Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Doe v. City of Northampton

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 6, 2023

    Additionally, qualified immunity stands as a further barrier to successfully litigating § 1983 claims. … “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • United States v. Sisson

    297 F. Supp. 902 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 1, 1969

    Similar views are held by reasonable men who are qualified experts. The testimony of Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University and Professor Howard Zinn of Boston University is sufficient proof. See also Ralph B. … There have been suggestions that to read the Constitution as granting an exemption from combat duty in a foreign campaign will immunize from public regulation all acts or refusals to act dictated by religious or conscientious

    Cited 53 timesPublished
  • B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor

    325 Mass. 201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 5, 1950

    Reading the third clause in the light of established principles of construction, we are of opinion that it manifests an intention to include after-born grandchildren. The will is inartificially drawn. … At the outset the third clause makes a gift of income to “my grandchildren” with no limiting or qualifying words.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Tanner v. Board of Appeals

    61 Mass. App. Ct. 647 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Aug 18, 2004

    To support their application, the plaintiffs argued that their operation qualifies as a hospital within the meaning of the zoning bylaw. … the case involved a challenge to the validity of a provision of the by-law prohibiting retail use of the plaintiff’s land; any discussion of uses falling within the agricultural category was unrelated to the holding and clearly

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries, Inc.

    407 Mass. 675 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jun 14, 1990

    (c) If the answer to question (b) above is yes, what considerations. ought this Court employ in determining which events qualify as ‘sudden’?” Acushnet River, 725 F. Supp. at 1279 . … Ct. 316 , . . . clearly sets forth the procedure which an insurer with a duty to defend must follow to bring that duty to an end.

    Cited 129 timesPublished
  • Taft v. Commonwealth

    158 Mass. 526 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 3, 1893

    The only ground stated for the objection in the first two instances, and seemingly the only one in the last, although that is not quite so clear, was that the witness was not qualified to state his opinion. … Sts. c. 49, § 31,) and to establish it against and in favor of all the world, by a proceeding to which all interested are parties.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • MacDonough v. Board of Directors

    28 Mass. App. Ct. 538 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Apr 23, 1990

    But as the commercial space involved was actually space in the basement which hardly qualified for retail business, Antonelli asked the plaintiff for further substantiation. … But the case in the plaintiff’s own light does not fall within the established public policy categories above described.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Islam v. Option One Mortgage Corp.

    432 F. Supp. 2d 181 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 2006

    The second category is clearly inapplicable here, and as this discussion will shortly indicate, Sections 1681t(b) and 1681h(e) are not in irreconcilable conflict. … “Section 1681h(e) suggests not that Congress has limited actions brought in all areas regulated by the FCRA but that defendants will have qualified immunity from actions based on information disclosed pursuant to certain

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co.

    356 F. Supp. 2d 6 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 2005

    Here, the defendants assert that it was “vexatious” and “unjustified” for the plaintiffs to continue the litigation after the claim construction pointed clearly to non-infringement. … But whether under that law one feature of a device qualifies as, for example, “insubstantially different” from a claim element ordinarily calls for an evaluative judgment that depends heavily on the context of the particular

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Brundige v. Todd

    29 Mass. L. Rptr. 188 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Nov 16, 2011

    The unrebutted presumption by itself establishes standing. That is enough, but there is more. … Whatever the reason for the prior owners’ mortgage on only two of three lots and their subsequent default, it would be perverse to adopt a rule of standing that immunizes the resulting non-conformities from challenge by the

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Aristocratic Restaurant of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission

    374 Mass. 547 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 3, 1978

    This is clearly not the case, as a few examples will demonstrate. … The plaintiffs clearly and forcefully advance the over-breadth argument at several points in their brief and reply brief.

    Cited 29 timesPublished
  • Shoolman v. Health Facilities Appeals Board

    10 Mass. App. Ct. 799 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Dec 11, 1980

    Were we to read into § 25E the standing requirements argued by the defendants, it would severely qualify the otherwise clear language of § 25G. … The plaintiffs argue that this study is clearly mandated by the statute. We find no support for this argument. General Laws c.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Gallagher v. Park West Bank and Trust Co.

    921 F. Supp. 867 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 27, 1996

    The 1978 Plan also established a mechanism by which it could be amended. … Finally, several of the IRS letters clearly stated that “[a]n employer who adopts this plan will be considered to have a plan qualified under Code section 401(a)____” See, e.g., Defendant’s Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Boston Police Department v. Chaves

    29 Mass. L. Rptr. 453 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Mar 1, 2012

    Scott] but was still acutely anxious and unable to answer even simple questions clearly or directly. … Under established case law, the city bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it had such a reason.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, LLC

    245 F.R.D. 38 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 6, 2007

    BACKGROUND This case involves the administration of qualified benefits plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 , et seq. W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. … have clearly established good cause for re- *45 quiring BeneFirst to produce the requested information.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Parker v. D'Avolio

    40 Mass. App. Ct. 394 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · May 6, 1996

    First was his contention that the defendants denied liability when they “clearly knew they were liable.” … Indeed, neither negligence nor knowledge of the risk is required to establish liability under G. L. c. 111, § 199. See Bencosme v. Kokoras, 400 Mass. 40, 43 (1987).

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

    445 Mass. 745 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 13, 2006

    L. c. 66, § 10. 4 The Crimson’s complaint was properly dismissed. 5 The purpose of rule 12 (b) (6) is to permit prompt resolution of a case where the allegations in the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff’s claim … The qualified officer also shall submit to the department of State police, on a monthly basis, a report setting forth all felonies that have occurred within the jurisdiction of the college or university during the previous

    Cited 116 timesPublished
  • TI Federal Credit Union v. Delbonis (In Re Delbonis)

    183 B.R. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 7, 1995

    The court concluded: Clearly, credit unions are different from banks and not in direct competition with each other as suggested by the Sinclair-Ganos court since banks do not have the same geographical limitations and restrictions … In order to deal with these problems, Congress authorized the establishment of federal credit unions. S.Rep. No. 555, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Stone Cranberry Corp. v. Foster-Miller, Inc.

    411 F. Supp. 2d 10 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 18, 2006

    If the answer to this second question is yes, the discretionary function exception applies and the United States is immune from suit. … The undisputed facts show that that “somewhere” was the Air Force’s Environmental Restoration Account, established by statute at 10 U.S.C. § 2703 (a)(4).

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Upham v. Parker

    220 Mass. 454 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Mar 2, 1915

    The plaintiff Thomas Upham was duly appointed and qualified as executor and trustee under the will in May, 1871. The testator’s widow, Harriet M. … appears from the will, is well established.

    Cited 7 timesPublished

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