Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
6,734 results
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Nascimento v. Harvard Community Health Plan, Inc.
7 Mass. L. Rptr. 572 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Sep 26, 1997
Nascimento, and to other participants in its health plan, by purchasing memberships for them in HCHP, a federally qualified HMO that is independent of Harvard University. … Although an action for specific performance clearly is an action designed to enforce contractual rights, so too is an action for damages flowing from an alleged contractual breach.
Cited 0 timesPublished420 Mass. 771 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 17, 1995
Even if the judge had made a finding of impropriety, that finding would have been clearly erroneous. … Hood’s testimony established that the defendant had a motive to kill the victim. She further established that he had threatened the victim.
Cited 67 timesPublishedWingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp.
385 Mass. 402 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1982
. *405 The report clearly constituted hearsay evidence, and just as clearly was admitted in evidence by the judge on two grounds: that it was an inconsistent prior statement of the plaintiff, and was a business record within … On the other hand, a document which qualified as a business record would not be admissible to establish a statement of opinion contained in it. Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 393 (1980). Contrast Fed. R.
Cited 71 timesPublishedUnited States Jaycees v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
391 Mass. 594 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1984
Associate membership is available to persons (including women, and men over thirty-five) and to businesses that are not qualified to be individual members. … Jaycees clearly does not fall within this characterization: all of the events that the organization promotes are open to the public, men and women alike. Whatever the wisdom of the U.S.
Cited 38 timesPublished395 Mass. 715 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Aug 21, 1985
Clearly, therefore, the judge properly could have excluded the contents of Schur’s affidavit in considering the motion. However, the defendants did not move to strike the improper portions of Schur’s affidavit. … The affidavits in this action, however, establish “that the Monitor is itself a religious activity of a religious organization, albeit one with a recognized position and an established reputation in the secular community.
Cited 273 timesPublishedDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 14, 2024
Qualified Immunity Finally, the DOC Defendants seek qualified immunity based on a four-sentence argument that, merely recites the standard and claims that qualified immunity … Here, DOC Defendants’ cursory qualified immunity argument does not prove “the existence of circumstances sufficient to bring the [qualified] immunity defense into play” on summary judgment.
Cited 0 timesUnknownPinti v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc.
472 Mass. 226 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 17, 2015
As the court observed in Chace , this is not always an easy question to answer: “The distinction between the two classes of cases [void and voidable] has not been very clearly defined, and the *241 decisions in the different … Paragraph 22 qualifies as a nonuniform covenant because some States have judicial foreclosure systems while others, including Massachusetts, offer a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure.
Cited 96 timesPublished460 Mass. 255 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jul 29, 2011
“We accept the judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but independently apply constitutional principles to the facts found.” Commonwealth v. Simon, supra at 296 . … A judge has broad discretion to decide whether a particular statement qualifies as an excited utterance. Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 296 , cert. denied, 131 S.
Cited 17 timesPublishedWE Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. BENEFIRST, LLC
661 F. Supp. 2d 37 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 2009
These plans provide medical benefits to qualifying employees of the Aubuchon entities. The plans are covered by ERISA. … If correct, this line of reasoning would essentially leave BeneFirst immune from suit. Aubuchon contends that BeneFirst cannot have it both ways.
Cited 6 timesPublishedNextEra Energy Resources, LLC v. Department of Public Utilities
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Sep 3, 2020
the delivery of qualified shortfall energy. … Clean Energy Generation Units" are electricity generating facilities "capable of producing Qualified Clean Energy, or Qualified Shortfall Energy"; and both "Qualified Clean Energy" and "Qualified Shortfall Energy" are
Cited 0 timesPublishedSherter v. Ross Fialkow Capital Partners, LLP
31 Mass. L. Rptr. 98 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 4, 2013
Ross’s name along with Fialkow’s appeared at the bottom of the investment letter, which both men clearly intended to be used as a solicitation. … Ross protests, however, that as a limited partner, he is immune from liability. The argument mistakes the rules laid down in both the Partnership Act and MUSA.
Cited 0 timesPublished542 F. Supp. 2d 141 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2008
To establish a claim under 151B, § 4(16), DeCaro must prove: (1) [he] is handicapped within the meaning of the statute; (2)[he] is a ‘qualified handicapped person’ (meaning that, notwithstanding the handicap, [he] can perform … Though it concedes that DeCaro is a handicapped individual, Hasbro argues that it is entitled to summary-judgment because, on the record before the court, Plaintiff cannot establish (1) that he was a “qualified handicapped
Cited 3 timesPublishedHarris v. Commissioner of Correction
409 Mass. 472 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 6, 1991
Again, however, although the regulations provide inmates subject to a disciplinary hearing with a qualified right to call witnesses, see 103 Code Mass. … The cases clearly are distinguishable.
Cited 20 timesPublishedBoespflug v. Community Housing Resource, Inc.
24 Mass. L. Rptr. 547 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Oct 11, 2007
To qualify for inclusion in the Affordable Rental Housing Overlay District, the proposed buildings and pavement may not cover more than 25% of the area of the entire parcel. 30.6.B(3) Parking. … General Laws c. 40A, §9 requires the Board, to make “a detailed record of its proceedings” and to “set[ ] forth clearly the reason for its decision.”
Cited 0 timesPublished600 F. Supp. 2d 242 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 2008
Crohn’s disease is clearly a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g. Nesser v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir.1998). … Thus, plaintiff qualifies as “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. *254 2.
Cited 12 timesPublishedHickey v. Commissioner of Public Welfare
38 Mass. App. Ct. 259 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 16, 1995
To qualify as loans, however, there needed to be a document, signed by the borrower and expressing the borrower’s intent to repay. Ibid. … Hickey’s catalog of failings harp on such matters as a failure to distinguish clearly betwen SSI and SSDI and whether Hickey ever said that motels were a satisfactory place to live (she did not).
Cited 13 timesPublished429 Mass. 241 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 22, 1999
States must establish a schedule of reimbursement rates for Medicaid covered services. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13). … QMBs, in turn, fall into two groups: those who are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid (“pure” QMBs) and those whose level of financial need is so great as to qualify them for Medicaid (“dual eligibles”).
Cited 13 timesPublishedBoston Bicycle Couriers, Inc. v. Deputy Director of the Division of Employment & Training
56 Mass. App. Ct. 473 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 18, 2002
To establish the latter and qualify under the § 2(c) independent contractor standard, the insignia must be that of a freestanding, independent entrepreneurial business in which the worker has a proprietary interest. … Thus, a driver’s ‘business’ was not established ‘independently’ of AFM.
Cited 23 timesPublished387 Mass. 730 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 14, 1982
[Thus], the instructions do not clearly place on the Commonwealth the duty to prove the presence of malice beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Richards, 384 Mass. 396, 402-404 (1981). … It is the “lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the presumption,” which makes it possible for a reasonable jury to interpret the presumption as burden-shifting, and hence invalid. Sandstrom v.
Cited 9 timesPublished52 F. Supp. 3d 149 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 26, 2014
Therefore, Grenier must establish "good cause” for the amendment. Cruz v. … Additionally, it is not necessary for me to address Defendants’ assertion that the individual Defendants, i.e., the Board Members, are entitled to qualified immunity.
Cited 0 timesPublished
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