Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Latitude Service Company v. Reese

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2024

    Reese clearly knew about the shared drive by January 30, 2018, when he sent Mr. Pyle an email on a separate matter and directed his attention to “the L: Drive.” [Id. at 12]. … If the DOL number is accurate, and Latitude has not objected to it, Latitude clearly retains only a small slice of the TPA industry.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • MCDANIELS v. SMITH

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2021

    McDaniels' heart rate was in the 130s and 140s and that he "was clearly in atrial fibrillation and high ventricular response rate." Id. His blood had coagulated to a subtherapeutic level. Id. 2. … FTCA Standard The FTCA is a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Hoosier Environmental Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

    105 F. Supp. 2d 953 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 19, 2000

    Baker was not qualified to express an opinion regarding the likelihood or foreseeability of secondary development that would be caused by the riverboat casino. … As the Court has noted, Mengel does not qualify as a neutral and objective observer, much less an environmental or engineer expert.

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • TAYLOR v. DUNCAN

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 28, 2022

    A party can also support a fact by showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. … See dkt. 65-6 at 29:3–17.1 Agent Duncan asserts the defense of qualified immunity, but he relies on the factual assertion that he "has no personal animus towards Plaintiff and acted in good faith at all times."

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • EWING v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 25, 2021

    Med-1's failure to report Ewing's debt to TransUnion was clearly an unintentional result of Ms. Thompson mistakenly forwarding Ewing's dispute letter to the incorrect Med-1 department. … The Court finds that Med-1 has established by a preponderance of the evidence all three prongs of the bona fide error defense. Thus, Med-1's motion is granted.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Perry v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Aug 24, 2022

    Thus, he must establish that he was disabled as of that date. See Stevenson v. … So long as the first hypothetical which the ALJ ultimately relied on contained all of Perry’s clearly established limitations, there was no error. Id.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • SMITH v. KIJAKAZI

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 29, 2022

    STANDARD OF REVIEW To qualify for disability, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. … Elder is clearly distinguishable from this case, however.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Ben-Yisrayl v. State

    690 N.E.2d 1141 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1997

    To qualify as fundamental error, the defendant bears the burden of proving that "the error [was] a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant." Hart v. … First, the aggravating circumstances were clearly proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Cited 45 timesPublished
  • Richard Eric Johnson v. Gillian Wheeler Johnson

    Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 4, 2012

    Appellants must establish that the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, which occurs only when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. … The parents shall make every effort to establish a reasonable parenting time schedule.

    Cited 0 timesUnpublished
  • Reed v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Nov 29, 2021

    Clearly, the Commissioner’s argument is not supported by Seventh Circuit precedent.. … Berryhill, 887 F.3d 314, 317–18 (7th Cir. 2018) (ALJ was not qualified to make his own determination without the benefit of an expert opinion).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Austin v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 13, 2023

    Disability Standard To qualify for DIB and SSI, a claimant must be “disabled” as defined in the Social Security Act (“the Act”). … Further, the ALJ clearly considered such evidence because he cites it in the opinion. [DE 16 at 31 (discussing Mr. A.’s Xanax prescription)]. While Mr.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Group Dekko, Inc. v. Metro Light & Power, LLC

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 23, 2024

    “[S]ome financial information might qualify” for protection from public disclosure, but “some or most financial information will not . . . .” Cook Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 249 (S.D. Ind. 2001). … Even so, the parties’ underlying trade dress infringement dispute was defined clearly by Metro in its cease-and-desist letters as a potential Lanham Act claim.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Wagoner v. NPAS Inc

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Apr 27, 2020

    To establish an FDCPA violation, Ms. … Having not established NPAS a debt collector under the FDCPA, she likewise cannot do so under the IDCSA.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Scheibelhut v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Oct 20, 2021

    Disability Standard To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be “disabled” under Sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1615(a)(3)(A) of the Act. … In finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act, the ALJ conducted the five-step sequential inquiry established in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • CROUCH v. SAUL

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 25, 2022

    STANDARD OF REVIEW To qualify for Title II DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. … Here, the ALJ clearly reviewed, considered, and then discussed at length Scott's medical history, including his October 2019 x-rays.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Sullenger v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 20, 2020

    Disability insurance benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish “disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. … Clearly, however, a boilerplate statement that Tracey S.’s obesitywas considered in combination with herother impairments is not an adequate explanation. See Parker v. Colvin,2016 WL 4435622 *4 (N.D.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Williams v. Whitley Memorial Hospital, Inc. d/b/a Parkview Warsaw Medical Complex

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Sep 18, 2023

    It is unclear if the RCA member identified as an “RN (Lead)” would qualify under this definition. … Williams’ termination qualifies as a materially adverse employment action, nor do they explicitly dispute that she engaged in protected activity.21 A plaintiff establishes a causal connection by showing

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Elek v. Commissioner of Social Security

    District Court, N.D. Indiana · Nov 15, 2019

    Disability insurance benefits are available only to those individuals who can establish “disability” under the terms of the Social Security Act. … The decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • NOVIT v. METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WARREN TOWNSHIP

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 3, 2023

    Warren Township further admitted owing E.N. a duty of care, that the bus driver and bus monitor were its employees acting within the scope of their employment during the Bus Incident, and invoked the qualified immunity … The IDEA charges local educational agencies with the responsibility of establishing programs to provide disabled students with a FAPE. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a).

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • DURM v. MARION COUNTY, INDIANA SHERIFF'S OFFICE

    District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 31, 2025

    Well-established Seventh Circuit caselaw, as referenced below, makes clear that Deputy Durm, Sr. had neither a cognizable "special relationship" with the Defendants nor had he been placed by the State in a position of … The issuance of this order is enough to qualify as an affirmative act on the part of the officials.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown

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