In the Matter of KAREN M. STANLEY-WOLFE
Agency decision
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
October 13, 2017
CBCA 5822-RELO
In the Matter of KAREN M. STANLEY-WOLFE
Karen M. Stanley-Wolfe, Moreno Valley, CA, Claimant.
Chris Barned, Relocation Specialist/Certifying Officer, National Operations Center,
Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior, Denver, CO, appearing for
Department of the Interior.
LESTER, Board Judge.
Claimant, Karen M. Stanley-Wolfe, asks us to review a decision by the Department
of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denying reimbursement for expenses
that she had to pay to conclude her apartment lease at her original duty station after the BLM
relocated her to a new duty station. We grant Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s claim in part.
Background
On May 6, 2016, while assigned by BLM to a permanent duty station in Boulder City,
Nevada, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe executed a residential lease agreement for an apartment in
Boulder City with a term ending on April 30, 2017. Under the terms of the lease agreement,
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe, after making a pro-rated rental payment for the month of May 2016, was
obligated to pay $750 in rent on the first day of every month until the expiration of the lease
term and then, unless she had previously provided a timely notice of intent to vacate at the
expiration of the agreement, to continue making $750 payments on a month-to-month basis
until either party terminated the lease by giving the other party thirty days’ written notice.
CBCA 5822-RELO
2
The agreement did not provide the tenant with an express affirmative right to
terminate the lease prior to the end of its April 30, 2017, term, with an exception not
applicable here for members of the United States Armed Forces on extended active duty.
The agreement further provided that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe could not assign, sublet, or transfer
her interest in the lease without the landlord’s prior written consent. It also provided that,
upon lease termination, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe would vacate the apartment, remove all of her
property, and “return keys, personal property and Premises to the landlord in good, clean and
sanitary condition, normal wear excepted.” Lease Agreement ¶ 24.
On or about December 19, 2016, seven months into the one-year lease term, BLM
notified Ms. Stanley-Wolfe that it would be transferring her to a new duty station in Moreno
Valley, California, effective January 8, 2017. On December 20, 2016, a BLM relocation
specialist introduced herself to Ms. Stanley-Wolfe by email message and provided several
forms (including a transferee employee data sheet and a service agreement) for Ms. StanleyWolfe to complete. Ms. Stanley-Wolfe returned the completed forms as attachments to a
December 22, 2016, email message, but asked about the time frames for completion of her
move and whether she should continue making monthly rental payments for her Boulder City
apartment. She did not receive a specific response to that question.
Because BLM needed to fill several positions in Moreno Valley expeditiously, Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s transfer was, as the agency indicates, “somewhat haphazard.” Agency
Response at 2. Typically, BLM “requires at least six weeks . . . to coordinate a move,” which
provides time to “prepare paperwork, obtain funding, issue a relocation travel authorization,
and arrange for shipment of the [employee’s] household goods” (HHG). Id. BLM
acknowledges that, in Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s case, “there was not enough time between
notification [to Ms. Stanley-Wolfe of the transfer] and the [entry on duty date of January 8]
to properly coordinate the relocation.” Id. As a result, when Ms. Stanley-Wolfe left her
Boulder City apartment on January 8, 2017, and traveled to her new duty station, the agency
had not yet prepared a relocation travel authorization, and it had made no arrangements for
transporting her HHG (which, for reasons that we discuss below, the agency was obligated
to do in this case). Accordingly, prior to her departure for Moreno Valley on January 8, no
arrangements were made with a commercial van line to transport Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG
to the new duty station. Nevertheless, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe notified her landlord of her
impending move and, prior to her departure, told the landlord that, as soon as she had a date
for the removal and transport of her HHG, she would provide notification of the date by
which she would fully vacate the apartment.
By email message dated January 25, 2017, the BLM relocation specialist asked Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe to identify the address in Boulder City from which the HHG would need to
be moved. In a responsive email message on January 30, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe, in
CBCA 5822-RELO
3
addition to providing that address and (at the relocation specialist’s request) another
completed transferee employee data sheet, asked the relocation specialist to identify “a
window of availability” for the HHG transport so that she could request time off from her
new job to return to Boulder City to meet the movers. After receiving no response, Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe sent another email message to the BLM relocation specialist on February 9,
2017, representing that her Boulder City landlord had called to ask when she would be
vacating her apartment so that it could be advertised and indicating that, if she could arrange
to have her HHG moved no later than April 1, she could arrange for time off from her job
to meet the movers. After receiving no response, she left a voicemail message for the
relocation specialist on February 13, 2017. She then sent an email message to a BLM human
resources specialist, asking if there was someone other than the relocation specialist who
might be able to help her get her HHG out of Nevada, as she very much wanted to know
“when I can vacate the apartment (when will the movers arrive).” The human resources
specialist responded that the BLM relocation specialist had been “completely swamped” by
the “rush of hires” and then left a voicemail message for the relocation specialist to try to
assist in expediting the process.
It was not until February 17, 2017, that the BLM relocation specialist sent an order
to Berger Management Solutions, BLM’s HHG move manager, requesting transport of Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG from Boulder City to Moreno Valley. That same day, a BLM HHG
shipment coordinator spoke with Ms. Stanley-Wolfe to schedule a date for the HHG transport
and provided Ms. Stanley-Wolfe with a list of what BLM viewed as acceptable transport
dates. Because she had already been scheduled by her supervisors at her new duty station for
various necessary travel activities and had a jury duty obligation, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe was
unable immediately to travel to Boulder City to coordinate the HHG shipment from her old
apartment. She selected a relocation date of March 27 and 28, 2017, from the list of
acceptable dates provided.
On March 7, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe notified her Boulder City landlord of her intent
to vacate her apartment on March 28, 2017. By letter dated March 8, 2017, the landlord
notified Ms. Stanley-Wolfe that, although it had begun advertising the apartment for rent in
response to her March 7 notice, she would remain responsible for rent and utilities through
the end of her lease term (April 30) unless the landlord was able to rent the apartment to
someone else prior to that date. The landlord further indicated that “[w]e will do a
walkthrough of the property after [it] has been vacated on March 28, 2017, . . . will put a
lockbox on the property for future showings after you have vacated as of 03/28/17,” and
“will give you a 24 hour notice in the meantime for showings until the property is vacated.”
The movers packed Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG on March 27, 2017, and removed the
HHG the next day. Yet, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe did not return her keys for the apartment to the
CBCA 5822-RELO
4
landlord at that time. Instead, by letter dated March 28, 2017, she provided the landlord with
“an alternate and more reliable contact number for providing 24-hour notice to show the
apartment” (even though the landlord had previously indicated that notice would be
necessary only “until the property is vacated”), and she paid her April rent. Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe asserts that she provided this information and retained her keys because, under
the terms of her lease, she was responsible for any damage to the apartment until the end of
the lease term unless it was leased to someone else prior to that date.
Subsequently, from April 19 to 21, 2017, while on temporary duty (TDY) travel for
annual training with the United States Air Force (Air Force) at Nellis Air Force Base in
Nevada (approximately thirty-five miles from Boulder City), Ms. Stanley-Wolfe stayed at her
Boulder City apartment.1 She indicates that she intended to clean the apartment during that
stay, but that she discovered upon her arrival that the landlord had already cleaned it and
disposed of the cleaning supplies she had left behind. Ms. Stanley-Wolfe returned the
apartment keys to the landlord by certified mail on April 27, 2017, and her lease expired on
April 30, 2017.
On May 1, 2017, BLM for the first time provided Ms. Stanley-Wolfe with a travel
authorization for her relocation, back-dated to December 21, 2016. The travel authorization
provided that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe was entitled to HHG shipment “at Government expense”
on a government bill of lading (GBL), and it provided entitlement to reimbursement for lease
settlement fees incurred at the old duty station. BLM has indicated that the relocation
specialist prepared and signed the travel authorization at some unknown point after Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s relocation was effected on January 8, 2017, and that the authorization was
“improperly backdated.” Agency Response at 2.
On or about May 5, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe submitted a travel voucher seeking
reimbursement of various costs associated with her relocation, including $3000 representing
the rent on her Boulder City apartment from January through April 2017 and $643.74 for
utilities that she was required to pay during that period for the apartment. BLM initially
denied that $3643.74 reimbursement request, indicating that the amount could be reclaimed
with receipts for the lease payments and invoices for the utilities, along with a statement from
the landlord stating that the apartment was not re-rented after she had vacated it. On or about
June 12, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe resubmitted her payment request (revising her utility
reimbursement request down to $338.91) along with receipts for the rental and utility
payments.
1
Given that BLM had moved her HHG, it is unclear from the record how Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe was able to stay in the apartment for two nights in April 2017.
CBCA 5822-RELO
5
On July 6, 2017, a different BLM relocation specialist than the one previously
involved notified Ms. Stanley-Wolfe that she was evaluating Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s request
for recovery of what she considered to be “lease break” expenses, but indicated that she was
“completely confused” by it and, in particular, about the sequence of events leading to the
late March 2017 removal of the HHG and Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s mid-April 2017 stay in the
Boulder City apartment, both of which occurred more than two months after Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s relocation to Moreno Valley. After soliciting additional information from
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe, the specialist indicated that she could not “reimburse you lease breaking
expenses for an apartment that your furniture was still in” because such expenses are
allowable only for an apartment that has been vacated. On August 17, 2017, the BLM
relocation specialist denied Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s claim for lease and utility costs in its
entirety. Ms. Stanley-Wolfe then submitted her claim to the Board.
Discussion
I.
Unexpired Lease Expense Reimbursements
By statute, an employee who transfers in the interest of the Government from one
official duty station in the United States to another domestic duty station is entitled to
reimbursement for expenses incurred in “the settlement of [the employee’s] unexpired lease
. . . at the old official station . . . that are required to be paid by the employee.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 5724a(d)(1) (2012). Section 302-11.7 of the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) both
implements that obligation and identifies the prerequisites for reimbursement of such lease
expenses:
When [a transferred employee’s] unexpired lease . . . is for residence quarters
at [the employee’s] old official station, [the employee] may be reimbursed for
settlement expenses for an unexpired lease, including but not limited to
broker’s fees for obtaining a sublease or charges for advertising if:
(a)
Applicable laws or the terms of the lease provide for payment of
settlement expenses; or
(b)
Such expenses cannot be avoided by sublease or other arrangement; or
(c)
[The employee] ha[s] not contributed to the expenses by failing to give
appropriate lease termination notice promptly after [the employee has] definite
knowledge of [the] transfer; or
CBCA 5822-RELO
6
(d)
The broker’s fees or advertising charges are not in excess of those
customarily charged for comparable services in that locality.
41 CFR 302-11.7 (2016); see Department of the Interior, Permanent Change of Station Policy
(DOI PCS Policy) ¶ 9.5 (Oct. 2012) (identifying in the agency’s supplement to the FTR the
same requirements for unexpired lease cost reimbursement). Although “[t]he [FTR]
provision states the conditions in the alternative (‘or’), . . . the meaning is clearly that all
[four] of them must be fulfilled.” Mark. J. Musaus, CBCA 2184-RELO, 11-1 BCA ¶ 34,749,
at 171,054 n.1. If the employee meets the four prerequisites, the agency must reimburse the
unexpired lease expenses. 41 CFR 302-11.430.
Generally, then, if an employee is required to transfer to a new duty station – and, by
necessity, to vacate his or her apartment at the old duty station – before the end of a
pre-existing lease at the old duty station, the employee is entitled to recover the rental and
associated costs incurred for the vacated apartment so long as the employee has taken
reasonable steps to try to mitigate those costs. See, e.g., James R. Dikeman, CBCA
4238-RELO, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,200, at 176,653 (2015).2 In considering whether the steps that
an individual took to mitigate his or her unexpired lease expenses were adequate, the Board
must apply a “reasonable prudence” standard. Alphonso S. Hamilton, CBCA 5109-RELO,
16-1 BCA ¶ 36,441, at 177,607. That is, in dealing with unexpired leases, “federal
employees are ‘expected to exercise the same care as a prudent person relocating at personal
expense.’” Fernando Vazquez, CBCA 5469-RELO, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,567, at 178,101
(quoting Alphonso S. Hamilton, 16-1 BCA at 177,607).
2
We recognize that an employee generally cannot be reimbursed for expenses
incurred in advance of his or her receipt of formal notification of a pending transfer. Byron
L. Wells, CBCA 1206-RELO, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,979, at 168,064; 41 CFR 302-11.305. “The
reason given for this rule is that, if the transfer does not materialize, either the employee or
the Government may ‘lose money for no purpose.’” Byron L. Wells , 08-2 BCA at 168,064
(quoting Connie F. Green, GSBCA 15301-RELO, 01-1 BCA ¶ 31,175, at 153,998 (2000)).
Nevertheless, the employee can still be eligible for reimbursement if, prior to his or her
receipt of official orders, “the agency had manifested a clear ‘administrative intent’ to
transfer the employee.” Connie F. Green, 01-1 BCA at 153,998 (quoting Dennis A.
Edwards, GSBCA 14943-RELO, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,741, at 151,873). Here, the agency actually
transferred Ms. Stanley-Wolfe to Moreno Valley almost four months before she received her
official orders on May 1, 2017. Given that the agency had already required Ms. StanleyWolfe to report to her new duty station before any of the lease costs at issue were incurred,
there is no doubt of the agency’s clear administrative intent.
CBCA 5822-RELO
II.
7
HHG Transport Reimbursements
In addition to entitlements relating to unexpired lease expenses at the old duty station,
an employee transferred between official stations within the United States is also eligible for
the transportation and temporary storage of HHG. 41 CFR 302-7.1(a). There are two
authorized methods of transporting and paying for HHG transport and temporary storage:
(1) a commuted rate system, under which the employee assumes total responsibility for
arranging and paying for HHG storage and transport (subject to reimbursement by the
agency), and (2) the actual expense method, by which the agency assumes those
responsibilities. Id. 302-7.14. It is the agency’s obligation to determine which of the
methods will be authorized. Id. The Department of the Interior has adopted a policy of
shipping HHG by the actual expense method, DOI PCS Policy ¶ 6.1, and a BLM employee
cannot use the commuted rate system to arrange for HHG transport himself or herself unless
and until BLM determines that employee self-transport is the most cost-effective means of
transport and unless and until that alternate method is stated on the employee’s travel
authorization. Id. ¶ 6.9.
Under the actual expense method, which BLM eventually identified on the travel
authorization that it belatedly prepared for Ms. Stanley-Wolfe, “the Government assumes full
responsibility for transporting the goods which are shipped under a GBL.” Jeffrey R.
Herman, GSBCA 13832-RELO, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,704, at 143,320 (1996). The agency “is
responsible for making all the necessary arrangements for transporting HHG . . . and
temporary storage, including but not limited to packing/unpacking, crating/uncrating,
pickup/delivery, weighing, line-haul, etc.” 41 CFR 302-7.200; see Marilyn Daterman,
GSBCA 13686-RELO, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,880, at 144,021 (agency “is required to select the
carrier [that will transport the HHG]; to arrange carrier services including crating and
packing; to pay the carrier; and to process claims for loss and damage”).
“Ordinarily, an agency is expected not only to issue travel orders to a transferring
employee before he or she is expected to report to the new duty station, but also to inform
the employee of his or her transfer in sufficient time to permit the employee to prepare for
the move.” Marsha M. Webb (Dompreh), GSBCA 16542-RELO, 05-2 BCA ¶ 33,006, at
163,589. Further, it is typically preferable, or at least customary, for the transferring
employee to oversee the GBL movers who are packing and transporting the employee’s
HHG. See, e.g., Marilyn Daterman, 97-1 BCA at 144,021. Sometimes, though, for various
reasons (including staffing exigencies), an agency may not be able to provide an employee
the necessary planning time prior to a transfer. Our predecessor board for travel and
relocation matters recognized that at least certain relocation cost increases necessitated as a
result of the agency’s need to expedite the transfer fall upon the agency. For example, an
employee who returns “to his old duty station to supervise the shipment of his HHG under
CBCA 5822-RELO
8
a GBL because, due to circumstances beyond his control, he was unable to ship the HHG at
the time of his transfer” may be authorized reimbursement of the return trip expenses as a
proper TDY assignment, even though, in normal circumstances, the agency would expect the
employee to oversee the HHG shipment prior to his or her departure for the new duty station.
Richard DeLappe, GSBCA 15640-RELO, 02-2 BCA ¶ 31,956, at 157,887; see Martha M.
Webb (Dompreh), 05-2 BCA at 163,589-90; Marilyn Daterman, 97-1 BCA at 144,021.
III.
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s Lease Expenses
A.
Expenses Through the End of March 2017
When Ms. Stanley-Wolfe was notified that she would be transferred within a very
short time frame, she took appropriate action to attempt to deal with the activities that would
be necessary for a move. She asked the BLM relocation specialist about the transport of her
HHG, for which BLM was assuming responsibility under the actual expense method of HHG
transport. She notified her Boulder City landlord that she was relocating effective January 8,
2017, and that she would give him the specific date that she would be out of her apartment
as soon as BLM scheduled her HHG transport. After she began work at her new duty station,
she repeatedly asked the BLM relocation specialist for information about when her HHG
would be scheduled for transport. When, on February 17, 2017, a BLM HHG shipment
coordinator contacted Ms. Stanley-Wolfe and offered, among other dates, March 28, 2017,
as an acceptable HHG shipment date, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe accepted it.
In the circumstances here, we can see no basis for the agency’s denial of lease
expenses through the date that the BLM-authorized transport company finally came to take
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG out of her Boulder City apartment. We recognize that, normally,
“an underlying premise upon which the lease termination expense benefit is grounded is that
the leased premises were actually vacated and the employee no longer continued to receive
a benefit from the terminated lease.” Patsy S. Ricard, 67 Comp. Gen. 285, 289 (1988). That
premise must yield, though, when the agency itself is the primary cause of the transferring
employee’s inability to vacate the leased premises at the old duty station.
In light of its written policy, BLM was obligated to take control of the scheduling and
transport of Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG. Because it failed to do so in a timely manner, Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG remained in her Boulder City apartment, through no fault of her own,
after she had to transfer to Moreno Valley. Until the agency removed the HHG, she could
not vacate the apartment. “Compensation [for a lease prematurely ended because of a
transfer] is barred only where the employee could have reasonably avoided the charges,”
considering the facts known at the time rather than in hindsight. Carl E. Landrum, CBCA
2663-RELO, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,010, at 172,045; see Lorenzo Henderson, CBCA 651-RELO,
CBCA 5822-RELO
9
07-1 BCA ¶ 33,539, at 166,144 (lease breaking expenses are “not reimbursable when
forfeiture could have been avoided”). Given that BLM’s inaction essentially forced Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe to continue to occupy the Boulder City apartment until March 28, 2017, BLM
cannot impose the resulting lease costs on her.
The situation here is in some ways comparable to that in Rosemary H. Sellers,
GSBCA 13654-RELO, 97-1 BCA ¶ 28,714 (1996). The board’s primary holding in that
matter was that the employee’s delay in providing termination notice, which resulted in the
lease extending through mid-April when earlier notice would have allowed a lease end date
of mid-March, was reasonable in the circumstances there and entitled the employee to
reimbursement for “lease breaking” expenses through mid-April. However, the board
alternatively addressed the fact that, regardless of the notice issue, the agency, which was
responsible for scheduling and moving the employee’s HHG, for various reasons did not
move and could not have moved that HHG until mid-April. The board determined that, even
if the employee had given earlier notice to the landlord, “the Government would [still] have
been obligated to move and store her furniture from the end of the lease obligation in” midMarch until the HHG could be moved in mid-April. Id. at 143,338. Because the agency was
responsible for the employee’s HHG transport and the costs associated with it, the agency
was obligated to pay the lease expenses for the apartment in which the HHG was kept. Id.
BLM argues that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s two-and-a-half week delay in notifying her
landlord that the HHG would be removed from the apartment on March 28 (waiting until
March 7 to tell the landlord about a move that she knew about on February 17) precludes any
recovery for unexpired lease expenses, asserting that the agency “cannot possibly know how
much money in lease breaking fees might have been saved had Ms. Stanley-Wolfe acted
prudently.” Agency Response at 3. Although it acknowledges that “there would have been
some reimbursement of rent due her from the time she vacated the apartment [on January 8]
until she could have had the goods moved, as the delay in ordering the shipment was not her
fault,” it believes that she can recover nothing here because she “made no attempt to mitigate
costs.” Id. Although prompt termination notice to a landlord (once the employee has definite
knowledge of when he or she will need to vacate the rental unit) is one of the prerequisites
listed in the FTR for unexpired lease expense reimbursement, 41 CFR 302-11.7(c), that
prerequisite bars reimbursement only if and to the extent that a termination notice delay
contributes to the incurrence of expenses. 41 CFR 302-11.7(c); see David Robbins,
B-175916 (July 3, 1972) (delay in providing termination notice did not contribute to lease
expenses because, even with timely notice, tenant still would have forfeited the security
deposit because of early lease termination).
We cannot accept BLM’s argument that a termination notice delay beginning in
mid-February 2017 would bar expenses that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe reasonably incurred prior
CBCA 5822-RELO
10
to that date or, for that matter, through the date that BLM left the HHG in the Boulder City
apartment. Under the mitigation doctrine, a non-breaching party to a contract who fails
properly to attempt to mitigate damages following a contract breach is barred from
recovering from the breaching party those costs “which could have been avoided” through
reasonable mitigation efforts. Sylvan B. Orr v. Department of Agriculture, CBCA 5299, slip
op. at 15 (Sept. 29, 2017). Although an employee breaking his or her lease to transfer to a
new duty station is the breaching rather than the non-breaching party under the lease contract,
the FTR applies the same mitigation principle to employees seeking reimbursement from the
Government for their lease breaking costs. See Alphonso S. Hamilton, 16-1 BCA at 177,607;
41 CFR 302-11.7. As a result, lease termination costs that “should have been avoided in the
first stance” by reasonable mitigation efforts “may not be reimbursed,” John M. Taylor, 60
Comp. Gen. 528, 530 (1981), but the employee remains entitled to recover otherwise
reimbursable costs that would have been incurred despite any failure to mitigate. David
Robbins, B-175916. BLM left Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG in the Boulder City apartment until
March 28, 2017, and no new tenant could have moved in prior to that date. Any delay by Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe in providing notice to her landlord of a definite move-out date has no effect
upon her entitlement to reimbursement of lease expenses through the end of March.
BLM also argues that, when the BLM HHG shipment coordinator contacted her on
February 17, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe should have selected an earlier HHG pickup date than
March 28, 2017, and that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe should bear the costs associated with her
selection of the later date. Yet, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe picked a date from the available options
that the BLM HHG shipment coordinator gave her. Nothing was said at that time suggesting
that some of dates that BLM offered would cost Ms. Stanley-Wolfe money or that any of the
dates offered were viewed by BLM as too far in the future. Particularly in light of the BLM
relocation office’s delays in fulfilling its obligations to schedule HHG transport and the fact
that, during the period of the BLM relocation office’s delays, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s new duty
station employer scheduled work and travel activities for Ms. Stanley-Wolfe, we do not find
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s selection of the March 28 date for HHG shipment unreasonable or
imprudent.
BLM further argues that, possibly, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s son was using the apartment
with her permission during the period from January through March 2017, which, it argues,
indicates that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe never vacated, and never intended to vacate, the apartment.
We recognize that, “[s]o long as a member of an employee’s immediate family remains in
occupancy of permanent quarters which are leased at the old station, the employee continues
to receive the benefit of the lease and that part of the rent paid for the days of the month
during which the apartment was last occupied may not be reimbursed.” Mark J. Musaus,
11-1 BCA at 171,054 (quoting Robert T. Haas, B-243017 (Aug. 6, 1991)). Here, though,
CBCA 5822-RELO
11
BLM has no evidence to support its speculation. We reject abject supposition as a basis for
denying a relocation claim.
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe is entitled to rent and utilities that she paid for the Boulder City
apartment through the end of March 2017.3
B.
Lease Expenses In April 2017
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s request for lease expenses for the month of April 2017, after her
HHG was removed, is more problematic.
As previously discussed, on February 17, 2017, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe knew that her
HHG would be removed from the Boulder City apartment on March 28, but she waited two
and-a-half weeks – until March 7 – before giving her landlord a definite date for vacating the
apartment.4 The landlord immediately began advertising the apartment for rent the day that
it received Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s notice. Nevertheless, the landlord informed her that her
lease did not expire until April 30 and that she would remain responsible for rent and utilities
until that date unless the landlord was able to rent the apartment to someone else before the
end of Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s lease term. Ms. Stanley-Wolfe indicates that the landlord also
informed her that she would remain responsible for any damage to the apartment that
occurred prior to the April 30 lease termination date.
3
It appears that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe was required to pay her expenses of returning
to her old duty station to oversee the HHG transport in late March 2017 and had to take
annual leave for the duration of the trip. If true, we note that, as we previously mentioned,
an employee who returns “to his old duty station to supervise the shipment of his HHG under
a GBL because, due to circumstances beyond his control, he was unable to ship the HHG at
the time of his transfer” may be authorized reimbursement of the return trip expenses as a
proper TDY assignment. Richard DeLappe, 02-2 BCA at 157,887. Nevertheless, because
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe has not requested such expenses at this time, we need not evaluate her
entitlement to such costs here.
4
The agency mistakenly argues that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s lease was subject to a
thirty-day termination notice requirement, meaning that, with notice in March, the lease could
not end until April, but that a February notice would have ended the lease in March. The
lease actually did not expressly provide for any early termination rights before the end of the
lease term. The thirty-day notice provision applied only to termination of any month-tomonth tenancy created after the lease term ended.
CBCA 5822-RELO
12
After the BLM-authorized transport company removed Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s HHG
from the Boulder City apartment on March 28, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe did not return her
apartment keys to the landlord, and she provided the landlord with new contact information
at which the landlord could provide her with twenty-four-hour advance notice before
showing the apartment, even though, in a prior letter, the landlord had informed her that it
would provide her such notice up until she vacated the apartment on March 28. Under the
terms of her lease, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe was required to deliver her keys to the landlord upon
lease termination. Her actions in retaining the keys and providing new advance notice
contact information are inconsistent with the idea that she had broken her lease effective
March 28, 2017.
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe asserts that she kept the keys and gave new contact information
because the landlord had informed her that she would remain responsible for any damage to
the apartment until April 30, 2017, unless it was re-rented prior to that date.5 Although that
explanation might, in some circumstances, justify continued lease expense reimbursement,
Ms. Stanley-Wolfe also acknowledges that she stayed in the apartment from April 19 to 21,
2017, while she was on nearby TDY with the Air Force. By that time, she supposedly had
already vacated the apartment. Although she suggests that her action in staying in the
apartment benefitted the Government because she did not have to incur lodging costs during
her TDY, any reduction in TDY reimbursements benefitted the Air Force, not BLM. In
addition, she had left cleaning supplies behind in the apartment, planning to clean it, in
accordance with the lease provision requiring cleaning prior to lease termination, in midApril, an action inconsistent with the idea that she was vacating the apartment on March 28.
The amount of control that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe retained over the apartment, as well as her
actual use of the apartment, in April 2017 preclude us from allowing reimbursement of lease
expenses for that month. See Patsy S. Ricard, 67 Comp. Gen. at 289 (no reimbursement
where the employee “continued to occupy the leased premises”).
Further, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s two-and-a-half-week delay – from February 17 to March
7, 2017 – in disclosing the March 28 HHG removal date to the landlord means that the
landlord lost time to show the apartment to a potential new tenant seeking an April rental.
Although Ms. Stanley-Wolfe had no express contractual right to end her lease before
April 30, the landlord, once it knew of an impending early abandonment or termination, had
an affirmative obligation under Nevada law to make reasonable efforts to re-rent the unit,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 118.175 (2016), and execution of a new lease effective at some point in
April would have eliminated or reduced Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s rental costs for the month of
5
The agency speculates, without proof, that the claimant’s son may have been
staying in the apartment throughout the month of April 2017. We do not rely on speculation.
CBCA 5822-RELO
13
April. We cannot know whether, with the extra two-and-a-half weeks of time, the landlord
could have found a new tenant with an April lease, but it is the claimant’s burden to establish
the Government’s legal liability for costs claimed and his or her right to payment. Simeon
A. Milton, CBCA 5565-RELO, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,753, at 179,125; Mohammed Amin Fekrat –
Reconsideration, B-212316 (June 20, 1986). That burden includes an obligation to establish
that, had Ms. Stanley-Wolfe provided “prompt” notice on or after February 17, 2017, no
replacement tenant would have been found for April 2017. The FTR provision requiring the
employee “promptly” to provide termination notice after definite knowledge of a transfer,
41 CFR 302-11.7(c), generally means that the employee, once he or she has such knowledge,
must be “ready and quick to act as occasion demands; immediately or instantly at hand.”
Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary Unabridged 1441 (2d ed. 1975); see Desmond
A. Pridgen, GSBCA 14121-RELO, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,146, at 144,982 (limiting employee’s
lease break award to rental costs that employee would have incurred had he provided notice
on the same day that he gained definite knowledge of transfer). Nothing in the record here
indicates that there was a justification for the claimant’s disclosure delay, and the claimant
has not established that the delay had no negative effect upon the tenant search process.
Decision
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Stanley-Wolfe’s claim is granted in part. Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe is entitled to reimbursement of $2250 for rent paid for the Boulder City
apartment for the months of January, February, and March 2017, as well as reimbursement
for utility charges that Ms. Stanley-Wolfe paid for those months. BLM shall calculate the
amount of claimed utility costs applicable to the January-to-March time period. Ms.
Stanley-Wolfe’s claim for rent and utility charges in April 2017 is denied.
_________________________________
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
Board Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.