,

and containing facts admissible into evidence is sufficient to overcome a motion for

summary decision even when “made for purposes of [opposing] the motion only.”67

Moreover, Respondent has not cited to any material in the record negating

the contents of Dr. Barhaghi’s affidavit nor has Respondent demonstrated how the

affidavit fails to establish a genuine dispute as to the timely filing of the TFA

complaint.68 As it is Respondent’s burden, we conclude that Respondent fell short in

asserting that the timing of the filing of the complaint could not be genuinely

disputed.69 Construing Dr. Barhaghi’s affidavit together with all the facts in the

light most favorable to Complainant, we conclude there is a genuine dispute as to

the date of the filing of the complaint. Even presuming the date on which

Complainant received notice of Respondent’s intent to terminate her employment

was July 8, 2022 (the earliest date on which Respondent alleges it communicated

that intent), a fact finder could determine the complaint was timely filed.70

Respondent’s Response to Complainant’s Additional Briefing at 4; Resp. Br. at 17.

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the

assertion by: (i) Citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers,

or other materials; or (ii) Showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence

to support the fact.” 29 C.F.R. § 18.72(c)(1).“So long as an affidavit is ‘based upon personal

knowledge and set[s] forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, it is legally

competent to oppose summary judgment, irrespective of its self-serving nature.’” Sanchez v.

Vilsack, 695 F.3d 1174, 1180 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

29 C.F.R. § 18.72(c)(1).

See Vinnett v. Mitsubishi Power Sys., ARB No. 2008-0104, ALJ No. 2006-ERA-00029,

slip op. at 7 (ARB July 27, 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986))

(“The party bringing the motion for summary decision bears the burden of proof.”).

Respondent’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Respondent’s

Motion for Summary Disposition at 2 (citing Bubier Affidavit at ¶¶ 11, 12).

As a matter of law, Dr. Barhaghi could file Complainant’s TFA complaint for

her, and there is a genuine dispute as to whether he did so on January 4, 2023.71

Accordingly, we reverse the ALJ’s summary determination the complaint was

untimely filed with respect to her retaliatory termination claim and the alleged

adverse actions underlying the hostile work environment claims that the ALJ

concluded were actionable.72

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the ALJ’s Order Granting

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition, and REMAND this matter for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SO ORDERED.

RANDEL K. JOHNSON

Chief Administrative Appeals Judge

THOMAS H. BURRELL

Administrative Appeals Judge

PHILIP G. KIKO

Administrative Appeals Judge

It is therefore unnecessary for the Board to decide the remaining issues

Complainant raises on appeal.

As Complainant did not specifically argue, however, that the ALJ otherwise erred in

finding that some of her “facially timely allegations [of a hostile work environment] are not

themselves discriminatory acts but are simply natural consequences of the alleged

discriminatory acts” and were thus not actionable, she has waived arguments appealing

this determination. Order Granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition at 10. It

is a “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied

by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” Dev. Res., Inc., ARB No.

2002-0046, slip op. at 4 (ARB Apr. 11, 2002) (quoting Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58,

75 (2d Cir. 2001)).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.