Case law

Fisher v. United States

705 F. Supp. 2d 57 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2010

The junction box was clearly visible to anyone looking at the floor of the crawl space from a sufficient height. (DF 18). … The FTCA waives sovereign immunity for certain negligence claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1). There is no strict liability under the FTCA. Laird v.

Goodrich v. Davis

52 Mass. 40 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 15, 1846

Certain it is, that the extent to which the question of libel or no libel was formerly referred to the court exclusively, as a matter of law, has latterly been much qualified, and the jury are often called upon to decide … So far as it was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was the editor o°f the Massachusetts Cataract, and thus establishing the application of the libel to the plaintiff, it was clearly competent; beyond that, the evidence

Iwata v. Intel Corp.

349 F. Supp. 2d 135 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 8, 2004

-only establish the former proposition, not the latter. Iwata also cannot establish retaliatory discharge under section 1140, because her Complaint admits that she was unable to return to work. Compl. § 42. … To establish that she was terminated in violation of section 1140, she would first need to make out a prima facie case that: “(1) [s]he had the opportunity to attain rights under an ERISA benefit plan; (2)[s]he was qualified

Milliken v. Town of Littleton

361 Mass. 576 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 10, 1972

Towns may establish public libraries “and may re *579 ceive . . . any gift. . . therefor.” G. L. c. 78, § 7. … S. 488 (see fn. 5) may be applied in striking down restrictions (expressed in sectarian terms) on the persons qualified to perform quasi public or fiduciary functions with reference to the library.

Shamban v. Masidlover

429 Mass. 50 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 19, 1999

L. c. 188, § 1A and § 1, establishes two State exemptions. Under G. … Thus, we conclude the Legislature clearly intended to distinguish in § 1A between elderly and disabled declarants.

Commonwealth v. Long

482 Mass. 804 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 12, 2019

The officers established a perimeter around the warehouse. … P. 34 before circumstances had been established by trial).

Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis

863 F. Supp. 2d 75 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 22, 2012

The Sturgises cite no case law establishing that G.L. c. 183, § 27, is a condition precedent to a deficiency action. … If it does, a presumption of preemption arises that is reversible “only if the law can clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c).

Blanchard v. Stearns

46 Mass. 298 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Nov 15, 1842

But they establish several prerequisites, to be observed by all persons claiming the right to vote, which, without in the least impairing the rights of qualified voters, may contribute considerably to the protection and security … evidence offered at the trial may have been much stronger than that furnished to the selectmen, before the meeting ; and therefore the jury might have found, consistently with these instructions, that the plaintiff had now clearly

Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.

581 F. Supp. 2d 160 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 2, 2008

Claim 10 is clearly not drawn to the protein itself or to the process of its production. … The scope of prior art immunized by section 121 nonetheless appears to extend to the '698 patent.

Fordyce v. Town of Hanover

457 Mass. 248 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 9, 2010

“The prequalification committee shall select a minimum of [three] qualified general contractors to submit bids . . . Id. … law unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed.”

Cooke v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co.

875 F. Supp. 880 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 30, 1994

(ii) The rate used by the insurer in the qualifying bid under which the plan administrator will purchase annuities not being paid as a lump sum. … (ii) The rate used by the insurer in the qualifying bid under which the plan administrator will purchase annuities not being paid as a lump sum....

Johnson v. Martha's Vineyard Commission

3 Mass. L. Rptr. 132 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Dec 2, 1994

In so ruling, the court relied on well established First Circuit precedent which has repeatedly and steadfastly held that rejections of development projects do not ordinarily implicate substantive due process. … In light of this ruling, the court does not consider whether the Commissioners would be entitled to qualified immunity had the plaintiffs made out a substantive due process violation.

Ferrari v. Vitamin Shoppe, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2022

The statements at issue here are all sufficiently narrow to qualify as structure/function claims. Cf. … The defendant has carried the narrow burden for substantiation that existing law has established. Cf.

Palmer v. Ernst & Young, LLP

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 277 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Apr 11, 2007

The limitation of liability was clearly stated at the close of the letter, just below the paragraph informing Dr. … Palmer as its fee to establish and execute the Annuity Transaction.

Toomey Ex Rel. O'Connor Lumber Esop Participants Committee v. Jones

855 F. Supp. 19 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 24, 1994

That document states that PHA will “assume responsibility for keeping up with current laws and regulations in order to properly maintain the Plan on a qualified status for tax purposes. … To repeat, the record clearly reflects that PHA performed only ministerial tasks—however complex and involved—on behalf of the Plan and rendered advice only in regard to these services.

City of Somerville v. Somerville Municipal Employees Ass'n

80 Mass. App. Ct. 686 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 25, 2011

The relevant question here, as first clearly formulated during oral argument, is whether Pefine received “salary or compensation for service rendered in any civil service position” in violation of G. L. c. 31, § 71. … in the state and local service, encouraging competition and offering an opportunity for all qualified persons to compete.’ ” Ibid., quoting from Sholock v.

Bourassa v. Masscor Optical Industries

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 13, 2021

immunity doctrine. … Plaintiff is clearly offering these statements for the truth of the matter asserted.

Commonwealth v. Lahey

80 Mass. App. Ct. 606 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 12, 2011

Scores of cases establish the standard of review. The appellate court accepts the motion judge’s subsidiary findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. … We cannot reject those credibility determinations of subsidiary facts as clearly erroneous. *614 In turn, those findings establish, as an ultimate fact, the practical certainty of the discovery of the defendant by the Attleboro

Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver General

319 Mass. 672 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 3, 1946

Such a statute is subject to many well established limitations, Amory v. … For all practical purposes assessors became immune to action, and in most cases the amount that could be recovered from a city or town was not worth the effort and expense of litigation.

In Re Evergreen Ultra Short Opportunities Fund Securities Litigation

705 F. Supp. 2d 86 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2010

[and] would immunize a scheme that purported to invest in low-risk [securities] but in fact invested in legitimate but high risk [securities]. 257 F.R.D. at 547 . … The Court focused its analysis on the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff-purchaser, holding that to qualify as a Section 12 “seller,” the defendant “must be directly involved in the actual solicitation of a