Case law

Whitfield v. Minter

368 F. Supp. 798 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 1973

. § 1983 to secure rights, privileges and immunities established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Title IY, pt. A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. … Summing up, therefore, this Court clearly has jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of the current complaint.

Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head

98 F. Supp. 3d 55 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2015

establish[ing] a waiver of sovereign immunity.” … The Tribe is clearly an adequate representative with respect to this interest.

Yong Tang v. Chertoff

689 F. Supp. 2d 206 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 2010

It was not a blanket immunity from all court scrutiny, as the government had argued. … This "odd position” is not unlike the position in which the Court finds itself in determining qualified immunity in a civil rights case, see Harlow v.

Pevoski v. Pevoski

371 Mass. 358 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 18, 1976

Jackson, supra, indicates clearly that the State of New York would assert no interest on the facts of this accident. … today to support a general rule of interspousal tort immunity.”

Miles Plumbing & Heating Co. v. City of Brockton

17 Mass. App. Ct. 33 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 27, 1983

For any fault in the plan of the system there would be immunity. … If it were open to the plaintiff to argue the matter at this stage, the present record would have to be found insufficient to establish “integration.”

In Re Screws Antitrust Litigation

526 F. Supp. 1316 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 1981

Martin’s criminal-trial testimony is clearly hearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801 for purposes of the forthcoming civil trial, for the series of statements which comprise his testimony clearly were not made by Martin while testifying … In light of Martin’s absence from the jurisdiction of this Court and his established unwillingness to testify voluntarily at trial, it is certain that at the time of trial Martin will be unavailable as defined in Fed.R.Evid

Altman v. Kelly

28 F. Supp. 2d 50 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 7, 1998

Generally, public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for their conduct when they are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . … When prosecutors are performing administrative or investigatory functions, however, they are entitled only to qualified immunity. See id. 500 U.S. at 491 , 111 S.Ct. 1934 .

Joyce v. Town of Dennis

705 F. Supp. 2d 74 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2010

the relevant rights are well-enough defined to preclude a finding of qualified immunity. … Such immunity is determined by a two-part test: 1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right and 2) if so, whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of

Penate v. Kaczmarek

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 24, 2019

Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (holding that qualified immunity protected a police officer in a Fourth Amendment context because the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established law) (quotations omitted). … When a supervisor seeks qualified immunity in a section 1983 action, the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is satisfied when (1) the subordinate’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional

Kromhout v. Commonwealth

398 Mass. 687 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 2, 1986

This court has held that G.L.c. 258, § 2, does not in and of itself enlarge governmental liability beyond the remedies established under the common and statutory law. Dinsky v. … That was clearly not the case here.

Andersen v. Bishop

304 Mass. 396 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 28, 1939

Clearly the alleged acts were within the power of the defendants. … These are mere epithets which cannot change or qualify the material facts. Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63 , 71. Caverno v. Fellows, 286 Mass. 440, 443 .

Commonwealth v. Welosky

276 Mass. 398 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 9, 1931

The selection of jurors has constantly been required to be from those qualified to vote. Qualifications for voting have been continuously established by the Constitution. … of women becoming so qualified.

Visnick v. Caulfield

73 Mass. App. Ct. 809 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 10, 2009

The privilege invoked by Caulfield is well established. … Ct. 360 , 361 n.3 (2007), “the denial of a pretrial motion predicated upon an absolute privilege, which provides immunity from suit, would also qualify under the doctrine of present execution.”

SBT HOLDINGS, LLC v. Town of Westminster

541 F. Supp. 2d 405 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 25, 2008

Government officials subject to suit are normally shielded from liability from civil damages only when their actions “do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would … In contrast to this “qualified immunity,” a narrow class of government officials enjoy absolute immunity from suit.

Vaughan v. Commonwealth

377 Mass. 914 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 13, 1979

Even a statutory affirmation of governmental immunity would clearly have been definitive action. … When Whitney is read correctly, it becomes even more clear that we should not modify the law now established by a comprehensive statute. Judgment affirmed.

Doe v. Town of Framingham

965 F. Supp. 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 4, 1997

Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. … Team members and school officials may well be eligible for qualified immunity, see Puffer v.

Fiske v. Town of North Attleboro

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 242 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Feb 14, 2007

The First Circuit has held that there can be no cognizable claim for abuse of process under §1983, because the Supreme Court had effectively eliminated this type of claim with its decisions upholding qualified immunity. … The court does not consider whether the remaining individuals are entitled to qualified immunity on these common-law torts, since they did not raise that doctrine in their papers.

Amaral v. Seekonk Grand Prix Corp.

89 Mass. App. Ct. 1 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 14, 2016

"The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to … Grand Prix could fully anticipate that a parent accompanying minor children and paying a fee on their behalf would qualify as a paying customer under the statute.

Capozzi v. Department of Transportation

135 F. Supp. 2d 87 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 2, 2001

Qualified immunity All the individual defendants raise the claim of qualified immunity. … “Unless the plaintiffs allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Mitchell v.

Petricca v. City of Gardner

429 F. Supp. 2d 216 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 28, 2006

With respect to Comm’r Reynolds, § 1983 liability may attach only where no qualified immunity defense is available. … A public official is immune from § 1983 claims unless the facts establish that [his] conduct violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of the violation such that a reasonable officer would