Case law

Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc.

406 Mass. 615 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 12, 1990

Clearly, therefore, the workers’ compensation statute was intended to deal with injuries and liability occurring in the course of the employer-employee relationship. … Therefore, we conclude that a dispute of fact existed on the question whether Cranberry Growers and Dairy were engaged in a “joint venture” that qualified them for “single employer” status under c. 152. 3.

Davis v. Rennie

997 F. Supp. 137 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 25, 1998

Zampini also seek a declaration that they are entitled to qualified immunity. … THE ISSUE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY Plaintiffs motion that none of the defendants is qualifiedly immune is denied, as is the motion filed by certain of the defendants seeking a declaration of their entitlement to qualified immunity

Brum v. Town of Dartmouth

428 Mass. 684 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 21, 1999

Commonwealth claims that § 10 (i) *697 establishes that where a plaintiff can make out a claim that a government actor has acted with gross negligence in releasing an individual, the other immunities provided by § 10 cannot … We need not, therefore, address the parties’ arguments regarding the availability to defendants of a qualified immunity defense. See Estate of Gilmore, supra at 723 ; Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F.

Peters v. Ling

2 Mass. L. Rptr. 561 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 1, 1994

Section 205(b) provides that “information and records which are necessary to comply with risk management and qualify assurance programs established by the board of registration in medicine and which are necessary to the work … process. 243 CMR 3 .01, defining the scope and purpose of the regulatory scheme, states that “to assure free self-examination by physicians and institutions, the legislature provided extensive safeguards of confidentiality, immunity

Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., Inc.

374 Mass. 382 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 1978

We have extended the qualified privilege to a greater variety of situations. See, e.g., *386 Hutchinson v. New England Tel. & Tel. … Before giving this example, the judge clearly informed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that Lauber accused the plaintiff of the crime of larceny or dishonest conduct as an employee.

Wilkins v. City of Haverhill

468 Mass. 86 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 9, 2014

Without establishing a general rule, a number of prior appellate decisions have indicated that *89 to be entitled to the public use statute’s immunity from claims of ordinary negligence, a landowner must permit all members … for immunity”); Cregan v.

Canterbury Liquors & Pantry v. Sullivan

16 F. Supp. 2d 41 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 3, 1998

With regard to possible immunity, I must decide, first, whether there is a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy that the restraint at issue is intended to serve. … A state may establish a regulatory scheme to displace free competition in order to serve some other, clearly stated public policy.

Taplin v. Town of Chatham

390 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 1983

The statutory language does not, however, clearly resolve the issue. Two circumstances strongly support our conclusion. … A statute which is silent on the subject of the principal’s immunity but grants immunity to the agent would be expected to have no effect on the established common law.

Canterbury Automotive, Inc. v. City of Worcester

32 Mass. L. Rptr. 5 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 15, 2014

As to the City’s decisions not to make certain improvements to its sewer and drainage systems, these are clearly the type of core discretionary functions that are immunized from liability under G.L.c. 258, § 10(b). … The statute was designed to eliminate governmental immunity, subject to certain clearly delineated exceptions. See Harry Stoller & Co. v. City of Lowell, 412 Mass. 139, 141 (1992).

Commonwealth v. Doherty

394 Mass. 341 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 26, 1985

This court has not found it neccessary to *344 decide whether this statutory scheme establishes the exclusive procedure by which a Superior Court judge may grant immunity to a witness. See Commonwealth v. … Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that prosecutorial misconduct justified a court’s ordering the prosecutor to grant statutoiy immunity and that a witness capable of producing “clearly exculpatory evidence”

Natal v. City of New Bedford

37 F. Supp. 2d 74 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 23, 1999

Turgeon seeks summary judgment on grounds that (1) his use of deadly force was reasonable, and (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity. … rights could fall within the scope of qualified immunity.

Purvis v. Commissioner of Correction

29 Mass. App. Ct. 190 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 28, 1990

With respect to the Department’s claim of qualified immunity, under the applicable standard in these circumstances the governmental officials would be “shielded from liability for civil damages” if, at the time of the challenged … actions, “their conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Buzulis v. Mohegan Sun Casino

69 Mass. App. Ct. 708 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 9, 2007

App. 110, 115-117 (2004) (although Indian tribe qualified for sovereign immunity, defendant it hired as independent contractor did not). Cf. Vertentes v. … The casino enjoys sovereign immunity and the suit against it was rightly dismissed. The proper forum for suit to be brought was the Gaming Disputes Court, within the applicable period established by the Mohegan Tribe.

Shapiro v. City of Worcester

464 Mass. 261 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 30, 2013

We further determined that our holding should apply retroactively in order to “further[] the purpose of having a consistent and clearly defined body of law.” Id. at 592 . … However, in exceptional circumstances, when “determining whether a new rule arising from decisional law should apply prospectively, we look at three factors: (1) whether a new principle has been established whose resolution

Plourde v. Police Department

85 Mass. App. Ct. 178 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 9, 2014

Sovereign immunity. First, the plaintiff claims *181 the judge erred in dismissing his Wage Act claim based on the theory of sovereign immunity. … Boston, 364 Mass. 403, 413 (1973), where the Supreme Judicial Court stated, “ ‘[Ojur well established principle of construction’ that, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, a Special Act ‘made in

Priestly v. Doucette

1 Mass. L. Rptr. 415 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 21, 1993

Qualified immunity applies to civil rights violations as well as invasion of privacy claims. Duarte, supra at 44 . … If the law was clearly established and the supervisor failed to prove extraordinary circumstances for justifying a lack of knowledge of the law, the immunity defense fails. Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 646 (1989).

Clarke v. Board of Collegiate Authority

327 Mass. 279 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1951

[the administrator of veterans’ affairs] a list of the educational and training institutions, including industrial establishments, within the commonwealth which are qualified and equipped to furnish any form of education … If the agency advises the administrator that an institution is qualified, it is “deemed qualified.”

Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head

98 F. Supp. 3d 55 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 27, 2015

establish[ing] a waiver of sovereign immunity.” … The Tribe is clearly an adequate representative with respect to this interest.

Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation

475 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 11, 2016

Thus, public employers are not liable for postjudgment interest unless some other statute clearly waives sovereign immunity with respect to such interest. … L. c. 258, § 2, does not clearly indicate a legislative intent "to compensate the plaintiff for loss of the use of money when damages are not paid on time." Onofrio, supra at 659-660.

Yong Tang v. Chertoff

689 F. Supp. 2d 206 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 1, 2010

It was not a blanket immunity from all court scrutiny, as the government had argued. … This "odd position” is not unlike the position in which the Court finds itself in determining qualified immunity in a civil rights case, see Harlow v.