Case law

National Bank of Fairhaven v. United States

660 F. Supp. 125 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 16, 1987

Individual federal employees possess qualified immunity from law suits for their actions taken in the course of their official duties. Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1214 (1st Cir.1986). … Finally, the Bank has not shown that any “clearly established” Due Process rights were violated. Consequently, Mr. Brooks is protected by qualified immunity.

Quarterman v. City of Springfield

716 F. Supp. 2d 67 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2009

Defendants’ Immunity Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified and/or absolute immunity against suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. … Immunity Neither Defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity on the remaining state law claims.

Dalli v. Board of Education

358 Mass. 753 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1971

The first and second paragraphs, containing the general immunization requirement and the medical exemption, are clearly independent and separable from the third. … They will therefore remain unaffected under established principles. Commonwealth v. Petranich, 183 Mass. 217, 220 . Krupp v. Building Commr. of Newton, 325 Mass. 686, 691-692 , and cases cited.

Celona v. Erickson

270 F. Supp. 3d 473 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 19, 2017

The qualified 'immunity inquiry has two parts. … Pierre is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.

Fedele v. School Committee of Westwood

412 Mass. 110 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1992

immunity, a ground the defendants did not raise below. … We need not consider the issue of qualified immunity because the judgment in. the defendants’ favor on this claim can clearly be upheld on' the basis discussed in the text of this opinion.

Charles v. City of Boston

365 F. Supp. 2d 82 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 29, 2005

Bogdan’s related qualified immunity argument must also fail because it turns on the absence of a clearly established duty for him to disclose directly to a defendant, which is not the constitutional breach that Charles is … Thus, if the qualified immunity question is “whether a reasonable official could have believed his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and the information the official possessed at the time of the allegedly

Stetson v. Town of Ashland

24 Mass. L. Rptr. 427 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 8, 2008

Stetson did not request punitive damages for the alleged civil rights violation, and Melnick did not assert qualified immunity as a defense in his answer. 3 Cf. Powell, 391 Mass. at 23. … Additionally, Melnick later asserted qualified immunity as grounds for summary j udgment.

Grassia v. PIERS

735 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 3, 2010

Qualified immunity may also protect officers from liability in suits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . The touchstone of qualified immunity is whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable. … The Court will enter summary judgment in favor of Piers and Delaney because they are entitled to qualified immunity. First, however, a housekeeping matter requires attention.

Daley v. Harber

234 F. Supp. 2d 27 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 15, 2002

a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. … Although the qualified immunity standard is “not a stringent test,” Rivera v. Murphy, 979 *31 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir.1992), Harber has failed to meet it.

Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin

886 F. Supp. 955 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 26, 1995

The individual Town Defendants’ cross-motion is granted as to all claims against them on the grounds of qualified immunity. … The individual Town Defendants therefore enjoy qualified immunity and the complaint is dismissed as to them. D.

Jaundoo v. Clarke

783 F. Supp. 2d 190 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 28, 2011

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person … “[T]he second, ‘clearly established,’ step of the qualified immunity analysis ... in turn, has two aspects.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir.2009).

Gross v. Bohn

782 F. Supp. 173 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 17, 1991

Qualified Immunity Defendant Morgan also argues that he is entitled to have the action dismissed based on qualified immunity. The United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for qualified immunity in Harlow v. … Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 818 (1st Cir.1985) (stating firmly established principle of law that good faith defense of qualified immunity exists with respect to claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ).

Mulford v. Mangano

35 Mass. App. Ct. 800 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jan 21, 1994

“Another established principle is that the employee, in order to be entitled to compensation, need not necessarily be engaged in the actual performance of work at the moment of injury. … L. c. 152, § 1(7A), as amended through St. 1985, c. 572, § 11. 1 If Mangano’s sole reason for being at the restaurant were to watch the Celtics game with fellow employees, he would not qualify for coemployee immunity.

DeLong v. Dubois

7 Mass. L. Rptr. 47 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jun 6, 1997

III.The DOC is entitled to qualified immunity “Qualified immunity shields public officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established … The DOC did not violate a clearly established constitutional right because DeLong did not have an enforceable liberty interest. The DOC is entitled to qualified immunity.

Woodley v. Town of Nantucket

645 F. Supp. 1365 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 17, 1986

Hunter’s Immunity Hunter asserts, however, that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields him from any civil liability arising out of plaintiff’s arrest. In Harlow v. … The defense of qualified immunity, asserted by Officer Pearson and Chief of Police Hunter as individuals, is not available to the town. Owen v.

Ward v. City of Boston

367 F. Supp. 2d 7 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 21, 2005

The plaintiff has also failed to establish that the City was negligent in the hiring of the officers. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the defendants were not qualified to be police officers. … In view of this court’s holding that there was no deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, this court will not reach the alternative defense of qualified immunity.

Overton v. Torruella

183 F. Supp. 2d 295 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2001

Even if absolute immunity were not available in this case, the suit would be subject to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. See generally Harlow v. … The complaint does not allege facts which, if taken as true, show that the defendants violated “ ‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Matney v. City of North Adams

359 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 21, 2005

Moreover, the three individual defendants named in the complaint are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity against any claim under this statute. … The Supreme Court has made it clear that “government officials] performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

Maher v. Town of Ayer

463 F. Supp. 2d 117 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 30, 2006

Taylor contends that she is in any event shielded from liability by qualified immunity. In assessing a claim of qualified immunity, a prescribed sequence is to be followed. … or whether a reasonable officer would have understood her actions to be in violation of that clearly established right.

Tesson v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare

6 Mass. L. Rptr. 623 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 25, 1997

The Court (Fremont-Smith, J.) denied Tesson’s motion on the ground that a government official, such as the Commissioner, enj oys a qualified immunity from suit for civil damages when he or she is performing a discretionary … function and when, “at the time of the challenged action, the statutory or constitutional right allegedly violated was not ‘clearly established.’ ” Breault v.