DENIED: November 3, 2014

DENIED: November 3, 2014

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

In the Matter of ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; AGRINATIONAL

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.; AMERICAN AGRI-BUSINESS INSURANCE

COMPANY; COUNTRY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; GUIDEONE

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; EVEREST REINSURANCE COMPANY;

FARMERS MUTUAL HAIL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IOWA; GREAT

AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY; NAU

COUNTRY INSURANCE COMPANY; OCCIDENTAL FIRE AND CASUALTY

COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA; PRODUCERS AGRICULTURE INSURANCE

COMPANY; RURAL COMMUNITY INSURANCE COMPANY; and XL

REINSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

Michael E. Tucci, Lawrence P. Block, and Robin K. Carlson of Stinson Leonard

Street LLP, Washington, DC; and Charles D. Lee of National Crop Insurance Services,

Inc., Overland Park, KS, counsel for Appellants.

Daniel N. Rosenstein of Levin & Rosenstein, Rockville, MD, counsel for

Appellant Rural Community Insurance Company.

Michael J. Davenport and Bradley A. Meyer of Rain and Hail, LLC, Johnston, IA,

counsel for Appellant Ace American Insurance Company.

Zane J. Vaughn of American Agri-Business Insurance Company, Lubbock, TX,

counsel for Appellant American Agri-Business Insurance Company.

Grant Adams of Producers Agriculture Insurance Company, Amarillo, TX, counsel

for Appellant Producers Agriculture Insurance Company.

Kimberley E. Arrigo, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Agriculture,

Washington, DC, counsel for Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

2

Before Board Judges GOODMAN, KULLBERG, and STEEL.

STEEL, Board Judge.

The Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency (RMA), which

supervises the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), has filed a motion for

summary relief. In the motion, the RMA argues that the standard reinsurance agreement

(SRA) that it entered into with the appellants, Ace American Insurance Company, et al.,

and the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) do not preclude the FCIC from changing its

premium rate-making methodology at the end of each reinsurance year. Specifically, the

RMA asserts that, as its rate-making authority is not limited by the SRA or by statute,

modifying the rate-making methodology subsequent to entering into the 2011 SRA did

not breach the SRA or violate section 1508(k)(8) of title 7 of the United States Code.

The appellants oppose the motion, asserting that the RMA’s rate-making

methodology is intrinsically tied to the terms of the SRA and that, once the negotiations

for an SRA have been completed, the RMA no longer has any authority to change the

methodology. The appellants allege that any change to the rate-making methodology

violates section 1508(k)(8) of title 7 if implemented within five years after negotiating the

SRA, and breaches the SRA. However, the appellants do not allege breach of any

specific provision of the SRA.

For the reasons below, we grant the RMA’s motion for summary relief. We hold

that the FCIC did not breach the SRA when it modified the premium rate-making

methodology after it entered into the agreement.

Background

Federal Crop Insurance Program and the Appellants

In 1938, Congress passed the original Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA), which

is now codified, as amended, at sections 1501 through 1524 of title 7 of the United States

Code. The FCIA is intended to “promote the national welfare by improving the economic

stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop insurance and providing the means

for the research and experience helpful in devising and establishing such insurance.” 7

U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2012). The FCIC was created as an agency within the USDA to carry

out the purposes of the FCIA. Id. § 1503.

Federal crop insurance is sold and serviced by private companies pursuant to the

terms of a uniform contractual agreement with the FCIC. The agreement, which is

negotiated and executed by the parties, is the SRA. It governs the relationship between

the FCIC and each approved insurance provider (AIP), establishes the FCIC’s obligation

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

3

to provide federal reinsurance policies sold by the AIPs, and details the fees and expenses

to be received by the AIPs for selling and servicing federal crop insurance.

Each appellant is an AIP, as defined by the FCIA, 7 U.S.C. § 1502(b)(2), and each

writes federal crop insurance policies approved by the FCIC. The FCIC sets the

premiums to be charged for crop insurance. The AIPs must offer coverage on the terms

and conditions established by the FCIC. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(k)(1).

Standard Reinsurance Agreement Risk Allocation

Among other things, the SRA details the allocation of underwriting risks between

the AIPs and the FCIC, including the percentage of collected premiums ceded to

compensate the FCIC for its share of that risk, and the fees and expenses payable to the

AIPs for selling and servicing federal crop insurance policies.

The AIPs earn income from their participation in the federal crop insurance

program through two SRA provisions. One way that the AIPs earn income is through

administrative and operating (A&O) expense reimbursements by the FCIC. The other

provides for the AIPs to achieve an underwriting gain on the insurance policies they sell

when they retain all or a portion of the premium paid on the insurance policies.

Section II of the SRA contains formulas for allocating risk between the AIPs and

the FCIC. Section II is the framework for operating the crop insurance program. It

states: “In exchange for premiums ceded by the Company to FCIC under this Agreement,

FCIC will provide reinsurance to the Company with respect to such eligible crop

insurance contracts.” The SRA does not contain actual premium rates. Rather, in

general, under specified formulas, the AIPs and the FCIC each bear a certain portion of

the risk associated with the crop insurance policies.

While the gain/loss sharing formulas are somewhat complicated, the underlying

premise is fairly straightforward. The AIPs achieve an underwriting gain by retaining

more premiums than indemnities1 paid. For example, if an AIP collected $100 in

premiums and paid out $90 in indemnities, there would be a $10 underwriting gain. The

gain/loss sharing provisions describe how the $10 gain is shared between the AIP and the

FCIC.2 The reverse is true for underwriting losses.

1

Crop insurance companies pay indemnities to compensate policy beneficiaries

for their actual economic losses, up to the limiting amount of the insurance policy.

2

For example, for the “Commercial Fund,” which is a particular risk allocation

pool under the SRA, “[t]he Company shall retain at least a 35 percent interest in premium .

. . . The remainder shall be ceded to FCIC.”

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

4

Pertinent Federal Crop Insurance Act Provisions

Section 1506(n) of title 7 states:

(1) Projected loss ratio as of October 1, 1995. The Corporation shall take

such actions as are necessary to improve the actuarial soundness[3 ] of

Federal multiperil crop insurance coverage made available under [the

FCIA].

Section 1508(d) of title 7 states:

PREMIUMS REQUIRED.—The Corporation shall fix adequate premiums

for all the plans of insurance of the Corporation at such rates as the Board

determines are actuarially sufficient to attain an expected loss ratio of not

greater than—

a.

1.0 . . . .

Section 1508(i) of title 7 states:

(i) ADOPTION OF RATES AND COVERAGES.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall adopt, as soon as practicable,

rates and coverages that will improve the actuarial soundness of the

insurance operations of the Corporation for those crops that are determined

to be insured at rates that are not actuarially sound, except that no rate may

be increased by an amount of more than 20 percent over the comparable

rate of the preceding crop year.

(2) REVIEW OF RATING METHODOLOGIES.—To maximize

participation in the Federal crop insurance program and to ensure equity for

producers, the Corporation shall periodically review the methodologies

employed for rating plans of insurance under this subtitle consistent with

section 507(c)(2).

(3) ANALYSIS OF RATING AND LOSS HISTORY.—The Corporation

shall analyze the rating and loss history of approved policies and plans of

insurance for agricultural commodities by area.

3

The loss ratio of total premiums compared to total indemnities (claim

payments) paid out each year indicates actuarial soundness. A program-wide loss ratio of

no more than 1.0 would mean that the amount of premiums at least equals indemnities, and,

therefore, is actuarially sound under the statute.

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

5

(4) PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT.—If the Corporation makes a

determination that premium rates are excessive for an agricultural

commodity in an area relative to the requirements of subsection (d)(2) for

that area, then, for the 2002 crop year (and as necessary thereafter), the

Corporation shall make appropriate adjustments in the premium rates for

that area for that agricultural commodity.

Section 1508(k)(8) of title 7 provides that the FCIC may renegotiate “the financial

terms and conditions of each [SRA] . . . once during each period of 5 reinsurance years.”

2011 Standard Reinsurance Agreement Negotiation

The FCIC began planning to negotiate the 2011 SRA in the spring of 2009. One

of the FCIC’s objectives for the SRA was to set a reasonable rate of return on retained

premiums. The RMA negotiated the 2011 SRA with the appellants beginning in August

2009 and continuing until June 2010. This SRA became effective initially for the

reinsurance year starting July 1, 2010, and ending June 30, 2011.4

On November 30, 2009, the FCIC/RMA published a study of its rate-making

methodology (study 1) on its website in draft form for public comment. The draft study

contained twelve recommendations. On April 25, 2010, the RMA posted the final version

of study 1 on its website.

On May 24, 2010, the RMA commissioned a second study of its rate-making

methodology based on the recommendations contained in study 1 regarding weighting

historical data. In the summer of 2011, the RMA received a draft report of the second

study (study 2).

On November 28, 2011, the FCIC announced that it would apply the

recommendations from study 2 to corn and soybean premium rates beginning with the

2012 crop year. On November 27, 2012, the RMA adopted the recommendation from

study 2 for other crops, including wheat, cotton, rice, and grain sorghum. In November

2013, the RMA applied some form of the recommendations from study 2 to other crops.

Agency Determinations, Non-Response, and Appeals

The appellants requested that the RMA’s Deputy Administrator for Insurance

Services determine whether the change of the rate-making methodology (changing

4

Each appellant except GuideOne Mutual Insurance Company executed the

2011 SRA. GuideOne became a party to the 2011 SRA when it entered into an assignment

agreement with Austin Mutual Insurance Company. The FCIC approved the assignment.

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

6

premium rates) subsequent to entering into the 2011 SRA breached the SRA. The Deputy

Administrator determined5 that the RMA did not breach the SRA because the SRA does

not set premium rates and statute allows premium rates to change in order to maintain an

actuarially-sound crop insurance program. When the appellants sought a determination

on the same issue for the 2013 reinsurance year, the Deputy Administrator did not

respond.

The AIPs here appeal the agency determination and the non-response. The Board

docketed the appeals as CBCA 2876-FCIC on July 6, 2012; CBCA 3367-FCIC on May 6,

2013; and CBCA 3956-FCIC on July 9, 2014. We consolidated them because they arise

from the same transaction and present identical issues.

Discussion

Summary Relief Standard

In ruling upon the RMA’s motion, we recognize the following:

Summary relief is this “Board’s analogous procedure to summary judgment

in court . . . .” GE Capital Information Technology Solutions-Federal

Systems v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 15467, 01-2 BCA

¶ 31,445, at 155,306. It is well recognized that granting summary judgment

is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. In

considering summary judgment, it is not the judge’s function “to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter.” Id. at 249. All justifiable

inferences and presumptions are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving

party. Id. at 255. The moving party has the initial responsibility of stating

the basis for its motion and “identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). The nonmoving party is then required to “go beyond the pleadings

5

The Deputy Administrator for Insurance Services made these determinations

on March 20, 2012, for the 2011 reinsurance year and on January 29, 2013, for the 2012

reinsurance year.

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

7

and . . . designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324.

Navigant SatoTravel v. General Services Administration, CBCA 449, 08-1 BCA

¶ 33,821, at 167,403.

Changing the Premium Rate-Making Methodology Does Not Change the SRA

Contract interpretation begins with an examination of the plain language of the

contract. LAI Services, Inc. v. Gates, 573 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing M.A.

Mortenson Co. v. Brownlee, 363 F.3d 1203, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The contract must be

read as a whole, giving reasonable meaning to all its parts. Gould, Inc. v. United States,

935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991). If the plain language of the contract is

unambiguous on its face, the inquiry ends, and the contract’s plain language controls.

Hunt Construction Group, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

But if the contractual language at issue is susceptible of more than one reasonable

interpretation, it is ambiguous, and the Board’s task is to determine which party’s

interpretation should prevail. ACM Construction & Marine Group, Inc. v. Department of

Transportation, CBCA 2245, et al., 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,537, at 174,151.

The appellants allege that “[p]remium rates and the underlying methodology used

to determine them are the premise for each financial term and condition of the SRA.”

Complaint ¶ 88. The appellants claim that, “[a]s a result, a change in rate setting

methodology results in a change to the financial terms and conditions of the SRA.” Id.

¶ 89. The appellants assert that “[b]ecause the 2011 SRA became effective July 1, 2010,

FCIC lacked authority to change the financial terms and conditions of the 2011 SRA until

July 1, 2015 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 1508(k)(8).” Id. ¶ 90.

We find nothing in the SRA that precludes the RMA from revising the rate-making

methodology or premium rates as necessary to comply with the Act. The financial terms

of the SRA are contained in section II. That section does not fix premium rates at any

specified level or prevent the RMA from revising the rates. The financial terms contained

in section II of the SRA, i.e., the risk allocation mechanisms, remain unchanged as a

result of the rate adjustments for any crop. Thus, the RMA is not precluded by the terms

of the SRA from changing premiums rates or the rate-making methodology.

Moreover, even if there is an ambiguity in the SRA regarding the permissibility of

changing premium rates, statute establishes that the FCIC has the power and duty to

administer a crop insurance program that is actuarially sound. See American Growers

Insurance Co., AGBCA 98-200-F, 00-2 BCA ¶ 30,980, at 152,897 (Houry, J.,

concurring) (“Generally, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the Board is not

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

8

empowered to reform the SRA by granting rights to Appellant, or ascribing obligations to

FCIC, not addressed in the SRA.”).

Changing the Premium Rate-Making Methodology Does Not Violate Statute

Section 1508(k)(8) provides that the FCIC may renegotiate “the financial terms

and conditions of each Standard Reinsurance Agreement . . . once during each period of 5

reinsurance years.” Therefore, the appellants assert that “[b]ecause the 2011 SRA

became effective July 1, 2010, FCIC lacked authority to change [premium rates] until July

1, 2015 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 1508(k)(8).” Complaint ¶ 90.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law, beginning with the plain language of

the statute. Norfolk Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000)). However, “[w]hether or not words of a

statute are clear is itself not always clear.” Texas State Commission for the Blind v.

United States, 796 F.2d 400, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (en banc). To determine whether a

statute is clear, canons of construction are useful to extract the plain meaning from the

statute. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). Such canons

“are designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular

statutory language.” Id.

The plain meaning of a statute comes from its “text and structure.” Norfolk

Dredging Co., 375 F.3d at 1110. This meaning “of a statute must, in the first instance, be

sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is

within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole

function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States,

242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc.,467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the

end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

Therefore, we begin with the statutory provision’s plain language. Section

1508(k)(8) provides that the FCIC may renegotiate “the financial terms and conditions of

each Standard Reinsurance Agreement . . . once during each period of 5 reinsurance

years.” However, we do not read this provision in a vacuum. We read it within the

context of the entire statute, see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988),

because “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means

in a statute what it says there[,]” Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,

253-54 (1992).

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

9

Thus, we interpret the other pertinent provisions surrounding section 1508(k)(8) of

title 7. We provided the relevant text of each above. These sections require the RMA to

(1) provide premium rates to achieve an overall projected loss ratio (in accordance with

section 1506(n)); (2) fix premiums sufficient to cover anticipated losses and a reasonable

reserve (in accordance with section 1508(d)); and (3) adjust premium rates if the RMA

determines they are excessive (in accordance with section 1508(i)).

The appellants’ interpretation of section 1508(k)(8) does not align with the FCIC’s

requirements in sections 1506(n), 1508(d), and 1508(i) to maintain an actuarially-sound

federal crop insurance program. To accept the appellants’ interpretation that section

1508(k)(8) precludes changing the rate-making methodology or premium rates after the

SRA has been negotiated would render these provisions of the FCIA meaningless. This is

because, under the appellants’ interpretation, the RMA would not be able to change

premium rates for the five years immediately subsequent to entering into the SRA. Thus,

the RMA would not be able to make rate adjustments even if such changes would be

necessary to increase premiums to cover losses to achieve actuarial soundness.

No statutory construction should be adopted that would render statutory words or

phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous. Alaska Department of Environmental

Conservation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 489 n.13 (2004) (“It is,

moreover, ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the

whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be

superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31

(2001)); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991); Sharp

v. United States, 580 F.3d 1234, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting an interpretation that

would violate “the canon that [courts] must ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and

word of a statute’ and should avoid rendering any of the statutory text meaningless or as

mere surplusage”). Therefore, we must reconcile sections 1506(n), 1508(d), 1508(i), and

1508(k)(8) to give all provisions meaning.

The “financial terms and conditions” mentioned in section 1508(k)(8) are the

negotiated terms for risk sharing, i.e., those provisions contained in section II of the SRA.

Those risk sharing provisions are locked in for the five years subsequent to entering into

the SRA. But the requirement to maintain a crop insurance program that is actuarially

sound in sections 1506(n), 1508(d), and 1508(i) means that premium rates can be revised

as necessary. Changing premium rates is a means to achieve the ends dictated by statute

and encompassed in the SRA.

The Appellants’ Alternative Theories of Relief Lack Merit

The appellants also raise, as theories of relief in their complaint, breach of the duty

of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and reformation based on mutual

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

10

mistake. However, based on the analysis above, as well as the following, these theories

fail.

Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied in every contract, “imposes

obligations on both contracting parties that include the duty not to interfere with the other

party’s performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the

other party regarding the fruits of the contract.” Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d

1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Butte Timberlands, LLC v. Department of

Agriculture, CBCA 646, 08-1 BCA ¶ 33,730, at 166,994 (2007) (“An implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing imposes an obligation on the part of each party to a contract to

act reasonably.”). However, the “implied duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot

expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in the express contract or

create duties inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.” Metcalf Construction Co. v.

United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Based on their interpretation of the

SRA and statute, the appellants argue that the RMA unreasonably adopted a new

methodology for calculating premium rates and, thus, unlawfully changed premium rates

after executing the SRA. Complaint ¶ 76. Because the FCIC, in modifying its ratemaking methodology within the immediate five years subsequent to entering into the

2011 SRA, did what the contract allows based on the results of studies 1 and 2, there is no

violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Promissory Estoppel

Promissory estoppel means that “[a] promise which the promisor should

reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third

person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be

avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Law Mathematics & Technology, Inc. v.

United States, 779 F.2d 675, 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Therefore, “[a] party claiming an

estoppel of this nature must prove, first, that there was a promise or representation made,

second, that the promise or representation was relied upon by the party asserting the

estoppel in such a manner as to change his position for the worse, and, third, that the

promisee’s reliance was reasonable and should have been reasonably expected by the

promisor.” Id. (citing Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford, 467 U.S. 51

(1984)). However, when a contract already exists, this form of relief is not available

because promissory estoppel “create[s] a contract in the furtherance of justice and

fairness, when no such contract exists in fact.” See Burnett v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl.

806, 810 (1998). Furthermore, promissory estoppel is not a theory upon which the Board

may grant relief. California Business Telephones v. Department of Agriculture, CBCA

135, 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,553, at 166,172.

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

11

The appellants do not address the jurisdictional impediment to the Board granting

relief on this theory. But, even if the Board could grant such relief, the appellants fail to

establish that there is a genuine dispute as to whether any reliance they had on alleged

representations that premium rates would remain stagnant for the five years immediately

subsequent to entering into the SRA was reasonable. Because the SRA does not establish

premium rates and statute allows for the RMA to change premium rates each reinsurance

year to maintain an actuarially-sound crop insurance program, the appellants’ thinking

that premium rates would remain stagnant for five years is unreasonable. In addition, the

SRA is a contract and relief based on promissory estoppel is not available when a contract

exists. Holding the parties to their bargain, as enunciated in the contract, creates no

injustice.

Reformation

The appellants would have to prove the following to allow for reformation of the

SRA: “(1) the parties to the contract were mistaken in their belief regarding a fact; (2)

that mistaken belief constituted a basic assumption underlying the contract; (3) the

mistake had a material effect on the bargain; and (4) the contract did not put the risk of

the mistake on the party seeking reformation.” CH2M Hill Hanford Group v.

Department of Energy, CBCA 708, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,871, at 167,666 (quoting Dairyland

Power Cooperative v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The appellants

argue that the mutual mistake is the belief that the existing rating methodology would

remain the basis for determining premium rates for the five-year period following

entering into the 2011 SRA. However, there is no evidence in the record indicating that

the RMA was at all mistaken about its ability, based on the SRA and statute, to change

rate-making methodology and premium rates to maintain an actuarially-sound crop

insurance program. Thus, the appellants fail to establish that there is a genuine issue of

material fact that both parties were mistaken in their belief that premium rates would

remain the same for the five years subsequent to entering into the SRA. The RMA never

had this belief.

Decision

The RMA’s motion for summary relief is granted. The appeal is DENIED.

_________________________________

CANDIDA S. STEEL

Board Judge

CBCA 2876-FCIC, 3367-FCIC, 3956-FCIC

12

We concur:

_________________________________

_________________________________

ALLAN H. GOODMAN

Board Judge

H. CHUCK KULLBERG

Board Judge