Case law

Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives

386 Mass. 1223 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 23, 1982

If enacted, it would constitute the first step to accomplish by indirection what art. 44 clearly forbids, and the voters of the Commonwealth have clearly rejected by referendum vote on several recent occasions. … It is assumed to be capable of comprehension by those qualified to vote. Attorney General v. Methuen, 236 Mass. 564, 573 [1921]. Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 372 [1921].

Bellone v. Southwick-Tolland Regional School District

915 F. Supp. 2d 187 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 14, 2013

to August 16th”; that Plaintiff “has made significant progress in the[ ] areas [of stress reduction methods and problem solving strategies] over the past three months and speaks of getting back to teaching, a career he clearly … As to the inferential approach, the First Circuit has adopted a modified version of the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

College Hill Properties, LLC v. City of Worcester ex rel. Department of Building & Zoning

135 F. Supp. 3d 10 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2015

and (2) must suffice .to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.” … The individual Defendants also assert that that the claims against them must be dismissed on qüalifíed immunity grounds. Whether Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims.

Palmer v. Board of Selectmen

368 Mass. 620 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 29, 1975

They cite the well established principle that a statute conferring substantive rights, as opposed to one defining procedural practice, is not to have retroactive application unless the Legislature clearly *624 so intended … credits shall be earned and in light of the legislative policy sought to be effectuated by the act. 6 When so considered “further” can be inferred to mean attaining educational levels beyond the minimum requirements set for qualifying

Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health

348 Mass. 414 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 2, 1965

Statutory standards for cream and ungraded cream are established by Gr. … Similarly, advertising matter displayed on the frozen food counters from which Coffee-Rich is purveyed clearly and conspicuously states that Coffee-Rich is a “frozen non-dairy” product.

Kibbe v. DuBois

120 F. Supp. 2d 114 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 2000

Doyle qualifies as “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of AEDPA’s “contrary to” analysis. 15 The Commonwealth argues that Doyle is not controlling because Kibbe waived his right to remain silent. … Like Doyle , the Charles rule also qualifies as “clearly established Federal law” amenable to AEDPA’s “contrary to” analysis. b. The Rule of Anderson v.

Watman v. Groman (In Re Watman)

331 B.R. 502 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2005

In light of Watman’s status as sole officer, shareholder, and director of Childrens Dental, Childrens Dental clearly qualifies as an ‘insider’ of Watman for purposes of § 727(a)(7), and Watman does not argue otherwise.” … This finding is not clearly erroneous.

Slattery v. Town of Framingham

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 9, 2020

, and (2) that the remaining speech at issue was protected, the court need not address Chief Ferguson and Acting Chief Trask’s qualified immunity defenses. … Under Massachusetts law, immunity is afforded to discretionary functions, which “includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.

Commonwealth v. Smith

460 Mass. 385 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 12, 2011

The judge’s instructions in no way vouched for the Commonwealth’s theory of the incident; she clearly stated: “The Commonwealth is going forward with these indictments saying that they allege, and it will be up to you to … Where it is apparent that Penn’s statement qualifies as spontaneous utterance and was nontestimonial, it was not error to admit it at trial. *396 c. Exclusion of Penn’s statement to defendant’s investigator.

Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp.

410 Mass. 805 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 8, 1991

(permitting a grant of immunity for specified crimes for witnesses in a grand jury investigation); Correllas v. Viveiros, ante 314 (1991). … Fiesner has not clearly identified any “secured right” with which TCC interfered.

Commonwealth v. Labbe

6 Mass. App. Ct. 73 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 28, 1978

There, it was held that the evidence established nothing more than opportunity. … After the wife first asserted the privilege, the judge inquired to establish whether she would do so in all instances, and then he excused her as a witness.

Cyran v. Town of Ware

413 Mass. 452 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 19, 1992

Important to the decision were several statutes that established a police officer's obligations in the circumstances. … "[T]he very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability." Id. at 319 .

In Re Medallion Realty Trust

103 B.R. 8 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 11, 1989

Parties cannot establish a partnership through mere intention and reference to themselves as partners. E.g., Martin v. Stone, 332 Mass, at 540, 126 N.E.2d at 196 . … As such, it is clearly eligible for bankruptcy relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 , 101(35).

Salisbury Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. Division of Administrative Law Appeals

448 Mass. 365 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 15, 2007

The division has the power “to establish certain rates of payment for health care services.” G. L. c. 118G, § 2 (b). … Clearly it does. In reviewing a regulation, this court does not substitute its judgment concerning the wisdom of the regulation for that of the agency.

Civetti v. Commissioner of Public Welfare

392 Mass. 474 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 12, 1984

For the reasons we have discussed, we conclude that the plaintiffs qualified for AFDC payments under 106 Code Mass. … A categorically eligible child must also meet financial eligibility standards by qualifying as “needy.”

Chazournes v. Edwards

20 Mass. 5 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1825

Though the decision does not seem to be in exact conformity with the rule as before settled in several cases, yet the principle is clearly admitted. … A series of cases decided in New York have established the rule in that state incontrovertibly. The case of Livingston v.

Shannon O'Brien v. Deborah Goldberg

Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 4, 2025

But as CCC Chair, O'Brien's interactions with other commissioners and staff are clearly part and parcel of the development and implementation of the commission's policies. … Constitution, establishing succession in the event of "Disability of [the] President." See U.S. Const. amend.

Rogers v. Okin

638 F. Supp. 934 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 27, 1986

The essence of plaintiffs’ claim was that they should not be forcibly medicated or secluded, except in clearly defined emergencies. … The various factors to be considered in establishing the lodestar fee are set forth in King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir.1977). 1.

Guckenberger v. Boston University

974 F. Supp. 106 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 15, 1997

. § 794 (West Supp. 1997), and state law. 2 The class claims that BU discriminates against the learning-disabled by: (1) establishing unreasonable, overly- burdensome eligibility criteria for qualifying as a disabled student … Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.1995) (finding that “[i]t is enough for the plaintiff to suggest the existence of a plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits”).

Kosilek v. Spencer

889 F. Supp. 2d 190 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2012

Dennehy clearly communicated to Lappin her opposition to providing Kosilek sex reassign *225 ment surgery. … The evidence on the record clearly establishes that both Dr. Appelbaum and Dennehy were aware of facts from which they could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm to Kosilek existed, and drew the inference.