Case law

Clark v. Meade

377 Pa. 150 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 29, 1954

That the Act is also a special act cannot be denied, for it clearly grants special privileges and immunities. … 'the Act of 1953 clearly grants to individuals, in violation of the Article, a special or exclusive privilege or immunity.

Story v. Mechling

412 F. Supp. 2d 509 · District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Feb 1, 2006

Assuming, without deciding that these actions qualify as adverse, the Court finds and rules that Plaintiff has demonstrated the second prong necessary to maintain his retaliation claim. … SCI-Waynesburg is clearly a component of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which is an administrative department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See 71 Pa.

DeLong v. Brumbaugh

703 F. Supp. 399 · District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Jan 12, 1989

that JoAnn DeLong was also “otherwise qualified” to serve as a juror, if she had been selected to serve by the parties. … Schramm, 772 F.2d 1114, 1118-1119 (3d Cir.1985), nor the doctrine of judicial immunity. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 , 104 S.Ct. 1970 , 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1983).

Commonwealth ex rel. Milk Marketing Board v. Sunnybrook Dairies, Inc.

32 Pa. Commw. 313 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 2, 1977

Alternatively, Sunnybrook argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be abrogated altogether; clearly an untenable position. See Pa. Const, art. I, §11; Department of Public Welfare v. … The Justices were in agreement that waiver and consent were required, finding it in the Act of May 20, 1937, P.L. 728, as amended, 72 P.S. §4651-1 et seq., establishing the Board of Arbitration of Claims.

Jimenez v. Lakelands Racing Ass'n, Inc.

567 F. Supp. 1298 · District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 13, 1983

Moreover, the doctrine of immunity, qualified or absolute, has been held to be a product of judicial determination in the civil rights context and involves the balancing of the need to assure the unfettered fulfillment of … Moreover, to enjoy a qualified immunity, an official must demonstrate that a) he acted in good faith and b) that the acts taken are not a clear violation of the person’s rights. Moss v.

Coon v. Deputy Sheriff's Education & Training Board

111 Pa. Commw. 176 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Nov 19, 1987

That statutory standard clearly provides a yardstick for the board’s specific review of county curricula. … for deputy sheriff training by utilizing existing facilities, programs and qualified State and local personnel.

Davis v. Smith

126 F. Supp. 497 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Nov 22, 1954

Clearly, the Olberding and Neirbo cases are entirely consistent. … In the latter case the court stated, 212 Miss, at page 350, 54 So.2d at page 478 : “ * * * Clearly the McLaurin case [McLaurin v.

Werner v. Commonwealth

109 Pa. Commw. 134 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Sep 3, 1987

This instruction was clearly consistent with Section 114 of the Act. 50 P.S. §7113. … This testimony clearly did not contradict the other evidence so as to prejudice the Werners’ case.

Northwestern School District v. Pittenger

397 F. Supp. 975 · District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · Jun 16, 1975

The language of the statute in question clearly states the requirements which a school district must meet in order to qualify for “modified sparsity payments”. As stated by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. … If Northwestern School District had qualified for “modified sparsity payments”, it would have received $288,559.40 for the 1974-75 fiscal year under the formula contained in 24 P.S. § 25-2501(17). *982 The burden of establishing

Philadelphia Life Insurance v. Commonwealth

410 Pa. 571 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Apr 16, 1963

Supp. 809 ) fall within the first class of suits and are clearly with *577 in the rule of the Commonwealth’s immunity; the case at bar falls within the second class and is not within the rule of immunity. … Torquato, 386 Pa. 306, 328 , 125 A. 2d 755 , clearly controls this situation: “. . . it is equally well established that a Court of Equity has jurisdiction and in furtherance of justice will afford relief if the statutory

Johnstown Redevelopment Authority v. Commonwealth

124 Pa. Commw. 344 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 22, 1989

to establish a prima facie■ case. … The Authority has waived this governmental immunity argument for failure to raise this argument before the Commission. See Pa. R.A.P. 1551.

Merit v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority

276 F. Supp. 2d 382 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Aug 6, 2003

Defendant next contends that Plaintiffs ADA and PHRA claims should be dismissed because she cannot establish that she is disabled. 2 The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability … “It is well established that SEPTA is an agency of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] and as such is afforded all of the sovereign immunity protections enumerated in sections 8521 through 8526.” Frazier v.

Shaler Area School District v. Salakas

494 Pa. 630 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 2, 1981

. 11 In his brief, appellant argues that his property rights have been affected in that the unsatisfactory rating: (1) threatens his right to continued employment in his current tenured position; 12 (2) divests him of a qualifying … The entry of a peremptory judgment in this instance was clearly erroneous, since the ultimate question of whether any of appellant’s personal or property rights were affected involves factual as well as legal issues.

Davidow v. Anderson

83 Pa. Commw. 86 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jun 6, 1984

S. §8522(b) (3); or, (2) whether or not the above agreement establishes a Commonwealth interest in real estate which would waive a sovereign immunity defense on the part of the Commission pursuant to 42 Pa. C. … We interpret this section as being evidence of an intent on the part of the General Assembly to exempt the sovereign from immunity only in specific, clearly-stated situations and that it is our duty, therefore, strictly to

Commonwealth v. Brady

470 Pa. 420 · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · Jan 28, 1977

Thus, reference to the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 to interpret the previously enacted Immunity Act would clearly be improper. … The order to testify shall not be given except upon the order of court after a hearing in which the attorney general has established a need for the grant of immunity, as hereinafter provided.

Santiago v. City of Philadelphia

435 F. Supp. 136 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Jul 20, 1977

The Supreme Court clearly held in Pierson v. … violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Myers v. COM., DEPT. OF LABOR & INDUSTRY

312 Pa. Super. 61 · Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Mar 25, 1983

Thus, in McNair, supra, the court qualified its holding as follows: As it was admitted there was no bad faith and the mistake was an error of judgment____ 324 Pa. at 62-63 , 187 A. at 505 . … Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S.Ct. 1335 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959) (establishing absolute civil immunity for federal administrative officers.)

Smith v. School District of Philadelphia

112 F. Supp. 2d 417 · District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · Sep 6, 2000

McMonagle, 670 F.Supp. 1300, 1308 (E.D.Pa.1987) (noting that “attempts to persuade another to action are clearly within the scope of the First Amendment”). … Defendant Avi Barr, as a teacher at Carver, and defendant Steven Miller, as an Assistant Principal at Carver, do not qualify as high public officials for purposes of this common law immunity doctrine.

F. Minor v. Sgt. D. Kraynak

155 A.3d 114 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Feb 17, 2017

Also, they were clearly on duty and working within the prison walls when they allegedly took the action. … objection” if the defense is “clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.”

Smith v. Endless Mountain Transportation Authority

878 A.2d 177 · Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · Jul 5, 2005

Rajjoub’s deposition testimony establishes the following: (1) as a result of the accident, Smith fractured her C-l vertebrae, *181 (2) Smith was required to wear a halo device from October 17, 2001 through January 15, 2002 … The Supreme Court in Walsh interpreted Section 8553(c)(2)(ii) of the Code to require that any residual pain be manifested as a permanent loss of bodily function to qualify for pain and suffering damages against a local agency