Case law

DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination

447 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 12, 2006

The department is a municipal electric department established by the voters of the town of Wakefield (town), pursuant to G. L. c. 164, § 34, to operate the light plant owned by the town. … L. c. 30A, § 14, where the commission had denied interest based on an error of law. 15 (d) We also have spoken clearly on the issue of the interest on front pay awards in discrimination cases. In Conway v.

Restucci v. Clarke

669 F. Supp. 2d 150 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 16, 2009

Qualified Immunity The Prison Officials also argue that Restucci’s claim for damages is barred by the Prison Officials’ qualified immunity. … At this time, the Court expresses no opinion as to the Prison Officials’ claim of qualified immunity. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Prison Officials’ motion to dismiss is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.

Commonwealth v. DePina

476 Mass. 614 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 13, 2017

Immunized witness testimony. … See also Pontes, supra at 314, quoting Bruton, supra at 128 n.3 (statements must be "clearly inadmissible" against codefendant).

Correia v. Town of Framingham

969 F. Supp. 2d 89 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 3, 2013

The judicially engrafted doctrine of qualified immunity shields police officers from § 1983 liability if the constitutional right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. See, e.g. … In light of the Court’s conclusion, it need not decide whether Officer Brown infringed a cognizable interest of the plaintiffs or is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983. C.

Waterman v. City of Taunton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 2024

clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation.” … Notwithstanding the forfeiture, it is clearly established that it is unconstitutional to arrest someone because of criticism directed at an officer such that qualified immunity would not apply. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Lavery

188 Mass. 13 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 4, 1905

properly his license shall be revoked, clearly contemplates a careful selection of the person to whom such a privilege is granted. … It thus becomes personal in its nature, and is not capable of being transferred by the licensee, nor does the license furnish immunity from prosecution to another who seeks to avail himself of its benefit as if it had been

Kyle v. Commonwealth

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 241 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 10, 1994

While the Act explicitly exempts intentional torts from its ambit, G.L.c. 258, § 10(c), it covers claims arising out of ordinary or gross negligence “because such a claim qualifies as a negligent or wrongful act or omission … Where, however, the conduct at issue “involves . . . the carrying out of previously established policies or plans, such acts should be governed by the established standards of tort liability applicable to private individuals

Ali v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

661 F. Supp. 1234 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 13, 1986

A government official who enjoys qualified immunity loses it if he violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. … “Whether an official may prevail in his qualified immunity defense depends upon the objective reasonableness of his conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law.” Davis v.

Hussey v. City of Cambridge

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 11, 2022

Hussey responds that Bard is not entitled to qualified immunity because he has asserted a valid First Amendment claim against Bard, and his rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. … Qualified immunity provides that “government officials performing discretionary functions” are generally “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. State Tax Commission

358 Mass. 111 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 3, 1970

Superintendent of Schs. of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 518 ) requisite to establish an “actual controversy” on this issue. See G. L. c. 231A, § 1. … [fraternal benefit societies] unless they are expressly designated therein . . .,” when read in context, clearly refers only to insurance laws.

McDonald v. Com. of Mass.

901 F. Supp. 471 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 1995

In the last analysis, then, the court of appeals “may affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.” … Parsing the statutory provision in § 12132 to its basics, [t]o establish a violation of Title II, plaintiff must show: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation

Stagl v. City of Cambridge

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 300 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 21, 1994

“If the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … [provides] immunity only for discretionary conduct that involves policy making or planning.” Id.

Heinrich Ex Rel. Heinrich v. Sweet

118 F. Supp. 2d 73 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 2000

What emerges, although not always clearly elucidated by the courts, is a burden-shifting paradigm. … It has been the unenviable task of the courts to establish either liability or immunity based on the unique facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Bean v. General Electric Co.

593 F. Supp. 2d 306 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 6, 2009

. § 6331 (a) and 3) a levy is valid only where tax liability has been established. B. Procedural History Bean filed his complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court Department for *308 Essex County on October 16, 2008. … This Court concludes that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction clearly have been met here. Bean is a citizen of Massachusetts and GE is a citizen of both New York and Connecticut.

Arriaga v. Members of the Board of Regents

825 F. Supp. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 23, 1992

GENERAL LAWS; CHAPTER 653, AN ACT ESTABLISH *4 ING THE BUDGET CONTROL AND REFORM ACT OF 1989 WAS SIGNED INTO LAW. … Thus, defendants’ present willingness not to rely on Section 176 of the Budget Control Act in defending this suit does - not qualify the conclusion that plaintiffs have properly alleged a Contracts Clause claim. IV.

City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission

476 Mass. 591 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 10, 2017

Although § 17 (g) precludes ordinary modes of judicial review and thereby qualifies, for purposes of G. … Generally, orders denying motions to dismiss based on immunity from suit satisfy both criteria. Shapiro, 464 Mass. at 264–265, and cases cited.

Bemis v. Kelley

671 F. Supp. 837 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 29, 1987

They claim they are entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff has filed an opposition, claiming these defendants are acting deliberately to deprive him of his rights. … In addition, the four law enforcement defendants have claimed protection by qualified immunity.

Kimball v. Post Publishing Co.

199 Mass. 248 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 15, 1908

. *252 Bell, 7 Gray, 301 , that this statement, unqualified, is too broad, still subsequent decisions seem to show clearly that in England the principle of privilege is confined to reports of judicial or quasi judicial bodies … The difficulty of separating the damages gives no immunity to the defendants. Exceptions sustained.

Irvin v. McGee

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 201 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 27, 1993

“An employee must be able to point to some clearly-defined and well-established public policy that is threatened by the employer’s action.” Id.; see Mello v. … Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (noting the federal speech or debate provision reflected previous established state law principles), an examination of federal law illustrates that the scope of immunity granted legislators

Kennedy v. Osmanski, III

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 2025

To establish whether government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must engage in a “two- pronged inquiry.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014). … Determining whether a right is “clearly established” also requires a two-part inquiry. See Justiniano v. Walker, 986 F.3d 11, 26 (1st Cir. 2021).