Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
5,304 results
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State v. PRESTON CTY. BD. OF EDUC.
488 S.E.2d 34 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Jul 15, 1997
Serdich has not established that Milne's position was ever `open' so that the statutory requirements of W.Va.Code § 18A-4-7a, would then be applicable. … Milne's absence was clearly anticipated to be temporary.
Cited 0 timesPublished201 W. Va. 578 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Dec 5, 1997
After hearing post-trial motions, the circuit court set the verdict aside as being “clearly influenced by passion, partiality and prejudice” and granted the defendant a new trial. … Another means for removing immunity is found in W.Va.Code, 23-4-2(c)(2)(i) [1994], which removes an employer's immunity if "[i]t is proved that such employer ... acted with a consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed
Cited 4 timesPublished135 W. Va. 502 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Mar 1, 1951
Precedents in will cases serve only to establish general principles applicable alike to all. … Any language, technical or otherwise, which clearly indicates the intention of testator to dispose of his property to certain persons, either named or ascertainable, is sufficient for the purpose of a will. Runyon v.
Cited 9 timesPublished210 W. Va. 664 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Dec 13, 2001
Doe was entitled to exercise her peremptory strikes from a jury panel consisting of qualified, impartial and unbiased jurors. See Davis v. … However, the absence of an express assignment of such control does not automatically immunize the lessee from liability. .Ms. Doe also assigned error to Defendant's Instruction No. 20.
Cited 22 timesPublishedMaikotter v. University of West Virginia Board of Trustees/West Virginia University
206 W. Va. 691 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Dec 14, 1999
Maikotter had not established that WVU’s interpretation of W. Va.Code § 18B-7-l(d) “exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority, was arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise improper.” … If more than one qualified, nonexempt classified employee applies, the best-qualified nonexempt classified employee shall be awarded the position.
Cited 40 timesPublished194 W. Va. 561 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Jul 11, 1995
The trial court, after rather clearly weighing the evidence, determined that its weight and preponderance supported admissibility. … of the trial court, and will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
Cited 4 timesPublishedCox v. Raleigh General Hospital
District Court, S.D. West Virginia · Jan 12, 2022
Finally, Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity is a factual inquiry and “demands that the Defendants prove the basis for privilege.” … Still, even if the Court were to entertain Plaintiff’s argument, it is clearly without merit.
Cited 0 timesUnknownFord v. The County Commission of Marion County
District Court, N.D. West Virginia · Apr 8, 2021
Thus, for purposes of qualified immunity analysis, it is clearly established that using deadly force in such a situation is unlawful. … It is clearly established that, via Tennessee v.
Cited 0 timesUnknownState ex rel. Garner v. Garvin
145 W. Va. 820 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Dec 20, 1960
There is no merit to this contention because the rule of immunity in such cases was established many generations ago in England, and has been treated in this country as a part of the common law. … However, there was never any intention to limit such immunity to such cases. This is clearly indicated in the case of Morris v. Calhoun, 119 W. Va. 603, 608 , 195 S.
Cited 0 timesPublishedA.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Meadows
476 F. Supp. 2d 578 · District Court, S.D. West Virginia · Mar 1, 2007
As grounds for dismissal, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, that plaintiffs lack standing, and that she is entitled to qualified immunity. … Three elements are necessary to establish standing. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact.” White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 458 .
Cited 1 timesPublishedSTATE EX REL. MAPLE CREATIVE LLC v. Tincher
226 W. Va. 118 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 18, 2010
Despite well-established West Virginia law providing a preference to West Virginia businesses in such contract bids, the Director refused to apply the preference to Maple Creative. … The plain language of the Act, however, merely states that, to qualify for the preference, the resident vendor’s bid cannot exceed, by more than two and one-half percent, the lowest qualified bid from a non-resident vendor
Cited 3 timesPublished154 W. Va. 269 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 16, 1970
voters of the City of Wheeling, which exceeded the required ten per cent of qualified voters of the city as specified by its charter. … City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538 , 170 S.E.2d 367 , that: “Petitioners in mandamus must have a clear legal right to the relief sought therein and such right cannot be established in the proceeding itself.”
Cited 5 timesPublishedTolley v. ACF Industries, Inc.
212 W. Va. 548 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Nov 14, 2002
While plaintiffs’ experts disagree with the manner in which ACF performed its evaluation, plaintiffs’ experts admit that good, well intentioned and well qualified individuals can disagree about the manner of performing industrial … The circuit court also rejected Appellants' attempt to rely on the “dual capacity" or "dual personna” doctrine as a method of circumventing ACF’s statutory immunity from common law suit.
Cited 24 timesPublishedWilliams v. Board of Education
45 W. Va. 199 · West Virginia Supreme Court · Nov 16, 1898
In this case the trustees established a colored school at Coketon; and it must be presumed that this was done in accordance with the provisions of section 17, and not section 18, chapter 45, Code. … Discrimination against the colored people, because of color alone, as to privileges, immunities, and equal legal protection, is contrary to public policy and the law of the land.
Cited 1 timesPublishedMelissa C. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Resources
West Virginia Supreme Court · May 20, 2016
In its motion to dismiss, respondents argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity as to petitioner’s claims. … The circuit court declined to rule on respondents’ statute of limitations argument and noted that such an issue would be addressed when and if the case was refiled by requirements established by the U.S.
Cited 0 timesPublishedRetina Vitreous Consultants, Inc. v. Dana J. Brandenburg and WorkForce West Virginia
Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia · Oct 28, 2024
Mellen qualifies as “other gross misconduct” under the statute. … Brandenburg’s conduct clearly does not rise to the same level of severity as the conduct in Alcan and Smith.
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia · Mar 18, 2022
Qualified Immunity Standard The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established … Therefore, collateral estoppel is not applicable to the issue of qualified immunity. B.
Cited 0 timesUnknownC.C. and J.C., as next friends of the minor child M.C. v. Harrison County Board of Education
West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 17, 2021
In creating the general grant of immunity, in W. Va. … This claim also is precluded by the Act’s grant of immunity to political subdivisions because section 29-12A-5(a)(4) also provides immunity for a political subdivision’s “[a]doption . . .
Cited 0 timesPublishedSER Justin S. Golden, Sr. v. Hon. Tod J. Kaufman, Judge
West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 16, 2014
I write separately to express my displeasure with the majority’s foray into waters clearly reserved for legislative action. … By its use of prohibition to alter long-established common law, rather than as a means to enforce and uphold existing law, the majority acted in a manner that was highly irregular and clearly unwarranted.3
Cited 0 timesPublishedSER Justin S. Golden, Sr. v. Hon. Tod J. Kaufman, Judge
West Virginia Supreme Court · Jun 16, 2014
I write separately to express my displeasure with the majority’s foray into waters clearly reserved for legislative action. … By its use of prohibition to alter long-established common law, rather than as a means to enforce and uphold existing law, the majority acted in a manner that was highly irregular and clearly unwarranted.3
Cited 0 timesPublished
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