DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: February 15, 2013

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DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: February 15, 2013

CBCA 3053

JRS MANAGEMENT,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Respondent.

Jacqueline Sims, Owner of JRS Management, Lawrenceville, GA, appearing for

Appellant.

William D. Robinson and Nihar H. Vora, Office of General Counsel, Federal Bureau

of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.

Before Board Judges VERGILIO, GOODMAN, and ZISCHKAU.

GOODMAN, Board Judge.

On October 16, 2012, appellant, JRS Management, filed this appeal pursuant to the

Contract Disputes Act. Appellant alleged that the contracting officer of respondent, the

Federal Bureau of Prisons, had failed to issue a final decision in response to appellant’s claim

submitted on August 15, 2012. Appellant therefore treated its claim as deemed denied by the

contracting officer and appealed. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that

the Board lacks jurisdiction as the appeal is untimely. We find that the appeal was not timely

filed, as appellant did not timely appeal a contracting officer decision on an earlier version

of the claim. We grant respondent’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

CBCA 3053

2

Background

On July 15, 2009, respondent awarded a parenting instructor services contract (the

contract) to appellant. The contract was for a total amount of $81,432; it did not exceed the

simplified acquisition threshold of $150,000. Respondent prepared contractor performance

evaluations with regard to appellant’s performance during the contract’s base year and one

option year.

On March 27, 2012, appellant submitted a claim (claim 1) to the contracting officer.

The claim stated in relevant part:

[T]he contract did not contain any terms authorizing the preparation and

release of Contractor Performance Reports. Moreover, the reports were flawed

erroneous, and inaccurate.

Claim 1 alleged two counts. The first count was entitled “Unilateral Adjustment of

Contract Terms - Performance Evaluations not Authorized by Contract.” In this count,

appellant maintained that Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 42.1502 only requires

federal agencies to prepare performance evaluations for contracts that exceed the simplified

acquisition threshold of $150,000. Appellant further maintained that, as the contract did not

exceed this threshold, respondent’s preparation of performance evaluations breached the

contract, and respondent’s actions in releasing the performance evaluations to government

officials for source selection purposes, without first obtaining appellant’s permission

pursuant to FAR 52.212-4(c), was arbitrary and capricious.

The second count was entitled “The Performance Evaluation was Flawed/Inaccurate The Contract was Legally Unenforceable.” In this count, appellant maintained that even if

respondent had the right to issue performance evaluations, the performance evaluations were

flawed, erroneous, and inaccurate. Additionally, appellant argued that the contract was

legally unenforceable and was only enforceable to the extent it was performed. Appellant

also argued that respondent breached its “implied contractual duty of good faith and fair

dealing.”

Claim 1 sought an equitable adjustment of $1500 as compensation for the unilateral

modification of contract terms, and a modification of the performance evaluations prepared

by respondent to delete comments that appellant found to be inaccurate.

The contracting officer issued a decision on May 24, 2012, denying claim 1 in its

entirety. The decision stated: “Although per FAR 42.1502(b), Federal agencies are only

required to prepare evaluations of contractor performance for a contract that exceeds the

CBCA 3053

3

simplified acquisition threshold, Contracting Officers are not prohibited from utilizing this

resource for contracts not exceeding the simplified threshold.” The decision included

additional statements by the contracting officer with regard to the legal and factual

allegations raised in claim 1, and stated appeal rights to this Board and the Court of Federal

Claims. Appellant received the decision on May 29, 2012. Appellant did not file a notice

of appeal of this decision within ninety days of receiving the decision, or any time thereafter.

On August 15, 2012, appellant submitted another claim (claim 2) to respondent. Claim

2 alleged three counts. The first count was entitled “Agency Exceeded its Statutory

Authority and Violated Regulations by Preparing a Past Performance Evaluation Report.”

This count made essentially the same assertions as the first count of claim 1, with regard to

the requirements and alleged violations of FAR 42.1502 and 52.212-4(c).

The second and third counts were entitled “Agency Preparation of Past Performance

Evaluation Report Constituted a Constructive, Unilateral Change that Materially Breached

the Terms of the Contract, and Breached the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing” and

“The Performance Evaluation was Flawed, Inaccurate, Erroneous, Arbitrary, Capricious, and

An Abuse of Discretion.” These counts contain arguments similar to those made in the first

and second counts of claim 1, i.e., breach of FAR 52.212-4 and the covenant of good faith

and fair dealing.

The relief requested in claim 2 was similar to that in claim 1. The first count

requested an interpretation of the contract that performance evaluations were not authorized

and therefore a breach. The second count requested monetary damage allegedly arising from

the breach consisting of actual damages of $1218.21 - the alleged cost of appellant for

reviewing the performance evaluations, researching case law and the FAR, and preparing the

claim; and consequential damages of $4071.60 - calculated as 5% of the contract value as

compensation for “loss of the substantive contractual right to negotiate in advance any

proposed changes”. The third count requested additional interpretations that the contract was

legally unenforceable and that respondent did not have the right to unilaterally change the

contract, and demanded revisions in the performance evaluations.

The contracting officer issued a response to claim 2 by letter dated October 12, 2012.

That letter stated that “the allegations made stem from the same set of operative facts as the

original claim, and are substantially the same as, the original claim.” Additionally, the

contracting officer stated that claim 2 was properly addressed in the decision of May 24,

2012.

CBCA 3053

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Appellant filed this appeal on October 16, 2012, with regard to claim 2, alleging that

the contracting officer failed to issue a final decision in response to claim 2 as required by

the Contract Disputes Act.

Discussion

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that this Board lacks jurisdiction

to entertain this appeal. Respondent asserts that claim 1 and claim 2 arise from the same

operative facts, the issuance of performance evaluations, and are therefore the same claim.

Since appellant did not timely appeal the decision issued in response to claim 1, that decision

can no longer be appealed to this Board. Therefore, respondent maintains that the appeal of

claim 2 as a deemed denial of that claim is actually an untimely appeal of the decision

denying claim 1. Thus, respondent moves to dismiss the instant appeal as an untimely appeal

of claim 1.

In Battley v. Social Security Administration, CBCA 1063, 08-2 BCA ¶ 33,896, this

Board stated:

The established test for what constitutes a “new” claim is whether “claims are

based on a common or related set of operative facts. If the court will have to

review the same or related evidence to make its decision, then only one claim

exists.” Environmental Safety Consultants, Inc., ASBCA 54995, 06-1 BCA

¶ 33,230, at 164,666 (citing Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States,

920 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

08-2 BCA at 167,768.

In Battley, the Board found that the appellant’s two claims arose from the same

operative facts and were the same claim. As the appellant had failed to timely appeal the

decision denying the first claim, the appeal of the alleged deemed denial of the second claim

was dismissed as an untimely appeal of the first claim.

We have the same situation in the instant appeal. Appellant’s two claims arise from

the same operative fact that respondent issued performance evaluations. Both claims allege

that respondent had no basis to issue the performance evaluations and that the performance

evaluations as issued were detrimental to appellant. The claims allege in substance the same

legal theories. The relief sought in claim 2 is substantially the same as that sought in claim

1 with some additional relief sought. Claim 2 is not a new claim.

CBCA 3053

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In this case, the evidence we would review to reach the merits of the appeal would be

the performance evaluations and the contract. The introduction of additional facts that do

not alter the nature of the original claim, a dollar increase in the amount claimed, or the

assertion of a new legal theory of recovery, when based on the same operative facts as

included in the original claim, do not constitute new claims. Trepte Construction Co.,

ASBCA 38555, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,595. The fact that appellant asserts differing legal theories

and seeks greater relief does not convert claim 2 into a new claim, as it arose from the same

operative facts as those in claim 1, i.e., the issuance of the performance evaluation.

As appellant failed to timely appeal the decision in response to claim 1, the appeal of

claim 2 as an alleged deemed denial is untimely and must be dismissed. As we stated in

Battley:

The CDA [Contract Disputes Act], which governs the Board’s review of

contracting officer decisions, requires that an appeal of such decision be filed

“[w]ithin ninety days from the date of receipt of [the] decision.” 41 U.S.C.

§ 606 (2000). The plain language of the CDA clearly confers finality and

unreviewability of a contracting officer’s decision that is not properly appealed

within the statutory period provided. That finality is not limited to the

contracting officer’s authority to issue such a decision or the validity of the

contracting officer’s decision. See, e.g., United States v. Kasler Electric Co.,

123 F.3d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute affords the opportunity to

challenge the authority and/or validity of the decision, provided the challenge

is made within the statutory period. If a challenge is not made within the

statutory period, section 605(b) mandates that the contracting officer’s

decision “be final and conclusive and not subject to review.” 41 U.S.C. §

605(b). This deadline for filing has been strictly construed by the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the authorization to make the filing is

a waiver of sovereign immunity. A late filing divests the Board of jurisdiction

to consider the case on its merits.

08-2 BCA at 167,768.1

1

The referenced provisions of the Contract Disputes Act have be recodified as

follows: The ninety-day limitation formerly found at § 606 is now in § 7104(a). The

finality of an unappealed contracting officer decision is now stated at § 7103(g), rather

than § 605(b).

CBCA 3053

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Decision

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted. The appeal is untimely and therefore

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

__________________________

ALLAN H. GOODMAN

Board Judge

We concur:

________________________________

JOSEPH A. VERGILIO

Board Judge

___________________________

JONATHAN D. ZISCHKAU

Board Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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