Case law

McCormick v. State

293 Or. App. 197 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 1, 2018

Under such circumstances, recreational immunity does not apply. … But below and in its primary brief on appeal, the state did not contend that it had the authority to completely disallow recreational use; its argument, as we understand it, was simply that it qualified for recreational immunity

DeBiaso v. Spitz

957 F. Supp. 2d 1213 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jul 2, 2013

Neither may they avail themselves of qualified immunity for such conduct because the “right to be free from judicial deception in securing [an order removing a child from the home] was clearly established” before the events … Although absolute and qualified immunity are not available to her, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs cannot establish that any representations she made to the Court at the shelter hearing were false.

Clavette v. Sweeney

132 F. Supp. 2d 864 · District Court, D. Oregon · Jan 30, 2001

The determination whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis: “1) Was the law governing the official’s conduct clearly established? … The law. regarding the use of excessive force was clearly established at the time of the events at issue. See id. at 1141 .

Turner v. Dept. of Transportation

Oregon Supreme Court · May 26, 2016

Dept. of Transportation that removing parking spaces or reconfiguring parking on Highway 101 at Collins Street would qualify as low-cost. … Because we have determined that ODOT has failed to establish under the requisite summary judgment stan- dard a factual proposition that is essential to its affirmative defense of discretionary immunity based on the STIP selec

State v. Goacher

303 Or. App. 783 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 29, 2020

It does qualify, and could be charged as, second-degree sexual abuse, contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, or sexual misconduct. … That is so regardless of whether the group qualifies as a “true class,” an issue we need not, and do not, reach.

Garrison v. Deschutes County

334 Or. 264 · Oregon Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2002

On plaintiffs’ appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) the doctrine of qualified immunity protected the exercise of discretion by county employees in designing the transfer station; and (2) the county’s failure … As this court stated in Mosley , “[n]ormally, a choice within the permissible range, in order to qualify for immunity, is one that has been made by a supervisor or policy-making body.” 315 Or at 92.

Franson v. Radich

84 Or. App. 715 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Apr 15, 1987

They also knew, or should have known, that plaintiffs sought the advice of their doctors and other qualified professionals and that plaintiffs acted in reliance thereon as to what was the appropriate care for their infant … The federal statute provides that, in order for a state to qualify for funding, it shall “have in effect a State child abuse and neglect law which shall include provisions for immunity for persons reporting instances of child

Westfall v. State of Oregon

355 Or. 144 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 10, 2014

The PTA’s choice to have the sentence run consecutive to sen- tences imposed the same day, plaintiff argued, was not the sort of decision that qualified for discretionary immunity. … When Discretionary Immunity Applies to Employees Who Apply Policy In this case, the department established a gen- eral policy that, for purposes of our analysis in this case, Cite as 355 Or 144 (2014) 159 we

Freyd v. Univ. of Or.

384 F. Supp. 3d 1284 · District Court, D. Oregon · May 2, 2019

Qualified immunity for each defendant depends on whether he violated a clearly established constitutional right in their individual capacities as university officials. … The Supreme Court, in analyzing qualified immunity and the "clearly established" requirement, looks to whether precedent that directly establishes a right exists, and does not account for emergent or theoretical rights.

Conant v. Stroup

183 Or. App. 270 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 14, 2002

The phrasing of the statute clearly suggests that the legislature contemplated that the sort of permission that triggers statutory immunity is permission to the public to use private land for recreational purposes. … The purpose of the Oregon statute is clearly stated.

Baker v. State Board of Higher Education

20 Or. App. 277 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Feb 10, 1975

“It is well established that actionable negligence arises only from the breach of a duty owed by one person to another, and that to state a canse of action for negligence the complaint must state the duty imposed or facts … Cooper, supra, 256 Or at 506 ); as such it was a decision which a judge or a jury—lacking the expertise to weigh relevant political as well as technical considerations—is not qualified to review.

Wright v. White

166 Or. 136 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1941

See, to the same effect, 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 89. *145 The first case in which the rule of immunity was invoked in hehalf of an officer of the naval or military establishment is Sutton v. Johnstone, 1 Eng. Rul. … but applying to the acts of officers of the army and navy in the enforcement of military discipline the same rule of public policy that gave rise to the immunity of judges — an immunity established “to secure their independence

Pendergrass v. State

74 Or. App. 209 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Jul 3, 1985

ORS 482.260 is not self-executing; MVD can fulfill the statute’s requirements only if it establishes procedures to do so. … Although the question is closer, we also conclude that paragraph h does not allege conduct that comes within defendants’ discretionary acts immunity.

Mosley v. Portland School District No. 1J

315 Or. 85 · Oregon Supreme Court · Dec 24, 1992

Normally, a choice within the permissible range, in order to qualify for immunity, is one that has been made by a supervisor or policy-making body. Lowrimore v. Dimmitt, supra, 310 Or at 296 ; Fazzolari v. … Plaintiffs fourth allegation — that defendant was negligent in failing to stop the fight before the knife was used — is not as clearly a policy judgment as are the facts asserted in plaintiffs first allegation.

Praggastis v. Clackamas County

305 Or. 419 · Oregon Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1988

All judgments shall specify clearly the judgment debtor, judgment creditor, the amount to be recovered, the relief granted or other determination of the action. … Where the clerk neglected to notify a party as to the date of entry of judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the clerk was not qualified for absolute immunity because the actions were

Starrett/Nichols v. Myers

330 Or. 147 · Oregon Supreme Court · Apr 6, 2000

Voluntary compliance creates qualified immunity from civil liability.” … Voluntary compliance creates qualified immunity from civil liability. For lawful transfers, generally requires record destruction within 24 hours; current law authorizes record retention for five years.

Blacknall v. Westwood Corporation

307 Or. 113 · Oregon Supreme Court · Nov 16, 1988

If it did, it is immune from tort liability to the plaintiff. If it did not, it is not immune. The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. We affirm. … ORS 656.407(1) requires every employer to “establish proof with the director that the employer is qualified either: (a) As a carrier-insured employer by causing a guaranty contract issued by a guaranty contract insurer to

Clardy v. Gangitano

Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 7, 2024

His declaration clearly establishes his actions as alleged in plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint were not outside the scope of his employment. … Gangitano stated that plaintiff’s property qualified as “abandoned” under the rule and was disposed of for that reason on May 1, 2020.

Sande v. City of Portland

185 Or. App. 262 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Dec 11, 2002

Hawaii T & S Enterprises, Inc., 179 Or App 416, 419 , 39 P3d 931 (2002), there are “three criteria that a government function or duty must meet in order to qualify for discretionary immunity. … As noted, summary judgment in the city’s favor on discretionary immunity grounds was proper only if it established all of the elements of discretionary immunity.

Byrd v. Oregon State Police

236 Or. App. 555 · Court of Appeals of Oregon · Aug 11, 2010

It contends that Alden establishes that a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity against being sued in its own courts on an FLSA claim must meet the Eleventh Amendment standard for waiver, which is a stringent one. … In its view, the state’s enactment of the OTCA does not meet that standard, because it does not expressly and unequivocally establish that the state has waived its sovereign immunity against being sued in state court on FLSA