Case law

In Re Contempt Findings Against Schultz

428 N.E.2d 1284 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 8, 1981

Clearly, the constitution does not require us to transform the possibility of further prosecution in this or another jurisdiction into a source of absolute protected silence on the part of the witness. … excluding the answers thus elicited, in any subsequent criminal case. * * * * * * It exempts no one from the consequences of a crime which he may have committed, but only from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to establish

Brown v. Purdue University North Central

91 F. Supp. 3d 1026 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Feb 13, 2015

Oct. 18, 2012) (Title II claim not barred by sovereign immunity); with Rittenhouse v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 628 F.Supp.2d 887, 894-95 (S.D.Ill.2008) (Title II claim barred by sovereign immunity); Doe v. … Even if this court found that defendants were not immune from suit under the ADA, plaintiffs ADA claim would fail, as explained below.

Dowd, Warden v. Stuckey

222 Ind. 100 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 23, 1943

Unless there is such a legal basis for classification, penalties imposed by criminal statutes must apply equally, without privileges or immunities on the one hand or additional burdens upon the other. … A statute pro *105 viding the death penalty for murder by one under thirty years of age, and a lesser penalty for murder by an older person, would, it seems to us, be clearly unconstitutional. The principle is the same.

Anderson v. State

104 Ind. 467 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1885

Thus instructing the jury involves, in a qualified sense at least, the exercise of a judgment upon all matters of law concerning which the judge must give information to the jury. … In a more comprehensive sense it may be said to be “ a privilege or immunity recognized or conferred by competent authority.”

Virginia Tramill, Miah Gant, Marquel Cheaney and Jeremiah Tramill, the Mother and Children of Sara Tramill v. Anonymous Healthcare Provider

37 N.E.3d 553 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 8, 2015

The email language establishes only that the Appellants would not object to the third panelist being a forensic pathologist. … It does not establish that counsel agreed the third panelist would be a forensic pathologist and is not a stipulation.

Tyler v. Trustees of Purdue University

834 F. Supp. 2d 830 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jul 18, 2011

Coryell clearly possessed the requisite KSAs for the Executive Director, Administrative Services position.” … Because she has failed to establish that any exception to Purdue’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment’s applies, Tyler’s ADEA claim must fail. 4 D.

Matter of Adoption of LC

650 N.E.2d 726 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 19, 1995

We may not reverse the trial court's findings in such cireum-stances unless they are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). … Under ILC. § 81-3-1-6(a), the prospective adoptive parents must establish the written consent of all applicable parties listed in the statute.

Drendall Law Office, P.C. v. Lucy Mundia

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 2, 2019

[16] During discussions between the trial court and counsel settling the jury instructions, the trial court stated, “[T]here’s clearly going to be an instruction that says that there is immunity for the … Groves, on the other hand, was definitive in his answer stating that no governmental entity would settle a case when it so clearly possessed legal immunity. 10

Long v. Barrett

818 N.E.2d 18 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 10, 2004

; that her claims were barred by the defense of good faith; that they were shielded by judicial and quasi-judicial immunity; that her claims were barred by common law immunity; and that immunity pursuant to the Indiana Tort … Long initially testified that she was shown a warrant that indicated a charge of forgery, which would indicate Warrant #1; but, in later testimony, she clearly identified Warrant # 2 as the warrant shown to her and affirmed

Bowling v. Pence

39 F. Supp. 3d 1025 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 19, 2014

The memoranda issued by the Governor clearly contradict his prior representations to the court. … Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that this Section violates their due process rights to marry, access to courts, and right to travel; the Establishment Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Eakin v. Indiana Intergovernmental Risk Management Authority

557 N.E.2d 1095 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 1990

Applying this analysis, the Commissioner claims the “Master Contract” is clearly an insurance contract. First, the Commissioner argues the townships have an insurance interest capable of being valued in money. … The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting it was immune from liability under the charitable immunity doctrine.

Stackhouse v. City of Lafayette

26 Ind. 17 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1866

The ordinance of the common council directing such public improvements is judicial in its nature, and extends immunity from private action for damages to those who perform the duty. But there this immunity ends. … The power and duty to perform the latter is clearly ministerial, and falls under the class of private powers. The principle respondeat superior consequently applies.” In Furze v.

Carroll v. State

740 N.E.2d 1225 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 14, 2000

The State concedes that the first Strickler component is established. … Thus, the criminal history was clearly within the State's reach.

Guinn v. Light

531 N.E.2d 534 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 15, 1988

Provision is made for the establishment of medical review panels to review all proposed malpractice complaints against health care providers covered by this article. … In this case the rights of the parties are clearly governed by the statute; and no injustice will result from following such statute.

Commissioner, Department of Revenue v. Partlow

769 N.E.2d 1212 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 19, 2002

that the "certifying physician clearly ignored the requirements of 49 CFR 391.41, 49 CFR 391.48 and the Conference on Neurological Disorders and Commercial Drivers report." … Based upon the advisory section, the Department contends that the section states: A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial vehicle if that person: Has no established medical history or clinical diagnosis of

State, Department of Natural Resources v. Morgan

432 N.E.2d 59 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 1982

Appellees contend the Department owed James a duty established by the Strip Mining Act. Precisely what duty was owed by Department, appellees do not state. … Clearly, appellees invite us to expand the language of the statute to include any duty which they believe should be found under the statute. We respectfully decline the invitation.

Wabash Valley Power Ass'n v. Rural Electrification Administration

713 F. Supp. 1260 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 16, 1989

In addition to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., broadly waives the government’s sovereign immunity in suits seeking only equitable … Indiana law clearly provides for a similar challenge and appeals procedure.

McKibben Construction, Inc. v. Longshore

788 N.E.2d 452 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 12, 2003

McKibben objected to the affidavits on the grounds that the witnesses were not qualified as experts. … Converse's affidavit established the method used in determining septic system requirements. - Appellant's App. p. 376.

CHAMBERS v. HAMILTON COUNTY AND JOHNSON FOR THE STATE OF INDIANA

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 15, 2025

Qualified Immunity "Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability un- less the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly … that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation."

Owen v. Vaughn

479 N.E.2d 83 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 13, 1985

Judge Vaughn is judicially immune from suit on such grounds. … Further, the Tort Claims Act, I.C. 34-4-16.5-19, specifically establishes a basis for attorney fees for actions falling under its auspices.