Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co.

    414 Mass. 129 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 12, 1993

    Hence, these mental disturbances qualify as physical harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436A comment c (1965). … Both plaintiffs may attempt to establish at trial that they satisfied the physical manifestation requirement of Payton v.

    Cited 123 timesPublished
  • O'Neill v. School Committee

    464 Mass. 374 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 8, 2013

    If, however, the argument being advanced is that the town as a general matter is not bound to perform any contract executed solely by the school committee because the town itself is not a party, the argument clearly is without … pertinent part: “Notwithstanding the provision of any . . . law to the contrary, any city or town acting through its board of selectmen or city council or mayor with the approval of the city council, as the case may be, may establish

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Ciampa v. Bank of America

    88 Mass. App. Ct. 28 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 13, 2015

    The judge held that Jamie failed to establish that a mistake was made in the formation of the IRA. We review the propriety of that decision. … Mazzarella, 430 Mass. 248, 250 (1999) (trust language indicated settlor's intent to qualify for marital deduction); Grassian v.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • First National Bank of Boston v. Attorney General

    371 Mass. 773 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Feb 1, 1977

    Although the plaintiffs hold these views, the record does not establish that these views are supported in fact. … A corporation, we have held, is not a ‘citizen’ within *784 the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause. [Citation omitted.]

    Reversed on other grounds by First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation v. United States Postal Service

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 27, 2023

    That mandatory arbitration procedure “would conflict with the administrative arrangement established in the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 490 F. … Mass. 2021) (“[T]he FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for claims for money damages.”). IV.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Massachusetts v. Bartel (In Re Bartel)

    403 B.R. 173 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 13, 2009

    M.G.L. ch. 93A, § 4 clearly establishes the Attorney General’s right to bring such actions. 3 This right applies even if a company has ceased its unfair practices. Lowell Gas Co. v. … ch. 12, § 10 also invests the Attorney General with authority to take note of violations of the law and take appropriate action. 4 Nor does the Commonwealth had to have litigated those claims prior to the bankruptcy to qualify

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Board of License Commissioners

    387 Mass. 833 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 5, 1983

    Noting that a trial judge’s findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974), we summarize the facts as found by the judge. … There was evidence before the commissioners that the area had a large number of establishments selling beer and wine, and that the public did not need an additional establishment.

    Cited 14 timesPublished
  • Commonwealth v. Olivares

    30 Mass. App. Ct. 596 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 16, 1991

    This omission is not fatal where the ultimate conclusion is clearly evident from the record and implicit in the denial of the motion. See Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 392 Mass. 583 , 586 n.2 (1984). … “To qualify as exigent circumstances, the situation facing the officers at the time they commenced their warrantless search must be such that it was impracticable for them to get a warrant.” Commonwealth v.

    Cited 43 timesPublished
  • Custody of Vaughn

    422 Mass. 590 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · May 7, 1996

    The Probate Court’s findings clearly acknowledge that fact. … A qualified clinical psychologist with experience in family matters will, as Dr.

    Cited 100 timesPublished
  • In re Lupron Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation

    228 F.R.D. 75 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 12, 2005

    An attorney appearing for Robert Swanston, the class representative in the Arizona action, argued that the release given to TAP might conceivably be interpreted as immunizing other pharmaceutical companies which Swanston … It has always been the law that a legally immune party may be part of an actionable conspiracy. 37 See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15-21 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980).

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • MacLaurin v. City of Holyoke

    475 Mass. 231 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 18, 2016

    Accordingly, establishing that an existing residential building has undergone modifications significant enough to qualify as "major alterations" is not sufficient to show that the building has been substantially rehabilitated … MacLaurin contends that such a hearing was necessary to establish an acceptable record for review on appeal, based on written findings of fact and a clearly articulated rationale for the decision made.

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • McNiff v. Town of Dracut

    433 F. Supp. 2d 145 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 30, 2006

    Here, the defendant has clearly articulated a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Lt. Richardson was promoted over McNiff for a multitude of reasons: Lt. … Crowley American Transport, *157 Inc., 206 F.Supp.2d 279, 290 (D.P.R., 2002) (holding that an employee failed to establish discrimination when his employer chose to promote other more-qualified employees) (citing Santiago

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • City Welding & Manufacturing Co. v. Gidley-Eschenheimer Corp.

    16 Mass. App. Ct. 372 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Jul 18, 1983

    Not only was the causal relationship established, but we think the quantification of profits was not so speculative or uncertain as to preclude their recovery. See Neal v. … The implicit findings of the judge that GE was legally liable to Fontaine and that the amount of the judgment was reasonable were not clearly erroneous. 4. Oral statements.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Beechin v. United States Mineral Products Co.

    8 Mass. L. Rptr. 252 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 10, 1998

    The Supreme Judicial Court clearly stated that “either the insurer or the employee, but not both, may *254 file suit.” Pinto, 418 Mass. at 498 . … Benton, 356 Mass. 444 (1969) (court bound by stipulations of immunity signed by Attorney General); Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co.

    364 Mass. 153 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 10, 1973

    In fact the wife’s right for the “intentional” invasions had been earlier established in Massachusetts on broader grounds of policy. Nolin v. … Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v.

    Cited 133 timesPublished
  • Champa v. Weston Public Schools

    473 Mass. 86 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 23, 2015

    The agreements qualify as "education records" under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. … Their disagreement is over the question whether the agreements qualify as "student record[s]" under these regulations.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • United States v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc.

    591 F. Supp. 2d 116 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2008

    It is unlikely, however, that a physician could establish a practice without completing a residency program. 3 Id. … ‘qualified tuition and related expenses.’ ” 26 U.S.C. § 117 (b)(1).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • A.T. v. C.R.

    Massachusetts Appeals Court · Oct 16, 2015

    The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that each of the three qualifying acts was maliciously intended, defined by G. … The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that each of the three qualifying acts was maliciously intended, defined by G.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • McDermott v. Board of Appeals

    59 Mass. App. Ct. 457 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Sep 30, 2003

    Our court held otherwise, holding that “[u]nder § 6, issuance alone qualifies a special permit as a prior nonconforming use. . . . … [Section 6] clearly establishes that issuance of a special permit marks the beginning of protection as a prior nonconforming use from subsequent zoning changes.” Id. at 118-119.

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • Callender v. Marsh

    18 Mass. 418 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 15, 1823

    and that while the work was proceeding, as soon as a third surveyor had been appointed and qualified, his concurrence was also obtained. … We have only to look at our statutes, and we think they explicitly and clearly give the power to the surveyors, which was exercised by the defendant in the case before us.

    Cited 6 timesPublished

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