Case law

Cabot v. Lewis

241 F. Supp. 3d 239 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 15, 2017

Whether or not such a right exists, the Supreme Court has held that such a right is not “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity because reasonable officials could conclude that Hartman applies in the context … “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or.constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Todino v. Town of Wellfleet

66 Mass. App. Ct. 143 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 19, 2006

The Legislature clearly intended to provide full recovery for police officers and fire fighters incapacitated by injuries sustained in the performance of their duties due to no fault of their own. … Although not directly applicable, we note that the Legislature strictly has required timely payments of wages to active workers and established significant penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for untimely payment

Aaron v. City of Lowell

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 5, 2024

Qualified immunity protects public officials, in their individual capacity, “if their actions ‘d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” … Determining whether a right is “clearly established” is also a two-party inquiry. Id.

Kestenberg v. Dwyer

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 22, 2021

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … The defendants would enjoy qualified immunity in any event because no officer in their position would have clearly understood their actions to be improper.

Daly v. Mason

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2024

Qualified immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. … Since Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the “clearly established” standard of the qualified immunity analysis, Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity as to Count III.6

Crowley v. Town of Orange

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 478 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 29, 2008

If the moving party has carried its burden, and the plaintiff has not responded with specific facts to establish a genuine, triable issue, the court grants the motion for summary judgment. Cmty. Nat’l Bank v. … Upon parsing the statute, three requirements emerge in order for a lessor to qualify for immunity: (1) the lessor must lease the land to a nonprofit organization, (2) which will offer the land to the public for recreational

United States v. Bulger

928 F. Supp. 2d 305 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 1, 2013

established the proper foundation and gave appropriate notice under Fed. … The first three exceptions are clearly inapposite.

Moore v. McManus

8 Mass. L. Rptr. 263 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 17, 1998

Attached to that application was a lengthy police report which clearly linked Moore, Arseneau, Atteridge, and another as joint participants in several crimes. … Once again, there was no definitive resolution of the question because application of the principles of qualified immunity and the defendants’ lack of participation in the alleged wrong would have barred the plaintiffs’ claim

Mason v. Pegasystems, Inc.

5 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 10, 1996

To prove Mason’s claim of disparate handicap discrimination in violation of G.L.c. 15IB, she must “first establish a prima facie case by producing evidence that she is a handicapped person, that, in spite of her handicap … “Qualified Handicapped Person” and Disabilify Benefits The defendants argue that Mason does not qualify as a “qualified handicapped person” because she applied for and was granted total disabilify benefits. *511 G.L.c. 151B

Shank v. Town of Townsend

11 Mass. L. Rptr. 523 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 26, 2000

The performance of almost any function involves some exercise of discretion but not all functions qualify for § 10(b) immunity. See Harry Stoller & Co., Inc. v. … established standards of tort liability apply.

Sturdy Memorial Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Assessors

47 Mass. App. Ct. 519 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 3, 1999

These requested findings, if supported by the “uncontradicted evidence” as alleged, would establish (i) the absence of any private inurement: there is no profit generated by the enterprise, and in any event, the salaries … The fact of “appointment only” service is merely an efficient management arrangement which, so far as we can determine, has not been identified by our courts as a factor in the equation of charitable immunity.

Alter v. City of Newton

35 Mass. App. Ct. 142 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 16, 1993

governmental immunity that G. … The city also urges that it is immune from liability because of G.

Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc.

376 Mass. 313 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 7, 1978

There, a California statute had established a marketing plan for agricultural products. … Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), cited by the plaintiffs, supports their claim that the "state action” immunity is inapplicable here.

Broderick v. Roache

751 F. Supp. 290 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 21, 1990

established. … Because the constitutional rights at issue in this case are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense is not available and the good faith of the defendant is irrelevant. Miller v.

United States v. Medina

41 F. Supp. 2d 38 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 13, 1999

The reasons grants of immunity are not incompatible with § 201(c)(2) are essentially the same as for leniency: there is a long, well recognized and established history of immunizing witnesses for their testimony, and the … It is not even clearly in conflict with § 201(c)(2).

Commerce Insurance v. J&J Builders, LLC

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 483 · Massachusetts Superior Court · May 30, 2012

The defendant J&J Builders, LLC is a dissolved limited liability company (hereinafter “LLC”) originally established pursuant to G.L. Ch. 156C. … The undisputed facts .establish that in or about 2006, J&J Builders, LLC engaged in the construction of the Luzitania Court Condominiums in Gloucester, Massachusetts.

Marrero v. City of Brockton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 5, 2024

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory … Was the Right Clearly Established? Similarly, it is premature to determine whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation.

Perley v. City of Cambridge

220 Mass. 507 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 31, 1915

We are able to perceive no sound reason why this well established rule should not apply in instances where a municipality enters without shadow of right and as a pure trespasser upon the land of another and without consent … A municipality enjoys no special immunity in this respect not accorded in general to others. It commonly possesses the power to exercise eminent domain and thus take the property of the landowner against his will.

Commonwealth v. Federico

383 Mass. 485 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 28, 1981

. §§ 1021 to 1031, ERISA establishes minimum standards for pension plans, §§ 1051 to 1086, and provides for civil remedies for violations of the act’s provisions, §§ 1132, 1140. … Qualified exceptions to this broad preemption are made for State laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities. § 1144(b)(2). 4 Further, the preemption provision “shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal

Reguera v. Leduc

20 Mass. L. Rptr. 4 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Aug 22, 2005

The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of a triable issue. Pedersen v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). … Presentment to ‘To Whom it May Concern” in the October letter clearly fails because it does not identity anyone with authority to settle claims.