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  • Bushey v. Northern Assurance Co. of America

    362 Md. 626 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 8, 2001

    In § VI “ ‘Insured’ means any person or organization qualifying as an insured in the Who Is an Insured provision of the applicable coverage.” … In the case before us we decline, once again, to accept the invitation totally to abrogate this well established doctrine.

    Cited 85 timesPublished
  • Nichols v. Maryland Correctional Institution—Jessup

    186 F. Supp. 2d 575 · District Court, D. Maryland · Feb 1, 2002

    Hearing Officer John Sandstrom A hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding may be liable if his conduct “violated 'clearly established law’ in conducting [the] hearing in the manner in which he did.” Barry v. … The Supreme Court has held that hearing officers in prison disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity, but may be entitled to qualified immunity. Cleavinger v.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Suburban Hospital, Inc. v. Kirson

    128 Md. App. 533 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 27, 1999

    As the case law clearly indicates, the presumption rests in Smith’s favor that she did, in fact, perform her duties adequately. … Kirson early in the trial and would not qualify for § 3-2A-08(a)’s limited admissibility only after a verdict has been rendered.

    Reversed on other grounds by Suburban Hospital, Inc. v. Kirson, 362 Md. 140 (2000)Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Jackson v. Housing Opportunities Commission

    289 Md. 118 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 9, 1980

    Our different analysis produces a different result. *124 The first prong of an effective waiver of sovereign immunity is clearly satisfied in this case. A housing authority has power "[t]o sue and be sued.” § 8 (a). … However, the express inclusion of insurance relating to operations clearly manifests the legislative contemplation that liability insurance would be purchased as well.

    Overruled in part by Brooks v. Housing Authority, 411 Md. 603 (2009)Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. MONTMINY

    285 F. Supp. 2d 673 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 23, 2003

    It follows a fortiori from my holding that plaintiffs' claims fail on the merits that defendants would also be entitled to qualified immunity as to those claims. … and Brower decisions, they did not violate any clearly established constitutional right by their conduct.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • University of Maryland v. Maas

    173 Md. 554 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 3, 1938

    Coale, 165 Md. 224 , 167 A. 54 , further establish this beyond question, as well as the character of the governmental functions of this institution of learning. … The manner in which payments, for the use or benefit of the University, were *562 made was clearly stated, as above. Even the tuitions received are paid into the state treasury and disbursed like other state funds.

    Cited 52 timesPublished
  • Bailey v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND

    34 F. Supp. 2d 1025 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 29, 1999

    established at the time of the encounter. … The result is that Brock would enjoy qualified immunity from suit. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Count I as to Defendant Brock will be dismissed with prejudice. VII.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Appeal Tax Court v. Regents of the University of Maryland

    50 Md. 457 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Feb 28, 1879

    With respect to the lot and improvements on the southwest corner of Lombard and Greene streets, and the furniture and equipments thereof, these appear to he clearly within the exemption contained in the second section of … Now the 18th section of the Act of 1812 extended the same immunity to the appellees.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Furst v. Isom

    85 Md. App. 407 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 17, 1991

    He makes the point that, because the court in Pleet merely interpreted the statutory provision at issue and did not establish any new principle of law, neither overruling past precedents nor involving an issue of first impression … , not clearly foreshadowed, see Chevron Oil Company v.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Chin v. Wilhelm

    291 F. Supp. 2d 400 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 13, 2003

    The defendant maintains that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from liability for Fourth Amendment violations. (Def.’s Mem. at 25-30.) … As stated in the court’s earlier opinion, taking the facts in the complaint as true, Wilhelm could not have reasonably believed that his actions did not violate the plaintiffs’ clearly established rights.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Mta Lodge No. 34 v. Mta

    195 Md. App. 124 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 30, 2010

    First, we must clearly stake out the doctrinal terrain on which the parties battle. … That issue is not before us. [26] "[T]he General Assembly has the power to establish the terms under which it will permit a waiver of immunity...." Rios v.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn

    270 Md. 496 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 5, 1973

    In sum, he testified that the training in haircutting received by cosmetologists does not qualify them to cut men’s hair. … That case, however, is clearly distinguishable.

    Cited 44 timesPublished
  • Outbound Maritime Corp. v. P.T. Indonesian Consortium of Construction Industries

    582 F. Supp. 1136 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 13, 1984

    The contract at issue here clearly involved an agreement for the carriage of goods by sea. … First, the legislative history of the FSIA clearly indicates that the Act was intended to withdraw the executive branch from involvement with claims of immunity and place responsibility for such determinations with the judiciary

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Cox v. Prince George's County

    296 Md. 162 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 3, 1983

    Once this first step is established, then the plaintiff must show that the offending conduct occurred within the scope of the employment of the servant or under the express or implied authorization of the master. … The italicized clause clearly and unmistakably makes this point.

    Cited 68 timesPublished
  • Allstate v. Kim

    376 Md. 275 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 31, 2003

    Unless, as in Dua , the statute clearly fails one of those tests, both must be considered. … Riverdale Heights Fire Co., supra, 308 Md. 556, 560 , 520 A.2d 1319, 1321 , we held that the granting of immunity effects more than "mere change of practice, procedure, or *623 remedy" and instead "establishes a rule of substantive

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Pulliam v. Motor Vehicle Administration

    181 Md. App. 144 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Sep 4, 2008

    At that time, Arizona statutory law required the MVD to establish a Medical Advisory Board, but it had not done so. As a result, there were no medical standards established to address Bilodeau’s disorder. … The court rejected the state’s argument, explaining that the statute only limited governmental tort immunity to decisions involving the exercise of policy judgment, and did not immunize decisions that implemented or applied

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County v. Patient First Corp.

    444 Md. 452 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Aug 18, 2015

    Whether the Circuit Court’s Findings as to Negligence are Clearly Erroneous CCBC contends that, even if the burden of proof was properly placed on it to establish Patient First’s negligence as an affirmative defense … In sum, the Circuit Court was not clearly erroneous in finding that CCBC failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the scope and nature of Patient First’s duty with regard to the supervision of the CCBC intern.

    Cited 26 timesPublished
  • Seley-Radtke v. Hosmane

    450 Md. 468 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 22, 2016

    Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 117 , 928 A.2d 795, 806 (2007), we explained that “[a]n absolute privilege is distinguished from a qualified privilege in that the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the … We explained that the difference between an absolute privilege and a qualified privilege is that the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the defendant, or the reasonableness of his conduct, while

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Gordon v. Posner

    142 Md. App. 399 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 31, 2002

    The *430 Court then proceeded to consider whether, as a matter of law, Eagan’s conduct barred his immunity defense. … It explained that Eagan’s guilty plea could not be used to establish the intentional killing required to abrogate parent-child immunity in the wrongful death case, because Eagan had disputed the nature of the killing in his

    Cited 31 timesPublished
  • Schoberg v. Schwartzman

    District Court, D. Maryland · Jun 11, 2025

    Sept. 23, 2021), This rule allows for interlocutory appellate review of a denial of qualified immunity when the appeal is based on a “purely legal issue” such as “what law was clearly established,” but not when the appeal … was [not] ‘clearly established’ at the time of” the alleged violation.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown

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