In the Matter of LOIS J. GOVEN

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July 9, 2007

CBCA 768-TRAV

In the Matter of LOIS J. GOVEN

Lois J. Goven, Colorado Springs, CO, Claimant.

MSgt. Michael W. Standke, Travel Pay Analyst, Department of the Air Force, Denver,

CO, appearing for Department of the Air Force.

DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman).

Lois J. Goven, an employee of the Department of the Air Force, traveled on official

business on several occasions. In 2004, she submitted for reimbursement vouchers for trips

she took in 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Air Force refused to make payment, believing that

a statute of limitations precludes consideration of the claims. Ms. Goven objects to the

agency’s determination. She says that she had overlooked the vouchers during a stressful

period in her life, when she continued to work despite battling significant health problems.

She maintains that “this matter is little different from contract closeout, requiring that any

and all legitimate Government obligations be paid.”

The statute of limitations to which the Air Force refers is contained in 31 U.S.C.

§ 3702 (2000). Subsection (a) of section 3702 authorizes the Administrator of General

Services to “settle claims involving expenses incurred by Federal civilian employees for

official travel and transportation.” Subsection (b) says that such a claim “must be received

by the official responsible under subsection (a) for settling the claim or by the agency that

conducts the activity from which the claim arises within 6 years after the claim accrues.”

There are only two exceptions to subsection (b)’s limitation on the time within which a claim

can be made: “as provided in this chapter or another law” and if the claim is “of a State, the

District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States.”

CBCA 768-TRAV

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“A claim accrues when all events have occurred that establish the liability of the

agency and that entitle a claimant to submit a claim.” Keith B. Williams, GSBCA 16304­

RELO, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,472, at 160,597 (citing Empire Institute of Tailoring, Inc. v. United

States, 161 F. Supp. 409, 410 (Ct. Cl. 1958)); see also Greenlee Construction, Inc. v. General

Services Administration, CBCA 416, 07-1 BCA ¶ 33,514, at 166,063. Ms. Goven’s claims

accrued, under this standard, when she incurred expenses while traveling on official business

-- in 1995, 1996, and 1997. Ms. Goven has not suggested that a statute other than 31 U.S.C.

§ 3702 provides a time limitation different from the one contained in that law and applies to

her claims. She is plainly not a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession.

Thus, the latest of her claims could be considered only if it was made to her agency or to this

Board or its predecessor General Services Board of Contract Appeals (acting under

delegation of authority from the Administrator of General Services) no later than some time

in 2003. Unfortunately for Ms. Goven, the claims were made later than that, so they may not

be considered.1

Although a statute limiting the time within which a claim may be brought against the

Government is a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has held that in some

circumstances, the statute may be equitably tolled. These circumstances include those in

which “the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading

during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his

adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). The Court says that it has “generally been much

less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in

preserving his legal rights,” or with regard to “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”

Id. More recently, the Court has restricted further the application of equitable tolling to

claims against the Government, United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997), causing

other courts to question the viability of the concept. Stone Container Corp. v. United States,

229 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In any event, the reason Ms. Goven cites for her

failure to make her claims within six years of the dates on which they accrued does not

constitute or even resemble one of the kinds of circumstances described in Irwin as justifying

equitable tolling. Kenneth A. Jones, GSBCA 16372-RELO, 04-1 BCA ¶ 32,619; Frank

Hickey, GSBCA 15349-RELO, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,503; Frank H. Khattat, GSBCA

13711-TRAV, 97-2 BCA ¶ 29,069.

1

We note, with regard to the employee’s assertion that “this matter is little

different from contract closeout,” that a six-year limitation also applies to claims under

contracts with the Government. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2000); Greenlee Construction, 07-1

BCA at 166,063; Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378, at 165,474-75.

CBCA 768-TRAV

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The case is dismissed.

_________________________

STEPHEN M. DANIELS

Board Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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