Case law

Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

214 F.R.D. 43 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 1, 2003

The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 Constitute a Valid and Unambiguous Waiver of States’ Sovereign Immunity It is well-established that states may waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds. … Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be

Gilmore v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 1, 2023

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent [government officials] or those who knowingly violate the law” “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate a clearly established … immunity defense they must show that “established law so clearly precluded a reasonable officer 2 Plaintiffs conceded that Delauder is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment unlawful entry and false arrest

Bradshaw v. Oberg

690 F. Supp. 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 23, 1988

Accordingly, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed the Court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. … violated [plaintiff’s] clearly established fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable search.”

Way v. Johnson

893 F. Supp. 2d 15 · District Court, District of Columbia · Sep 26, 2012

Williams, and Bryan Young in their individual capacities also fail because these defendants are protected by qualified immunity. … ) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct.

Flythe v. District of Columbia

994 F. Supp. 2d 50 · District Court, District of Columbia · Nov 8, 2013

If there is no constitutional right violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. … If so, then the officer is not 10 entitled to qualified immunity; if the right violated was not clearly established at the time, then the officer is entitled to qualified

James v. United States

48 F. Supp. 3d 58 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 13, 2014

And even if the facts that James alleges could somehow qualify as a deprivation of rights for the purpose of Section 1983, the Court has little doubt that Officer Lee would be entitled to qualified immunity. … Supp. 2d 195, 203-04 (D.D.C. 2008) (officer who forced a woman to the ground and handcuffed her while conducting a Terry stop was entitled to qualified immunity because officer had “reasonable, articulable suspicion of

Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia

973 F. Supp. 184 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jul 17, 1997

immunity. … Activity that is constrained by regulations or clearly established policy or standards is ministerial in nature. Biscoe v.

Edwards v. Okie Dokie, Inc.

473 F. Supp. 2d 31 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 6, 2007

Qualified Immunity The doctrine of qualified immunity requires dismissal of the section 1983 claim against Officer Whiteside. … Qualified immunity shields a government official from liability under section 1983 provided that the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known

Optiperu, S.A. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp.

640 F. Supp. 420 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 22, 1986

OPIC is authorized, inter alia, “to sue and be sued in its corporate name ____” Although this “sue and be sued clause” clearly represents a waiver of. sovereign immunity as to OPIC, Section 2199(d) contains no express grant … There is clearly more than $10,000 in controversy in Optiperu’s contract action against OPIC. See supra note 1. Therefore, if the Tucker Act applies to this case (see infra Part II.

Clayton v. District of Columbia

931 F. Supp. 2d 192 · District Court, District of Columbia · Mar 21, 2013

“Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign immunity has been abrogated.” Stone v. Dep’t of Hsg. & Urban Dev’t, 859 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2012). … CONCLUSION AND ORDER Because Clayton did not establish that the DCNG waived sovereign immunity, the DCNG’s motion to dismiss will be granted.

Daisley v. Riggs Bank, N.A.

372 F. Supp. 2d 61 · District Court, District of Columbia · May 31, 2005

In some jurisdictions, physical injury is a clearly established requirement for recovery under a negligent hiring or negligent supervision theory. See Monte v. … and supervising personnel, regardless of whether certain employees may have been more or less qualified for their positions, is within Treasury’s discretion, and, therefore, “immune from suit for negligence in *83 the performance

Wagshal v. District of Columbia

216 A.2d 172 · District of Columbia Court of Appeals · Jan 19, 1966

And whether it be called governmental or ministerial, it is well established that an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the District’s obligation to maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condition for … The Urow case Pointed out that the Dis' trict of Columbia’s decision to establish or not to establish a general plan of improvement is within the area protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Inversora Murten v. Energoprojekt

District Court, District of Columbia · Dec 3, 2009

Similarly, in its notice of sovereign immunity, JICA stated that it is an “official agency of the Government of Japan, established by legislative enactment of the Japanese Diet.” … When a defendant qualifies for sovereign immunity, “the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction” over proceedings against that defendant, and therefore “must dismiss the case” against the immune defendant.

Chewning v. Schlesinger

471 F. Supp. 767 · District Court, District of Columbia · Apr 23, 1979

Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by proving: *771 (i) that he belongs to a [protected] minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified … It has long been established that “a waiver of the traditional sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” United States v.

Berio v. EEOC

446 F. Supp. 171 · District Court, District of Columbia · Feb 28, 1978

As to the immunity issue, it does not appear that the defendant enjoys absolute immunity so as to preclude the action. … As was noted earlier, in certain instances executive officials sued in their individual capacities are only accorded qualified immunity.

Montgomery v. District of Columbia

District Court, District of Columbia · Aug 5, 2019

Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. … Qualified immunity therefore bars relief unless the plaintiff can establish both (1) the violation of a constitutional right and (2) that the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.

Stevens v. Stover

727 F. Supp. 668 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 5, 1990

The defense of qualified immunity shields Officer Stover against plaintiff’s excessive force claim as long as his conduct did “ ‘not violate clearly established ... rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” … Accordingly, Officer Stover is entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s section 1983 claim.

Oberwetter v. Hilliard

680 F. Supp. 2d 152 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jan 25, 2010

Qualified immunity protects a government official “ ‘from liability for money damages insofar as [the challenged] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … And second, “whether the right was clearly established.” Id.

Secretary of Labor v. Industrial TurnAround Corporation

138 F.4th 1339 · Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · Jun 3, 2025

Unlike a denial of qualified immunity — for which collateral review is “essential” because “the nub of qualified immunity is the need  10 to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when … the relevant law is not clearly established” — the interest affected by the district court’s decision was “the avoidance of litigation for its own sake[.]”

Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Shultz

376 F. Supp. 889 · District Court, District of Columbia · Jun 7, 1974

Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 622 , 83 S.Ct. 999 , 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963) [the challenge by appellants] clearly falls within the ‘exception’ almost as broad as the ‘rule’ that ‘sovereign immunity does not prevent a suit against a state … The contrary is clearly established by Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-620 , 32 S.Ct. 340 , 56 L.Ed. 570 (1912); see Stark v.