CBCA 2719 DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: September 14, 2012

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CBCA 2719 DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: September 14, 2012

CBCA 2718, 2719

GTSI CORPORATION,

Appellant,

v.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Respondent in CBCA 2718

and

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent in CBCA 2719.

Joseph J. Petrillo of Petrillo & Powell, PLLC, Washington, DC, counsel for Appellant.

Kathleen Oram, Office of Legal Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent in CBCA 2718.

Jennifer L. Howard, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration,

Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent in CBCA 2719.

Before Board Judges BORWICK, HYATT, and SHERIDAN.

SHERIDAN, Board Judge.

Appellant, GTSI Corporation (GTSI), seeks $285,876.85 in termination costs

associated with a delivery order (DO) issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) under a General Services Administration (GSA) federal supply

CBCA 2718, 2719

2

schedule (FSS) contract. Appellant submitted identical claims seeking the $285,876.85 both

from the GSA contracting officer responsible for administering the FSS contract and from

the EEOC contracting officer responsible for administering the DO. The EEOC contracting

officer issued a final decision denying the claim and the GSA contracting officer did not

respond to the claim. GTSI filed an appeal with this Board from the EEOC’s final decision,

which was docketed as CBCA 2718, GTSI Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission. The GSA contracting officer’s failure to issue a final decision was also

appealed by GTSI, and it was docketed as CBCA 2719, GTSI Corp. v. General Services

Administration.

The Board has consolidated the two appeals for the purpose of issuing a decision as

to which agency, the EEOC or the GSA, is the proper respondent to this dispute. The parties

briefed the issue. Each agency argued that it is not the proper party to defend the

Government in this dispute, while appellant argued that both parties should remain as

respondents. The GSA, in CBCA 2719, submitted a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction. We conclude that the Board possesses jurisdiction to decide CBCA 2718, but

not CBCA 2719. The GSA’s motion to dismiss CBCA 2719 is granted.

Background

The GSA awarded FSS contract GS35F4120D (the FSS contract) to GTSI for the

general purpose of leasing and purchasing commercial information technology equipment

during the period covering April 1, 1996, through January 2, 2011. The EEOC issued DO

EECDO100087 against GTSI’s schedule contract on June 17, 2010, for “the lease of a data

backup system and associated software and support.” The total lease term was thirty-six

months and included a “base period + option year 1 + option year 2.”

Pertinent to this dispute, GTSI’s lease quote reference 052710EEOC was incorporated

into the DO. That lease quote reference stated it was made pursuant to option two of the FSS

contract and included a termination ceiling table. Option two of the GSA FSS contract

contained several lease terms, a statement of government intent, and the terms under which

the lease could be terminated.

By email message dated March 17, 2011, the EEOC contracting officer contacted

GTSI stating, “Due to budgetary constraints, it does not appear that EEOC will exercise

Option Year 1 under the [ ] delivery order”; he asked for information about equipment

removal. GTSI provided the removal information and noted it would be assessing a

termination fee as provided for in the DO. On April 26, the EEOC contracting officer

responded:

CBCA 2718, 2719

3

EEOC reserves the right to exercise the option to extend the term of the

delivery order in accordance with Note E of Attachment No. 1. You are

hereby notified that EEOC has elected not to exercise Option 1 under Delivery

Order No. EECDO100087. Based on the foregoing, EEOC is not liable for

any other costs beyond 17 JUN 2011.

GTSI proceeded to remove the equipment and on September 14, 2011, it submitted

identical certified claims seeking $285,876.85 in termination costs to both the EEOC

contracting officer administering the DO and the GSA contracting officer administering the

FSS contract.

In a final decision issued on November 3, 2011, denying the claim made to the EEOC,

the EEOC contracting officer stated:

EEOC’s decision not to exercise Option Year 1 of Delivery Order No.

EECDO100087 was a “Termination for Non-Appropriation” in accordance

with Paragraph 4(c) of GSA Schedule Contract No. GS-35F-4120D entitled

“Lease Termination”. There was a continuing need, but adequate funds were

not made available to the ordering office in an amount sufficient to continue

to make the lease payments beyond the base period of the delivery order (June

17, 2011).

The GSA contracting officer failed to issue a final decision on the claim made to the

GSA.

Discussion

The issue currently before the Board is one of jurisdiction and which agency, the

ordering agency (EEOC) or the agency issuing the FSS contract (GSA), is the proper agency

in a dispute where the ordering agency decides not to exercise the option years of a DO citing

lack of appropriations as authority for its actions. The ordering agency has invoked the

termination for non-appropriation clause set forth in the FSS contract as supporting its right

to not exercise option year one. If the facts do not support application of the aforementioned

clause, the ordering agency may be liable for termination for convenience costs in accordance

with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4 paragraph (1), 48 CFR 52.212-4 (1)

(2011), as well as early termination charges.

To begin our analysis of which agency is the proper respondent to defend this appeal

we turn to the FAR Part 8. Originally, the FAR Part 8 provisions pertinent to GSA FSS

contracts and the DOs issued against them required all unresolved disputes to be referred to

CBCA 2718, 2719

4

the GSA contracting officer for resolution. See FAR 8.405-7 (2000). Effective July 29,

2002, the FAR Council issued a final rule modifying FAR Part 8. See 65 Fed. Reg. 79,702­

03 (Dec. 19, 2000). The revised disputes provision was renumbered as FAR 8.406-6.

The revised FAR 8.406-6 gave ordering office contracting officers the authority to

issue final decisions on disputes “pertaining to the performance of orders” and gave FSS

contracting officers authority to resolve disputes “pertaining to the terms and conditions” of

the FSS contracts:

(a) Disputes pertaining to the performance of orders under a schedule

contract.

(1) Under the Disputes clause of the schedule contract, the

ordering activity contracting officer may­

(i) Issue final decisions on disputes arising from

performance of the order (but see paragraph (b) of this section); or

(ii) Refer the dispute to the schedule contracting officer.

(2) The ordering activity contracting officer shall notify the

schedule contracting officer promptly of any final decision.

(b) Disputes pertaining to the terms and conditions of schedule

contracts. The ordering activity contracting officer shall refer all disputes that

relate to the contract terms and conditions to the schedule contracting officer

for resolution under the Disputes clause of the contract and notify the schedule

contractor of the referral.

(c) Appeals. Contractors may appeal final decisions to either the Board

of Contract Appeals servicing the agency that issued the final decision or the

U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

48 CFR 8.406-6 (2002).

In commenting on the verbiage that ultimately formed FAR 8.406-6, the American

Bar Association noted the new regulation could create technical and jurisdictional issues for

vendors. William Gormley & Larry Allen, Leasing, in John W. Chierichella & Jonathan S.

Aronie, Multiple Award Schedule Contracting (2006) (citing draft ABA comments dated

Feb. 20, 2001). Indeed, FAR 8.406-6 proved problematic in several appeals, particularly

CBCA 2718, 2719

5

where performance disputes require some interpretation or application of an FSS clause or

an FSS clause needed to be applied in the context of performance disputes. Where, as occurs

in this appeal, the dispute pertains to the performance of the DO as well as which FSS clause

should be applied to resolve the dispute, and the issues seem inextricably intertwined, a

contractor can be left with a conundrum as to the proper contracting officer to approach with

a claim.

As ordering agencies increasingly use FSS contracts to fulfill their needs, there is also

an increased potential for disputes arising out of the task and delivery orders issued by the

ordering agencies. Oftentimes, the facts giving rise to the dispute are held exclusively by the

ordering agency and which FSS contract provision applies to the dispute is only a tangential

issue. To the extent the FAR Council, in revising FAR 8.406-6, was attempting to provide

ordering agencies increased responsibility, and authority to issue final decisions in contracts,

where the facts solely arose out of actions (or inactions) on the part of ordering agency, the

FAR revisions are unclear. Several disputes pertaining to the “performance of orders under

a schedule contract,” to some degree, also pertain to some provision contained in the schedule

contract, i.e., the termination clauses, changes clause, etc. To resolve the problem of which

agency had the authority to act on its claim, GTSI submitted its claim to both the EEOC

contracting officer and the GSA FSS contracting officer.

We conclude on the facts before us that the EEOC contracting officer had authority

to issue the final decision and, thus, the EEOC is the proper respondent.1 We reach this

conclusion because the terms and operation of the FSS termination for non-appropriations

clause are not at issue. The issue is purely factual and the facts are solely relevant to the

EEOC: was the status of EEOC’s appropriations sufficient to invoke the termination for

non-appropriations clause? This issue is appropriately addressed by the EEOC contracting

officer, not a remote GSA contracting officer who has no knowledge of EEOC’s

appropriations.

We did not make this decision lightly, and carefully studied appropriate case law that

has addressed similar situations. The problems inherent in interpreting the current FAR

8.406-6 have been addressed by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals. Waterstone

Environmental Hydrology and Engineering, Inc., ASBCA 57557, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,028;

Spectrum Resources, Inc., ASBCA 55120, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,377 (involving a Department of

Veterans Affairs FSS contract); Sharp Electronics Corp., ASBCA 54475, 04-2 BCA ¶

32,704.

1

The EEOC contracting officer did not refer the matter to the GSA contracting

officer for resolution as it had the option to do pursuant to FAR 8.406-6 (a)(1)(ii).

CBCA 2718, 2719

6

In the appeal before us, it was not the terms and conditions of the FSS contract clauses

or their interpretation that caused this dispute. Rather, it was the action (or inaction) of the

ordering agency, by refusing to exercise an option, that caused the dispute. Whether the

EEOC lacked sufficient appropriated funds and was entitled to invoke the termination for

non-appropriation clause is not a dispute concerning the FSS contract terms and conditions.

The FSS provisions merely provide a context in which to interpret the ordering agency’s

actions or inactions. We believe that the GSA, in taking the position that it was not the

proper party to defend this action, recognized the facts that drive this dispute. A member of

the FAR Council that issued the revised FAR 8.406-6, the GSA appears to implicitly

understand that to treat the FAR revision any other way would essentially render the revision

an absurdity because there would rarely, if ever, be circumstances in which performance

issues would be disputed without the context of some FSS contract provision.

Ultimately, since this dispute arises primarily from the EEOC’s non-performance, and

the terms and conditions of the FSS contract are only tangentially at issue, this matter was

properly presented to and decided by the EEOC contracting officer.

Decision

The GSA’s motion is granted, and CBCA 2719 is DISMISSED. The Board retains

jurisdiction over CBCA 2718.

PATRICIA J. SHERIDAN

Board Judge

We concur:

ANTHONY S. BORWICK

Board Judge

CATHERINE B. HYATT

Board Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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