Case law

Commonwealth v. Brewer

472 Mass. 307 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 24, 2015

establishing the elements of the crime. … We have stated that "if the proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or . . . relate[s] only to the credibility of the government's witnesses," then judicial immunity is not available

Adoption of Keefe

49 Mass. App. Ct. 818 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 10, 2000

The profile evidence was “clearly inadmissible, and, in other circumstances, might be deemed sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. … Such testimony is less than highly probative, and the judge was not clearly wrong in rejecting that testimony.

Hilbert v. Aeroquip, Inc.

486 F. Supp. 2d 135 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 2007

This court is as qualified to evaluate the factors establishing federal jurisdiction as any other federal court. … Northrop has not met its burden of *149 establishing even a colorable defense of sovereign immunity. F.

Tolbert v. Clarke

685 F. Supp. 2d 244 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 22, 2010

Clarke and Pepe move for summary judgement on the grounds that Tolbert has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that they, in their individual capacities, are subject to qualified immunity. … Qualified Immunity In light of the foregoing, the issue of whether Clarke and Pepe are eligible for qualified immunity need not be reached. VI.

M. H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission

386 Mass. 64 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 30, 1982

Brown, supra, and its progeny, activity which is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as State policy and actively supervised by the State is “State action” and thus immune. Parker v. Brown, supra. … Brown, supra, and subsequent decisions established two standards for antitrust immunity: “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’; second, the policy must

Lombardo v. Town of Billerica

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 75 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 5, 1994

If the governmental actor’s actions were prescribed by a statute, regulation or established agency practice, then there is no discretion. … [provides] immunity only for discretionary conduct that involves policy making or planning.” Id. at 141. “[G]overnmental immunity does not result automatically just because the governmental actor had discretion.

United States v. Gianelli

658 F. Supp. 2d 255 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 21, 2009

For example, on July 1, 1993, AUSA Wyshak asked Gianelli a series of leading questions about the term “make-up” which on their face clearly establish that AUSA Wyshak had prior knowledge of the meaning of that term. … those machines were divided between Gianelli and the establishments in which they were installed.

Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo

467 Mass. 478 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 14, 2014

To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 402 Mass. 650, 660 (1988). … AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., supra at 104 (“once immunity has been invoked, the burden of overcoming the immunity rests exclusively with the plaintiff”).

Chiao-Yun Ku v. Town of Framingham

62 Mass. App. Ct. 271 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 18, 2004

The motion judge correctly ruled that despite his independent contractor status, “Drake was clearly acting within the scope of his employment” and “on behalf of the public employer.” The question is close. … “The immunities provided by [G.

Perini Corp v. Commissioner of Revenue

419 Mass. 763 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 22, 1995

Both domestic and foreign corporations “exercising [their] charter [s], or qualified to do business or actually doing business in the commonwealth,” must pay the excise. §§ 32, 39. … The flow of value between the plaintiffs and their foreign subsidiaries clearly constitutes interstate commerce.

Conners v. Northeast Hospital Corp.

439 Mass. 469 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 29, 2003

The first clause of the first sentence of § 85K abolishes charitable immunity, and is not at issue here. … The second clause *479 of the first sentence then qualifies the abrogation of charitable immunity by limiting the liability for tort damages to only those activities that “accomplish directly the charitable purposes.”

Flaherty v. Knapik

999 F. Supp. 2d 323 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 21, 2014

Qualified Immunity Defendant argues that, even if his actions did violate Plaintiffs’ rights to free expression, he is entitled to the protection of the doctrine of qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity attaches where a government official’s action does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Alake v. City of Boston

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 380 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 10, 1993

“If the moving party establishes that absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond and allege specific facts which would establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to defeat … [provides] immunity only for discretionary conduct that involves policy making or planning.” Id, at 141. “[GJovernmental immunity does not result automatically just because the governmental actor had discretion.

Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz

14 Mass. L. Rptr. 208 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 31, 2001

provide expert litigation support and testimony relating to the valuation of the RAI stock and Rogal’s 100% ownership interests in RAI and a related corporation. 1 Horvitz, a certified public accountant, had previously qualified … It is established that witnesses are immune from claims for defamation and that the absolute privilege extends to statements made in the institution or conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications preliminary

Parzyck v. Dubois

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 517 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jul 21, 1997

. §1983 Claim The defendants move for dismissal of this claim on the grounds that they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for any violations of the plaintiffs rights. … As the hearing officer was performing a discretionary function when he refused to view the videotape, he is protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Matthews v.

Morrissey v. New England Deaconess Ass'n - Abundant Life Communities, Inc.

458 Mass. 580 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 22, 2010

In Asíala , the court stated that “[a] statute is not to be interpreted as effecting a material change in or a repeal of the common law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed,” and it concluded that nothing in the … Retroactive application of our decision furthers the purpose of having a consistent and clearly defined body of law, and we envision no specific hardships or inequities that would likely follow. 3.

Stahr v. Lincoln Sudbury Regional High School District

93 Mass. App. Ct. 243 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 18, 2018

Governmental Immunity. School and School Committee, Athletic coach, Liability for tort. Negligence, School, Governmental immunity. Words, "Intervention." … See id. at 41-42 (students 6 Even if we consider this theory of liability, the act of allowing an untrained volunteer coach to direct and supervise the drill in which Alexandra was injured would not qualify as the "

Ahmed v. Burns

12 Mass. L. Rptr. 191 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 20, 2000

Although the RMLD is a governmental body which qualifies as a public employer under the Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, it is nonetheless a distinct and independent entity from the town. See Middleborough v. … involve the implementation and execution of such governmental policy or planning [for which there would be no governmental immunity].

United States v. Bulger

928 F. Supp. 2d 294 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 2013

That no jury right attaches to defendant’s claim of immunity is firmly established by binding precedent. … Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (noting in the context of § 1983 qualified immunity that “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an

Gallant v. Worcester

383 Mass. 707 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 4, 1981

The record suggests but does not establish such compliance. … The Legislature clearly intended to do away with the "person" distinction in enacting G.L.c. 258. [9] Recovery, though substantively premised on G.L.c. 229, § 2, would be limited to the terms of G.L.c. 258.