Case law

Opinion Number

Louisiana Attorney General Reports · Apr 23, 2001

X, Sec. 16, "A system of classified fire and police civil service is created and established. … X, § 16 (1974)] relating to establishment of a police and fire civil service are not applicable." 683 So.2d at 928 .

Washington v. Fieldwood Energy LLC

275 F. Supp. 3d 767 · District Court, E.D. Louisiana · Aug 1, 2017

Whether an individual qualifies as a “borrowed employee” is an issue of law determined by nine separate factors first delineated by the Fifth Circuit in Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co. … Given this testimony, this Court finds that Fieldwood clearly exercised control over Roberts, and this factor weighs in favor of a finding of borrowed employee status. B.

Rosenthal v. Betsy's Pancake House, Inc.

2000 La.App. 4 Cir. 1546 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · May 16, 2001

Charlet, the first witness to testify, was qualified as an expert on the Jefferson Parish building code. When Mr. … wrong based on the evidence, or clearly without evi-dentiary support.

Coastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.

45 F. Supp. 859 · District Court, W.D. Louisiana · Jul 11, 1942

It is important that we should quote fully the two main sections of this act so that the obligating force and effect upon the qualifying corporation may be well and fully appreciated : “Every corporation organized under the … Accordingly, we hold that Section 51 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 , is clearly and directly applicable and this court is vested with the venue of this case and the jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.

York v. City of St. Gabriel

89 F. Supp. 3d 843 · District Court, M.D. Louisiana · Mar 4, 2015

Gabriel having been denied the right to vote or prevented from qualifying to run for office on account of race. (Tr. I at 83:24-84:8, 101:25-102:8). The Court can find no evidence in the record to establish that St. … As reviewed supra, in 2003, there were only two white candidates out of sixteen qualified on the ballot; in 2007, there were two white candidates out of twenty qualified on the ballot. (See Ex. P-3 at p. 37, tbl.1.1).

Doug Reed Enterprises, Inc. v. Baton Rouge

591 So. 2d 733 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Nov 22, 1991

The ordinance also establishes "unspecified" wrecker lists which are maintained by the Baton Rouge police department. … Accordingly two mutually owned businesses which are contiguous may only qualify for one listing on the unspecified call lists.

Hayes v. Gunn

12 La.App. 3 Cir. 1153 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Apr 24, 2013

Therefore, although Hayes was in possession prior to the institution of this dispute, Hayes clearly does not own any portion of Lot 13. Lot 13 is clearly owned by Brittany Marie Gunn. … In the case at bar, Hayes clearly does not have any act translative of ownership regarding Lot 13 and he clearly knew of the defects in his ownership.

Chisom v. Edwards

659 F. Supp. 183 · District Court, E.D. Louisiana · Jul 10, 1987

Although a potential conflict may develop between the holdings in Wells and Haith, Wells clearly states the “one man one vote” principle is not applicable to judicial elections. … Wells, supra, has precedential authority and clearly conflicts with Kirksey , an untested lower court opinion. 8 . In Village of Arlington Heights v.

Smith v. Board of Trustees

387 So. 2d 1291 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Jul 7, 1980

The first issue is whether the plaintiff is entitled to any retirement benefits under the act establishing the Louisiana School Employees’ Retirement System. … In addition, the legislative intent on the matter clearly expressed in the 1970 amendment of LSA-R.S. 17:882.

Henderson v. Domingue

626 So. 2d 555 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Nov 3, 1993

At that point, there was no further effort by Domingue or his attorney to explain or qualify this answer. … The record before us clearly reflects the Hendersons suffered serious aggravation and grave concern over their encounter with the IRS's collection division.

Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Broussard

450 So. 2d 17 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Apr 11, 1984

The trial judge's use of this comparable to establish the per-acre value of defendant's property was a reasonable exercise of his discretion. … Clearly, the trial court is empowered to award reasonable attorney's fees even if that means an award greater than 25% of the excess compensation judgment.

Smith v. HJ Landreneau Bldg. Contractor

426 So. 2d 1360 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Feb 3, 1983

This is clearly not a declaration of the defect but rather a denial that the defect exists. … Moreau, who qualified as an expert appraiser, testified that the market value of a house depreciates from 10 to 75 percent due to susceptibility to flooding.

McNeal v. Massman Construction Co.

98 La.App. 3 Cir. 1792 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · May 5, 1999

Because McNeal failed to establish that he was physically incapable of performing any employment, we conclude that the workers’ compensation judge did not err in denying McNeal’s claim for disability benefits. … La.R.S. 23:1221(3)(a) provides that in order to qualify for supplemental earnings benefits, a claimant must prove that a work-related injury resulted in his inability to earn wages equal to 90% or more of his wages at the

Suire v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc.

930 So. 2d 221 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · May 3, 2006

The testimony recited above also established that the control room position was considered a full duty one. … While Suire contends that the trial court erred in awarding lost wages for a period of only five months, she states in her brief that she "does not contend that such error was clearly wrong" and does not brief the issue further

Guillory v. City of Lake Charles

614 So. 2d 165 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Feb 3, 1993

As a result, his conclusions of fact are afforded great discretion and will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly wrong. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). … The medical evidence establishes Guillory is still experiencing pain and his shoulder is still "frozen." The evidence does not establish *170 that he could do any of the listed jobs at this time.

Sydnes v. Harwell

94 La.App. 3 Cir. 1194 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Mar 1, 1995

We should not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in the absence of “manifest error” or unless the findings are “clearly wrong.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). … Those defects of more recent origin which might not be subject to the “grandfather” clause were clearly visible to the reasonably prudent buyer.

Copley v. Dinkgrave

27 La. 601 · Supreme Court of Louisiana · Jul 15, 1875

No line of demarcation, it seems, was ever run and established, indicating with precision which was the upper half or which *604 the lower half. … We think it is clearly shown that under the act of Congress of twenty-seventh January, 1851, all the land within the limits of the Maison Rouge grant was reserved from sale, entry or location, from the date of the act until

St. Landry Homestead Federal Savings Bank v. Vidrine

12 La.App. 3 Cir. 1406 · Louisiana Court of Appeal · Jun 12, 2013

These qualify as contracts as that term is defined in La.Civ.Code art. 1906. … However, we do not interpret the supreme court’s decisions in Whitney, Jesco, and King to establish a rule of law that the Louisiana Credit Agreement Act renders a financial institution immune from any and all liability arising

Tyler v. Harmon

158 La. 439 · Supreme Court of Louisiana · Mar 2, 1925

The second section of the ordinance makes it unlawful for any white person to establish *441 Ms lióme or residence in a negro community, or portion of the city inhabited principally by negroes, or for any negro to establish … Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that they sought to deprive this defendant of his property without due process of law, .by attempting to deprive him of the right to lease it to a constitutionally qualified

Opinion Number

Louisiana Attorney General Reports · Mar 9, 1999

To deny you and your employees the benefits derived from a qualified fitness program solely on this basis would, in our opinion, be unjust and inequitable. … Clearly, one can not put a specific price on the value of the benefits received by your office as a result of employee participation in a structured fitness program.