Case law

Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manufacturing Co.

94 Mass. 298 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 15, 1866

a franchise; and that such aggregate value represents not merely the corporate property, but also the rights, privileges, immunities and benefits of the corporate organization constituting the franchise. … If therefore the mode of valuation tends at all to establish the position that this is a property tax, it tends also to show it to be a tax, not upon the property of the corporation, but rather upon the property of the individual

Community-Suffolk, Inc. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad

475 F. Supp. 443 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 1979

Clearly therefore, although Congress chose to harmonize the geographical boundaries of the United States districts with state borders it need not have done so. … Thus, for purposes of establishing jurisdiction pursuant to the Massachusetts Long Arm Statute, the activities of connecting carriers within Massachusetts are not attributable to the defendant and plaintiff must establish

DeMayo v. Quinn

87 Mass. App. Ct. 115 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Feb 24, 2015

Here, the uncontested evidence, as captured on video 2 A relationship between the parties is not required to qualify for a c. 258E harassment prevention order; the same is not true for abuse prevention orders … Given the judge's findings, which we will not disturb on appeal unless clearly erroneous, Millennium Equity Holdings, LLC v.

Crocker v. Townsend Oil Co.

464 Mass. 1 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 17, 2012

The plaintiffs each signed a contract carrier agreement with Townsend that established the terms of their relationships. … On the one hand, it might suggest that Townsend itself was unaware that plaintiffs might actually qualify as employees.

Voigt v. City of Medford

22 Mass. L. Rptr. 122 · Massachusetts Superior Court · Jan 30, 2007

Carr stated that certain unidentified people in the community did not want a tattoo establishment in Medford Square. … Section 94-148 requires all body art establishments to seek a special permit from the city council to conduct business.

Finigan v. Burwell

189 F. Supp. 3d 201 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 19, 2016

To treat her diabetes, Finigan’s physician “established a blood glucose testing regimen requiring the use of a [CGMS,]” Id. at 0062 . … The sole issue with regard to Finigan’s appeal is whether her CGMS supplies qualify as “durable medical equipment.”

In Re Boston Regional Medical Center

256 B.R. 212 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 2000

The Debtor does not contend that it does, and the obligation clearly is not discretionary. … To qualify as an administrative expense, a claim must be incurred by the estate.

Commonwealth v. Williams

364 Mass. 145 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Oct 3, 1973

From any standpoint we would establish a potentially mischievous precedent if we were to honor the argument. … This questionnaire clearly met the total requirements of the Miranda rule.

Commonwealth v. Lahti

398 Mass. 829 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Dec 18, 1986

The judge further found that “[t]he Commonwealth clearly did not ‘coerce’ the children to testify. … Equally well-established precepts qualify this sweeping exclusionary principle, however.

Gray v. Patriot Bank (In re Newbury Cafe, Inc.)

80 B.R. 259 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 21, 1987

United States, 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir.1986). 1 The Fourth Circuit found that the language of section 506(b) established a distinction between interest and the other claims that could be made by an oversecured creditor: The … Though Congress could have more clearly separated the interest clause from the agreement clause, we think that the natural meaning of its chosen words is to permit postpetition interest on noncon-sensual oversecured claims

Commonwealth v. Sheppard

313 Mass. 590 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 26, 1943

Holt, who qualified as a psychiatrist and who had examined Sheppard on three occasions subsequently to January 1, 1942. … There was no error in the admission of this testimony by a duly qualified psychiatrist who had examined Sheppard.

Marcoux v. Attorney General

375 Mass. 63 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Apr 19, 1978

As to the last danger, the difficulty or impossibility of testing drivers for marihuana intoxication could be thought to justify a ban on the substance rather than a qualified regulation of it. … The menace to health and safety is clearly not as grave as was once supposed and, some would say, is minor compared to the dangers of a number of substances not controlled or banned. See J.

Prenaveau v. Prenaveau

81 Mass. App. Ct. 479 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Mar 26, 2012

However, the mother has also clearly established a lengthy track record of paying attention to and attending to the needs of the children. … In a bench trial credibility is “quintessentially the domain of the trial judge [so that his] assessment is close to immune from reversal on appeal except on the most compelling of showings.” Johnston v.

Alvarez v. Worcester

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 2, 2022

Nonetheless, McKiernan is entitled to qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability for constitutional violations when the constitutional right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Gilk v.

Hollingworth v. Beneficial Massachusetts, Inc. (In Re Hollingworth)

453 B.R. 32 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 27, 2011

TILA establishes an 8% threshold before a loan qualifies as a high-cost home loan rather than the 5% threshold established by Chapter 183C. … As the regulation clearly indicates, however, if a creditor is a federally chartered institution, such as Key ban k, its transactions in Massachusetts are not exempt from TILA.

Al-Abbas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

52 F. Supp. 3d 288 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2014

Durand treated her for chronic fatigue and immune deficiency syndrome. In February 2010, Al-Abbas reported increased symptoms, much worse than those she had experienced prior to this period. … On April 17, 2012, the Social Security Administration approved Al-Abbas’s claim for disability benefits, establishing a disability date of February 27, 2010. H.

Boulet v. Cellucci

107 F. Supp. 2d 61 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 2000

Enforceable Right —Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . … The statute was intended to prevent the States from denying benefits, even temporarily, to a person who has been found fully qualified for aid. Jefferson v.

Commonwealth v. Clark

65 Mass. App. Ct. 39 · Massachusetts Appeals Court · Nov 2, 2005

To qualify as ‘reasonable,’ the officer’s suspicion ‘must be based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’ … We cannot say on this record that the judge was clearly wrong to base no findings on this, at best, highly ambiguous testimony.

Doe v. City of Northampton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 6, 2023

Additionally, qualified immunity stands as a further barrier to successfully litigating § 1983 claims. … “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

B. M. C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Taylor

325 Mass. 201 · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · Jan 5, 1950

Reading the third clause in the light of established principles of construction, we are of opinion that it manifests an intention to include after-born grandchildren. The will is inartificially drawn. … At the outset the third clause makes a gift of income to “my grandchildren” with no limiting or qualifying words.