Case law

Pritchett Control, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.

361 F. Supp. 3d 530 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 10, 2019

The state analog to the federal Miller Act, the statute protects suppliers who furnish material and labor on public construction projects who, but for sovereign immunity, could secure payment using a mechanics lien. … Co. , 325 F.2d 54 , 62 (9th Cir. 1963) ("[a]ll that is required [to establish a Miller Act Claim] is proof that the labor or material was furnished in the prosecution of the work provided for in the prime contract, and that

Waheed v. State of Maryland

District Court, D. Maryland · Oct 22, 2021

(“SPP”) §§ 21-101 (establishing MSRPS); 21-103 (establishing MSRPS’s Board); 21-117 (establishing MSRA as “an agency of the Board”). … Courts in Maryland apply a two-part test to determine whether sovereign immunity applies in a specific case: “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for its protection; and, if so, (2) whether the legislature

George v. State of Maryland Department of Publice Safety and Correctional Services

District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 28, 2021

The burden of establishing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. Evans v. BF. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999). … Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

Brinsfield v. Howeth

110 Md. 520 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · May 20, 1909

It is to be observed that he was not called to establish her general reputation for chastity. … The defendant’s fourth prayer was bad in that it did not require the jury to find the facts which in law would amount to a qualified privilege.

Anne Arundel County v. Muir

149 Md. App. 617 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Feb 28, 2003

Those sections addressed the circumstances under which a member or former member of a qualified state or local government subdivision retirement or pension plan could transfer service credit from that plan to another qualified … Clearly, he did not meet all four of the conditions required for eligibility under section 31(b).

Sokol v. Nattans

26 Md. App. 65 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · May 5, 1975

As we have seen, the statute was last amended as to substance effective 1 July 1972 whereby the commissions and allowances now in effect were established. … And it is patent that the compensation was not so inadequate as to make it impracticable to find persons properly qualified to act. 11 .

Olivares v. NASA

934 F. Supp. 698 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 15, 1996

But employees who file EEO complaints are not immune from decisions affecting their working conditions, including for example, as the present case illustrates, reprimands for making threats to co-workers and being subject … So long as they were not practicing illicit discrimination — and clearly they were not — they had a right to relocate his office, to assign or not assign him to various work projects, and to reprimand him when, as here, he

BROWN BY BROWN v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc.

997 F. Supp. 661 · District Court, D. Maryland · Jan 20, 1998

The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate clearly that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barwick v. … In the former, “day-to-day decisions regarding care... necessarily will be made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons.” Id. at 323 n. 30.

Williams v. Morgan State University

District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 26, 2021

Courts in Maryland apply a two-part test to determine whether sovereign immunity applies in a specific case: “(1) whether the entity asserting immunity qualifies for its protection; and, if so, (2) whether the legislature … The terms of § 12-104(a)(1) are clearly limited to tort actions. Additionally, § 12-104 is entitled, “Waiver of State tort immunity.” Neither of Ms.

DiVivo v. Egger

601 F. Supp. 1259 · District Court, D. Maryland · Dec 28, 1984

.); but did not meet the standards subsequently established by the Supreme Court on June 30, 1983 in United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 , 103 S.Ct. 3164 , 77 L.Ed.2d 785 (1983), and United States v. … The threshold inquiry of whether a case is one of first impression is clearly intended to focus on the Supreme Court’s prior precedent (see Solem v.

Saul v. State

6 Md. App. 540 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 22, 1969

The communication to the jury was clearly as to the law on responsibility for criminal conduct and thus was an instruction. … The lower court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, found that he was qualified as an expert psychologist.

Gillespie v. United States

District Court, D. Maryland · Jul 30, 2024

“Once service has been contested, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the validity of service pursuant to Rule 4.” Id. … Rule 12(b)(1) – The FSHCAA, FTCA, and Sovereign Immunity “[T]he FSHCAA ‘essentially makes the U.S. government the medical malpractice insurer for qualifying . . . health centers, their officers, employees,

Stephens v. Dixon

30 Md. App. 56 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Jan 28, 1976

Clearly, there was conflicting testimony on the issue and, accordingly, the trial judge correctly denied appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. … , under this standard, he is already required to establish negligence with respect to such falsity.”

Conyers v. State

115 Md. App. 114 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Apr 2, 1997

One must first be an “accused” and then be placed at a “critical stage” to qualify. Neither situation alone will suffice. … It is presumably the propriety of that ruling at the suppression hearing that the appellant now raises before us, although his procedural focus is by no means clearly differentiated.

Maryland Attorney General Opinion 99OAG171

Maryland Attorney General Reports · Dec 5, 2014

After the bidders are qualified, however, the P3 statute specifically authorizes more extensive dialogue between the agency and qualified bidders: (2) After a bidder is qualified and at any time before … From this standpoint, a P3 would seem to qualify as procurement.

Ellis v. Ellis

19 Md. App. 361 · Court of Special Appeals of Maryland · Nov 23, 1973

Litigants in a child custody proceeding, as in all judicial proceedings, are entitled to have their cause determined ultimately by a duly qualified judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. Md. Const., Art. … After all, it has long been established that the State, under our form of government, stands in its relationship to minors as parens patriae. See Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 236 Md. 548 ; also 67 C.J.S.

Giles v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan

925 F. Supp. 2d 700 · District Court, D. Maryland · Nov 20, 2012

In addition, the 2007-08 amendments to the Plan established a “Window Period,” between April 1 and July 31, 2008. … He insists that “the Plan clearly disregarded its fiduciary duties to him and made a decision to serve [its] own interests.” Id.

Evening News Co. v. Bowie

154 Md. 604 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Apr 4, 1928

In some jurisdictions it is held that when the justification is not fully established the circumstances may be considered in mitigation of damages.” … If Judge Moss had made the charge or hint of corruption, the appellant would have been protected by its qualified privilege.

Poole v. State

295 Md. 167 · Court of Appeals of Maryland · Jan 7, 1983

Clearly, Poole’s conviction for the murder of Horad cannot stand. … In our opinion in Poole I, supra, we clearly expressed our views with respect to counsel’s argument to the jury concerning appellate review of a death sentence.

In Re Goldschein

244 B.R. 595 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland · Feb 10, 2000

The act intended to insure that “disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation and administration of such plans...” Id. … It is clearly a plan governed by ERISA and contains the anti-alienation language mandated by that statute and by the Internal Revenue Code. 9 In addition, as drafted and published to the Internal Revenue Service, it has been