MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: March 19, 2026

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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: March 19, 2026

CBCA 8362

BRITTANI WATTIKER,

Appellant,

v.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent.

Brittani Wattiker, pro se, Dallas, TX.

Anne C. McDermott, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,

Philadelphia, PA, counsel for Respondent.

Before Board Judges LESTER, KULLBERG, and O’ROURKE.

KULLBERG, Board Judge.

Appellant requests that the Board reconsider its decision dismissing Geoffrey Wattiker

(Mr. Wattiker) for lack of standing as an appellant in this appeal. Geoffrey Wattiker and

Brittani Wattiker v. General Services Administration, CBCA 8362, 26-1 BCA ¶ 38,985. The

Board dismissed Mr. Wattiker because he was not a party to the contracts at issue in this

appeal and lacked standing. Appellant has raised various objections to the Board’s decision.

As discussed below, the Board denies appellant’s motion for reconsideration.

Appellant argues that “[i]n addition to the fact that the law does not limit standing in

this case to a single contractor, it also does not preclude the inclusion of other parties along

CBCA 8362

2

with the contractor/filer.” Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Motion) at 3. The

Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2018), states that “[t]he term

‘contractor’ means a party to a Federal Government contract other than the Federal

Government.” Id. § 7101(7). “Each claim by a contractor against the Federal Government

relating to a contract shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision.” Id.

§ 7103(a)(1). “A contractor, within 90 days from the date of receipt of a contracting officer’s

decision under section 7103 of this title, may appeal the decision to an agency board.” Id.

§ 7104(a). “[T]he CDA is ‘a statute waiving sovereign immunity, which must be strictly

construed.’” Winter v. FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Cosmic

Construction Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 1389, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1982)). “[T]hose who are

not in privity of contract with the government cannot avail themselves of the CDA’s appeal

provisions.” Id. at 1371 (citing Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. England, 313 F.3d 1344,

1350-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Admiralty Construction, Inc. v. Dalton, 156 F.3d 1217, 1220-21

(Fed. Cir. 1998); Erickson Air Crane Company of Washington, Inc. v. United States, 731

F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Consequently, “only a ‘contractor’ may file an appeal of a

contracting officer’s final decision.” Kristin Allred v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

CBCA 4952, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,108, at 176,282 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a)). Mr. Wattiker

was never in privity of contract with the Government, and appellant’s suggestion that the

CDA allows Mr. Wattiker to be an appellant is without merit.

In her motion, appellant erroneously argues that Mr. Wattiker is “a Petitioner in this

case.” Motion at 4. The Board’s Rules state that “‘Party’ means an appellant, applicant,

petitioner, or respondent.” Rule 1(b) (48 CFR 6101.1(b) (2024)). The terms petition and

petitioner are defined as follows:

Petition; petitioner. “Petition” means a request that the Board direct a

contracting officer to issue a written decision on a claim. A “petitioner” is a

party submitting a petition.

Id. Appellant misapplies the Board’s Rules to the facts of this appeal. The Board docketed

this case as an appeal and not a petition. Appellant and Mr. Wattiker filed a notice of appeal

with the Board on February 26, 2025, which appealed the “deemed decision of [the] Sales

Contracting Officer . . . who has failed to issue a decision regarding their formal demand

letter dated December 11, 2024.” The Board’s February 27, 2025, order directed the

contracting officer to issue a decision, and the contracting officer issued a final decision

(COFD), which was dated March 6, 2025. Appeal File, Exhibit 1. The COFD was addressed

only to appellant, the contractor for all three contracts and did not include Mr. Wattiker.

Even if this case had been filed as a petition, Mr. Wattiker could not have been a

petitioner. The CDA states that “[a] contractor may request the tribunal concerned to direct

CBCA 8362

3

a contracting officer to issue a decision in a specified period of time.” 41 U.S.C.

§ 7103(f)(4). The CDA does not provide for any person other than the contractor to make

such a request. Also, once a contracting officer issues a COFD on a claim, any pending

petition seeking to require issuance of a COFD becomes moot and is dismissed. See Fluor

Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Homeland Security, CBCA 6662, 2019 WL 7583125

(Dec. 31, 2019).

Appellant also argues that Mr. Wattiker has a financial interest in the outcome of this

appeal and that he should be joined as a party under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(FRCP) 19, required joinder, or FRCP 20, permissive joinder. Motion at 4-5. The Board’s

Rules provide that the Board “may apply principles of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

to resolve issues not covered by these rules.” Rule 1(c). One of our predecessor boards, the

Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals, recognized, however, that “third party

practice, be it interpleading, mandatory or permissive joinder, impleading, or intervention is

simply not available before a board of contract appeals.” Power Contracting Co.,

VABCA 7356, 06-1 BCA ¶ 33,134, at 164,203 (2005). “The reason for this is that a board

of contract [appeals’] jurisdiction is limited to appeals by ‘contractors,’ the term ‘contractor’

being defined by the CDA.” Id. The financial interest of a person other than the contractor

in an appeal “do[es] not trump the limited jurisdiction granted to the boards of contract

appeals by the CDA.” Id. at 164,204. The Board, accordingly, does not need to look to other

rules, such as the FRCP, where its jurisdiction under the CDA precludes Mr. Wattiker from

being an appellant.

Finally, appellant misrepresents the Board as an “arm” of the Government and argues

that it is “estopped” from removing Mr. Wattiker as an appellant by citing a Supreme Court

decision that concerned a plea bargain with a prosecutor in a criminal case. Motion at 6

(citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).1 The Board’s authority under the

CDA is understood as follows:

The legislative history of the Contract Disputes Act reveals that the drafters

viewed [a board of contract appeals] as an entity quite distinct from the

contracting agency:

The agency boards of contract appeals . . . function as quasi

judicial bodies. Their members serve as administrative judges

1

In Santobello, the Court held that “a constant factor is that when a plea rests

in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor . . . such promise must

be fulfilled.” 404 U.S. at 262.

CBCA 8362

4

in an adversary-type proceeding, make findings of fact, and

interpret the law . . . . In performing this function they do not act

as a representative of the agency, since the agency is contesting

the contractor’s entitlement to relief.

Boeing Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Watkins, 935 F.2d 1260, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting

S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at 26 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5260). A board

of contract appeals “‘is neither an agency nor the alter ego of agency contracting officers’

. . . and cannot be equated with such officials for purposes of ascertaining the bounds of our

jurisdiction.” Dry Roof Corp., ASBCA 29061, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,096, at 106,504 (quoting

Martin Marietta Corp., ASBCA 25828, 84-1 BCA ¶ 17,119, at 85,258). Appellant argues,

without support, that the Board’s docketing of this appeal with Mr. Wattiker as one of the

appellants amounted to an agreement, which the Board is estopped from denying, but the

Board’s jurisdiction is subject to the CDA and cannot be bargained away.

Decision

Appellant’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

H. Chuck Kullberg

H. CHUCK KULLBERG

Board Judge

We concur:

Harold D. Lester, Jr.

HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.

Board Judge

Kathleen J. O’Rourke

KATHLEEN J. O’ROURKE

Board Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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