Case law

ROLLS-ROYCE NORTH AMERICAN TECHNOLOGIES INC v. DYNETICS, INC.

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 28, 2020

Consequently, Dynetics shall enforce its determination that LibertyWorks no longer qualifies for exclusivity under the Teaming Agreement.” (Filing No. 1-2 at 38.) … The evidence in the record establishes a timeline for Dynetics’ breach of this provision.

Hayes v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 10, 2025

The Social Security regulations create a five-step process to determine whether the claimant qualifies as disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); 416.920(a)(4)(i)– (v). … A claimant qualifies as disabled if he or she cannot perform such work.

Dave's Excavating, Inc. v. City of New Castle

959 N.E.2d 369 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 11, 2012

Notice: If CONTRACTOR [Dave’s] believes that any subsurface or physical condition at or contiguous to the Site that is uncovered or revealed either: 1. is of such a nature as to establish that any “technical data” on which … The facts in Paden are clearly distinguishable.

DUSHANE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2024

The FTCA creates a limited waiver of this immunity by permitting suits against the United States for certain personal injuries caused by federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). … The Court concludes that Congress has established an alternative remedial structure for claims such as Mr. DuShane's, so expansion of a Bivens remedy in this context would be inappropriate.

BISIGNANO

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 31, 2026

Specifically, she argues that she "clearly had lost her insurance, and her treatment options were limited." [Dkt. 10 at 22.] This argument is not entirely consistent with the record. … But by the time of her disability hearing, Claimant was receiving insurance through the Healthy Indiana Plan ("HIP"), which is Indiana's Medicaid program for qualified adults. [Dkt. 8-2 at 45.]

Todd v. State

229 Ind. 664 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 4, 1951

That opinion established the law of this case. … On the subject of the sanctity and conclusiveness of a final judgment in a criminal case this court has *692 spoken clearly and with emphasis.

Eads v. Community Hospital

909 N.E.2d 1009 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 23, 2009

Therefore, if Eads's malpractice claim is to be rescued by the Journey's Account Statute, she must establish, among other things, that her malpractice claim is a continuation of the Negligence Complaint. … Enacted in 1975, the MMA set up a system under which a health care provider meeting qualifications set forth in the MMA ("Qualified Provider") would enjoy *1017 certain benefits, including a limitation on liability.

Snow v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 28, 2021

Berryhill, 887 F.3d 314, 317–18 (7th Cir. 2018) (“the ALJ was not qualified to make his own determination without the benefit of an expert opinion…he could have sought an updated medical opinion”). … Clearly, this is pure speculation.

Hecke v. Beck

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jun 6, 2025

court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … United States, 412 U.S. 521, 529–30 (1973) (noting that federal statute allowing federal officials to contract with county jails to hold federal pretrial detainees “clearly contemplated that the day-to-day operations of

Todd Slavin v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 2012

An abuse of discretion is a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. … A document does not need to be open and available to the public in order to qualify for admission under the public records exception. Id. (citing 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick On Evidence § 295 (6th ed. 2006)).

Joseph K. Buelna v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 30, 2014

The trial court abuses its discretion only where its decision regarding the admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the … The evidence was sufficient to establish both Buelna’s participation in the manufacture of methamphetamine at the house and to establish that Buelna manufactured more than three grams of pure or adulterated methamphetamine

Thorpe v. Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 28, 2023

A claimant qualifies as disabled if he or she cannot perform such work. … In order to establish that his headaches are a medically determinable impairment, Mr.

Lartnec Investment Co. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Co. Convention & Tourism Authority

603 F. Supp. 1210 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 8, 1985

are dubious given the change in market conditions which the Grand Wayne Center might produce, the court, for purposes of these motions, accepts as true that Lartnec will suffer some loss of competitive advantage so as to qualify … Clearly, Lartnec’s interests fall outside the zone of interests to be protected by this statute. Thus, the court finds that Lartnec does not have standing to assert either of its claims against the City in No. F 84-163.

LEJ MANAGEMENT, LLC v. MORRIS INVEST, LLC

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 28, 2020

P. 8(d) establishes a party's ability to "plead breach of an express contract, breach of an implied contract, and promissory estoppel in the alternative." CoMentis, Inc. v. … To qualify as special chattel and be subject to a conversion action, money must be a "determinate sum".

Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.

195 B.R. 716 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Apr 19, 1996

Clearly, this' Court could consider the previous orders of another federal court when deciding a motion to dismiss. … The courts have not defined “free and clear of any interest in such property” under 11 U.S.C. section 363 (f) clearly. 2 Daniel R.

Baker v. Warden

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Mar 22, 2021

We have explained that clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions. … It likened the expiration of a limitations period to a form of amnesty and reasoned that the new statute imposed punishment for conduct that was, in essence, immunized from punishment by the passage of time

Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Carter

569 F. Supp. 2d 737 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 14, 2008

To qualify as “prevailing,” a party “must have succeeded on ‘any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit’ sought.” Earth Island Institute, Inc. v. … Determination of “Reasonable Fee” The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. Hensley v.

THURSTON v. KIJAKAZI

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 28, 2022

Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Knight v. … She clearly had issues with attention, which he addressed in his discussion of her ability to perform simple vs. complex instructions.

Hann v. Hann

655 N.E.2d 566 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 20, 1995

Moreover, nonqualified but fully vested plan assets (i.e., "nonqualified deferred compensation" or "457 plan assets") remain subject to forfeiture and are nevertheless routinely divided pursuant to qualified domestic relations … Clearly, there is no guarantee of forfeiture upon an employee's termination. *573 Once again, reality in the world of the ISOP is that unless the plan participant was terminated as a result of poor performance or misconduct

RHODES v. ENHANCED RECOVERY COMPANY, LLC

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 21, 2020

In granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court held that Kohl's qualified as a creditor under the FDCPA because it was the entity offering credit accounts to its customers … Accordingly, because the undisputed facts before us establish that Enhanced Recovery's letter to Plaintiffs violated § 1692g(a)(2) by 3 Enhanced Recovery argues that the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Smith v.