Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
10,000+ results
1.55s
Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
171 F. Supp. 2d 389 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Nov 7, 2001
Having established the proper standard, I now turn to whether Title II does, in fact, validly abrogate Tennessee’s sovereign immunity. … The United States has clearly made the grant of any federal funds contingent on waiver of a recipient state’s sovereign immunity from suit under Section 504 of the Rehab. Act.
Cited 2 timesPublished115 N.J. Eq. 401 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 26, 1934
The executors, after qualifying, merely continued his said employment on the same terms as were in effect at the time of the testator's death. … The unquestioned evidence clearly establishes that the executors, through Mr.
Cited 17 timesPublished335 N.J. Super. 427 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 11, 2000
Thus, even when a provision of the TCA establishes liability, that liability is ordinarily negated if the public entity possesses a corresponding immunity. Rochinsky v. … NOTES [1] N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7a provides absolute immunity to a qualified organization from liability to a "beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society, or association[]."
Cited 2 timesPublishedCoyne v. State, Department of Transportation
182 N.J. 481 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 2, 2005
As a result, the dissent concluded that “[t]he terms of N.J.S.A. 59:4-2a, generally establishing the parameters of liability, and the well-established idea that even the question of whether conduct was ‘palpably unreason … To construe [N.J.S.A. 59:2-3a] that broadly, however, would in effect eliminate most of the liability which the Legislature clearly intended to permit when it enacted the statute. [Costa v.
Cited 100 timesPublished196 N.J. 569 · Supreme Court of New Jersey · Dec 3, 2008
Summarizing the case succinctly, the motion court explained that “this is a case clearly in which [plaintiff is] alleging that the County of Essex allowed a dangerous condition that [it] had constructive notice of to exist … Any application of the Tort Claims Act must start from its “guiding principle,” that is, “that ‘immunity from tort liability is the general rule and liability is the exception.’ ” Coyne v.
Cited 406 timesPublishedTp. of Holmdel v. Nj Hwy. Auth
329 N.J. Super. 410 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 3, 2000
That language does not establish what that tax immunity is for. Specifically, it does not say that any project engaged in by the Authority that might serve a public purpose is tax immune. … If it was not contemplated in 1968, it clearly is not entitled to a tax immunity.
Cited 7 timesPublished282 F. Supp. 2d 221 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Sep 23, 2003
Qualified immunity grants government officials performing discretionary functions immunity from suit “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable … The advice of counsel can indeed be a factor in the qualified immunity analysis. See Castle v. Clymer, 15 F.Supp.2d 640, 667 (E.D.Pa.1998).
Cited 35 timesPublishedLathers v. Township of West Windsor
308 N.J. Super. 301 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 23, 1998
. *304 Prior to the Tort Claims Act, however, our courts recognized a common law immunity stemming from negligence in the removal of snow from public property. The common law immunity was established in Miehl v. … Because there was no landlord-tenant relationship established in Rossi , immunity applied. That rationale applies more forcefully under the facts of this case.
Cited 7 timesPublishedFlodmand v. STATE, INSTITUTIONS & AGENCIES DEP'T
175 N.J. Super. 503 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 29, 1980
It establishes the principle of vicarious liability for all public entities for "injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment" and thereby relies upon established … Clearly, the Department's design and structure of the Yardfields program represented a basic policy determination which is protected by the immunity rule.
Cited 7 timesPublishedTurner v. Township of Irvington
430 N.J. Super. 274 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 23, 2013
Accordingly, we conclude that N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10(d) does not qualify or limit the general rule of public entity immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:2-10, and therefore the Township remains immune for the wanton and willful misconduct … As such, this provision qualifies the general declaration of immunity in Section 2-1(a).
Cited 3 timesPublished193 N.J. Super. 271 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Sep 7, 1983
The provisions of the act primarily involved are those which establish immunity for law enforcement actions and for failure to enforce the law. … Consequently, the availability of public employee immunity may determine the liability of the municipality itself. The necessity for establishing *284 a workable interpretation of the two immunity provisions is clear.
Cited 62 timesPublished339 N.J. Super. 429 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Apr 24, 2001
POINT II: THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LAW IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, WHICH HOLDS THAT A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WHO IS GRANTED USE IMMUNITY AND IS THEN WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DECLINING TO ANSWER … have been clearly advised of his use immunity at the outset as a prerequisite to the subsequent imposition of a disciplinary sanction for refusal to make a statement.
Cited 146 timesPublishedFarrell v. Estell Manor Zoning Bd. of Adj.
193 N.J. Super. 554 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Jan 10, 1984
They assert, however, that intervenor is entitled to a qualified immunity from the strict terms of the zoning ordinance and should, therefore, be permitted to operate a residential treatment and evaluation center at the subject … Defendants argue that assuming all of the above to be true the State's qualified immunity does not inure to the benefit of the plaintiffs and cannot be relied upon by the State which is the lessee and not the owner.
Cited 7 timesPublished214 N.J. Super. 379 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Dec 19, 1986
The hospital also contends that it was unduly prejudiced by the trial judge's refusal to exclude the testimony of Gerald O'Rourke, who testified as an expert in security, because he was not qualified as an expert on hospital … Tp. of North Bergen, 77 N.J. 538, 559 (1978), and the intent to change the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed because an intent to alter the common law rule further than clearly expressed is not to be implied
Cited 4 timesPublishedHughes v. County of Burlington
99 N.J. Super. 405 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Feb 26, 1968
It was also established that engineering officials of the county and state highway departments had endorsed their *411 approval of the plans for the reconstruction of the road pursuant to federal aid requirements. … Plaintiff adduced the testimony of two engineering experts qualified as to knowledge of highway construction standards.
Cited 6 timesPublishedHess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.(PATH)
809 F. Supp. 1172 · District Court, D. New Jersey · Dec 21, 1992
Stated differently, the Supreme Court “has drawn upon principles of sovereign immunity to construe the [Eleventh] Amendment to “establish that ‘an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts 4 by her … This asymmetry, in fact, is based on the established precedent that a state may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit in state court while, nevertheless, maintaining its Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 14 Feeney,
Reversed on other grounds by Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30 (1994)Cited 4 timesPublishedHorn v. Village Supermarkets, Inc.
260 N.J. Super. 165 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Nov 10, 1992
The court in Carollo "conclude[d] therefore that the [arrest authorization of the] statute does not afford qualified immunity from a malicious prosecution action instituted by the merchant." 251 N.J. … Any person purposely concealing unpurchased merchandise of any store or other retail mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such store or other retail mercantile establishment, shall be
Cited 24 timesPublishedRussell Forde Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education
Supreme Court of New Jersey · Mar 11, 2026
See Margolis & Novack, Title 59: Claims Against Public Entities, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 (2025) (“This section establishes a basis for employer immunity once a ground is established for the employer’s vicarious liability … Supreme Court was established.
Cited 0 timesPublished148 N.J. Super. 15 · New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division · Mar 4, 1977
The act re-established governmental immunity from tort liability except for specific provisions therein establishing liability. … I perceive no warrant to qualify that term in this section of the Tort Claims Act simply because the commentator provided a reason for its enactment. The comment is not the statute and should not be given that effect.
Reversed by Malloy v. State, 76 N.J. 515 (1978)Cited 3 timesPublishedSodexho Operations, LLC v. Director, Division of Taxation
21 N.J. Tax 24 · New Jersey Tax Court · Aug 13, 2003
The establishment of those levels was done independently of the hospital. … Sodexho established food preparation procedures, policies, and recipes, and could use and retain its procedure manuals.
Cited 2 timesPublished
Ask Donna