Case law

(1996)

81 Op. Att'y Gen. 207 · Maryland Attorney General Reports · Jan 17, 1996

. § 1983 , the sheriff or deputy sheriff may assert qualified or "good faith" immunity if the transport were authorized by statute. If not, no immunity would be available. … Under this form of immunity, government officials are not subject to damages liability for the performance of their discretionary functions when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

O'Brien & Gere Engineers, Inc. v. City of Salisbury

447 Md. 394 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 26, 2016

Nature and History of Litigation Privilege We begin by examining the established contours of the litigation privilege, which accords the putative tortfeasor absolute immunity from civil liability. … The litigation privilege has been described as “more of an immunity for litigators, by contrast to a qualified privilege.” Paul T.

Pope v. Williams

66 L.R.A. 398 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Dec 3, 1903

. *66 On 29th September, 1903, he applied for registration to the Board of Registration of the election district in Montgomery County in which he resided to be registered as a qualified voter, but the board refused to comply … The scope of the series of constitutional provisions of which the 14th Amendment is one, was clearly stated in the case of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303—312.

Para v. Richards Group of Washington Ltd. Partnership

339 Md. 241 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 20, 1995

Upon remand, the owner/developer established that he had a custom building contract for the house in question. … immune from tort suit.

Bender v. Bender

57 Md. App. 593 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 6, 1984

Interspousal Immunity Throughout the proceeding, Penelope Bender relied upon the doctrine of interspousal immunity as a defense to her husband’s suit to recover the money. … , preferring a case by case approach, it clearly paves the way for such actions involving intentional infliction of personal *601 injury.

Beall v. Holloway-Johnson

446 Md. 48 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 21, 2016

In a case involving a question of qualified immunity for State Police troopers, the Court of Special Appeals, relying on our decision in Okwa, stated that “a police officer acting without malice may be liable for using … “Baltimore City police officers enjoy an indirect statutory qualified immunity under LGTCA [but] do not possess a direct immunity from liability for their tortious conduct under LGTCA.

Bord v. Baltimore County

220 Md. App. 529 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Dec 17, 2014

, or establishes that ‘no reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct complained of was lawful.’” … Appellee contends that the circuit court considered appellant’s allegations in comparison with the case law concerning qualified immunity for public officials and correctly ruled that the actions of both officers were not

Honaker v. W. C. & A. N. Miller Development Co.

278 Md. 453 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Nov 4, 1976

The relation established by the statute was described in terms of two employers of the same employee: “One was [the employee’s] immediate employer, the subcontractor, whose relation was founded in contract; and the second … “If an employer is within the [Workmen’s Compensation] act to bear its liabilities, he must remain to be accorded its immunities, in the absence of clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary.” State v.

Karangelen v. Snyder

40 Md. App. 393 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Oct 13, 1978

The only issue is whether the appellee is entitled to the protection of governmental immunity. … Accordingly, he is protected by a qualified immunity against civil liability for non-malicious acts performed within the scope of his authority. Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271 , 170 A. 2d 220 (1961); Clark v.

Davenport v. Maryland

38 F. Supp. 3d 679 · District Court, D. Maryland · Aug 6, 2014

She further alleges “other officers, who were less qualified and had tested lower than Plaintiff, received letters for oral interviews.” (Id.). … Servs. for City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir.1990) (“The waiver of sovereign immunity in the Maryland Torts Claims Act clearly limits the state’s waiver of immunity to actions brought in the Maryland state courts.

Mayor of Baltimore v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail-road

6 Gill 288 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jun 15, 1848

The effort made to restrict the immunity now under consideration to State taxes only, cannot be sustained. … There are no words used by the legislature qualifying or limiting the extent of the immunity conferred; it is therefore unlike the case of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore vs.

Ladnier v. Murray

572 F. Supp. 544 · District Court, D. Maryland · Sep 27, 1983

Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 95 S.Ct. 992 , 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) for the proposition that under the defense of qualified immunity a police officer is immune from damages in § 1983 cases unless he: knew or reasonably should … Third, the aspect of the defense of qualified immunity that involves the issue of whether or not a governmental officer acted with malice was *548 abandoned by the Supreme Court in Harlow v.

Fitchette v. Collins

402 F. Supp. 147 · District Court, D. Maryland · Oct 13, 1975

Hence, the Court adopted a qualified immunity for school board officials: (I)n the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew … Rather, damages will be appropriate only if the school board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot

Ensko v. Howard County, Md.

423 F. Supp. 2d 502 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 22, 2006

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions “generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory … If true, such conduct violated a clearly established statutory right; there is a genuine issue whether Livesay is entitled to qualified immunity.

Colon v. United States

320 F. Supp. 3d 733 · District Court, D. Maryland · Mar 13, 2018

Wollenburg also included Kassop and Taylor as fact witnesses in those hearings, on the grounds that Kassop was qualified to testify as a physician and Taylor was qualified to testify as to Colon's mental health. … In maintaining, operating, and controlling the aircraft those individuals were also clearly engaged in a "military act." Finally, in Bailey v.

In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Aug 28, 2025

As a part of a study, the court may order that the child or any parent or guardian be examined by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other professionally qualified person. … SB 3 changes existing law and establishes some new procedures with which we disagree.

State v. Sharafeldin

382 Md. 129 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jul 27, 2004

” and picking, instead, “candidates who were less qualified than the Plaintiff.” … There was clearly no intent on the part of the Legislature to waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in actions in Federal court or to waive its inherent sovereign immunity in actions filed in the courts of some other

Kee v. State Highway Administration

68 Md. App. 473 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 10, 1986

in situations where the legislature had clearly intended to waive it. … As we explained earlier, the legislature clearly manifested its intent to waive immunity in this type of action if fiscally possible.

Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Pollitt

220 Md. 132 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 20, 1959

It is a general rule that the official participants in judicial and legislative proceedings enjoy an immunity from actions for defamation, described as an absolute privilege, on grounds of public policy. … But it has been stated that the rule should not be extended “beyond the strict line established by a concurrence of decisions.” Maurice v. Warden, 54 Md. 233, 254 .

Bowie v. State

14 Md. App. 567 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Mar 3, 1972

As the moving party, the appellant bore the burden of establishing a clear factual predicate for his theory of defense. … The compelling circumstances are such that the appellant here would not qualify; the redress is such that the appellant here would not benefit.