Case law

Johnson v. State

721 N.E.2d 327 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1999

Specifically, Johnson argues that the evidence does not establish that he had repeated or continuing contact with the victim nor does it establish that the victim felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. … To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be a clear and substantial blatant violation of basic and elementary principles that renders the trial unfair to the defendant. Townsend v.

League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita

915 N.E.2d 151 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 17, 2009

The League acknowledged that, pursuant to 140 Indiana Administrative Code § 7-4-8, Indiana offers free identification to qualified voters who are able to establish their residence and identity by way of an original or certified … It creates a preference, and establishes an inequality among a class of citizens all of who are equally meritorious.

Peavler v. BD. OF COM'RS MONROE CTY.

528 N.E.2d 40 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 9, 1988

Immunity may be established by government defendants who can show that the challenged decision was discretionary because it resulted from a policy oriented decision-making process. … The defendants here seek to establish the defense of immunity. Each bears the burden to show that a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and benefits, took place.

Greathouse v. Armstrong

616 N.E.2d 364 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 24, 1993

"The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by the conscious balancing of risks and benefits." … The immunity provided the performance of discretionary functions in I.C. § 34-4-16.5-8(6) does not shield the Sheriff's Department from liability for conduct associated with implementation of its established policies.

Williams v. HISSONG

679 F. Supp. 2d 954 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Dec 22, 2009

Qualified immunity is intended to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. … The rationale behind this is “[i]f the law did not put the [defendant] on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate.”

City of Tell City v. Noble

489 N.E.2d 958 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 1986

In Mills, supra, where the city established a park and equipped it accordingly, the court held that the decision to establish the park and equip it was a discretionary function, but once it opted to do so, the city had a … As seen in Cataldi, the act of establishing a fire department did not exhaust the city's discretion, but rather discretion flowed into many aspects of the fire department.

State Election Board v. Bartolomei

434 N.E.2d 74 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 19, 1982

The burden is upon those who challenge its validity to make any constitutional defect clearly apparent. … since their terms do not prevent application of their provisions to any county that may eventually qualify.

Ray v. State Election Board

422 N.E.2d 714 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1981

The Court further finds that the action of the Election Board was not contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity. … When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest....

Bostic v. Pence

District Court, N.D. Indiana · Jan 23, 2023

claim qualified immunity; so long as they have not violated a ‘clearly established’ right, they are shielded from personal liability.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. … Step Two: Clearly Established Law The second element of the qualified immunity test requires that the constitutional right at issue be “clearly established.”

Cole Ex Rel. Cole v. Greenfield-Central Community Schools

657 F. Supp. 56 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 5, 1986

Maxwell, (teacher): It is quite well-settled that all of these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 suit. Wood v. … plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Molly Ann Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Board

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 14, 2020

The Defendants asserted two kinds of immunity: absolute quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity. … is that qualified immunity, not quasi-judicial immunity, applies.” Id. at 36.

Fortenberry v. Board of School Trustees

149 F. Supp. 2d 542 · District Court, N.D. Indiana · Nov 28, 2000

If she is not qualified for any reason, then she falls short of establishing a prima facie case, and there is no inference of discrimination. Id. … Because the issue of whether the Defendants believed Meyers to be more qualified than the Plaintiff is crucial both to establishing the fourth element of the Plaintiffs prima facie case and to establishing pretext, the Court

Board of Com'rs of Delaware County v. Briggs

167 Ind. App. 96 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 3, 1975

We believe that this is a reference to the generally established requirements for personal governmental immunity protection. … The issue was clearly before the jury, and the instruction was properly given.

Penny v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development

852 N.E.2d 954 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 18, 2006

We noted the statement made to the Employment Security Department was, by statute, protected by a qualified privilege. Id. at 1175 (citing Ind.Code § 22-4-17-9). We affirmed summary judgment for How-met. … To be eligible for unemployment benefits an individual must establish wage credits in a specified amount during a specified period, Ind.Code § 22-4-14-5; the amount of wage credits determines the weekly benefit.

Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden

524 N.E.2d 1306 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 1988

This section clearly and unambiguously prohibits the disclosure of the determinations of, and communications to a peer review committee, subject to specified exceptions. … Basden has not established a prima fa-cie showing of fraud. No misrepresentation of fact by THRH or its peer review committee has been shown to exist.

Hartman v. Keri

858 N.E.2d 1017 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 2006

Absolute privilege or immunity in the judicial setting is well-established in Indiana law. See, eg., H.B. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 300 , 302 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. denied. … Qualified privilege or immunity also is well-established in Indiana law. Ind. Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied.

Williams v. R.H. Marlin, Inc.

656 N.E.2d 1145 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 1995

Essentially, Hutchi-son is attempting to claim immunities under the Act without establishing that he was in fact an employee of Centin. … Therefore, having failed to establish the existence of the requisite employer-employee relationship, Hutchison is not entitled to immunity under the Act's fellow-employee exemption and Williams is not relegated to the Act

Miller v. Griesel

261 Ind. 604 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 22, 1974

Sovereign or governmental immunity is a *608 complete bar to an action which may be interposed by a government defendant and will prevent liability even in a situation where tortious conduct might otherwise be clearly established … A failure to plead and establish such a bar to a suit can be deemed a waiver.

Leo MacHine & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.

936 N.E.2d 855 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 12, 2010

The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by the conscious balancing of risk and benefits. Id. … However, based on the established case law, it is clear that the timing of the decision to use Anderson's excavator does not solely determine its immunity status; rather, the nature of the specific decision is equally important

State Ex Rel. Buttz v. Marion Circuit Court

225 Ind. 7 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 9, 1947

shall serve for two years or until their successors shall have been appointed and qualified. … As such duty to enter said so-called judgment was clearly mandatory, under the terms of the special improvement statute, it was a ministerial act.